GSSAPI key exchange support

This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
years.  This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface.  This one is
particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
system resources."

However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
-krb5 packages (as we used to have).  It seems to have a generally good
security history.

Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
Last-Updated: 2015-08-19

Patch-Name: gssapi.patch

1 files changed, 295 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0847469af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgsss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+int
+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+        
+        /* 
+         * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
+         * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific 
+         * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently 
+         * activating this non-standard behaviour.
+         */
+
+        OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
+        gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
+        gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+        Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+        u_int slen, klen, kout;
+        u_char *kbuf;
+        DH *dh;
+        int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
+        BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+        BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+        int type = 0;
+        gss_OID oid;
+        char *mechs;
+        u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+        size_t hashlen;
+
+        /* Initialise GSSAPI */
+
+        /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
+         * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
+         * into life
+         */
+        if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
+                mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+                free(mechs);
+        }
+
+        debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, ssh->kex->name);
+        oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+        if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+           fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
+
+        debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
+                fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
+
+        switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+                dh = dh_new_group1();
+                break;
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+                dh = dh_new_group14();
+                break;
+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+                debug("Doing group exchange");
+                packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+                min = packet_get_int();
+                nbits = packet_get_int();
+                max = packet_get_int();
+                min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+                max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+                packet_check_eom();
+                if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
+                        fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
+                            min, nbits, max);
+                dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
+                if (dh == NULL)
+                        packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
+
+                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
+                packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
+                packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
+                packet_send();
+
+                packet_write_wait();
+                break;
+        default:
+                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+        }
+
+        dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
+
+        do {
+                debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
+                type = packet_read();
+                switch(type) {
+                case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
+                        if (dh_client_pub != NULL) 
+                                fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
+                        recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+                        recv_tok.length = slen; 
+
+                        if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                                fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
+
+                        packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
+
+                        /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
+                        break;
+                case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+                        recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+                        recv_tok.length = slen; 
+                        break;
+                default:
+                        packet_disconnect(
+                            "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+                            type);
+                }
+
+                maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, 
+                    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
+
+                free(recv_tok.value);
+
+                if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
+                        fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
+
+                if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
+                        fatal("No client public key");
+                
+                if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+                        debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+                        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                        packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+                        packet_send();
+                        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+                }
+        } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+                if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+                        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                        packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+                        packet_send();
+                }
+                fatal("accept_ctx died");
+        }
+
+        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+                fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
+
+        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+                fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
+        
+        if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
+                packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+
+        klen = DH_size(dh);
+        kbuf = xmalloc(klen); 
+        kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
+        if (kout < 0)
+                fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+
+        shared_secret = BN_new();
+        if (shared_secret == NULL)
+                fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
+
+        if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+                fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+        memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+        free(kbuf);
+
+        hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+        switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+                kex_dh_hash(
+                    ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
+                    buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
+                    buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
+                    NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
+                    dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
+                    hash, &hashlen
+                );
+                break;
+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+                kexgex_hash(
+                    ssh->kex->hash_alg,
+                    ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
+                    buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
+                    buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
+                    NULL, 0,
+                    min, nbits, max,
+                    dh->p, dh->g,
+                    dh_client_pub,
+                    dh->pub_key,
+                    shared_secret,
+                    hash, &hashlen
+                );
+                break;
+        default:
+                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+        }
+
+        BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+
+        if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
+                ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+                ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
+                memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
+        }
+
+        gssbuf.value = hash;
+        gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
+                fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
+
+        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
+        packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+        packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
+
+        if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+                packet_put_char(1); /* true */
+                packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+        } else {
+                packet_put_char(0); /* false */
+        }
+        packet_send();
+
+        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
+
+        if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+                gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+        else 
+                ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+        DH_free(dh);
+
+        kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+        BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+        kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+
+        /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
+         * just exchanged.  */
+        if (options.gss_store_rekey)
+                ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
+        return 0;
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */