upstream: In sshkey_in_file(), ignore keys that are considered for

being too short (i.e. SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH). These keys will not be considered
to be "in the file". This allows key revocation lists to contain short keys
without the entire revocation list being considered invalid.

bz#2897; ok dtucker

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9f3d857d07194a42ad7e62889a74dc3f9d9924b

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
index be4a57736..b1c92f4ad 100644
--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.130 2018/07/09 21:59:10 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.131 2018/09/21 12:20:12 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -459,6 +459,8 @@ sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
                 return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
 
         while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+                sshkey_free(pub);
+                pub = NULL;
                 cp = line;
 
                 /* Skip leading whitespace. */
@@ -477,16 +479,20 @@ sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
                         r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
                         goto out;
                 }
-                if ((r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) != 0)
+                switch (r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) {
+                case 0:
+                        break;
+                case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH:
+                        continue;
+                default:
                         goto out;
+                }
                 if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) ||
                     (check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
                     sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) {
                         r = 0;
                         goto out;
                 }
-                sshkey_free(pub);
-                pub = NULL;
         }
         r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
  out: