- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06

     [auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
     [packet.c ssh-rsa.c]
     implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
     timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
     some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
     readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
index fe08257df..e52946bcd 100644
--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.306 2010/06/25 07:20:04 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.307 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
         }
         /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */
         if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len ||
-            memcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
+            timing_safe_cmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
                 x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) {
                 debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data.");
                 return -1;