Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
index 8d26d7b6f..84a14cfb8 100644
--- a/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/auth-log-verbosity.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 283322f493ee7dc75511f6cf9e9b88e536de0874 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 1ecd5db58295874d8b9a7ce98fe1880ab08fbcaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
 Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:02 +0000
 Subject: Quieten logs when multiple from= restrictions are used
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Patch-Name: auth-log-verbosity.patch
  4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
-index fa209ea..df61330 100644
+index f3d9c9d..d4d22d7 100644
 --- a/auth-options.c
 +++ b/auth-options.c
 @@ -54,9 +54,20 @@ int forced_tun_device = -1;
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ index fa209ea..df61330 100644
                                 auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not "
                                     "permitted to use this key for login.",
                                     remote_host);
-@@ -510,11 +524,14 @@ parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
+@@ -511,11 +525,14 @@ parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
                                         break;
                                 case 0:
                                         /* no match */
@@ -91,10 +91,10 @@ index 7455c94..a3f0a02 100644
  void   auth_clear_options(void);
  int    auth_cert_options(Key *, struct passwd *);
 diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
-index 5dad6c3..260ce2f 100644
+index e9f4ede..5d7bdcb 100644
 --- a/auth-rsa.c
 +++ b/auth-rsa.c
-@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
+@@ -179,6 +179,8 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
         if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL)
                 return 0;
  
@@ -104,10 +104,10 @@ index 5dad6c3..260ce2f 100644
          * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key.  If
          * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
 diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
-index 0fd27bb..7c56927 100644
+index f3ca965..f78b046 100644
 --- a/auth2-pubkey.c
 +++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct KeyCert *cert)
+@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
                 restore_uid();
                 return 0;
         }