diff options
author | Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> | 2009-12-29 21:42:53 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> | 2009-12-29 21:42:53 +0000 |
commit | 87552344215a38d3a2b0d4d63dc151e05978bbe1 (patch) | |
tree | 9f4b96055e6ccaa915e8d59d9f2805e9e119371d /PROTOCOL.agent | |
parent | a25ec0b132c44c9e341e08464ff830de06b81126 (diff) | |
parent | ef94e5613d37bcbf880f21ee6094e4b1c7683a4c (diff) |
import openssh-5.1p1-gsskex-cjwatson-20080722.patch
Diffstat (limited to 'PROTOCOL.agent')
-rw-r--r-- | PROTOCOL.agent | 516 |
1 files changed, 516 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.agent b/PROTOCOL.agent new file mode 100644 index 000000000..49adbdd5c --- /dev/null +++ b/PROTOCOL.agent | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,516 @@ | |||
1 | This describes the protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent. | ||
2 | |||
3 | OpenSSH's agent supports managing keys for the standard SSH protocol | ||
4 | 2 as well as the legacy SSH protocol 1. Support for these key types | ||
5 | is almost completely disjoint - in all but a few cases, operations on | ||
6 | protocol 2 keys cannot see or affect protocol 1 keys and vice-versa. | ||
7 | |||
8 | Protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys are separated because of the differing | ||
9 | cryptographic usage: protocol 1 private RSA keys are used to decrypt | ||
10 | challenges that were encrypted with the corresponding public key, | ||
11 | whereas protocol 2 RSA private keys are used to sign challenges with | ||
12 | a private key for verification with the corresponding public key. It | ||
13 | is considered unsound practice to use the same key for signing and | ||
14 | encryption. | ||
15 | |||
16 | With a couple of exceptions, the protocol message names used in this | ||
17 | document indicate which type of key the message relates to. SSH_* | ||
18 | messages refer to protocol 1 keys only. SSH2_* messages refer to | ||
19 | protocol 2 keys. Furthermore, the names also indicate whether the | ||
20 | message is a request to the agent (*_AGENTC_*) or a reply from the | ||
21 | agent (*_AGENT_*). Section 3 below contains the mapping of the | ||
22 | protocol message names to their integer values. | ||
23 | |||
24 | 1. Data types | ||
25 | |||
26 | Because of support for legacy SSH protocol 1 keys, OpenSSH's agent | ||
27 | protocol makes use of some data types not defined in RFC 4251. | ||
28 | |||
29 | 1.1 uint16 | ||
30 | |||
31 | The "uint16" data type is a simple MSB-first 16 bit unsigned integer | ||
32 | encoded in two bytes. | ||
33 | |||
34 | 1.2 mpint1 | ||
35 | |||
36 | The "mpint1" type represents an arbitrary precision integer (bignum). | ||
37 | Its format is as follows: | ||
38 | |||
39 | uint16 bits | ||
40 | byte[(bits + 7) / 8] bignum | ||
41 | |||
42 | "bignum" contains an unsigned arbitrary precision integer encoded as | ||
43 | eight bits per byte in big-endian (MSB first) format. | ||
44 | |||
45 | Note the difference between the "mpint1" encoding and the "mpint" | ||
46 | encoding defined in RFC 4251. Also note that the length of the encoded | ||
47 | integer is specified in bits, not bytes and that the byte length of | ||
48 | the integer must be calculated by rounding up the number of bits to the | ||
49 | nearest eight. | ||
50 | |||
51 | 2. Protocol Messages | ||
52 | |||
53 | All protocol messages are prefixed with their length in bytes, encoded | ||
54 | as a 32 bit unsigned integer. Specifically: | ||
55 | |||
56 | uint32 message_length | ||
57 | byte[message_length] message | ||
58 | |||
59 | The following message descriptions refer only to the content the | ||
60 | "message" field. | ||
61 | |||
62 | 2.1 Generic server responses | ||
63 | |||
64 | The following generic messages may be sent by the server in response to | ||
65 | requests from the client. On success the agent may reply either with: | ||
66 | |||
67 | byte SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS | ||
68 | |||
69 | or a request-specific success message. | ||
70 | |||
71 | On failure, the agent may reply with: | ||
72 | |||
73 | byte SSH_AGENT_FAILURE | ||
74 | |||
75 | SSH_AGENT_FAILURE messages are also sent in reply to unknown request | ||
76 | types. | ||
77 | |||
78 | 2.2 Adding keys to the agent | ||
79 | |||
80 | Keys are added to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY and | ||
81 | SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY requests for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys | ||
82 | respectively. | ||
83 | |||
84 | Two variants of these requests are SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED | ||
85 | and SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - these add keys with optional | ||
86 | "constraints" on their usage. | ||
87 | |||
88 | OpenSSH may be built with support for keys hosted on a smartcard | ||
