New upstream release (6.8p1).

1 files changed, 454 insertions, 391 deletions

diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index eb31df90f..4bbaa2080 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -14,12 +14,12 @@
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */
 
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.17 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.31 2015/01/30 01:10:33 djm Exp $ */
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
+#include <sys/param.h>  /* MIN */
 #include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
 #include <openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h>
 #include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
 
@@ -30,12 +30,14 @@
 #include <time.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "bitmap.h"
 
 #include "krl.h"
 
@@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp);
 /* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */
 struct revoked_blob {
         u_char *blob;
-        u_int len;
+        size_t len;
         RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry;
 };
 static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b);
@@ -81,7 +83,7 @@ RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp);
 
 /* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */
 struct revoked_certs {
-        Key *ca_key;
+        struct sshkey *ca_key;
         struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials;
         struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids;
         TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry;
@@ -154,8 +156,7 @@ revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc)
                 free(rki->key_id);
                 free(rki);
         }
-        if (rc->ca_key != NULL)
-                key_free(rc->ca_key);
+        sshkey_free(rc->ca_key);
 }
 
 void
@@ -190,12 +191,13 @@ ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version)
         krl->krl_version = version;
 }
 
-void
+int
 ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment)
 {
         free(krl->comment);
         if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL)
-                fatal("%s: strdup", __func__);
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+        return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -203,14 +205,16 @@ ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment)
  * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already.
  */
 static int
-revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
+revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
     struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create)
 {
         struct revoked_certs *rc;
+        int r;
 
         *rcp = NULL;
         TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
-                if (key_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) {
+                if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) ||
+                    sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) {
                         *rcp = rc;
                         return 0;
                 }
@@ -219,15 +223,18 @@ revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
                 return 0;
         /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */
         if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL)
-                return -1;
-        if ((rc->ca_key = key_from_private(ca_key)) == NULL) {
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+        if (ca_key == NULL)
+                rc->ca_key = NULL;
+        else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) {
                 free(rc);
-                return -1;
+                return r;
         }
         RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials);
         RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids);
         TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
-        debug3("%s: new CA %s", __func__, key_type(ca_key));
+        KRL_DBG(("%s: new CA %s", __func__,
+            ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key)));
         *rcp = rc;
         return 0;
 }
@@ -245,14 +252,14 @@ insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
         if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) {
                 /* No entry matches. Just insert */
                 if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL)
-                        return -1;
+                        return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
                 memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs));
                 ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs);
                 if (ers != NULL) {
                         KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__));
                         /* Shouldn't happen */
                         free(irs);
-                        return -1;
+                        return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
                 }
                 ers = irs;
         } else {
@@ -267,6 +274,7 @@ insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
                 if (ers->hi < hi)
                         ers->hi = hi;
         }
+
         /*
          * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones;
          * coalesce as necessary.
@@ -305,40 +313,42 @@ insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
 }
 
 int
-ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
     u_int64_t serial)
 {
         return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial);
 }
 
 int
-ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
-    u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+    const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
 {
         struct revoked_certs *rc;
+        int r;
 
         if (lo > hi || lo == 0)
-                return -1;
-        if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1) != 0)
-                return -1;
+                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
+                return r;
         return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi);
 }
 
 int
-ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
     const char *key_id)
 {
         struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki;
         struct revoked_certs *rc;
+        int r;
 
-        if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1) != 0)
-                return -1;
+        if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
+                return r;
 
-        debug3("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id);
+        KRL_DBG(("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id));
         if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL ||
             (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) {
                 free(rki);
-                fatal("%s: strdup", __func__);
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
         }
         erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
         if (erki != NULL) {
@@ -350,33 +360,32 @@ ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key,
 
 /* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */
 static int
-plain_key_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blob, u_int *blen)
+plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen)
 {
-        Key *kcopy;
+        struct sshkey *kcopy;
         int r;
 
-        if ((kcopy = key_from_private(key)) == NULL)
-                return -1;
-        if (key_is_cert(kcopy)) {
-                if (key_drop_cert(kcopy) != 0) {
-                        error("%s: key_drop_cert", __func__);
-                        key_free(kcopy);
-                        return -1;
+        if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0)
+                return r;
+        if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) {
+                if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) {
+                        sshkey_free(kcopy);
+                        return r;
                 }
         }
-        r = key_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen);
-        free(kcopy);
+        r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen);
+        sshkey_free(kcopy);
         return r;
 }
 
 /* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */
 static int
-revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, u_int len)
+revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len)
 {
         struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb;
 
         if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL)
-                return -1;
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
         rb->blob = blob;
         rb->len = len;
         erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb);
@@ -388,36 +397,39 @@ revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, u_int len)
 }
 
 int
-ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
+ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
 {
         u_char *blob;
-        u_int len;
+        size_t len;
+        int r;
 
-        debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, key_type(key));
-        if (plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len) < 0)
-                return -1;
+        debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+        if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0)
+                return r;
         return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len);
 }
 
 int
-ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
+ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
 {
         u_char *blob;
-        u_int len;
+        size_t len;
+        int r;
 
-        debug3("%s: revoke type %s by sha1", __func__, key_type(key));
-        if ((blob = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, &len)) == NULL)
-                return -1;
+        debug3("%s: revoke type %s by sha1", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
+        if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
+            &blob, &len)) != 0)
+                return r;
         return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_sha1s, blob, len);
 }
 
 int
-ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
+ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
 {
-        if (!key_is_cert(key))
+        if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
                 return ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key);
 
-        if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0) {
+        if (sshkey_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0) {
                 return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
                     key->cert->signature_key,
                     key->cert->key_id);
@@ -429,8 +441,8 @@ ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
 }
 
 /*
- * Select a copact next section type to emit in a KRL based on the
- * current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial
+ * Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on
+ * the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial
  * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial.
  * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type
  * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL.
@@ -500,50 +512,69 @@ choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final,
                 *force_new_section = 1;
                 cost = cost_bitmap_restart;
         }
-        debug3("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:"
+        KRL_DBG(("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:"
             "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, "
             "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig,
             (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final,
             (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range,
             (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap,
             (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state,
-            *force_new_section ? " restart" : "");
+            *force_new_section ? " restart" : ""));
         return new_state;
 }
 
+static int
+put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap)
+{
+        size_t len;
+        u_char *blob;
+        int r;
+
+        len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap);
+        if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+        if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) {
+                free(blob);
+                return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+        r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len);
+        free(blob);
+        return r;
+}
+
 /* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */
 static int
-revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, Buffer *buf)
+revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
 {
-        int final, force_new_sect, r = -1;
+        int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
         u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0;
         struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs;
         struct revoked_key_id *rki;
         int next_state, state = 0;
-        Buffer sect;
-        u_char *kblob = NULL;
-        u_int klen;
-        BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL;
-
-        /* Prepare CA scope key blob if we have one supplied */
-        if (key_to_blob(rc->ca_key, &kblob, &klen) == 0)
-                return -1;
+        struct sshbuf *sect;
+        struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
 
-        buffer_init(&sect);
+        if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 
-        /* Store the header */
-        buffer_put_string(buf, kblob, klen);
-        buffer_put_string(buf, NULL, 0); /* Reserved */
-
-        free(kblob);
+        /* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */
+        if (rc->ca_key == NULL) {
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
+        } else {
+                if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
+        }
+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+                goto out;
 
         /* Store the revoked serials.  */
         for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials);
              rs != NULL;
              rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) {
-                debug3("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__,
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__,
                     (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi,
-                    state);
+                    state));
 
                 /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */
                 nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
@@ -561,37 +592,43 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, Buffer *buf)
                  */
                 if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state ||
                     state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) {
-                        debug3("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state);
+                        KRL_DBG(("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state));
                         switch (state) {
                         case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
                         case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
                                 break;
                         case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
-                                buffer_put_bignum2(&sect, bitmap);
-                                BN_free(bitmap);
+                                if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
+                                        goto out;
+                                bitmap_free(bitmap);
                                 bitmap = NULL;
                                 break;
                         }
-                        buffer_put_char(buf, state);
-                        buffer_put_string(buf,
-                            buffer_ptr(&sect), buffer_len(&sect));
-                        buffer_clear(&sect);
+                        if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
+                            (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+                                goto out;
+                        sshbuf_reset(sect);
                 }
 
