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authorColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2014-10-07 13:33:15 +0100
committerColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2014-10-07 14:27:30 +0100
commitf0b009aea83e9ff3a50be30f51012099a5143c16 (patch)
tree3825e6f7e3b7ea4481d06ed89aba9a7a95150df5 /debian/patches/shell-path.patch
parent47f0bad4330b16ec3bad870fcf9839c196e42c12 (diff)
parent762c062828f5a8f6ed189ed6e44ad38fd92f8b36 (diff)
Merge 6.7p1.
* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7): - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to remove unsafe algorithms. In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are disabled by default. The full set of algorithms remains available if configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options. - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718). - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519 key types. - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads. - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is the same as the one sent during initial key exchange. - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family. - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys option. - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local host, remote user, hostname, port). Helps avoid exceeding miserly pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths. - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the authentication success / failure messages. - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes: #734553). - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing /proc/self/{mem,maps}. * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7. It is true that dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice. It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze. * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status field.
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches/shell-path.patch')
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/shell-path.patch8
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/shell-path.patch b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
index 48c16d2a2..07e20f03d 100644
--- a/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
1From 6103c29d855e82c098e88ee12f05a6eb41f659ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 1From 66377fbb52584b41bd7f6f19116107fbbad41058 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> 2From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:00 +0000 3Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:00 +0000
4Subject: Look for $SHELL on the path for ProxyCommand/LocalCommand 4Subject: Look for $SHELL on the path for ProxyCommand/LocalCommand
@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ Patch-Name: shell-path.patch
16 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) 16 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
17 17
18diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c 18diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
19index 573d7a8..9e02837 100644 19index ac09eae..26116d2 100644
20--- a/sshconnect.c 20--- a/sshconnect.c
21+++ b/sshconnect.c 21+++ b/sshconnect.c
22@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) 22@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
23 /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any 23 /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
24 extra privileges above. */ 24 extra privileges above. */
25 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); 25 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ index 573d7a8..9e02837 100644
28 perror(argv[0]); 28 perror(argv[0]);
29 exit(1); 29 exit(1);
30 } 30 }
31@@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ ssh_local_cmd(const char *args) 31@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
32 if (pid == 0) { 32 if (pid == 0) {
33 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); 33 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
34 debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); 34 debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);