89 | or other hardware security module. These keys may be added | ||
90 | to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY and | ||
91 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED requests. | ||
92 | |||
93 | 2.2.1 Key constraints | ||
94 | |||
95 | The OpenSSH agent supports some basic optional constraints on key usage. | ||
96 | At present there are two constraints defined. | ||
97 | |||
98 | The first constraint limits the validity duration of a key. It is | ||
99 | encoded as: | ||
100 | |||
101 | byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME | ||
102 | uint32 seconds | ||
103 | |||
104 | Where "seconds" contains the number of seconds that the key shall remain | ||
105 | valid measured from the moment that the agent receives it. After the | ||
106 | validity period has expired, OpenSSH's agent will erase these keys from | ||
107 | memory. | ||
108 | |||
109 | The second constraint requires the agent to seek explicit user | ||
110 | confirmation before performing private key operations with the loaded | ||
111 | key. This constraint is encoded as: | ||
112 | |||
113 | byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM | ||
114 | |||
115 | Zero or more constraints may be specified when adding a key with one | ||
116 | of the *_CONSTRAINED requests. Multiple constraints are appended | ||
117 | consecutively to the end of the request: | ||
118 | |||
119 | byte constraint1_type | ||
120 | .... constraint1_data | ||
121 | byte constraint2_type | ||
122 | .... constraint2_data | ||
123 | .... | ||
124 | byte constraintN_type | ||
125 | .... constraintN_data | ||
126 | |||
127 | Such a sequence of zero or more constraints will be referred to below | ||
128 | as "constraint[]". Agents may determine whether there are constraints | ||
129 | by checking whether additional data exists in the "add key" request | ||
130 | after the key data itself. OpenSSH will refuse to add a key if it | ||
131 | contains unknown constraints. | ||
132 | |||
133 | 2.2.2 Add protocol 1 key | ||
134 | |||
135 | A client may add a protocol 1 key to an agent with the following | ||
136 | request: | ||
137 | |||
138 | byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY or | ||
139 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED | ||
140 | uint32 ignored | ||
141 | mpint1 rsa_n | ||
142 | mpint1 rsa_e | ||
143 | mpint1 rsa_d | ||
144 | mpint1 rsa_iqmp | ||
145 | mpint1 rsa_q | ||
146 | mpint1 rsa_p | ||
147 | string key_comment | ||
148 | constraint[] key_constraints | ||
149 | |||
150 | Note that there is some redundancy in the key parameters; a key could be | ||
151 | fully specified using just rsa_q, rsa_p and rsa_e at the cost of extra | ||
152 | computation. | ||
153 | |||
154 | "key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is | ||
155 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY. | ||
156 | |||
157 | The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been | ||
158 | successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. | ||
159 | |||
160 | 2.2.3 Add protocol 2 key | ||
161 | |||
162 | The OpenSSH agent supports DSA and RSA keys for protocol 2. DSA keys may | ||
163 | be added using the following request | ||
164 | |||
165 | byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or | ||
166 | SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED | ||
167 | string "ssh-dss" | ||
168 | mpint dsa_p | ||
169 | mpint dsa_q | ||
170 | mpint dsa_g | ||
171 | mpint dsa_public_key | ||
172 | mpint dsa_private_key | ||
173 | string key_comment | ||
174 | constraint[] key_constraints | ||
175 | |||
176 | RSA keys may be added with this request: | ||
177 | |||
178 | byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or | ||
179 | SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED | ||
180 | string "ssh-rsa" | ||
181 | mpint rsa_n | ||
182 | mpint rsa_e | ||
183 | mpint rsa_d | ||
184 | mpint rsa_iqmp | ||
185 | mpint rsa_p | ||
186 | mpint rsa_q | ||
187 | string key_comment | ||
188 | constraint[] key_constraints | ||
189 | |||
190 | Note that the 'rsa_p' and 'rsa_q' parameters are sent in the reverse | ||
191 | order to the protocol 1 add keys message. As with the corresponding | ||
192 | protocol 1 "add key" request, the private key is overspecified to avoid | ||
193 | redundant processing. | ||
194 | |||
195 | For both DSA and RSA key add requests, "key_constraints" may only be | ||
196 | present if the request type is SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED. | ||
197 | |||
198 | The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been | ||
199 | successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. | ||
200 | |||
201 | 2.2.4 Loading keys from a smartcard | ||
202 | |||
203 | The OpenSSH agent may have optional smartcard support built in to it. If | ||
204 | so, it supports an operation to load keys from a smartcard. Technically, | ||
205 | only the public components of the keys are loaded into the agent so | ||
206 | this operation really arranges for future private key operations to be | ||
207 | delegated to the smartcard. | ||
208 | |||
209 | byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY or | ||
210 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED | ||
211 | string reader_id | ||
212 | string pin | ||
213 | constraint[] key_constraints | ||
214 | |||
215 | "reader_id" is an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin" | ||
216 | is a PIN or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the | ||
217 | device. "key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is | ||
218 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED. | ||
219 | |||
220 | This operation may load all SSH keys that are unlocked using the | ||
221 | "pin" on the specified reader. The type of key loaded (protocol 1 | ||
222 | or protocol 2) will be specified by the smartcard itself, it is not | ||
223 | client-specified. | ||
224 | |||
225 | The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have | ||
226 | been successfully loaded or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. | ||
227 | The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support | ||
228 | smartcards. | ||
229 | |||
230 | 2.3 Removing multiple keys | ||
231 | |||
232 | A client may request that an agent delete all protocol 1 keys using the | ||
233 | following request: | ||
234 | |||
235 | byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES | ||
236 | |||
237 | This message requests the deletion of all protocol 2 keys: | ||
238 | |||
239 | byte SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES | ||
240 | |||
241 | On success, the agent will delete all keys of the requested type and | ||
242 | reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS message. If an error occurred, the agent | ||
243 | will reply with SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. | ||
244 | |||
245 | Note that, to delete all keys (both protocol 1 and 2), a client | ||
246 | must send both a SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES and a | ||
247 | SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES request. | ||
248 | |||
249 | 2.4 Removing specific keys | ||
250 | |||
251 | 2.4.1 Removing a protocol 1 key | ||
252 | |||
253 | Removal of a protocol 1 key may be requested with the following message: | ||
254 | |||
255 | byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY | ||
256 | uint32 key_bits | ||
257 | mpint1 rsa_e | ||
258 | mpint1 rsa_n | ||
259 | |||
260 | Note that key_bits is strictly redundant, as it may be inferred by the | ||
261 | length of rsa_n. | ||
262 | |||
263 | The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key | ||
264 | and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will | ||
265 | return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. | ||
266 | |||
267 | 2.4.2 Removing a protocol 2 key | ||
268 | |||
269 | Protocol 2 keys may be removed with the following request: | ||
270 | |||
271 | byte SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY | ||
272 | string key_blob | ||
273 | |||
274 | Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key | ||
275 | Algorithms" for either of the supported key types: "ssh-dss" or | ||
276 | "ssh-rsa". | ||
277 | |||
278 | The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key | ||
279 | and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will | ||
280 | return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. | ||
281 | |||
282 | 2.4.3 Removing keys loaded from a smartcard | ||
283 | |||
284 | A client may request that a server remove one or more smartcard-hosted | ||
285 | keys using this message: | ||
286 | |||
287 | byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY | ||
288 | string reader_id | ||
289 | string pin | ||
290 | |||
291 | "reader_id" the an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin" is a PIN | ||
292 | or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the device. | ||
293 | |||
294 | When this message is received, and if the agent supports | ||
295 | smartcard-hosted keys, it will delete all keys that are hosted on the | ||
296 | specified smartcard that may be accessed with the given "pin". | ||
297 | |||
298 | The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have | ||
299 | been successfully removed or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. | ||
300 | The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support | ||
301 | smartcards. | ||
302 | |||
303 | 2.5 Requesting a list of known keys | ||
304 | |||
305 | An agent may be requested to list which keys it holds. Different | ||
306 | requests exist for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys. | ||
307 | |||
