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authorColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2020-02-21 11:57:14 +0000
committerColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2020-02-21 14:27:02 +0000
commit886e47e745586c34e81cfd5c5fb9b5dbc8e84d04 (patch)
treedd6c3b4dc64a17c520af7aaf213163f8a0a63e56 /debian/NEWS
parentac2b4c0697fcac554041ab95f81736887eadf6ec (diff)
parenta2dabf35ce0228c86a288d11cc847a9d9801604f (diff)
New upstream release (8.2p1)
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/NEWS')
-rw-r--r--debian/NEWS47
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/NEWS b/debian/NEWS
index 32a0c721e..1963c7919 100644
--- a/debian/NEWS
+++ b/debian/NEWS
@@ -1,3 +1,50 @@
1openssh (1:8.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
2
3 OpenSSH 8.2 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
4 configurations:
5
6 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): This release removes the "ssh-rsa"
7 (RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures
8 (i.e. the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will use
9 the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default when the ssh-keygen(1)
10 CA signs new certificates.
11
12 Certificates are at special risk to SHA1 collision vulnerabilities as
13 an attacker has effectively unlimited time in which to craft a
14 collision that yields them a valid certificate, far more than the
15 relatively brief LoginGraceTime window that they have to forge a host
16 key signature.
17
18 The OpenSSH certificate format includes a CA-specified (typically
19 random) nonce value near the start of the certificate that should make
20 exploitation of chosen-prefix collisions in this context challenging,
21 as the attacker does not have full control over the prefix that
22 actually gets signed. Nonetheless, SHA1 is now a demonstrably broken
23 algorithm and futher improvements in attacks are highly likely.
24
25 OpenSSH releases prior to 7.2 do not support the newer RSA/SHA2
26 algorithms and will refuse to accept certificates signed by an OpenSSH
27 8.2+ CA using RSA keys unless the unsafe algorithm is explicitly
28 selected during signing ("ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa"). Older
29 clients/servers may use another CA key type such as ssh-ed25519
30 (supported since OpenSSH 6.5) or one of the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521
31 types (supported since OpenSSH 5.7) instead if they cannot be upgraded.
32
33 * ssh(1), sshd(8): Remove diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 from the default
34 key exchange proposal for both the client and server.
35
36 * ssh-keygen(1): The command-line options related to the generation and
37 screening of safe prime numbers used by the
38 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* key exchange algorithms have changed.
39 Most options have been folded under the -O flag.
40
41 * sshd(8): The sshd listener process title visible to ps(1) has changed
42 to include information about the number of connections that are
43 currently attempting authentication and the limits configured by
44 MaxStartups.
45
46 -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Fri, 21 Feb 2020 12:11:52 +0000
47
1openssh (1:8.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium 48openssh (1:8.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
2 49
3 OpenSSH 8.1 includes a number of changes that may affect existing 50 OpenSSH 8.1 includes a number of changes that may affect existing