* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.2).

  - Add support for multiple required authentication in SSH protocol 2 via
    an AuthenticationMethods option (closes: #195716).
  - Fix Sophie Germain formula in moduli(5) (closes: #698612).
  - Update ssh-copy-id to Phil Hands' greatly revised version (closes:
    #99785, #322228, #620428; LP: #518883, #835901, #1074798).

1 files changed, 196 insertions, 20 deletions

diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index d42ba14b8..f980b0dad 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.30 2011/09/25 05:44:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.34 2013/02/14 21:35:59 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -27,9 +27,15 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
 
+#include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
 #include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -241,7 +247,7 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct KeyCert *cert)
                         if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
                                 debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
                                     "from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
-                                    cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
+                                    cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
                                 if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
                                     file, linenum) != 1)
                                         continue;
@@ -254,31 +260,22 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct KeyCert *cert)
         fclose(f);
         restore_uid();
         return 0;
-}       
+}
 
-/* return 1 if user allows given key */
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
 static int
-user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
+check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
 {
         char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
         const char *reason;
         int found_key = 0;
-        FILE *f;
         u_long linenum = 0;
         Key *found;
         char *fp;
 
-        /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
-        temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-
-        debug("trying public key file %s", file);
-        f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
-
-        if (!f) {
-                restore_uid();
-                return 0;
-        }
-
         found_key = 0;
         found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
 
@@ -373,8 +370,6 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
                         break;
                 }
         }
-        restore_uid();
-        fclose(f);
         key_free(found);
         if (!found_key)
                 debug2("key not found");
@@ -437,7 +432,180 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
         return ret;
 }
 
-/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
+{
+        FILE *f;
+        int found_key = 0;
+
+        /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+        temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+        debug("trying public key file %s", file);
+        if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
+                found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
+                fclose(f);
+        }
+
+        restore_uid();
+        return found_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
+{
+        FILE *f;
+        int ok, found_key = 0;
+        struct passwd *pw;
+        struct stat st;
+        int status, devnull, p[2], i;
+        pid_t pid;
+        char *username, errmsg[512];
+
+        if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
+            options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
+                return 0;
+
+        if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
+                error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
+            "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+        pw = getpwnam(username);
+        if (pw == NULL) {
+                error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
+                    username, strerror(errno));
+                free(username);
+                return 0;
+        }
+        free(username);
+
+        temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+        if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
+                error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
+                    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+                goto out;
+        }
+        if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
+            errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+                error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
+                goto out;
+        }
+
+        if (pipe(p) != 0) {
+                error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+                goto out;
+        }
+
+        debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
+            options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
+
+        /*
+         * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+         * run cleanup_exit() code.
+         */
+        restore_uid();
+
+        switch ((pid = fork())) {
+        case -1: /* error */
+                error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+                close(p[0]);
+                close(p[1]);
+                return 0;
+        case 0: /* child */
+                for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
+                        signal(i, SIG_DFL);
+
+                if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+                        error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+                            strerror(errno));
+                        _exit(1);
+                }
+                /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
+                if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+                    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
+                        error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+                        _exit(1);
+                }
+                closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+                /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
+                if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+                        error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+                            strerror(errno));
+                        _exit(1);
+                }
+                if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+                        error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+                            strerror(errno));
+                        _exit(1);
+                }
+                /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
+                if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+                        error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+                        _exit(1);
+                }
+
+                execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
+                    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
+
+                error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
+                    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+                _exit(127);
+        default: /* parent */
+                break;
+        }
+
+        temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+        close(p[1]);
+        if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+                error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+                close(p[0]);
+                /* Don't leave zombie child */
+                kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+                while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+                        ;
+                goto out;
+        }
+        ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
+        fclose(f);
+
+        while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+                if (errno != EINTR) {
+                        error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+                        goto out;
+                }
+        }
+        if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+                error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
+                    options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
+                goto out;
+        } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+                error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
+                    options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+                goto out;
+        }
+        found_key = ok;
+ out:
+        restore_uid();
+        return found_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
+ */
 int
 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
 {
@@ -454,9 +622,17 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
         if (success)
                 return success;
 
+        success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
+        if (success > 0)
+                return success;
+
         for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
+
+                if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
+                        continue;
                 file = expand_authorized_keys(
                     options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
+
                 success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
                 xfree(file);
         }