upstream: switch over to the new authorized_keys options API and

remove the legacy one.

Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state
between key file lines.

feedback and ok markus@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df

19 files changed, 767 insertions, 984 deletions

diff --git a/.depend b/.depend
index 4c6b49d54..0893a87ab 100644
--- a/.depend
+++ b/.depend
@@ -7,8 +7,7 @@ audit-linux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-c
 audit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h
 auth-bsdauth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h
 auth-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h xmalloc.h ssh.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h misc.h servconf.h uidswap.h key.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
-auth-options.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h key.h sshkey.h xmalloc.h match.h ssherr.h log.h canohost.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h misc.h channels.h servconf.h auth-options.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h
-auth-options.o: audit.h loginrec.h
+auth-options.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h sshkey.h match.h ssh2.h auth-options.h
 auth-pam.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h
 auth-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h misc.h servconf.h key.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h
 auth-rhosts.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h uidswap.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h key.h sshkey.h servconf.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
@@ -16,7 +15,7 @@ auth-shadow.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-c
 auth-sia.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h
 auth-skey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h
 auth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h xmalloc.h match.h groupaccess.h log.h misc.h servconf.h key.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h canohost.h uidswap.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
-auth.o: dispatch.h opacket.h authfile.h monitor_wrap.h ssherr.h compat.h
+auth.o: dispatch.h opacket.h authfile.h monitor_wrap.h ssherr.h compat.h channels.h
 auth2-chall.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h key.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h misc.h servconf.h
 auth2-gss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h
 auth2-hostbased.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h canohost.h
@@ -161,7 +160,7 @@ sshconnect.o: ssh2.h version.h authfile.h ssherr.h authfd.h
 sshconnect2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h key.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h
 sshconnect2.o: myproposal.h sshconnect.h authfile.h dh.h authfd.h log.h misc.h readconf.h match.h canohost.h msg.h pathnames.h uidswap.h hostfile.h ssherr.h utf8.h
 sshd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h misc.h match.h servconf.h uidswap.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h
-sshd.o: chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h key.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h myproposal.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h version.h ssherr.h
+sshd.o: chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h key.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h myproposal.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h auth-options.h version.h ssherr.h
 ssherr.o: ssherr.h
 sshkey-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h
 sshkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h buffer.h sshbuf.h crypto_api.h ssh2.h ssherr.h misc.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h sshkey-xmss.h match.h xmss_fast.h
diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
index 8b93b51e5..484e44b74 100644
--- a/auth-options.c
+++ b/auth-options.c
@@ -1,14 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.75 2018/03/03 03:06:02 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
- */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.76 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
@@ -39,649 +29,15 @@
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 
-#include "key.h"        /* XXX for typedef */
-#include "buffer.h"     /* XXX for typedef */
 #include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "match.h"
 #include "ssherr.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "packet.h"
 #include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "misc.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
 #include "sshkey.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-
-/* Flags set authorized_keys flags */
-int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
-int no_pty_flag = 0;
-int no_user_rc = 0;
-int key_is_cert_authority = 0;
-
-/* "command=" option. */
-char *forced_command = NULL;
-
-/* "environment=" options. */
-struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL;
-
-/* "tunnel=" option. */
-int forced_tun_device = -1;
-
-/* "principals=" option. */
-char *authorized_principals = NULL;
-
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/* XXX refactor to be stateless */
-
-void
-auth_clear_options(void)
-{
-        struct ssh *ssh = active_state;         /* XXX */
-
-        no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
-        no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
-        no_pty_flag = 0;
-        no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
-        no_user_rc = 0;
-        key_is_cert_authority = 0;
-        while (custom_environment) {
-                struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
-                custom_environment = ce->next;
-                free(ce->s);
-                free(ce);
-        }
-        free(forced_command);
-        forced_command = NULL;
-        free(authorized_principals);
-        authorized_principals = NULL;
-        forced_tun_device = -1;
-        channel_clear_permitted_opens(ssh);
-}
-
-/*
- * Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match
- * 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0
- * if negated option matches. 
- * If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to
- * point to the first character after the option and, if 'msg' is not NULL
- * then a message based on it added via auth_debug_add().
- */
-static int
-match_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, char **optsp, const char *msg)
-{
-        size_t opt_len = strlen(opt);
-        char *opts = *optsp;
-        int negate = 0;
-
-        if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) {
-                opts += 3;
-                negate = 1;
-        }
-        if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) {
-                *optsp = opts + opt_len;
-                if (msg != NULL) {
-                        auth_debug_add("%s %s.", msg,
-                            negate ? "disabled" : "enabled");
-                }
-                return negate ? 0 : 1;
-        }
-        return -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not.
- * side effect: sets key option flags
- * XXX remove side effects; fill structure instead.
- */
-int
-auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, const char *file,
-    u_long linenum)
-{
-        struct ssh *ssh = active_state;         /* XXX */
-        const char *cp;
-        int i, r;
-
-        /* reset options */
-        auth_clear_options();
-
-        if (!opts)
-                return 1;
-
-        while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
-                if ((r = match_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts, NULL)) != -1) {
-                        key_is_cert_authority = r;
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-                if ((r = match_flag("restrict", 0, &opts, NULL)) != -1) {
-                        auth_debug_add("Key is restricted.");
-                        no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
-                        no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
-                        no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
-                        no_pty_flag = 1;
-                        no_user_rc = 1;
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-                if ((r = match_flag("port-forwarding", 1, &opts,
-                    "Port forwarding")) != -1) {
-                        no_port_forwarding_flag = r != 1;
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-                if ((r = match_flag("agent-forwarding", 1, &opts,
-                    "Agent forwarding")) != -1) {
-                        no_agent_forwarding_flag = r != 1;
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-                if ((r = match_flag("x11-forwarding", 1, &opts,
-                    "X11 forwarding")) != -1) {
-                        no_x11_forwarding_flag = r != 1;
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-                if ((r = match_flag("pty", 1, &opts,
-                    "PTY allocation")) != -1) {
-                        no_pty_flag = r != 1;
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-                if ((r = match_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts,
-                    "User rc execution")) != -1) {
-                        no_user_rc = r != 1;
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-                cp = "command=\"";
-                if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-                        opts += strlen(cp);
-                        free(forced_command);
-                        forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-                        i = 0;
-                        while (*opts) {
-                                if (*opts == '"')
-                                        break;
-                                if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
-                                        opts += 2;
-                                        forced_command[i++] = '"';
-                                        continue;
-                                }
-                                forced_command[i++] = *opts++;
-                        }
-                        if (!*opts) {
-                                debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                free(forced_command);
-                                forced_command = NULL;
-                                goto bad_option;
-                        }
-                        forced_command[i] = '\0';
-                        auth_debug_add("Forced command.");
-                        opts++;
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-                cp = "principals=\"";
-                if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-                        opts += strlen(cp);
-                        free(authorized_principals);
-                        authorized_principals = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-                        i = 0;
-                        while (*opts) {
-                                if (*opts == '"')
-                                        break;
-                                if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
-                                        opts += 2;
-                                        authorized_principals[i++] = '"';
-                                        continue;
-                                }
-                                authorized_principals[i++] = *opts++;
-                        }
-                        if (!*opts) {
-                                debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                free(authorized_principals);
-                                authorized_principals = NULL;
-                                goto bad_option;
-                        }
-                        authorized_principals[i] = '\0';
-                        auth_debug_add("principals: %.900s",
-                            authorized_principals);
-                        opts++;
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-                cp = "environment=\"";
-                if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-                        char *s;
-                        struct envstring *new_envstring;
-
-                        opts += strlen(cp);
-                        s = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-                        i = 0;
-                        while (*opts) {
-                                if (*opts == '"')
-                                        break;
-                                if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
-                                        opts += 2;
-                                        s[i++] = '"';
-                                        continue;
-                                }
-                                s[i++] = *opts++;
-                        }
-                        if (!*opts) {
-                                debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                free(s);
-                                goto bad_option;
-                        }
-                        s[i] = '\0';
-                        opts++;
-                        if (options.permit_user_env) {
-                                auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: "
-                                    "%.900s", s);
-                                debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s);
-                                new_envstring = xcalloc(1,
-                                    sizeof(*new_envstring));
-                                new_envstring->s = s;
-                                new_envstring->next = custom_environment;
-                                custom_environment = new_envstring;
-                                s = NULL;
-                        }
-                        free(s);
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-                cp = "from=\"";
-                if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-                        const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
-                        const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(
-                            ssh, options.use_dns);
-                        char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-
-                        opts += strlen(cp);
-                        i = 0;
-                        while (*opts) {
-                                if (*opts == '"')
-                                        break;
-                                if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
-                                        opts += 2;
-                                        patterns[i++] = '"';
-                                        continue;
-                                }
-                                patterns[i++] = *opts++;
-                        }
-                        if (!*opts) {
-                                debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                free(patterns);
-                                goto bad_option;
-                        }
-                        patterns[i] = '\0';
-                        opts++;
-                        switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
-                            patterns)) {
-                        case 1:
-                                free(patterns);
-                                /* Host name matches. */
-                                goto next_option;
-                        case -1:
-                                debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid criteria",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
-                                    "invalid criteria", file, linenum);
-                                /* FALLTHROUGH */
-                        case 0:
-                                free(patterns);
-                                logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
-                                    "correct key but not from a permitted "
-                                    "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).",
-                                    pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip);
-                                auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
-                                    "permitted to use this key for login.",
-                                    remote_host);
-                                break;
-                        }
-                        /* deny access */
-                        return 0;
-                }
-                cp = "permitopen=\"";
-                if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-                        char *host, *p;
-                        int port;
-                        char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-
-                        opts += strlen(cp);
-                        i = 0;
-                        while (*opts) {
-                                if (*opts == '"')
-                                        break;
-                                if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
-                                        opts += 2;
-                                        patterns[i++] = '"';
-                                        continue;
-                                }
-                                patterns[i++] = *opts++;
-                        }
-                        if (!*opts) {
-                                debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing "
-                                    "end quote", file, linenum);
-                                free(patterns);
-                                goto bad_option;
-                        }
-                        patterns[i] = '\0';
-                        opts++;
-                        p = patterns;
-                        /* XXX - add streamlocal support */
-                        host = hpdelim(&p);
-                        if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
-                                debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen "
-                                    "specification <%.100s>", file, linenum,
-                                    patterns);
-                                auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
-                                    "Bad permitopen specification", file,
-                                    linenum);
-                                free(patterns);
-                                goto bad_option;
-                        }
-                        host = cleanhostname(host);
-                        if (p == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(p)) < 0) {
-                                debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen port "
-                                    "<%.100s>", file, linenum, p ? p : "");
-                                auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: "
-                                    "Bad permitopen port", file, linenum);
-                                free(patterns);
-                                goto bad_option;
-                        }
-                        if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0)
-                                channel_add_permitted_opens(ssh, host, port);
-                        free(patterns);
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-                cp = "tunnel=\"";
-                if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
-                        char *tun = NULL;
-                        opts += strlen(cp);
-                        tun = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
-                        i = 0;
-                        while (*opts) {
-                                if (*opts == '"')
-                                        break;
-                                tun[i++] = *opts++;
-                        }
-                        if (!*opts) {
-                                debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                free(tun);
-                                forced_tun_device = -1;
-                                goto bad_option;
-                        }
-                        tun[i] = '\0';
-                        forced_tun_device = a2tun(tun, NULL);
-                        free(tun);
-                        if (forced_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
-                                debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device",
-                                    file, linenum);
-                                forced_tun_device = -1;
-                                goto bad_option;
-                        }
-                        auth_debug_add("Forced tun device: %d", forced_tun_device);
-                        opts++;
-                        goto next_option;
-                }
-next_option:
-                /*
-                 * Skip the comma, and move to the next option
-                 * (or break out if there are no more).
-                 */
-                if (!*opts)
-                        fatal("Bugs in auth-options.c option processing.");
-                if (*opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
-                        break;          /* End of options. */
-                if (*opts != ',')
-                        goto bad_option;
-                opts++;
-                /* Process the next option. */
-        }
-
-        /* grant access */
-        return 1;
-
-bad_option:
-        logit("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
-            file, linenum, opts);
-        auth_debug_add("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s",
-            file, linenum, opts);
-
-        /* deny access */
-        return 0;
-}
-
-#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL        1
-#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS      2
-static int
-parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
-    u_int which, int crit,
-    int *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
-    int *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
-    int *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
-    int *cert_no_pty_flag,
-    int *cert_no_user_rc,
-    char **cert_forced_command,
-    int *cert_source_address_done)
-{
-        struct ssh *ssh = active_state;         /* XXX */
-        char *command, *allowed;
-        const char *remote_ip;
-        char *name = NULL;
-        struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL;
-        int r, ret = -1, result, found;
-
-        if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) {
-                error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
-                goto out;
-        }
-
-        while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) {
-                sshbuf_free(data);
-                data = NULL;
-                if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
-                    (r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) {
-                        error("Unable to parse certificate options: %s",
-                            ssh_err(r));
-                        goto out;
-                }
-                debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu",
-                    name, sshbuf_len(data));
-                found = 0;
-                if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) {
-                        if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
-                                *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
-                                found = 1;
-                        } else if (strcmp(name,
-                            "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) {
-                                *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
-                                found = 1;
-                        } else if (strcmp(name,
-                            "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) {
-                                *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
-                                found = 1;
-                        } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) {
-                                *cert_no_pty_flag = 0;
-                                found = 1;
-                        } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) {
-                                *cert_no_user_rc = 0;
-                                found = 1;
-                        }
-                }
-                if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) {
-                        if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
-                                if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command,
-                                    NULL)) != 0) {
-                                        error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
-                                            "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
-                                        goto out;
-                                }
-                                if (*cert_forced_command != NULL) {
-                                        error("Certificate has multiple "
-                                            "force-command options");
-                                        free(command);
-                                        goto out;
-                                }
-                                *cert_forced_command = command;
-                                found = 1;
-                        }
-                        if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
-                                if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed,
-                                    NULL)) != 0) {
-                                        error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
-                                            "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
-                                        goto out;
-                                }
-                                if ((*cert_source_address_done)++) {
-                                        error("Certificate has multiple "
-                                            "source-address options");
-                                        free(allowed);
-                                        goto out;
-                                }
-                                remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
-                                result = addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
-                                    allowed);
-                                free(allowed);
-                                switch (result) {
-                                case 1:
-                                        /* accepted */
-                                        break;
-                                case 0:
-                                        /* no match */
-                                        logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
-                                            "with valid certificate but not "
-                                            "from a permitted host "
-                                            "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
-                                            remote_ip);
-                                        auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
-                                            "is not permitted to use this "
-                                            "certificate for login.",
-                                            remote_ip);
-                                        goto out;
-                                case -1:
-                                default:
-                                        error("Certificate source-address "
-                                            "contents invalid");
-                                        goto out;
-                                }
-                                found = 1;
-                        }
-                }
-
-                if (!found) {
-                        if (crit) {
-                                error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" "
-                                    "is not supported", name);
-                                goto out;
-                        } else {
-                                logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" "
-                                    "is not supported", name);
-                        }
-                } else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) {
-                        error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt "
-                            "(extra data)", name);
-                        goto out;
-                }
-                free(name);
-                name = NULL;
-        }
-        /* successfully parsed all options */
-        ret = 0;
-
- out:
-        if (ret != 0 &&
-            cert_forced_command != NULL &&
-            *cert_forced_command != NULL) {
-                free(*cert_forced_command);
-                *cert_forced_command = NULL;
-        }
-        free(name);
-        sshbuf_free(data);
-        sshbuf_free(c);
-        return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Set options from critical certificate options. These supersede user key
- * options so this must be called after auth_parse_options().
- */
-int
-auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw, const char **reason)
-{
-        int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
-        int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
-        int cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
-        int cert_no_pty_flag = 1;
-        int cert_no_user_rc = 1;
-        char *cert_forced_command = NULL;
-        int cert_source_address_done = 0;
-
-        *reason = "invalid certificate options";
-
-        /* Separate options and extensions for v01 certs */
-        if (parse_option_list(k->cert->critical, pw,
-            OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
-            &cert_forced_command,
-            &cert_source_address_done) == -1)
-                return -1;
-        if (parse_option_list(k->cert->extensions, pw,
-            OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0,
-            &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
-            &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
-            &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
-            &cert_no_pty_flag,
-            &cert_no_user_rc,
-            NULL, NULL) == -1)
-                return -1;
-
-        no_port_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_port_forwarding_flag;
-        no_agent_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag;
-        no_x11_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag;
-        no_pty_flag |= cert_no_pty_flag;
-        no_user_rc |= cert_no_user_rc;
-        /*
-         * Only permit both CA and key option forced-command if they match.
-         * Otherwise refuse the certificate.
-         */
-        if (cert_forced_command != NULL && forced_command != NULL) {
-                if (strcmp(forced_command, cert_forced_command) == 0) {
-                        free(forced_command);
-                        forced_command = cert_forced_command;
-                } else {
-                        *reason = "certificate and key options forced command "
-                            "do not match";
-                        free(cert_forced_command);
-                        return -1;
-                }
-        } else if (cert_forced_command != NULL)
-                forced_command = cert_forced_command;
-        /* success */
-        *reason = NULL;
-        return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * authorized_keys options processing.
- */
 
 /*
  * Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match
diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
index 0dbfc325e..16871d754 100644
--- a/auth-options.h
+++ b/auth-options.h
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.24 2018/03/03 03:06:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.25 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- *                    All rights reserved
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
- * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
- * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
- * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
- * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
- * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
 #ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H
@@ -18,30 +22,6 @@
 struct passwd;
 struct sshkey;
 
-/* Linked list of custom environment strings */
-struct envstring {
-        struct envstring *next;
-        char   *s;
-};
-
-/* Flags that may be set in authorized_keys options. */
-extern int no_port_forwarding_flag;
-extern int no_agent_forwarding_flag;
-extern int no_x11_forwarding_flag;
-extern int no_pty_flag;
-extern int no_user_rc;
-extern char *forced_command;
-extern struct envstring *custom_environment;
-extern int forced_tun_device;
-extern int key_is_cert_authority;
-extern char *authorized_principals;
-
-int     auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, const char *, u_long);
-void    auth_clear_options(void);
-int     auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *, struct passwd *, const char **);
-
-/* authorized_keys options handling */
-
 /*
  * sshauthopt represents key options parsed from authorized_keys or
  * from certificate extensions/options.
diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
index de29c04c9..50d2073d7 100644
--- a/auth-pam.c
+++ b/auth-pam.c
@@ -1077,7 +1077,7 @@ do_pam_chauthtok(void)
 }
 
 void
-do_pam_session(void)
+do_pam_session(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
         debug3("PAM: opening session");
 
@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ do_pam_session(void)
                 sshpam_session_open = 1;
         else {
                 sshpam_session_open = 0;
-                disable_forwarding();
+                auth_restrict_session(ssh);
                 error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
                     pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
         }
diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h
index c47b442e4..419860745 100644
--- a/auth-pam.h
+++ b/auth-pam.h
@@ -25,10 +25,12 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 
+struct ssh;
+
 void start_pam(Authctxt *);
 void finish_pam(void);
 u_int do_pam_account(void);
-void do_pam_session(void);
+void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
 void do_pam_setcred(int );
 void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
 int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
diff --git a/auth-passwd.c b/auth-passwd.c
index 996c2cf71..6097fdd24 100644
--- a/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/auth-passwd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.45 2016/07/21 01:39:35 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.46 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -68,22 +68,15 @@ extern login_cap_t *lc;
 
 #define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN        1024
 
-void
-disable_forwarding(void)
-{
-        no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
-        no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
-        no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
-}
-
 /*
  * Tries to authenticate the user using password.  Returns true if
  * authentication succeeds.
  */
 int
-auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
 {
-        struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw;
+        Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+        struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
         int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
 #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
         static int expire_checked = 0;
@@ -128,9 +121,9 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
                         authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
         }
 #endif
-        result = sys_auth_passwd(authctxt, password);
+        result = sys_auth_passwd(ssh, password);
         if (authctxt->force_pwchange)
-                disable_forwarding();
+                auth_restrict_session(ssh);
         return (result && ok);
 }
 
@@ -170,19 +163,19 @@ warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as)
 }
 
 int
-sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
 {
-        struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+        Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
         auth_session_t *as;
         static int expire_checked = 0;
 
-        as = auth_usercheck(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
+        as = auth_usercheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
             (char *)password);
         if (as == NULL)
                 return (0);
         if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) {
                 auth_close(as);
-                disable_forwarding();
+                auth_restrict_session(ssh);
                 authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
                 return (1);
         } else {
@@ -195,8 +188,9 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
 }
 #elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
 int
-sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
 {
+        Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
         struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
         char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
 
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index fd02eff07..041a09e3f 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.125 2018/01/08 15:21:49 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.126 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -74,12 +74,14 @@
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "ssherr.h"
 #include "compat.h"
+#include "channels.h"
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
 extern int use_privsep;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
 extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
 
 /* Debugging messages */
 Buffer auth_debug;
@@ -386,10 +388,8 @@ auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
  * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
  */
 int
-auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
+auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
 {
-        struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
-
         switch (options.permit_root_login) {
         case PERMIT_YES:
                 return 1;
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
                         return 1;
                 break;
         case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
-                if (forced_command) {
+                if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
                         logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
                         return 1;
                 }
@@ -993,3 +993,173 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
                 *child = f;
         return pid;
 }
+
+/* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */
+
+/* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */
+void
+auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote)
+{
+        int do_env = options.permit_user_env && opts->nenv > 0;
+        int do_permitopen = opts->npermitopen > 0 &&
+            (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0;
+        size_t i;
+        char msg[1024], tbuf[32];
+
+        snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", opts->force_tun_device);
+        /* Try to keep this alphabetically sorted */
+        snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
+            opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ? " agent-forwarding" : "",
+            opts->force_command == NULL ? "" : " command",
+            do_env ?  " environment" : "",
+            do_permitopen ?  " permitopen" : "",
+            opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ? " port-forwarding" : "",
+            opts->cert_principals == NULL ? "" : " principals",
+            opts->permit_pty_flag ? " pty" : "",
+            opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : " tun=",
+            opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : tbuf,
+            opts->permit_user_rc ? " user-rc" : "",
+            opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "");
+
+        debug("%s: %s", loc, msg);
+        if (do_remote)
+                auth_debug_add("%s: %s", loc, msg);
+
+        if (options.permit_user_env) {
+                for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) {
+                        debug("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]);
+                        if (do_remote) {
+                                auth_debug_add("%s: environment: %s",
+                                    loc, opts->env[i]);
+                        }
+                }
+        }
+
+        /* Go into a little more details for the local logs. */
+        if (opts->cert_principals != NULL) {
+                debug("%s: authorized principals: \"%s\"",
+                    loc, opts->cert_principals);
+        }
+        if (opts->force_command != NULL)
+                debug("%s: forced command: \"%s\"", loc, opts->force_command);
+        if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) {
+                for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) {
+                        debug("%s: permitted open: %s",
+                            loc, opts->permitopen[i]);
+                }
+        }
+}
+
+/* Activate a new set of key/cert options; merging with what is there. */
+int
+auth_activate_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshauthopt *opts)
+{
+        struct sshauthopt *old = auth_opts;
+        const char *emsg = NULL;
+
+        debug("%s: setting new authentication options", __func__);
+        if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_merge(old, opts, &emsg)) == NULL) {
+                error("Inconsistent authentication options: %s", emsg);
+                return -1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/* Disable forwarding, etc for the session */
+void
+auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+        struct sshauthopt *restricted;
+
+        debug("%s: restricting session", __func__);
+
+        /* A blank sshauthopt defaults to permitting nothing */
+        restricted = sshauthopt_new();
+        restricted->restricted = 1;
+
+        if (auth_activate_options(ssh, restricted) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: failed to restrict session", __func__);
+        sshauthopt_free(restricted);
+}
+
+int
+auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
+    struct sshauthopt *opts, int allow_cert_authority, const char *loc)
+{
+        const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+        const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
+            options.use_dns);
+
+        /* Consistency checks */
+        if (opts->cert_principals != NULL && !opts->cert_authority) {
+                debug("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
+                auth_debug_add("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
+                /* deny access */
+                return -1;
+        }
+        /* cert-authority flag isn't valid in authorized_principals files */
+        if (!allow_cert_authority && opts->cert_authority) {
+                debug("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
+                auth_debug_add("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
+                /* deny access */
+                return -1;
+        }
+
+        /* Perform from= checks */
+        if (opts->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
+                switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
+                    opts->required_from_host_keys )) {
+                case 1:
+                        /* Host name matches. */
+                        break;
+                case -1:
+                default:
+                        debug("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
+                        auth_debug_add("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
+                        /* FALLTHROUGH */
+                case 0:
+                        logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with "
+                            "correct key but not from a permitted "
+                            "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s, required=%.200s).",
+                            loc, pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip,
+                            opts->required_from_host_keys);
+                        auth_debug_add("%s: Your host '%.200s' is not "
+                            "permitted to use this key for login.",
+                            loc, remote_host);
+                        /* deny access */
+                        return -1;
+                }
+        }
+        /* Check source-address restriction from certificate */
+        if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
+                switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
+                    opts->required_from_host_cert)) {
+                case 1:
+                        /* accepted */
+                        break;
+                case -1:
+                default:
+                        /* invalid */
+                        error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid",
+                            loc);
+                        /* FALLTHROUGH */
+                case 0:
+                        logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with valid "
+                            "certificate but not from a permitted source "
+                            "address (%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_ip);
+                        auth_debug_add("%s: Your address '%.200s' is not "
+                            "permitted to use this certificate for login.",
+                            loc, remote_ip);
+                        return -1;
+                }
+        }
+        /*
+         *
+         * XXX this is spammy. We should report remotely only for keys
+         *     that are successful in actual auth attempts, and not PK_OK
+         *     tests.
+         */
+        auth_log_authopts(loc, opts, 1);
+
+        return 0;
+}
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 64f3c2eb5..23ce67caf 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.94 2018/01/08 15:21:49 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.95 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -42,9 +42,11 @@
 #include <krb5.h>
 #endif
 
+struct passwd;
 struct ssh;
-struct sshkey;
 struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+struct sshauthopt;
 
 typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
 typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
@@ -128,11 +130,12 @@ struct KbdintDevice
 int
 auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
 
-int      auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int      auth_password(struct ssh *, const char *);
 
 int      hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *,
             struct sshkey *);
-int      user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int);
+int      user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
+    struct sshauthopt **);
 int      auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *, const struct sshkey *);
 
 /*
@@ -163,14 +166,12 @@ int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *);
 #include "audit.h"
 void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
 
-void disable_forwarding(void);
-
 void    do_authentication2(Authctxt *);
 
 void    auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
 void    auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *) __attribute__((noreturn));
 void    userauth_finish(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *);
-int     auth_root_allowed(const char *);
+int     auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *, const char *);
 
 void    userauth_send_banner(const char *);
 
@@ -214,8 +215,17 @@ int	 get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
 int      sshd_hostkey_sign(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **,
              size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
 
+/* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
+const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
+int      auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *);
+void     auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *);
+int      auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *, struct passwd *pw,
+    struct sshauthopt *, int, const char *);
+void     auth_log_authopts(const char *, const struct sshauthopt *, int);
+
 /* debug messages during authentication */
-void     auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void     auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void     auth_debug_send(void);
 void     auth_debug_reset(void);
 
@@ -227,7 +237,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
 pid_t   subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
     const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
 
-int      sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int      sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
 
 #define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: "
 
diff --git a/auth2-none.c b/auth2-none.c
index 35d25fa63..8d4e9bb8c 100644
--- a/auth2-none.c
+++ b/auth2-none.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.20 2017/05/30 14:29:59 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.21 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh)
         if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
                 fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
         if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication)
-                return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh->authctxt, "")));
+                return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, "")));
         return (0);
 }
 
diff --git a/auth2-passwd.c b/auth2-passwd.c
index 5f7ba3244..445016aec 100644
--- a/auth2-passwd.c
+++ b/auth2-passwd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.14 2017/05/30 14:29:59 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.15 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh)
 
         if (change)
                 logit("password change not supported");
-        else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh->authctxt, password)) == 1)
+        else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, password)) == 1)
                 authenticated = 1;
         explicit_bzero(password, len);
         free(password);
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 8fb7ffe71..8024b1d6a 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.76 2018/02/07 22:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.77 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static int
 userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
         Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+        struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
         struct sshbuf *b;
         struct sshkey *key = NULL;
         char *pkalg, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL;
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
         size_t blen, slen;
         int r, pktype;
         int authenticated = 0;
+        struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL;
 
         if (!authctxt->valid) {
                 debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
@@ -185,7 +187,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
 
                 /* test for correct signature */
                 authenticated = 0;
-                if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
+                if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
                     PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b),
                     sshbuf_len(b), NULL, ssh->compat)) == 0) {
                         authenticated = 1;
@@ -210,7 +212,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
                  * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
                  * issue? -markus
                  */
-                if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) {
+                if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) {
                         if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
                             != 0 ||
                             (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
@@ -221,10 +223,14 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
                         authctxt->postponed = 1;
                 }
         }
-        if (authenticated != 1)
-                auth_clear_options();
 done:
+        if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) {
+                debug("%s: key options inconsistent with existing", __func__);
+                authenticated = 0;
+        }
         debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
+
+        sshauthopt_free(authopts);
         sshkey_free(key);
         free(userstyle);
         free(pkalg);
@@ -254,18 +260,77 @@ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Process a single authorized_principals format line. Returns 0 and sets
+ * authoptsp is principal is authorised, -1 otherwise. "loc" is used as a
+ * log preamble for file/line information.
+ */
+static int
+check_principals_line(struct ssh *ssh, char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
+    const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+        u_int i, found = 0;
+        char *ep, *line_opts;
+        const char *reason = NULL;
+        struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
+
+        if (authoptsp != NULL)
+                *authoptsp = NULL;
+
+        /* Trim trailing whitespace. */
+        ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
+        while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
+                *ep-- = '\0';
+
+        /*
+         * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
+         * key options.
+         */
+        line_opts = NULL;
+        if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
+            (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
+                for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
+                        ;
+                line_opts = cp;
+                cp = ep;
+        }
+        if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
+                debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
+                auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
+                return -1;
+        }
+        /* Check principals in cert against those on line */
+        for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+                if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0)
+                        continue;
+                debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
+                    loc, cert->principals[i]);
+                found = 1;
+        }
+        if (found && authoptsp != NULL) {
+                *authoptsp = opts;
+                opts = NULL;
+        }
+        sshauthopt_free(opts);
+        return found ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
 static int
-process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
-    const struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+process_principals(struct ssh *ssh, FILE *f, const char *file,
+    const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
-        char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
+        char loc[256], line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep;
         u_long linenum = 0;
-        u_int i, found_principal = 0;
+        u_int found_principal = 0;
+
+        if (authoptsp != NULL)
+                *authoptsp = NULL;
 
         while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
                 /* Always consume entire input */
                 if (found_principal)
                         continue;
+
                 /* Skip leading whitespace. */
                 for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
                         ;
@@ -274,50 +339,33 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
                         *ep = '\0';
                 if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
                         continue;
-                /* Trim trailing whitespace. */
-                ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
-                while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
-                        *ep-- = '\0';
-                /*
-                 * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
-                 * key options.
-                 */
-                line_opts = NULL;
-                if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
-                    (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
-                        for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
-                                ;
-                        line_opts = cp;
-                        cp = ep;
-                }
-                for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
-                        if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
-                                debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
-                                    file, linenum, cert->principals[i]);
-                                if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
-                                    file, linenum) != 1)
-                                        continue;
-                                found_principal = 1;
-                                continue;
-                        }
-                }
+
+                snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
+                if (check_principals_line(ssh, cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
+                        found_principal = 1;
         }
         return found_principal;
 }
 
+/* XXX remove pw args here and elsewhere once ssh->authctxt is guaranteed */
+
 static int
-match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+match_principals_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, char *file,
+    struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
         FILE *f;
         int success;
 
+        if (authoptsp != NULL)
+                *authoptsp = NULL;
+
         temporarily_use_uid(pw);
         debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
         if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
                 restore_uid();
                 return 0;
         }
-        success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert);
+        success = process_principals(ssh, f, file, cert, authoptsp);
         fclose(f);
         restore_uid();
         return success;
@@ -328,12 +376,13 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
  * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
  */
 static int
-match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
+match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
+    const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
+        struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
         const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert;
         FILE *f = NULL;
         int r, ok, found_principal = 0;
-        struct passwd *pw;
         int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
         pid_t pid;
         char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
@@ -341,6 +390,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
         char serial_s[16];
         void (*osigchld)(int);
 
+        if (authoptsp != NULL)
+                *authoptsp = NULL;
         if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
                 return 0;
         if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
@@ -358,8 +409,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
         /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
         username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
             "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-        pw = getpwnam(username);
-        if (pw == NULL) {
+        runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
+        if (runas_pw == NULL) {
                 error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
                     username, strerror(errno));
                 goto out;
@@ -417,15 +468,15 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
         /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
         command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
 
-        if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command,
+        if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
             ac, av, &f,
             SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
                 goto out;
 
         uid_swapped = 1;
-        temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+        temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
 
-        ok = process_principals(f, "(command)", pw, cert);
+        ok = process_principals(ssh, f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp);
 
         fclose(f);
         f = NULL;
@@ -452,130 +503,225 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
         free(keytext);
         return found_principal;
 }
+
+static void
+skip_space(char **cpp)
+{
+        char *cp;
+
+        for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+                ;
+        *cpp = cp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Advanced *cpp past the end of key options, defined as the first unquoted
+ * whitespace character. Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (e.g.
+ * unterminated quotes).
+ */
+static int
+advance_past_options(char **cpp)
+{
+        char *cp = *cpp;
+        int quoted = 0;
+
+        for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+                if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+                        cp++;   /* Skip both */
+                else if (*cp == '"')
+                        quoted = !quoted;
+        }
+        *cpp = cp;
+        /* return failure for unterminated quotes */
+        return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key
+ * matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp
+ * on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages.
+ */
+static int
+check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
+    char *cp, const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+        int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type;
+        struct sshkey *found = NULL;
+        struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL, *certopts = NULL, *finalopts = NULL;
+        char *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+        const char *reason = NULL;
+        int ret = -1;
+
+        if (authoptsp != NULL)
+                *authoptsp = NULL;
+
+        if ((found = sshkey_new(want_keytype)) == NULL) {
+                debug3("%s: keytype %d failed", __func__, want_keytype);
+                goto out;
+        }
+
+        /* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */
+
+        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
+                /* no key?  check for options */
+                debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp);
+                key_options = cp;
+                if (advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
+                        reason = "invalid key option string";
+                        goto fail_reason;
+                }
+                skip_space(&cp);
+                if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
+                        /* still no key?  advance to next line*/
+                        debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp);
+                        goto out;
+                }
+        }
+        /* Parse key options now; we need to know if this is a CA key */
+        if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) {
+                debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
+                auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
+                goto out;
+        }
+        /* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */
+        if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+                /* Certificate; check signature key against CA */
+                if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key) ||
+                    !keyopts->cert_authority)
+                        goto out;
+        } else {
+                /* Plain key: check it against key found in file */
+                if (!sshkey_equal(found, key) || keyopts->cert_authority)
+                        goto out;
+        }
+
+        /* We have a candidate key, perform authorisation checks */
+        if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
+            options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+                fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
+
+        debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc,
+            sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp);
+
+        if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, keyopts,
+            sshkey_is_cert(key), loc) != 0) {
+                reason = "Refused by key options";
+                goto fail_reason;
+        }
+        /* That's all we need for plain keys. */
+        if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+                verbose("Accepted key %s %s found at %s",
+                    sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
+                finalopts = keyopts;
+                keyopts = NULL;
+                goto success;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Additional authorisation for certificates.
+         */
+
+        /* Parse and check options present in certificate */
+        if ((certopts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
+                reason = "Invalid certificate options";
+                goto fail_reason;
+        }
+        if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, certopts, 0, loc) != 0) {
+                reason = "Refused by certificate options";
+                goto fail_reason;
+        }
+        if ((finalopts = sshauthopt_merge(keyopts, certopts, &reason)) == NULL)
+                goto fail_reason;
+
+        /*
+         * If the user has specified a list of principals as
+         * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
+         * their username in the certificate principals list.
+         */
+        if (keyopts->cert_principals != NULL &&
+            !match_principals_option(keyopts->cert_principals, key->cert)) {
+                reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
+                goto fail_reason;
+        }
+        if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
+           keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
+                goto fail_reason;
+
+        verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
+            "signed by CA %s %s found at %s",
+            key->cert->key_id,
+            (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+            sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
+
+ success:
+        if (finalopts == NULL)
+                fatal("%s: internal error: missing options", __func__);
+        if (authoptsp != NULL) {
+                *authoptsp = finalopts;
+                finalopts = NULL;
+        }
+        /* success */
+        ret = 0;
+        goto out;
+
+ fail_reason:
+        error("%s", reason);
+        auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+ out:
+        free(fp);
+        sshauthopt_free(keyopts);
+        sshauthopt_free(certopts);
+        sshauthopt_free(finalopts);
+        sshkey_free(found);
+        return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
  */
 static int
-check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct passwd *pw)
+check_authkeys_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, FILE *f,
+    char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
-        char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+        char *cp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], loc[256];
         int found_key = 0;
         u_long linenum = 0;
-        struct sshkey *found = NULL;
 
-        while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
-                char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
-                const char *reason = NULL;
+        if (authoptsp != NULL)
+                *authoptsp = NULL;
 
+        while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
                 /* Always consume entire file */
                 if (found_key)
                         continue;
-                sshkey_free(found);
-                found = sshkey_new(sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
-                if (found == NULL)
-                        goto done;
-                auth_clear_options();
 
                 /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
-                for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-                        ;
+                cp = line;
+                skip_space(&cp);
                 if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
                         continue;
-
-                if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
-                        /* no key?  check if there are options for this key */
-                        int quoted = 0;
-                        debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-                        key_options = cp;
-                        for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
-                                if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-                                        cp++;   /* Skip both */
-                                else if (*cp == '"')
-                                        quoted = !quoted;
-                        }
-                        /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
-                        for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-                                ;
-                        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
-                                debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-                                /* still no key?  advance to next line*/
-                                continue;
-                        }
-                }
-                if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
-                        if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
-                                continue;
-                        if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
-                            linenum) != 1)
-                                continue;
-                        if (!key_is_cert_authority)
-                                continue;
-                        if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
-                            options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
-                                continue;
-                        debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
-                            file, linenum, sshkey_type(found), fp);
-                        /*
-                         * If the user has specified a list of principals as
-                         * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
-                         * their username in the certificate principals list.
-                         */
-                        if (authorized_principals != NULL &&
-                            !match_principals_option(authorized_principals,
-                            key->cert)) {
-                                reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
-                                    "authorized principal";
- fail_reason:
-                                free(fp);
-                                error("%s", reason);
-                                auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
-                                continue;
-                        }
-                        if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
-                            authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
-                            &reason) != 0)
-                                goto fail_reason;
-                        if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0)
-                                goto fail_reason;
-                        verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
-                            "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
-                            (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-                            sshkey_type(found), fp, file);
-                        free(fp);
-                        found_key = 1;
-                        break;
-                } else if (sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
-                        if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
-                            linenum) != 1)
-                                continue;
-                        if (key_is_cert_authority)
-                                continue;
-                        if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
-                            options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
-                                continue;
-                        debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
-                            file, linenum, sshkey_type(found), fp);
-                        free(fp);
+                snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
+                if (check_authkey_line(ssh, pw, key, cp, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
                         found_key = 1;
-                        continue;
-                }
         }
- done:
-        sshkey_free(found);
-        if (!found_key)
-                debug2("key not found");
         return found_key;
 }
 
 /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
 static int
-user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key)
+user_cert_trusted_ca(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
+    struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
         char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
         const char *reason;
+        struct sshauthopt *principals_opts = NULL, *cert_opts = NULL;
+        struct sshauthopt *final_opts = NULL;
         int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
 
+        if (authoptsp != NULL)
+                *authoptsp = NULL;
+
         if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
                 return 0;
 
@@ -596,36 +742,69 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key)
          * against the username.
          */
         if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
-                if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert))
+                if (match_principals_file(ssh, pw, principals_file,
+                    key->cert, &principals_opts))
                         found_principal = 1;
         }
         /* Try querying command if specified */
-        if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key))
+        if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(ssh, pw, key,
+            &principals_opts))
                 found_principal = 1;
         /* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
         use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
             options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
         if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
                 reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
- fail_reason:
-                error("%s", reason);
-                auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
-                goto out;
+                goto fail_reason;
         }
+        if (use_authorized_principals && principals_opts == NULL)
+                fatal("%s: internal error: missing principals_opts", __func__);
         if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
             use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
                 goto fail_reason;
-        if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0)
+
+        /* Check authority from options in key and from principals file/cmd */
+        if ((cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
+                reason = "Invalid certificate options";
+                goto fail_reason;
+        }
+        if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, cert_opts, 0, "cert") != 0) {
+                reason = "Refused by certificate options";
                 goto fail_reason;
+        }
+        if (principals_opts == NULL) {
+                final_opts = cert_opts;
+                cert_opts = NULL;
+        } else {
+                if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, principals_opts, 0,
+                    "principals") != 0) {
+                        reason = "Refused by certificate principals options";
+                        goto fail_reason;
+                }
+                if ((final_opts = sshauthopt_merge(principals_opts,
+                    cert_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
+ fail_reason:
+                        error("%s", reason);
+                        auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+                        goto out;
+                }
+        }
 
+        /* Success */
         verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
             "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
             (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
             sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
             options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
+        if (authoptsp != NULL) {
+                *authoptsp = final_opts;
+                final_opts = NULL;
+        }
         ret = 1;
-
  out:
+        sshauthopt_free(principals_opts);
+        sshauthopt_free(cert_opts);
+        sshauthopt_free(final_opts);
         free(principals_file);
         free(ca_fp);
         return ret;
@@ -636,17 +815,22 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key)
  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
  */
 static int
-user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, char *file)
+user_key_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
+    char *file, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
         FILE *f;
         int found_key = 0;
 
+        if (authoptsp != NULL)
+                *authoptsp = NULL;
+
         /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
         temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 
         debug("trying public key file %s", file);
         if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
-                found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
+                found_key = check_authkeys_file(ssh, pw, f, file,
+                    key, authoptsp);
                 fclose(f);
         }
 
@@ -659,17 +843,20 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, char *file)
  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
  */
 static int
-user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key)
+user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
+    struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
+        struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
         FILE *f = NULL;
         int r, ok, found_key = 0;
-        struct passwd *pw;
         int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
         pid_t pid;
         char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
         char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
         void (*osigchld)(int);
 
+        if (authoptsp != NULL)
+                *authoptsp = NULL;
         if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
                 return 0;
         if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
@@ -686,8 +873,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key)
         /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
         username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
             "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-        pw = getpwnam(username);
-        if (pw == NULL) {
+        runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
+        if (runas_pw == NULL) {
                 error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
                     username, strerror(errno));
                 goto out;
@@ -745,15 +932,16 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key)
                 xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
         }
 
-        if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
+        if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
             ac, av, &f,
             SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
                 goto out;
 
         uid_swapped = 1;
-        temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+        temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
 
-        ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
+        ok = check_authkeys_file(ssh, user_pw, f,
+            options.authorized_keys_command, key, authoptsp);
 
         fclose(f);
         f = NULL;
@@ -783,10 +971,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key)
  * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
  */
 int
-user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, int auth_attempt)
+user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
+    int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 {
         u_int success, i;
         char *file;
+        struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
+        if (authoptsp != NULL)
+                *authoptsp = NULL;
 
         if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
                 return 0;
@@ -794,25 +986,31 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, int auth_attempt)
             auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
                 return 0;
 
-        success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);
-        if (success)
-                return success;
+        if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0)
+                goto out;
+        sshauthopt_free(opts);
+        opts = NULL;
 
-        success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
-        if (success > 0)
-                return success;
+        if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0)
+                goto out;
+        sshauthopt_free(opts);
+        opts = NULL;
 
         for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
-
                 if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
                         continue;
                 file = expand_authorized_keys(
                     options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
-
-                success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
+                success = user_key_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, file, &opts);
                 free(file);
         }
 
+ out:
+        if (success && authoptsp != NULL) {
+                *authoptsp = opts;
+                opts = NULL;
+        }
+        sshauthopt_free(opts);
         return success;
 }
 
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index c80911aeb..e0034229a 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.144 2018/01/23 05:27:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.145 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ userauth_finish(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, const char *method,
 
         /* Special handling for root */
         if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-            !auth_root_allowed(method)) {
+            !auth_root_allowed(ssh, method)) {
                 authenticated = 0;
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
                 PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
index b45a9ec63..1e660b021 100644
--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.124 2018/03/02 03:02:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.125 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -1921,6 +1921,7 @@ child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
         }
 
         /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */
+        /* XXX xasprintf */
         env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1);
         snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value);
 }
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index e4ac3ccfd..c68e1b0d9 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.179 2018/02/05 05:37:46 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.180 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ extern u_char session_id[];
 extern Buffer auth_debug;
 extern int auth_debug_init;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
 
 /* State exported from the child */
 static struct sshbuf *child_state;
@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static Authctxt *authctxt;
 static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
 static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
 static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
 static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
 static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
 static char *auth_method = "unknown";
@@ -252,7 +254,6 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
 struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
 
 /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
-
 static void
 monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
 {
@@ -297,6 +298,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
         authctxt = _authctxt;
         memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+        ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
 
         authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
 
@@ -331,7 +333,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
                                 fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
                                     __func__, ent->type);
                         if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-                            !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
+                            !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
                                 authenticated = 0;
 #ifdef USE_PAM
                         /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
@@ -365,6 +367,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
         debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
             __func__, authctxt->user);
+        ssh->authctxt = NULL;
         ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
 
         mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
@@ -413,7 +416,7 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
         monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
         monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
 
-        if (!no_pty_flag) {
+        if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
         }
@@ -558,9 +561,11 @@ monitor_reset_key_state(void)
         free(key_blob);
         free(hostbased_cuser);
         free(hostbased_chost);
+        sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
         key_blob = NULL;
         key_bloblen = 0;
         key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+        key_opts = NULL;
         hostbased_cuser = NULL;
         hostbased_chost = NULL;
 }
@@ -828,6 +833,7 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
 int
 mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
+        struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
         static int call_count;
         char *passwd;
         int authenticated;
@@ -838,7 +844,7 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
         passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
         /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
         authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
-            auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
+            auth_password(ssh, passwd);
         explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
         free(passwd);
 
@@ -1129,15 +1135,16 @@ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
 int
 mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
+        struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
         struct sshkey *key;
         char *cuser, *chost;
         u_char *blob;
         u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
         enum mm_keytype type = 0;
-        int allowed = 0;
+        int r, allowed = 0;
+        struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
 
         debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
         type = buffer_get_int(m);
         cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
         chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
@@ -1156,28 +1163,31 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
                 switch (type) {
                 case MM_USERKEY:
-                        allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
-                            !auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
-                            match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-                            options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
-                            user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
-                            pubkey_auth_attempt);
                         auth_method = "publickey";
-                        if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
-                            (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
-                                auth_clear_options();
+                        if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
+                                break;
+                        if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
+                                break;
+                        if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+                            options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1)
+                                break;
+                        allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
+                            pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
                         break;
                 case MM_HOSTKEY:
-                        allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
-                            !auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
-                            match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-                            options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
-                            hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+                        auth_method = "hostbased";
+                        if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
+                                break;
+                        if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
+                                break;
+                        if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+                            options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1)
+                                break;
+                        allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
                             cuser, chost, key);
                         auth2_record_info(authctxt,
                             "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
                             cuser, chost);
-                        auth_method = "hostbased";
                         break;
                 default:
                         fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
@@ -1185,7 +1195,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 }
         }
 
-        debug3("%s: key is %s", __func__, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
+        debug3("%s: %s authentication%s: %s key is %s", __func__,
+            auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
+            (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
+            allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
 
         auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
         sshkey_free(key);
@@ -1198,6 +1211,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 key_blob = blob;
                 key_bloblen = bloblen;
                 key_blobtype = type;
+                key_opts = opts;
                 hostbased_cuser = cuser;
                 hostbased_chost = chost;
         } else {
@@ -1210,10 +1224,13 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
         buffer_clear(m);
         buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
-        buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-
+        if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: sshauthopt_serialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
         mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
 
+        if (!allowed)
+                sshauthopt_free(opts);
+
         return (0);
 }
 
@@ -1336,6 +1353,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
 int
 mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
 {
+        struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
         struct sshkey *key;
         u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
         char *sigalg;
@@ -1390,6 +1408,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
         free(data);
         free(sigalg);
 
+        if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
+                auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
         monitor_reset_key_state();
 
         sshkey_free(key);
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index cce318bc5..9666bda4b 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.98 2018/01/08 15:14:44 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.99 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
 
 /* Do the password authentication */
 int
-mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
+mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
 {
         Buffer m;
         int authenticated = 0;
@@ -378,34 +378,38 @@ mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
 }
 
 int
-mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
-    int pubkey_auth_attempt)
+mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
+    int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
 {
         return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key,
-            pubkey_auth_attempt));
+            pubkey_auth_attempt, authoptp));
 }
 
 int
 mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user, const char *host,
     struct sshkey *key)
 {
-        return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0));
+        return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0, NULL));
 }
 
 int
 mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
-    struct sshkey *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt)
+    struct sshkey *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
 {
         Buffer m;
         u_char *blob;
         u_int len;
-        int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0;
+        int r, allowed = 0;
+        struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
 
         debug3("%s entering", __func__);
 
+        if (authoptp != NULL)
+                *authoptp = NULL;
+
         /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
         if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
-                return (0);
+                return 0;
 
         buffer_init(&m);
         buffer_put_int(&m, type);
@@ -418,18 +422,24 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
         mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m);
 
         debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__);
-        mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, &m);
+        mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+            MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, &m);
 
         allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
-
-        /* fake forced command */
-        auth_clear_options();
-        have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m);
-        forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL;
-
+        if (allowed && type == MM_USERKEY) {
+                if ((r = sshauthopt_deserialise(&m, &opts)) != 0)
+                        fatal("%s: sshauthopt_deserialise: %s",
+                            __func__, ssh_err(r));
+        }
         buffer_free(&m);
 
-        return (allowed);
+        if (authoptp != NULL) {
+                *authoptp = opts;
+                opts = NULL;
+        }
+        sshauthopt_free(opts);
+
+        return allowed;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index f5af1e819..762332704 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.36 2017/12/18 02:25:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.37 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY };
 
 struct monitor;
 struct Authctxt;
+struct sshkey;
+struct sshauthopt;
 
 void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
 int mm_is_monitor(void);
@@ -44,10 +46,11 @@ int mm_key_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int,
 void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
 struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
 char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
-int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
 int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *,
-    int);
-int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int);
+    int, struct sshauthopt **);
+int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
+    struct sshauthopt **);
 int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
     const char *, struct sshkey *);
 int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
index 7e2abd52f..d6fe24cc1 100644
--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.204 2018/02/11 21:16:56 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.205 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
 
