- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06

     [auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
     [packet.c ssh-rsa.c]
     implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
     timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
     some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
     readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/jpake.c b/jpake.c
index 130661069..50cf5c82e 100644
--- a/jpake.c
+++ b/jpake.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.2 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.3 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
         if (peer_confirm_hash_len != expected_confirm_hash_len)
                 error("%s: confirmation length mismatch (my %u them %u)",
                     __func__, expected_confirm_hash_len, peer_confirm_hash_len);
-        else if (memcmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash,
+        else if (timing_safe_cmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash,
             expected_confirm_hash_len) == 0)
                 success = 1;
         bzero(expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len);