Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 17 insertions, 89 deletions

diff --git a/bufec.c b/bufec.c
index 89482b906..749ce9d4c 100644
--- a/bufec.c
+++ b/bufec.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: bufec.c,v 1.3 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: bufec.c,v 1.4 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */
+
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
@@ -15,73 +16,29 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-#include "includes.h"
+/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#include "includes.h"
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 
-/*
- * Maximum supported EC GFp field length is 528 bits. SEC1 uncompressed
- * encoding represents this as two bitstring points that should each
- * be no longer than the field length, SEC1 specifies a 1 byte
- * point type header.
- * Being paranoid here may insulate us to parsing problems in
- * EC_POINT_oct2point.
- */
-#define BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN ((528*2 / 8) + 1)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 
-/*
- * Append an EC_POINT to the buffer as a string containing a SEC1 encoded
- * uncompressed point. Fortunately OpenSSL handles the gory details for us.
- */
 int
 buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
     const EC_POINT *point)
 {
-        u_char *buf = NULL;
-        size_t len;
-        BN_CTX *bnctx;
-        int ret = -1;
+        int ret;
 
-        /* Determine length */
-        if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-                fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
-        len = EC_POINT_point2oct(curve, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
-            NULL, 0, bnctx);
-        if (len > BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN) {
-                error("%s: giant EC point: len = %lu (max %u)",
-                    __func__, (u_long)len, BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN);
-                goto out;
-        }
-        /* Convert */
-        buf = xmalloc(len);
-        if (EC_POINT_point2oct(curve, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
-            buf, len, bnctx) != len) {
-                error("%s: EC_POINT_point2oct length mismatch", __func__);
-                goto out;
-        }
-        /* Append */
-        buffer_put_string(buffer, buf, len);
-        ret = 0;
- out:
-        if (buf != NULL) {
-                explicit_bzero(buf, len);
-                free(buf);
+        if ((ret = sshbuf_put_ec(buffer, point, curve)) != 0) {
+                error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
+                return -1;
         }
-        BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
-        return ret;
+        return 0;
 }
 
 void
@@ -96,43 +53,13 @@ int
 buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
     EC_POINT *point)
 {
-        u_char *buf;
-        u_int len;
-        BN_CTX *bnctx;
-        int ret = -1;
+        int ret;
 
-        if ((buf = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
-                error("%s: invalid point", __func__);
+        if ((ret = sshbuf_get_ec(buffer, point, curve)) != 0) {
+                error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret));
                 return -1;
         }
-        if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-                fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
-        if (len > BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN) {
-                error("%s: EC_POINT too long: %u > max %u", __func__,
-                    len, BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN);
-                goto out;
-        }
-        if (len == 0) {
-                error("%s: EC_POINT buffer is empty", __func__);
-                goto out;
-        }
-        if (buf[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
-                error("%s: EC_POINT is in an incorrect form: "
-                    "0x%02x (want 0x%02x)", __func__, buf[0],
-                    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED);
-                goto out;
-        }
-        if (EC_POINT_oct2point(curve, point, buf, len, bnctx) != 1) {
-                error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
-                goto out;
-        }
-        /* EC_POINT_oct2point verifies that the point is on the curve for us */
-        ret = 0;
- out:
-        BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
-        explicit_bzero(buf, len);
-        free(buf);
-        return ret;
+        return 0;
 }
 
 void
@@ -144,3 +71,4 @@ buffer_get_ecpoint(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
 }
 
 #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+