Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 18 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
index 4fab9d7c4..a000c98e5 100644
--- a/channels.h
+++ b/channels.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.113 2013/06/07 15:37:52 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.115 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -56,7 +56,9 @@
 #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER        15      /* Listener for mux conn. */
 #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT          16      /* Conn. to mux slave */
 #define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED           17      /* Abandoned session, eg mux */
-#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE            18
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER       18      /* Listening on a domain socket. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER      19      /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE            20
 
 #define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC      -1
 
@@ -254,6 +256,8 @@ char	*channel_open_message(void);
 int      channel_find_open(void);
 
 /* tcp forwarding */
+struct Forward;
+struct ForwardOptions;
 void     channel_set_af(int af);
 void     channel_permit_all_opens(void);
 void     channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int);
@@ -263,18 +267,19 @@ void	 channel_update_permitted_opens(int, int);
 void     channel_clear_permitted_opens(void);
 void     channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void);
 void     channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void);
-int      channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int);
-Channel *channel_connect_to(const char *, u_short, char *, char *);
+int      channel_input_port_forward_request(int, struct ForwardOptions *);
+Channel *channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *);
+Channel *channel_connect_to_path(const char *, char *, char *);
 Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char*, u_short, int, int);
-Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short, char *, char *);
-int      channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *, u_short,
-             const char *, u_short);
-int      channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short,
-             const char *, u_short, int);
-int      channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port);
-int      channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short, int *, int);
-int      channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *, u_short);
-int      channel_cancel_lport_listener(const char *, u_short, int, int);
+Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *, u_short,
+             char *, char *);
+Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *, char *, char *);
+int      channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *);
+int      channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, struct ForwardOptions *);
+int      channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *);
+int      channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, int *, struct ForwardOptions *);
+int      channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct Forward *);
+int      channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct Forward *, int, struct ForwardOptions *);
 int      permitopen_port(const char *);
 
 /* x11 forwarding */