* New upstream release (closes: #453367).

  - CVE-2007-4752: Prevent ssh(1) from using a trusted X11 cookie if
    creation of an untrusted cookie fails; found and fixed by Jan Pechanec
    (closes: #444738).
  - sshd(8) in new installations defaults to SSH Protocol 2 only. Existing
    installations are unchanged.
  - The SSH channel window size has been increased, and both ssh(1)
    sshd(8) now send window updates more aggressively. These improves
    performance on high-BDP (Bandwidth Delay Product) networks.
  - ssh(1) and sshd(8) now preserve MAC contexts between packets, which
    saves 2 hash calls per packet and results in 12-16% speedup for
    arcfour256/hmac-md5.
  - A new MAC algorithm has been added, UMAC-64 (RFC4418) as
    "umac-64@openssh.com". UMAC-64 has been measured to be approximately
    20% faster than HMAC-MD5.
  - Failure to establish a ssh(1) TunnelForward is now treated as a fatal
    error when the ExitOnForwardFailure option is set.
  - ssh(1) returns a sensible exit status if the control master goes away
    without passing the full exit status.
  - When using a ProxyCommand in ssh(1), set the outgoing hostname with
    gethostname(2), allowing hostbased authentication to work.
  - Make scp(1) skip FIFOs rather than hanging (closes: #246774).
  - Encode non-printing characters in scp(1) filenames. These could cause
    copies to be aborted with a "protocol error".
  - Handle SIGINT in sshd(8) privilege separation child process to ensure
    that wtmp and lastlog records are correctly updated.
  - Report GSSAPI mechanism in errors, for libraries that support multiple
    mechanisms.
  - Improve documentation for ssh-add(1)'s -d option.
  - Rearrange and tidy GSSAPI code, removing server-only code being linked
    into the client.
  - Delay execution of ssh(1)'s LocalCommand until after all forwardings
    have been established.
  - In scp(1), do not truncate non-regular files.
  - Improve exit message from ControlMaster clients.
  - Prevent sftp-server(8) from reading until it runs out of buffer space,
    whereupon it would exit with a fatal error (closes: #365541).
  - pam_end() was not being called if authentication failed
    (closes: #405041).
  - Manual page datestamps updated (closes: #433181).

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 505102f8a..c1e0f4812 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -115,11 +115,11 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
         /* grab passwd field for locked account check */
 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
         if (spw != NULL)
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
                 passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
 #else
                 passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
-#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF  && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
 #else
         passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
 #endif
@@ -141,9 +141,9 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
                 if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
                         locked = 1;
 #endif
-#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
                 free(passwd);
-#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF  && !BROKEN_LIBIAF */
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
                 if (locked) {
                         logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
                             pw->pw_name);