308 | 2.5.1 Requesting a list of protocol 1 keys | ||
309 | |||
310 | To request a list of protocol 1 keys that are held in the agent, a | ||
311 | client may send the following message: | ||
312 | |||
313 | byte SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES | ||
314 | |||
315 | The agent will reply with the following message: | ||
316 | |||
317 | byte SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER | ||
318 | uint32 num_keys | ||
319 | |||
320 | Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as: | ||
321 | |||
322 | uint32 bits | ||
323 | mpint1 rsa_e | ||
324 | mpint1 rsa_n | ||
325 | string key_comment | ||
326 | |||
327 | 2.5.2 Requesting a list of protocol 2 keys | ||
328 | |||
329 | A client may send the following message to request a list of | ||
330 | protocol 2 keys that are stored in the agent: | ||
331 | |||
332 | byte SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES | ||
333 | |||
334 | The agent will reply with the following message header: | ||
335 | |||
336 | byte SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER | ||
337 | uint32 num_keys | ||
338 | |||
339 | Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as: | ||
340 | |||
341 | string key_blob | ||
342 | string key_comment | ||
343 | |||
344 | Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key | ||
345 | Algorithms" for either of the supported key types: "ssh-dss" or | ||
346 | "ssh-rsa". | ||
347 | |||
348 | 2.6 Private key operations | ||
349 | |||
350 | The purpose of the agent is to perform private key operations, such as | ||
351 | signing and encryption without requiring a passphrase to unlock the | ||
352 | key and without allowing the private key itself to be exposed. There | ||
353 | are separate requests for the protocol 1 and protocol 2 private key | ||
354 | operations. | ||
355 | |||
356 | 2.6.1 Protocol 1 private key challenge | ||
357 | |||
358 | The private key operation used in version 1 of the SSH protocol is | ||
359 | decrypting a challenge that has been encrypted with a public key. | ||
360 | It may be requested using this message: | ||
361 | |||
362 | byte SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE | ||
363 | uint32 ignored | ||
364 | mpint1 rsa_e | ||
365 | mpint1 rsa_n | ||
366 | mpint1 encrypted_challenge | ||
367 | byte[16] session_id | ||
368 | uint32 response_type /* must be 1 */ | ||
369 | |||
370 | "rsa_e" and "rsa_n" are used to identify which private key to use. | ||
371 | "encrypted_challenge" is a challenge blob that has (presumably) | ||
372 | been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range | ||
373 | 1 <= encrypted_challenge < 2^256. "session_id" is the SSH protocol 1 | ||
374 | session ID (computed from the server host key, the server semi-ephemeral | ||
375 | key and the session cookie). | ||
376 | |||
377 | "ignored" and "response_type" exist for compatibility with legacy | ||
378 | implementations. "response_type" must be equal to 1; other response | ||
379 | types are not supported. | ||
380 | |||
381 | On receiving this request, the server decrypts the "encrypted_challenge" | ||
382 | using the private key matching the supplied (rsa_e, rsa_n) values. For | ||
383 | the response derivation, the decrypted challenge is represented as an | ||
384 | unsigned, big-endian integer encoded in a 32 byte buffer (i.e. values | ||
385 | smaller than 2^248 will have leading 0 bytes). | ||
386 | |||
387 | The response value is then calculated as: | ||
388 | |||
389 | response = MD5(decrypted_challenge || session_id) | ||
390 | |||
391 | and returned in the following message | ||
392 | |||
393 | byte SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE | ||
394 | byte[16] response | ||
395 | |||
396 | If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied (rsa_e, | ||
397 | rsa_n) then it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. | ||
398 | |||
399 | 2.6.2 Protocol 2 private key signature request | ||
400 | |||
401 | A client may use the following message to request signing of data using | ||
402 | a protocol 2 key: | ||
403 | |||
404 | byte SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST | ||
405 | string key_blob | ||
406 | string data | ||
407 | uint32 flags | ||
408 | |||
409 | Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key | ||
410 | Algorithms" for either of the supported key types: "ssh-dss" or | ||
411 | "ssh-rsa". "flags" is a bit-mask, but at present only one possible value | ||
412 | is defined (see below for its meaning): | ||
413 | |||
414 | SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 1 | ||
415 | |||
416 | Upon receiving this request, the agent will look up the private key that | ||
417 | corresponds to the public key contained in key_blob. It will use this | ||
418 | private key to sign the "data" and produce a signature blob using the | ||
419 | key type-specific method described in RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key | ||
420 | Algorithms". | ||
421 | |||
422 | An exception to this is for "ssh-dss" keys where the "flags" word | ||
423 | contains the value SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE. In this case, a legacy | ||
424 | signature encoding is used in lieu of the standard one. In this case, | ||
425 | the DSA signature blob is encoded as: | ||
426 | |||
427 | byte[40] signature | ||
428 | |||
429 | The signature will be returned in the response message: | ||
430 | |||
431 | byte SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE | ||
432 | string signature_blob | ||
433 | |||
434 | If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied key_blob then | ||
435 | it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. | ||
436 | |||
437 | 2.7 Locking or unlocking an agent | ||
438 | |||
439 | The agent supports temporary locking with a passphrase to suspend | ||
440 | processing of sensitive operations until it has been unlocked with the | ||
441 | same passphrase. To lock an agent, a client send the following request: | ||
442 | |||
443 | byte SSH_AGENTC_LOCK | ||
444 | string passphrase | ||
445 | |||
446 | Upon receipt of this message and if the agent is not already locked, | ||
447 | it will suspend processing requests and return a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS | ||
448 | reply. If the agent is already locked, it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. | ||
449 | |||
450 | While locked, the agent will refuse all requests except | ||
451 | SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES and | ||
452 | SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES. The "request identities" requests are | ||
453 | treated specially by a locked agent: it will always return an empty list | ||
454 | of keys. | ||
455 | |||
456 | To unlock an agent, a client may request: | ||
457 | |||
458 | byte SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK | ||
459 | string passphrase | ||
460 | |||
461 | If the passphrase matches and the agent is locked, then it will resume | ||
462 | processing all requests and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If the agent | ||
463 | is not locked or the passphrase does not match then it will return | ||
464 | SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. | ||
465 | |||
466 | Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys. | ||
467 | |||
468 | 3. Protocol message numbers | ||
469 | |||
470 | 3.1 Requests from client to agent for protocol 1 key operations | ||
471 | |||
472 | SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1 | ||
473 | SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3 | ||
474 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7 | ||
475 | SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8 | ||
476 | SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9 | ||
477 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24 | ||
478 | |||
479 | 3.2 Requests from client to agent for protocol 2 key operations | ||
480 | |||
481 | SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11 | ||
482 | SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13 | ||
483 | SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17 | ||
484 | SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18 | ||
485 | SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19 | ||
486 | SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25 | ||
487 | |||
488 | 3.3 Key-type independent requests from client to agent | ||
489 | |||
490 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20 | ||
491 | SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21 | ||
492 | SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22 | ||
493 | SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23 | ||
494 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26 | ||
495 | |||
496 | 3.4 Generic replies from agent to client | ||
497 | |||
498 | SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5 | ||
499 | SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6 | ||
500 | |||
501 | 3.5 Replies from agent to client for protocol 1 key operations | ||
502 | |||
503 | SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2 | ||
504 | SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4 | ||
505 | |||
506 | 3.6 Replies from agent to client for protocol 2 key operations | ||
507 | |||
508 | SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12 | ||
509 | SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14 | ||
510 | |||
511 | 3.7 Key constraint identifiers | ||
512 | |||
513 | SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 | ||
514 | SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 | ||
515 | |||
516 | $OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.4 2008/07/01 23:12:47 stevesk Exp $ | ||