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authorDarren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>2016-07-15 13:32:45 +1000
committerColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2016-07-22 13:58:37 +0100
commite5ef9d3942cebda819a6fd81647b51c8d87d23df (patch)
tree51e73ff68b275ee8f0555a4a9fb8b2b9ad1155f4 /auth-passwd.c
parent43a633de1cabe77e652125dac394a99ad9cac3b4 (diff)
Determine appropriate salt for invalid users.
When sshd is processing a non-PAM login for a non-existent user it uses the string from the fakepw structure as the salt for crypt(3)ing the password supplied by the client. That string has a Blowfish prefix, so on systems that don't understand that crypt will fail fast due to an invalid salt, and even on those that do it may have significantly different timing from the hash methods used for real accounts (eg sha512). This allows user enumeration by, eg, sending large password strings. This was noted by EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com (CVE-2016-6210). To mitigate, use the same hash algorithm that root uses for hashing passwords for users that do not exist on the system. ok djm@ Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=9286875a73b2de7736b5e50692739d314cd8d9dc Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831902 Last-Update: 2016-07-22 Patch-Name: CVE-2016-6210-1.patch
Diffstat (limited to 'auth-passwd.c')
-rw-r--r--auth-passwd.c12
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/auth-passwd.c b/auth-passwd.c
index 63ccf3cab..530b5d4f7 100644
--- a/auth-passwd.c
+++ b/auth-passwd.c
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int
193sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) 193sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
194{ 194{
195 struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; 195 struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
196 char *encrypted_password; 196 char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
197 197
198 /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */ 198 /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
199 char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd; 199 char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
@@ -202,9 +202,13 @@ sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
202 if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0) 202 if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
203 return (1); 203 return (1);
204 204
205 /* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */ 205 /*
206 encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, 206 * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a
207 (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx"); 207 * NULL and let xcrypt pick one.
208 */
209 if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1])
210 salt = pw_password;
211 encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt);
208 212
209 /* 213 /*
210 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords 214 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords