Allow ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and other secure files to be

group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the
file's owner; this extends a patch previously applied to ~/.ssh/config
(closes: #581919).

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 54f4548f1..a188b891e 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -385,8 +385,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
                 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
                 if (options.strict_modes &&
                     (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
-                    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
-                    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+                    !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
                         logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
                             "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
                             pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
@@ -438,8 +437,7 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 
         /* check the open file to avoid races */
         if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
-            (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
-            (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+            !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) {
                 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
                     buf);
                 return -1;
@@ -455,8 +453,7 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
 
                 debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
                 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
-                    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
-                    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+                    !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) {
                         snprintf(err, errlen,
                             "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
                         return -1;