- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/07 11:30:30

     [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c]
     [key.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
     add some optional indirection to matching of principal names listed
     in certificates. Currently, a certificate must include the a user's name
     to be accepted for authentication. This change adds the ability to
     specify a list of certificate principal names that are acceptable.

     When authenticating using a CA trusted through ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
     this adds a new principals="name1[,name2,...]" key option.

     For CAs listed through sshd_config's TrustedCAKeys option, a new config
     option "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile" specifies a per-user file containing
     the list of acceptable names.

     If either option is absent, the current behaviour of requiring the
     username to appear in principals continues to apply.

     These options are useful for role accounts, disjoint account namespaces
     and "user@realm"-style naming policies in certificates.

     feedback and ok markus@

1 files changed, 30 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 89a936068..bec191a59 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.86 2010/03/05 02:58:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.87 2010/05/07 11:30:29 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -366,6 +366,14 @@ authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
         return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
 }
 
+char *
+authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+        if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
+                return NULL;
+        return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
+}
+
 /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
 HostStatus
 check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
@@ -477,21 +485,18 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
         return 0;
 }
 
-FILE *
-auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
+static FILE *
+auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
+    int log_missing, char *file_type)
 {
         char line[1024];
         struct stat st;
         int fd;
         FILE *f;
 
-        /*
-         * Open the file containing the authorized keys
-         * Fail quietly if file does not exist
-         */
         if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
-                if (errno != ENOENT)
-                        debug("Could not open keyfile '%s': %s", file,
+                if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
+                        debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
                            strerror(errno));
                 return NULL;
         }
@@ -501,8 +506,8 @@ auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
                 return NULL;
         }
         if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
-                logit("User %s authorized keys %s is not a regular file",
-                    pw->pw_name, file);
+                logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
+                    pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
                 close(fd);
                 return NULL;
         }
@@ -521,6 +526,20 @@ auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
         return f;
 }
 
+
+FILE *
+auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
+{
+        return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
+}
+
+FILE *
+auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
+{
+        return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
+            "authorized principals");
+}
+
 struct passwd *
 getpwnamallow(const char *user)
 {