                 /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */
                 if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) {
-                        debug3("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__, next_state);
+                        KRL_DBG(("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__,
+                            next_state));
                         state = next_state;
-                        buffer_clear(&sect);
+                        sshbuf_reset(sect);
                         switch (state) {
                         case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
                         case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
                                 break;
                         case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
-                                if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                                if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
+                                        r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
                                         goto out;
+                                }
                                 bitmap_start = rs->lo;
-                                buffer_put_int64(&sect, bitmap_start);
+                                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect,
+                                    bitmap_start)) != 0)
+                                        goto out;
                                 break;
                         }
                 }
@@ -599,12 +636,15 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, Buffer *buf)
                 /* Perform section-specific processing */
                 switch (state) {
                 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
-                        for (i = 0; i < contig; i++)
-                                buffer_put_int64(&sect, rs->lo + i);
+                        for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
+                                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0)
+                                        goto out;
+                        }
                         break;
                 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
-                        buffer_put_int64(&sect, rs->lo);
-                        buffer_put_int64(&sect, rs->hi);
+                        if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 ||
+                            (r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0)
+                                goto out;
                         break;
                 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
                         if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
@@ -612,9 +652,11 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, Buffer *buf)
                                 goto out;
                         }
                         for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
-                                if (BN_set_bit(bitmap,
-                                    rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 1)
+                                if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap,
+                                    rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) {
+                                        r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
                                         goto out;
+                                }
                         }
                         break;
                 }
@@ -622,119 +664,125 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, Buffer *buf)
         }
         /* Flush the remaining section, if any */
         if (state != 0) {
-                debug3("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x",
-                    __func__, state);
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x",
+                    __func__, state));
                 switch (state) {
                 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
                 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
                         break;
                 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
-                        buffer_put_bignum2(&sect, bitmap);
-                        BN_free(bitmap);
+                        if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
+                                goto out;
+                        bitmap_free(bitmap);
                         bitmap = NULL;
                         break;
                 }
-                buffer_put_char(buf, state);
-                buffer_put_string(buf,
-                    buffer_ptr(&sect), buffer_len(&sect));
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
         }
-        debug3("%s: serial done ", __func__);
+        KRL_DBG(("%s: serial done ", __func__));
 
         /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */
-        buffer_clear(&sect);
+        sshbuf_reset(sect);
         RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
-                debug3("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id);
-                buffer_put_cstring(&sect, rki->key_id);
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id));
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
         }
-        if (buffer_len(&sect) != 0) {
-                buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID);
-                buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(&sect),
-                    buffer_len(&sect));
+        if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
         }
         r = 0;
  out:
-        if (bitmap != NULL)
-                BN_free(bitmap);
-        buffer_free(&sect);
+        bitmap_free(bitmap);
+        sshbuf_free(sect);
         return r;
 }
 
 int
-ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, Buffer *buf, const Key **sign_keys,
-    u_int nsign_keys)
+ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
+    const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys)
 {
-        int r = -1;
+        int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
         struct revoked_certs *rc;
         struct revoked_blob *rb;
-        Buffer sect;
-        u_char *kblob = NULL, *sblob = NULL;
-        u_int klen, slen, i;
+        struct sshbuf *sect;
+        u_char *sblob = NULL;
+        size_t slen, i;
 
         if (krl->generated_date == 0)
                 krl->generated_date = time(NULL);
 
-        buffer_init(&sect);
+        if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 
         /* Store the header */
-        buffer_append(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1);
-        buffer_put_int(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION);
-        buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->krl_version);
-        buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->generated_date);
-        buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->flags);
-        buffer_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
-        buffer_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment ? krl->comment : "");
+        if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date) != 0) ||
+            (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0)
+                goto out;
 
         /* Store sections for revoked certificates */
         TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
-                if (revoked_certs_generate(rc, &sect) != 0)
+                sshbuf_reset(sect);
+                if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
                         goto out;
-                buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES);
-                buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(&sect),
-                    buffer_len(&sect));
         }
 
         /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */
-        buffer_clear(&sect);
+        sshbuf_reset(sect);
         RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
-                debug3("%s: key len %u ", __func__, rb->len);
-                buffer_put_string(&sect, rb->blob, rb->len);
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: key len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
         }
-        if (buffer_len(&sect) != 0) {
-                buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY);
-                buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(&sect),
-                    buffer_len(&sect));
+        if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
         }
-        buffer_clear(&sect);
+        sshbuf_reset(sect);
         RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
-                debug3("%s: hash len %u ", __func__, rb->len);
-                buffer_put_string(&sect, rb->blob, rb->len);
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
         }
-        if (buffer_len(&sect) != 0) {
-                buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1);
-                buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(&sect),
-                    buffer_len(&sect));
+        if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf,
+                    KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
         }
 
         for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) {
-                if (key_to_blob(sign_keys[i], &kblob, &klen) == 0)
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: signature key %s", __func__,
+                    sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i])));
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0)
                         goto out;
 
