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authorSimon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>2014-02-09 16:09:48 +0000
committerColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2016-01-14 15:07:15 +0000
commit6a0a4b2f79889c9b0d5e2478a6ee5f51be38dcc9 (patch)
tree2f8cd5a92310d9ed3b7020366f3030fc0d1b53a4 /auth.c
parenteeff4de96f5d7365750dc56912c2c62b5c28db6b (diff)
GSSAPI key exchange support
This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned system resources." However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate -krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good security history. Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242 Last-Updated: 2016-01-04 Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
Diffstat (limited to 'auth.c')
-rw-r--r--auth.c3
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 214c2c708..bd6a026a1 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -354,7 +354,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
354 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: 354 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
355 if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || 355 if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
356 strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || 356 strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
357 strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) 357 strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 ||
358 strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0)
358 return 1; 359 return 1;
359 break; 360 break;
360 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: 361 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: