- stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 20:43:25

     [sshd.8]
     spelling.  ok markus@

2 files changed, 9 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index dd68e706c..06a1bb1e1 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -14,12 +14,15 @@
      [readconf.c ssh.1]
      ``StrictHostKeyChecking ask'' documentation and small cleanup.
      ok markus@
-   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 22:27:05
-     [authfile.c]
-     spelling.  use sizeof vs. strlen().  ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 20:43:25
+     [sshd.8] 
+     spelling.  ok markus@
    - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 20:53:21
      [xmalloc.c]
      use size_t for strlen() return.  ok markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/28 22:27:05
+     [authfile.c]
+     spelling.  use sizeof vs. strlen().  ok markus@
    - niklas@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/29 1:59:14
      [atomicio.h canohost.h clientloop.h deattack.h dh.h dispatch.h
       groupaccess.c groupaccess.h hmac.h hostfile.h includes.h kex.h
@@ -29,7 +32,6 @@
       sshconnect.h sshd_config tildexpand.h uidswap.h uuencode.h]
      $OpenBSD$
 
-
 20010126
  - (bal) SSH_PROGRAM vs _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM fix pointed out by Roumen 
    Petrov <roumen.petrov@skalasoft.com>
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index 5aadeafe9..1aad0fc88 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.85 2001/01/28 10:37:25 markus Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.86 2001/01/28 20:43:25 stevesk Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
@@ -515,14 +515,14 @@ the three colon separated values
 .Dq start:rate:full
 (e.g., "10:30:60").
 .Nm
-will refuse connection attempts with a probabillity of
+will refuse connection attempts with a probability of
 .Dq rate/100
 (30%)
 if there are currently
 .Dq start
 (10)
 unauthenticated connections.
-The probabillity increases linearly and all connection attempts
+The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts
 are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches
 .Dq full
 (60).