- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/05/23 03:33:38

     [auth.c]
     make secure_filename() spam debug logs less

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index cac12b2e7..cd95da931 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.93 2011/05/23 03:30:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.94 2011/05/23 03:33:38 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -456,7 +456,6 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
                 }
                 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
 
-                debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
                 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
                     (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
                     (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
@@ -466,11 +465,9 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
                 }
 
                 /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
-                if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
-                        debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
-                            buf);
+                if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
                         break;
-                }
+
                 /*
                  * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
                  * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too