Handle SELinux authorisation roles

Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
will need an SSH protocol change.  In the meantime, this came from Debian's
SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
Last-Update: 2017-10-04

Patch-Name: selinux-role.patch

15 files changed, 97 insertions, 30 deletions

diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 29835ae92..27a1a88ec 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
         char            *service;
         struct passwd   *pw;            /* set if 'valid' */
         char            *style;
+        char            *role;
 
         /* Method lists for multiple authentication */
         char            **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index 54070e3a9..1f9ec6327 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 {
         Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
         Authmethod *m = NULL;
-        char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
+        char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
         int authenticated = 0;
 
         if (authctxt == NULL)
@@ -233,8 +233,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
         debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
         debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
 
+        if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+                *role++ = 0;
+
         if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
                 *style++ = 0;
+        else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
+                *style++ = '\0';
 
         if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
                 /* setup auth context */
@@ -261,8 +266,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
                     use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
                 authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
                 authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+                authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
                 if (use_privsep)
-                        mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+                        mm_inform_authserv(service, style, role);
                 userauth_banner();
                 if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
                         packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index cabfeb8a4..510e3496e 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -799,6 +801,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
         /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
         monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
         monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -829,14 +832,37 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
         authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
         authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-        debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
-            __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+        authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+        debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
+            __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
 
         if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
                 free(authctxt->style);
                 authctxt->style = NULL;
         }
 
+        if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+                free(authctxt->role);
+                authctxt->role = NULL;
+        }
+
+        return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+        monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+        authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+        debug3("%s: role=%s",
+            __func__, authctxt->role);
+
+        if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+                free(authctxt->role);
+                authctxt->role = NULL;
+        }
+
         return (0);
 }
 
@@ -1471,7 +1497,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
         res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
         if (res == 0)
                 goto error;
-        pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
+        pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty, authctxt->role);
 
         buffer_put_int(m, 1);
         buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
index ec41404c7..4c7955d7a 100644
--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
         MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
         MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
 
+        MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 154,
+
 };
 
 struct monitor {
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 0e171a6a6..d806bb2e7 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -336,10 +336,10 @@ mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
         return (banner);
 }
 
-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
+/* Inform the privileged process about service, style, and role */
 
 void
-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style, char *role)
 {
         Buffer m;
 
@@ -348,12 +348,30 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
         buffer_init(&m);
         buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
         buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
 
         mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
 
         buffer_free(&m);
 }
 
+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
+
+void
+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
+{
+        Buffer m;
+
+        debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+        buffer_init(&m);
+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
+
+        mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
+
+        buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
 /* Do the password authentication */
 int
 mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index 7b2e89452..a9ccb243e 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
 DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
 int mm_key_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int,
     const char *);
-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *, char *);
+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
 struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
 char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
 int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
index e4c5d1b7c..e26faf08c 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include "key.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#endif
+
 #include "log.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "port-linux.h"
@@ -56,7 +62,7 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
 
 /* Return the default security context for the given username */
 static security_context_t
-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, const char *role)
 {
         security_context_t sc = NULL;
         char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
@@ -71,9 +77,16 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-        r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+        if (role != NULL && role[0])
+                r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
+                                                       &sc);
+        else
+                r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
 #else
-        r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+        if (role != NULL && role[0])
+                r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
+        else
+                r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
 #endif
 
         if (r != 0) {
@@ -103,7 +116,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
 
 /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
 void
-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, const char *role)
 {
         security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
 
@@ -112,7 +125,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
 
         debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
 
-        user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+        user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
         if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
                 switch (security_getenforce()) {
                 case -1:
@@ -134,7 +147,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
 
 /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
 void
-ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty, const char *role)
 {
         security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
         security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
@@ -145,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
 
         debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
 
-        user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+        user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
 
         /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
 
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
index 3c22a854d..c88129428 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
 
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
-void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *, const char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, const char *);
 void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
 void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
 #endif
diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
index 18c7751de..380ee3a41 100644
--- a/platform.c
+++ b/platform.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
  * called if sshd is running as root.
  */
 void
-platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
 {
 #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
         /*
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
         }
 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-        ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+        ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, role);
 #endif
 }
 
diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
index ea4f9c584..60d72ffe7 100644
--- a/platform.h
+++ b/platform.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
 void platform_post_fork_child(void);
 int  platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
 void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
-void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *, const char *);
 char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
 char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
 int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 4bccb62d1..d40afe4f7 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
 
 /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
 void
-do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
 {
         char *chroot_path, *tmp;
 
@@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
                 endgrent();
 #endif
 
-                platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
+                platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw, role);
 
                 if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
                     strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
 
         /* Force a password change */
         if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-                do_setusercontext(pw);
+                do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
                 child_close_fds(ssh);
                 do_pwchange(s);
                 exit(1);
@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
         /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
         if (!options.use_pam)
                 do_nologin(pw);
-        do_setusercontext(pw);
+        do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
         /*
          * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
          * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
@@ -1891,7 +1891,7 @@ session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
         tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
 
         if (!use_privsep)
-                pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
+                pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty, s->authctxt->role);
 
         /* Set window size from the packet. */
         pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
index 54dd1f0ca..8535ebcef 100644
--- a/session.h
+++ b/session.h
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
 Session *session_new(void);
 Session *session_by_tty(char *);
 void     session_close(struct ssh *, Session *);
-void     do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+void     do_setusercontext(struct passwd *, const char *);
 
 const char      *session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *, u_int, int);
 
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index a66e9ca6c..af1ec3376 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
         reseed_prngs();
 
         /* Drop privileges */
-        do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+        do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw, authctxt->role);
 
  skip:
         /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
index fe2fb5aa2..feb22b06b 100644
--- a/sshpty.c
+++ b/sshpty.c
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
 }
 
 void
-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty, const char *role)
 {
         struct group *grp;
         gid_t gid;
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
                     strerror(errno));
 
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-        ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
+        ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty, role);
 #endif
 
         if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h
index 9ec7e9a15..de7e000ae 100644
--- a/sshpty.h
+++ b/sshpty.h
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ int	 pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
 void     pty_release(const char *);
 void     pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
 void     pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
-void     pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
+void     pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);
 void     disconnect_controlling_tty(void);