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authorColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2008-07-22 19:45:18 +0000
committerColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2008-07-22 19:45:18 +0000
commit137d76ba65883aa8143af1fcad83b57e7badef0c (patch)
treef426e804bb5248ceafedfab7bb78ae6e6752942c /auth.c
parentdac7d049dad31f5f84d421d4eb628a7e13f977d7 (diff)
parentef94e5613d37bcbf880f21ee6094e4b1c7683a4c (diff)
* New upstream release (closes: #474301). Important changes not previously
backported to 4.7p1: - 4.9/4.9p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.9): + Added chroot(2) support for sshd(8), controlled by a new option "ChrootDirectory" (closes: #139047, LP: #24777). + Linked sftp-server(8) into sshd(8). The internal sftp server is used when the command "internal-sftp" is specified in a Subsystem or ForceCommand declaration. When used with ChrootDirectory, the internal sftp server requires no special configuration of files inside the chroot environment. + Added a protocol extension method "posix-rename@openssh.com" for sftp-server(8) to perform POSIX atomic rename() operations; sftp(1) prefers this if available (closes: #308561). + Removed the fixed limit of 100 file handles in sftp-server(8). + ssh(8) will now skip generation of SSH protocol 1 ephemeral server keys when in inetd mode and protocol 2 connections are negotiated. This speeds up protocol 2 connections to inetd-mode servers that also allow Protocol 1. + Accept the PermitRootLogin directive in a sshd_config(5) Match block. Allows for, e.g. permitting root only from the local network. + Reworked sftp(1) argument splitting and escaping to be more internally consistent (i.e. between sftp commands) and more consistent with sh(1). Please note that this will change the interpretation of some quoted strings, especially those with embedded backslash escape sequences. + Support "Banner=none" in sshd_config(5) to disable sending of a pre-login banner (e.g. in a Match block). + ssh(1) ProxyCommands are now executed with $SHELL rather than /bin/sh. + ssh(1)'s ConnectTimeout option is now applied to both the TCP connection and the SSH banner exchange (previously it just covered the TCP connection). This allows callers of ssh(1) to better detect and deal with stuck servers that accept a TCP connection but don't progress the protocol, and also makes ConnectTimeout useful for connections via a ProxyCommand. + scp(1) incorrectly reported "stalled" on slow copies (closes: #140828). + scp(1) date underflow for timestamps before epoch. + ssh(1) used the obsolete SIG DNS RRtype for host keys in DNS, instead of the current standard RRSIG. + Correctly drain ACKs when a sftp(1) upload write fails midway, avoids a fatal() exit from what should be a recoverable condition. + Fixed ssh-keygen(1) selective host key hashing (i.e. "ssh-keygen -HF hostname") to not include any IP address in the data to be hashed. + Make ssh(1) skip listening on the IPv6 wildcard address when a binding address of 0.0.0.0 is used against an old SSH server that does not support the RFC4254 syntax for wildcard bind addresses. + Enable IPV6_V6ONLY socket option on sshd(8) listen socket, as is already done for X11/TCP forwarding sockets (closes: #439661). + Fix FD leak that could hang a ssh(1) connection multiplexing master. + Make ssh(1) -q option documentation consistent with reality. + Fixed sshd(8) PAM support not calling pam_session_close(), or failing to call it with root privileges (closes: #372680). + Fix activation of OpenSSL engine support when requested in configure (LP: #119295). - 5.1/5.1p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.1): + Introduce experimental SSH Fingerprint ASCII Visualisation to ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1). Visual fingerprint display is controlled by a new ssh_config(5) option "VisualHostKey". The intent is to render SSH host keys in a visual form that is amenable to easy recall and rejection of changed host keys. + sshd_config(5) now supports CIDR address/masklen matching in "Match address" blocks, with a fallback to classic wildcard matching. + sshd(8) now supports CIDR matching in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys from="..." restrictions, also with a fallback to classic wildcard matching. + Added an extended test mode (-T) to sshd(8) to request that it write its effective configuration to stdout and exit. Extended test mode also supports the specification of connection parameters (username, source address and hostname) to test the application of sshd_config(5) Match rules. + ssh(1) now prints the number of bytes transferred and the overall connection throughput for SSH protocol 2 sessions when in verbose mode (previously these statistics were displayed for protocol 1 connections only). + sftp-server(8) now supports extension methods statvfs@openssh.com and fstatvfs@openssh.com that implement statvfs(2)-like operations. + sftp(1) now has a "df" command to the sftp client that uses the statvfs@openssh.com to produce a df(1)-like display of filesystem space and inode utilisation (requires statvfs@openssh.com support on the server). + Added a MaxSessions option to sshd_config(5) to allow control of the number of multiplexed sessions supported over a single TCP connection. This allows increasing the number of allowed sessions above the previous default of 10, disabling connection multiplexing (MaxSessions=1) or disallowing login/shell/subsystem sessions entirely (MaxSessions=0). + Added a no-more-sessions@openssh.com global request extension that is sent from ssh(1) to sshd(8) when the client knows that it will never request another session (i.e. when session multiplexing is disabled). This allows a server to disallow further session requests and terminate the session in cases where the client has been hijacked. + ssh-keygen(1) now supports the use of the -l option in combination with -F to search for a host in ~/.ssh/known_hosts and display its fingerprint. + ssh-keyscan(1) now defaults to "rsa" (protocol 2) keys, instead of "rsa1". + Added an AllowAgentForwarding option to sshd_config(8) to control whether authentication agent forwarding is permitted. Note that this is a loose control, as a client may install their own unofficial forwarder. + ssh(1) and sshd(8): avoid unnecessary malloc/copy/free when receiving network data, resulting in a ~10% speedup. + ssh(1) and sshd(8) will now try additional addresses when connecting to a port forward destination whose DNS name resolves to more than one address. The previous behaviour was to try the only first address and give up if that failed. + ssh(1) and sshd(8) now support signalling that channels are half-closed for writing, through a channel protocol extension notification "eow@openssh.com". This allows propagation of closed file descriptors, so that commands such as "ssh -2 localhost od /bin/ls | true" do not send unnecessary data over the wire. + sshd(8): increased the default size of ssh protocol 1 ephemeral keys from 768 to 1024 bits. + When ssh(1) has been requested to fork after authentication ("ssh -f") with ExitOnForwardFailure enabled, delay the fork until after replies for any -R forwards have been seen. Allows for robust detection of -R forward failure when using -f. + "Match group" blocks in sshd_config(5) now support negation of groups. E.g. "Match group staff,!guests". + sftp(1) and sftp-server(8) now allow chmod-like operations to set set[ug]id/sticky bits. + The MaxAuthTries option is now permitted in sshd_config(5) match blocks. + Multiplexed ssh(1) sessions now support a subset of the ~ escapes that are available to a primary connection. + ssh(1) connection multiplexing will now fall back to creating a new connection in most error cases (closes: #352830). + Make ssh(1) deal more gracefully with channel requests that fail. Previously it would optimistically assume that requests would always succeed, which could cause hangs if they did not (e.g. when the server runs out of file descriptors). + ssh(1) now reports multiplexing errors via the multiplex slave's stderr where possible (subject to LogLevel in the mux master). + Prevent sshd(8) from erroneously applying public key restrictions leaned from ~/.ssh/authorized_keys to other authentication methods when public key authentication subsequently fails (LP: #161047). + Fixed an UMAC alignment problem that manifested on Itanium platforms.
Diffstat (limited to 'auth.c')
-rw-r--r--auth.c49
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index fa32da70f..af6b052bf 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
1/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.75 2006/08/03 03:34:41 deraadt Exp $ */ 1/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.79 2008/07/02 12:03:51 dtucker Exp $ */
2/* 2/*
3 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. 3 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
4 * 4 *
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
32#include <netinet/in.h> 32#include <netinet/in.h>
33 33
34#include <errno.h> 34#include <errno.h>
35#include <fcntl.h>
35#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H 36#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
36# include <paths.h> 37# include <paths.h>
37#endif 38#endif
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@
48#include <stdarg.h> 49#include <stdarg.h>
49#include <stdio.h> 50#include <stdio.h>
50#include <string.h> 51#include <string.h>
52#include <unistd.h>
51 53
52#include "xmalloc.h" 54#include "xmalloc.h"
53#include "match.h" 55#include "match.h"
@@ -114,6 +116,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
114#endif /* USE_SHADOW */ 116#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
115 117
116 /* grab passwd field for locked account check */ 118 /* grab passwd field for locked account check */
119 passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
117#ifdef USE_SHADOW 120#ifdef USE_SHADOW
118 if (spw != NULL) 121 if (spw != NULL)
119#ifdef USE_LIBIAF 122#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
@@ -121,8 +124,6 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
121#else 124#else
122 passwd = spw->sp_pwdp; 125 passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
123#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ 126#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
124#else
125 passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
126#endif 127#endif
127 128
128 /* check for locked account */ 129 /* check for locked account */
@@ -443,7 +444,7 @@ reject_blacklisted_key(Key *key, int hostkey)
443 * 444 *
444 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure 445 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
445 */ 446 */
446int 447static int
447secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, 448secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
448 char *err, size_t errlen) 449 char *err, size_t errlen)
449{ 450{
@@ -503,6 +504,46 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
503 return 0; 504 return 0;
504} 505}
505 506
507FILE *
508auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
509{
510 char line[1024];
511 struct stat st;
512 int fd;
513 FILE *f;
514
515 /*
516 * Open the file containing the authorized keys
517 * Fail quietly if file does not exist
518 */
519 if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
520 return NULL;
521
522 if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
523 close(fd);
524 return NULL;
525 }
526 if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
527 logit("User %s authorized keys %s is not a regular file",
528 pw->pw_name, file);
529 close(fd);
530 return NULL;
531 }
532 unset_nonblock(fd);
533 if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
534 close(fd);
535 return NULL;
536 }
537 if (options.strict_modes &&
538 secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
539 fclose(f);
540 logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
541 return NULL;
542 }
543
544 return f;
545}
546
506struct passwd * 547struct passwd *
507getpwnamallow(const char *user) 548getpwnamallow(const char *user)
508{ 549{