Restore wildcard semantics

We now ignore the wildcard if we have another matching key -- even if
the wildcard entry comes first in authorized_keys.

This is how it worked before the forward port.

2 files changed, 65 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index d630d43ef..1f0436ebd 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -555,6 +555,42 @@ advance_past_options(char **cpp)
         return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0;
 }
 
+static int
+check_authkey_line_for_wildcard(struct sshkey *key, char *cp, const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+        struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL;
+        const char *reason = NULL;
+        char *key_options = cp;
+
+        if (advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) return -1;
+        skip_space(&cp);
+
+        if (!(*cp == '*' && (cp[1] == ' ' || cp[1] == '\n' || cp[1] == '\t' || cp[1] == '\0'))) {
+                return -1; // This is not a wildcard auth line.
+        }
+
+        if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) {
+                debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
+                auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
+                return -1;
+        }
+
+        if (keyopts->force_command) { /* We have a valid wildcard entry! */
+
+                *authoptsp = keyopts;
+                return 0;
+
+        } else {
+
+                sshauthopt_free(keyopts);
+                reason = "Wildcard login is not allowed without specifying a forced command";
+                error("%s", reason);
+                auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+                return -1;
+
+        }
+}
+
 /*
  * Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key
  * matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp
@@ -581,8 +617,6 @@ check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
 
         /* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */
 
-        int wild = 0;
-
         if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
                 /* no key?  check for options */
                 debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp);
@@ -593,8 +627,8 @@ check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
                 }
                 skip_space(&cp);
                 if (*cp == '*' && (cp[1] == ' ' || cp[1] == '\n' || cp[1] == '\t' || cp[1] == '\0')) {
-                        cp += 2;
-                        wild = 1;
+                        /* This is a wildcard entry.  Ignore it silently. */
+                        goto out;
                 } else if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
                         /* still no key?  advance to next line*/
                         debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp);
@@ -607,33 +641,6 @@ check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
                 auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
                 goto out;
         }
-
-        if (wild) {
-                int r;
-                char *keytext = NULL;
-                if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
-                        error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-                        goto out;
-                }
-                if (!keyopts->force_command) {
-                        reason = "Wildcard login is not allowed without specifying a forced command";
-                        goto fail_reason;
-                }
-
-                wildcard_remote_key = keytext;
-                wildcard_remote_key_type = sshkey_type(key);
-                wildcard_remote_key_fingerprint = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_HEX);
-
-                verbose("Accepted wildcard authorization for %s key %s with forced_command=%s",
-                                                sshkey_type(key),
-                                                wildcard_remote_key_fingerprint,
-                                                keyopts->force_command);
-
-                finalopts = keyopts;
-                keyopts = NULL;
-                goto success;
-        }
-
         /* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */
         if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
                 /* Certificate; check signature key against CA */
@@ -739,6 +746,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, FILE *f,
         size_t linesize = 0;
         int found_key = 0;
         u_long linenum = 0;
+        struct sshauthopt *wildcardoptsp = NULL;
 
         if (authoptsp != NULL)
                 *authoptsp = NULL;
@@ -757,9 +765,32 @@ check_authkeys_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, FILE *f,
                 snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
                 if (check_authkey_line(ssh, pw, key, cp, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
                         found_key = 1;
+                else if (wildcardoptsp == NULL) {
+                        check_authkey_line_for_wildcard(key, cp, loc, &wildcardoptsp);
+                }
         }
         free(line);
-        return found_key;
+        if (found_key) {
+                return 1;
+        } else if (!wildcardoptsp) {
+                return 0;
+        } else {
+
+                if (1) { // This block is obsoleted by SSH_USER_AUTH
+                        int r;
+                        char *keytext = NULL;
+                        if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
+                                error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+                                return -1;
+                        }
+                        wildcard_remote_key = keytext;
+                        wildcard_remote_key_type = sshkey_type(key);
+                        wildcard_remote_key_fingerprint = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_HEX);
+                }
+
+                *authoptsp = wildcardoptsp;
+                return 1;
+        }
 }
 
 /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index fca7e4095..694c41a4c 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1095,8 +1095,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
         if (s->display)
                 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
         if (wildcard_remote_key) {
-    /* This is basically obsolete because of SSH_USER_AUTH */
-    /* I'm leaving it here only because I have code that uses these variables. */
+                /* This is basically obsolete because of SSH_USER_AUTH */
+                /* I'm leaving it here only because I have code that uses these variables. */
                 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_REMOTE_KEY",
                         wildcard_remote_key);
                 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_REMOTE_KEY_TYPE",