-                debug3("%s: signature key len %u", __func__, klen);
-                buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE);
-                buffer_put_string(buf, kblob, klen);
-
-                if (key_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen,
-                    buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf)) == -1)
+                if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen,
+                    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), 0)) == -1)
+                        goto out;
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen));
+                if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0)
                         goto out;
-                debug3("%s: signature sig len %u", __func__, slen);
-                buffer_put_string(buf, sblob, slen);
         }
 
         r = 0;
  out:
-        free(kblob);
         free(sblob);
-        buffer_free(&sect);
+        sshbuf_free(sect);
         return r;
 }
 
@@ -746,194 +794,178 @@ format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts)
 
         t = timestamp;
         tm = localtime(&t);
-        *ts = '\0';
-        strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm);
+        if (tm == NULL)
+                strlcpy(ts, "<INVALID>", nts);
+        else {
+                *ts = '\0';
+                strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm);
+        }
 }
 
 static int
-parse_revoked_certs(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
+parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
 {
-        int ret = -1, nbits;
+        int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
         u_char type;
         const u_char *blob;
-        u_int blen;
-        Buffer subsect;
+        size_t blen, nbits;
+        struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL;
         u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi;
-        BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL;
+        struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
         char *key_id = NULL;
-        Key *ca_key = NULL;
+        struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL;
 
-        buffer_init(&subsect);
+        if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 
-        if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, &blen)) == NULL ||
-            buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, NULL) == NULL) { /* reserved */
-                error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+        /* Header: key, reserved */
+        if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
                 goto out;
-        }
-        if ((ca_key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+        if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0)
                 goto out;
 
-        while (buffer_len(buf) > 0) {
-                if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, buf) != 0 ||
-                    (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, &blen)) == NULL) {
-                        error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
-                        goto out;
+        while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) {
+                if (subsect != NULL) {
+                        sshbuf_free(subsect);
+                        subsect = NULL;
                 }
-                buffer_clear(&subsect);
-                buffer_append(&subsect, blob, blen);
-                debug3("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type);
-                /* buffer_dump(&subsect); */
+                if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type));
+                /* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */
 
                 switch (type) {
                 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
-                        while (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) {
-                                if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial,
-                                    &subsect) != 0) {
-                                        error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+                        while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
+                                if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0)
                                         goto out;
-                                }
-                                if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key,
-                                    serial) != 0) {
-                                        error("%s: update failed", __func__);
+                                if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
+                                    ca_key, serial)) != 0)
                                         goto out;
-                                }
                         }
                         break;
                 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
-                        if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_lo, &subsect) != 0 ||
-                            buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_hi, &subsect) != 0) {
-                                error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+                        if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
+                            (r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0)
                                 goto out;
-                        }
-                        if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key,
-                            serial_lo, serial_hi) != 0) {
-                                error("%s: update failed", __func__);
+                        if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
+                            ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0)
                                 goto out;
-                        }
                         break;
                 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
-                        if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-                                error("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+                        if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
+                                r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
                                 goto out;
                         }
-                        if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_lo, &subsect) != 0 ||
-                            buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&subsect, bitmap) != 0) {
-                                error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+                        if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
+                            (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect,
+                            &blob, &blen)) != 0)
                                 goto out;
-                        }
-                        if ((nbits = BN_num_bits(bitmap)) < 0) {
-                                error("%s: bitmap bits < 0", __func__);
+                        if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) {
+                                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                                 goto out;
                         }
-                        for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int)nbits; serial++) {
+                        nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap);
+                        for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) {
                                 if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) {
                                         error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__);
+                                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                                         goto out;
                                 }
-                                if (!BN_is_bit_set(bitmap, serial))
+                                if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial))
                                         continue;
-                                if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key,
-                                    serial_lo + serial) != 0) {
-                                        error("%s: update failed", __func__);
+                                if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
+                                    ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0)
                                         goto out;
-                                }
                         }
-                        BN_free(bitmap);
+                        bitmap_free(bitmap);
                         bitmap = NULL;
                         break;
                 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID:
-                        while (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) {
-                                if ((key_id = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&subsect,
-                                    NULL)) == NULL) {
-                                        error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+                        while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
+                                if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect,
+                                    &key_id, NULL)) != 0)
                                         goto out;
-                                }
-                                if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca_key,
-                                    key_id) != 0) {
-                                        error("%s: update failed", __func__);
+                                if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
+                                    ca_key, key_id)) != 0)
                                         goto out;
-                                }
                                 free(key_id);
                                 key_id = NULL;
                         }
                         break;
                 default:
                         error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type);
+                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                         goto out;
                 }
-                if (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) {
+                if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
                         error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data");
+                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                         goto out;
                 }
         }
 
-        ret = 0;
+        r = 0;
  out:
-        if (ca_key != NULL)
-                key_free(ca_key);
         if (bitmap != NULL)
-                BN_free(bitmap);
+                bitmap_free(bitmap);
         free(key_id);
-        buffer_free(&subsect);
-        return ret;
+        sshkey_free(ca_key);
+        sshbuf_free(subsect);
+        return r;
 }
 
 
 /* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */
 int
-ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
-    const Key **sign_ca_keys, u_int nsign_ca_keys)
+ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
+    const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys)
 {
-        Buffer copy, sect;
-        struct ssh_krl *krl;
+        struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL;
+        struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
         char timestamp[64];
-        int ret = -1, r, sig_seen;
-        Key *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL;
+        int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen;
+        struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used;
         u_char type, *rdata = NULL;
         const u_char *blob;
-        u_int i, j, sig_off, sects_off, rlen, blen, format_version, nca_used;
+        size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, rlen, blen, nca_used;
+        u_int format_version;
 
         nca_used = 0;
         *krlp = NULL;
-        if (buffer_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 ||
-            memcmp(buffer_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
+        if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 ||
+            memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
                 debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__);
-                /*
-                 * Return success but a NULL *krlp here to signal that the
-                 * file might be a simple list of keys.
-                 */
-                return 0;
+                return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC;
         }
 
         /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */
-        buffer_init(&copy);
-        buffer_append(&copy, buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf));
-
-        buffer_init(&sect);
-        buffer_consume(&copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1);
+        if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
+                r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                goto out;
+        }
+        if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0)
+                goto out;
 
         if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
                 error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
                 goto out;
         }
 
-        if (buffer_get_int_ret(&format_version, &copy) != 0) {
-                error("%s: KRL truncated", __func__);
+        if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0)
                 goto out;
-        }
         if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) {
-                error("%s: KRL unsupported format version %u",
-                    __func__, format_version);
+                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                 goto out;
         }
-        if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->krl_version, &copy) != 0 ||
-            buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->generated_date, &copy) != 0 ||
-            buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->flags, &copy) != 0 ||
-            buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&copy, NULL) == NULL || /* reserved */
-            (krl->comment = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&copy, NULL)) == NULL) {
-                error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+        if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0)
                 goto out;
-        }
 
         format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
         debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s",
@@ -945,18 +977,22 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
          * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified.
          */
         sig_seen = 0;
-        sects_off = buffer_len(buf) - buffer_len(&copy);
-        while (buffer_len(&copy) > 0) {
-                if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, &copy) != 0 ||
-                    (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&copy, &blen)) == NULL) {
-                        error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+        if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
+                /* Shouldn't happen */
+                r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto out;
+        }
+        sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
+        while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
+                if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
                         goto out;
-                }
-                debug3("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type);
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
                 if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) {
                         if (sig_seen) {
                                 error("KRL contains non-signature section "
                                     "after signature");
+                                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                                 goto out;
                         }
                         /* Not interested for now. */
@@ -964,94 +1000,114 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
                 }
                 sig_seen = 1;
                 /* First string component is the signing key */
-                if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) {
-                        error("%s: invalid signature key", __func__);
+                if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+                        goto out;
+                }
+                if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
+                        /* Shouldn't happen */
+                        r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
                         goto out;
                 }
-                sig_off = buffer_len(buf) - buffer_len(&copy);
+                sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
                 /* Second string component is the signature itself */
-                if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&copy, &blen)) == NULL) {
-                        error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+                if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
+                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                         goto out;
                 }
                 /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */
-                if (key_verify(key, blob, blen,
-                    buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf) - sig_off) != 1) {
-                        error("bad signaure on KRL");
+                if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen,
+                    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf) - sig_off, 0)) != 0)
                         goto out;
-                }
                 /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */
                 for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
-                        if (key_equal(ca_used[i], key)) {
+                        if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) {
                                 error("KRL signed more than once with "
                                     "the same key");
+                                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                                 goto out;
                         }
                 }
                 /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */
-                ca_used = xrealloc(ca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used));
+                tmp_ca_used = reallocarray(ca_used, nca_used + 1,
+                    sizeof(*ca_used));
+                if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) {
+                        r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                        goto out;
+                }
+                ca_used = tmp_ca_used;
                 ca_used[nca_used++] = key;
                 key = NULL;
                 break;
         }
 
+        if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) {
+                /* Shouldn't happen */
+                r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto out;
+        }
+
         /*
          * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point
          * where the section start.
          */
-        buffer_append(&copy, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(buf) + sects_off,
-            buffer_len(buf) - sects_off);
-        while (buffer_len(&copy) > 0) {
-                if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, &copy) != 0 ||
-                    (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&copy, &blen)) == NULL) {
-                        error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
-                        goto out;
+        sshbuf_free(copy);
+        if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
+                r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                goto out;
+        }
+        if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0)
+                goto out;
+        while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
+                if (sect != NULL) {
+                        sshbuf_free(sect);
+                        sect = NULL;
                 }
-                debug3("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type);
-                buffer_clear(&sect);
-                buffer_append(&sect, blob, blen);
+                if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
+                    (r = sshbuf_froms(copy, &sect)) != 0)
+                        goto out;
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
 
                 switch (type) {
                 case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES:
-                        if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(&sect, krl)) != 0)
+                        if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0)
                                 goto out;
                         break;
                 case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY:
                 case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1:
-                        while (buffer_len(&sect) > 0) {
-                                if ((rdata = buffer_get_string_ret(&sect,
-                                    &rlen)) == NULL) {
-                                        error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+                        while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
+                                if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect,
+                                    &rdata, &rlen)) != 0)
                                         goto out;
-                                }
                                 if (type == KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 &&
                                     rlen != 20) {
                                         error("%s: bad SHA1 length", __func__);
+                                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                                         goto out;
                                 }
-                                if (revoke_blob(
+                                if ((r = revoke_blob(
                                     type == KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY ?
                                     &krl->revoked_keys : &krl->revoked_sha1s,
-                                    rdata, rlen) != 0)
+                                    rdata, rlen)) != 0)
                                         goto out;
-                                rdata = NULL; /* revoke_blob frees blob */
+                                rdata = NULL; /* revoke_blob frees rdata */
                         }
                         break;
                 case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
                         /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
-                        buffer_clear(&sect);
-                        if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&copy,
-                            &blen)) == NULL) {
-                                error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+                        sshbuf_reset(sect);
+                        sect = NULL;
+                        if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
                                 goto out;
-                        }
                         break;
                 default:
                         error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type);
+                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                         goto out;
                 }
-                if (buffer_len(&sect) > 0) {
+                if (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
                         error("KRL section contains unparsed data");
+                        r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                         goto out;
                 }
         }
@@ -1062,12 +1118,13 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
                 if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0)
                         sig_seen = 1;
                 else {
-                        key_free(ca_used[i]);
+                        sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
                         ca_used[i] = NULL;
                 }
         }
         if (nca_used && !sig_seen) {
                 error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked");
+                r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
                 goto out;
         }
 
@@ -1078,163 +1135,169 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
                         for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) {
                                 if (ca_used[j] == NULL)
                                         continue;
-                                if (key_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) {
+                                if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) {
                                         sig_seen = 1;
                                         break;
                                 }
                         }
                 }
                 if (!sig_seen) {
+                        r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
                         error("KRL not signed with any trusted key");
                         goto out;
                 }
         }
 
         *krlp = krl;
-        ret = 0;
+        r = 0;
  out:
-        if (ret != 0)
+        if (r != 0)
                 ssh_krl_free(krl);
-        for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
-                if (ca_used[i] != NULL)
-                        key_free(ca_used[i]);
-        }
+        for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++)
+                sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
         free(ca_used);
         free(rdata);
-        if (key != NULL)
-                key_free(key);
-        buffer_free(&copy);
-        buffer_free(&sect);
-        return ret;
+        sshkey_free(key);
+        sshbuf_free(copy);
+        sshbuf_free(sect);
+        return r;
 }
 
-/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */
+/* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */
 static int
-is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
+is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc)
 {
-        struct revoked_blob rb, *erb;
         struct revoked_serial rs, *ers;
         struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki;
-        struct revoked_certs *rc;
-
-        /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */
-        memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
-        if ((rb.blob = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, &rb.len)) == NULL)
-                return -1;
-        erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
-        free(rb.blob);
-        if (erb != NULL) {
-                debug("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__);
-                return -1;
-        }
-
-        /* Next, explicit keys */
-        memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
-        if (plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len) < 0)
-                return -1;
-        erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
-        free(rb.blob);
-        if (erb != NULL) {
-                debug("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__);
-                return -1;
-        }
-
-        if (!key_is_cert(key))
-                return 0;
-
-        /* Check cert revocation */
-        if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key,
-            &rc, 0) != 0)
-                return -1;
-        if (rc == NULL)
-                return 0; /* No entry for this CA */
 
         /* Check revocation by cert key ID */
         memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki));
         rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id;
         erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki);
         if (erki != NULL) {
-                debug("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__);
-                return -1;
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__));
+                return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
         }
 
         /*
          * Legacy cert formats lack serial numbers. Zero serials numbers
          * are ignored (it's the default when the CA doesn't specify one).
          */
-        if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0)
+        if (sshkey_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0)
                 return 0;
 
         memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
         rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial;
         ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs);
         if (ers != NULL) {
-                KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__,
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__,
                     key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi));
-                debug("%s: revoked by serial", __func__);
-                return -1;
+                return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
         }
-        KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial));
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */
+static int
+is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+        struct revoked_blob rb, *erb;
+        struct revoked_certs *rc;
+        int r;
+
+        /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */
+        memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
+        if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
+            &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
+                return r;
+        erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+        free(rb.blob);
+        if (erb != NULL) {
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__));
+                return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+        }
+
+        /* Next, explicit keys */
+        memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
+        if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
+                return r;
+        erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+        free(rb.blob);
+        if (erb != NULL) {
+                KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__));
+                return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+        }
+
+        if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
+                return 0;
 
+        /* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */
+        if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key,
+            &rc, 0)) != 0)
+                return r;
+        if (rc != NULL) {
+                if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
+                        return r;
+        }
+        /* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */
+        if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0)
+                return r;
+        if (rc != NULL) {
+                if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
+                        return r;
+        }
+
+        KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial));
         return 0;
 }
 
 int
-ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key)
+ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
 {
         int r;
 
-        debug2("%s: checking key", __func__);
+        KRL_DBG(("%s: checking key", __func__));
         if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0)
                 return r;
-        if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+        if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
                 debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__);
                 if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
                         return r;
         }
-        debug3("%s: key okay", __func__);
+        KRL_DBG(("%s: key okay", __func__));
         return 0;
 }
 
-/* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error or key revoked, -2 if path is not a KRL */
 int
-ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const Key *key)
+ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
 {
-        Buffer krlbuf;
-        struct ssh_krl *krl;
-        int revoked, fd;
+        struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL;
+        struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
+        int oerrno = 0, r, fd;
 
         if (path == NULL)
                 return 0;
 
+        if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
         if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
-                error("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
-                error("Revoked keys file not accessible - refusing public key "
-                    "authentication");
-                return -1;
-        }
-        buffer_init(&krlbuf);
-        if (!key_load_file(fd, path, &krlbuf)) {
-                close(fd);
-                buffer_free(&krlbuf);
-                error("Revoked keys file not readable - refusing public key "
-                    "authentication");
-                return -1;
-        }
-        close(fd);
-        if (ssh_krl_from_blob(&krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0) != 0) {
-                buffer_free(&krlbuf);
-                error("Invalid KRL, refusing public key "
-                    "authentication");
-                return -1;
+                r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+                oerrno = errno;
+                goto out;
         }
-        buffer_free(&krlbuf);
-        if (krl == NULL) {
-                debug3("%s: %s is not a KRL file", __func__, path);
-                return -2;
+        if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) {
+                oerrno = errno;
+                goto out;
         }
+        if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+                goto out;
         debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
-        revoked = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key) != 0;
+        r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
+ out:
+        close(fd);
+        sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
         ssh_krl_free(krl);
-        return revoked ? -1 : 0;
+        if (r != 0)
+                errno = oerrno;
+        return r;
 }