 /* XXX */
 extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
 extern int use_privsep;
 
 static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */
@@ -456,12 +457,13 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
         originator_port = packet_get_int();
         packet_check_eom();
 
-        debug("server_request_direct_tcpip: originator %s port %d, target %s "
-            "port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
+        debug("%s: originator %s port %d, target %s port %d", __func__,
+            originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
 
         /* XXX fine grained permissions */
         if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
-            !no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding) {
+            auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag &&
+            !options.disable_forwarding) {
                 c = channel_connect_to_port(ssh, target, target_port,
                     "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg);
         } else {
@@ -487,20 +489,20 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh)
         struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
 
         if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
-                fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user");
+                fatal("%s: no/invalid user", __func__);
 
         target = packet_get_string(NULL);
         originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
         originator_port = packet_get_int();
         packet_check_eom();
 
-        debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s",
+        debug("%s: originator %s port %d, target %s", __func__,
             originator, originator_port, target);
 
         /* XXX fine grained permissions */
         if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
-            !no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding &&
-            (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) {
+            auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag &&
+            !options.disable_forwarding && (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) {
                 c = channel_connect_to_path(ssh, target,
                     "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
         } else {
@@ -519,8 +521,7 @@ static Channel *
 server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
         Channel *c = NULL;
-        int mode, tun;
-        int sock;
+        int mode, tun, sock;
         char *tmp, *ifname = NULL;
 
         mode = packet_get_int();
@@ -539,10 +540,10 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
         }
 
         tun = packet_get_int();
-        if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
-                if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
+        if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
+                if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && auth_opts->force_tun_device != tun)
                         goto done;
-                tun = forced_tun_device;
+                tun = auth_opts->force_tun_device;
         }
         sock = tun_open(tun, mode, &ifname);
         if (sock < 0)
@@ -767,7 +768,8 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 
                 /* check permissions */
                 if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
-                    no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding ||
+                    !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
+                    options.disable_forwarding ||
                     (!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) ||
                     (fwd.listen_port != 0 &&
                      !bind_permitted(fwd.listen_port, pw->pw_uid))) {
@@ -805,7 +807,8 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 
                 /* check permissions */
                 if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
-                    || no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding ||
+                    || !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
+                    options.disable_forwarding ||
                     (pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) {
                         success = 0;
                         packet_send_debug("Server has disabled "
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 51c5ea0ec..58826db16 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.293 2017/10/23 05:08:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.294 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
 extern int startup_pipe;
 extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
 char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
 
 /* original command from peer. */
@@ -288,14 +289,42 @@ prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info)
         restore_uid();
 }
 
+static void
+set_permitopen_from_authopts(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshauthopt *opts)
+{
+        char *tmp, *cp, *host;
+        int port;
+        size_t i;
+
+        if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
+                return;
+        channel_clear_permitted_opens(ssh);
+        for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitopen; i++) {
+                tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitopen[i]);
+                /* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
+                if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+                        fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__);
+                host = cleanhostname(host);
+                if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
+                        fatal("%s: internal error: permitopen port",
+                            __func__);
+                channel_add_permitted_opens(ssh, host, port);
+                free(tmp);
+        }
+}
+
 void
 do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
         setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
 
+        auth_log_authopts("active", auth_opts, 0);
+
         /* setup the channel layer */
         /* XXX - streamlocal? */
-        if (no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding ||
+        set_permitopen_from_authopts(ssh, auth_opts);
+        if (!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
+            options.disable_forwarding ||
             (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
                 channel_disable_adm_local_opens(ssh);
         else
@@ -642,9 +671,9 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
                 original_command = command;
                 command = options.adm_forced_command;
                 forced = "(config)";
-        } else if (forced_command) {
+        } else if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
                 original_command = command;
-                command = forced_command;
+                command = auth_opts->force_command;
                 forced = "(key-option)";
         }
         if (forced != NULL) {
@@ -947,8 +976,9 @@ static char **
 do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
 {
         char buf[256];
+        size_t n;
         u_int i, envsize;
-        char **env, *laddr;
+        char *ocp, *cp, **env, *laddr;
         struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
 #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
         char *path = NULL;
@@ -1023,20 +1053,17 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
         if (getenv("TZ"))
                 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
 
-        /* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */
-        while (custom_environment) {
-                struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
-                char *str = ce->s;
-
-                for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++)
-                        ;
-                if (str[i] == '=') {
-                        str[i] = 0;
-                        child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1);
+        /* Set custom environment options from pubkey authentication. */
+        if (options.permit_user_env) {
+                for (n = 0 ; n < auth_opts->nenv; n++) {
+                        ocp = xstrdup(auth_opts->env[n]);
+                        cp = strchr(ocp, '=');
+                        if (*cp == '=') {
+                                *cp = '\0';
+                                child_set_env(&env, &envsize, ocp, cp + 1);
+                        }
+                        free(ocp);
                 }
-                custom_environment = ce->next;
-                free(ce->s);
-                free(ce);
         }
 
         /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
@@ -1138,7 +1165,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
  * first in this order).
  */
 static void
-do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
+do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
 {
         FILE *f = NULL;
         char cmd[1024];
@@ -1150,7 +1177,7 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
 
         /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
         if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
-            !no_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
+            auth_opts->permit_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
             stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
                 snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
                     shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
@@ -1570,7 +1597,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
 
         closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
 
-        do_rc_files(s, shell);
+        do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
 
         /* restore SIGPIPE for child */
         signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
@@ -1833,8 +1860,8 @@ session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
         u_int len;
         int n_bytes;
 
-        if (no_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
-                debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication.");
+        if (!auth_opts->permit_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
+                debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection.");
                 return 0;
         }
         if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
@@ -2022,9 +2049,11 @@ static int
 session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
 {
         static int called = 0;
+
         packet_check_eom();
-        if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
-                debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag");
+        if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
+            !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
+                debug("%s: agent forwarding disabled", __func__);
                 return 0;
         }
         if (called) {
@@ -2402,8 +2431,8 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
         char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
         u_int i;
 
-        if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
-                packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
+        if (!auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag) {
+                packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
                 return 0;
         }
         if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
@@ -2412,7 +2441,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
         }
         if (options.xauth_location == NULL ||
             (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
-                packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
+                packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward X11.");
                 return 0;
         }
         if (s->display != NULL) {
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 0b9a7ec46..fd95b681b 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.505 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.506 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@
 #endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
 #include "version.h"
 #include "ssherr.h"
 
@@ -232,6 +233,9 @@ static int privsep_chroot = 1;
 /* global authentication context */
 Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
 
+/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
+struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
+
 /* sshd_config buffer */
 Buffer cfg;
 
@@ -2066,6 +2070,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
         the_authctxt = authctxt;
 
+        /* Set default key authentication options */
+        if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
+                fatal("allocation failed");
+
         /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
         buffer_init(&loginmsg);
         auth_debug_reset();
@@ -2122,7 +2130,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #ifdef USE_PAM
         if (options.use_pam) {
                 do_pam_setcred(1);
-                do_pam_session();
+                do_pam_session(ssh);
         }
 #endif