upstream: switch over to the new authorized_keys options API and

remove the legacy one.

Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state
between key file lines.

feedback and ok markus@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df

1 files changed, 45 insertions, 25 deletions

diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index e4ac3ccfd..c68e1b0d9 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.179 2018/02/05 05:37:46 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.180 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ extern u_char session_id[];
 extern Buffer auth_debug;
 extern int auth_debug_init;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
 
 /* State exported from the child */
 static struct sshbuf *child_state;
@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static Authctxt *authctxt;
 static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
 static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
 static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
 static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
 static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
 static char *auth_method = "unknown";
@@ -252,7 +254,6 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
 struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
 
 /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
-
 static void
 monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
 {
@@ -297,6 +298,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
         authctxt = _authctxt;
         memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+        ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
 
         authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
 
@@ -331,7 +333,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
                                 fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
                                     __func__, ent->type);
                         if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
-                            !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
+                            !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
                                 authenticated = 0;
 #ifdef USE_PAM
                         /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
@@ -365,6 +367,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
         debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
             __func__, authctxt->user);
+        ssh->authctxt = NULL;
         ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
 
         mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
@@ -413,7 +416,7 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
         monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
         monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
 
-        if (!no_pty_flag) {
+        if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
         }
@@ -558,9 +561,11 @@ monitor_reset_key_state(void)
         free(key_blob);
         free(hostbased_cuser);
         free(hostbased_chost);
+        sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
         key_blob = NULL;
         key_bloblen = 0;
         key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+        key_opts = NULL;
         hostbased_cuser = NULL;
         hostbased_chost = NULL;
 }
@@ -828,6 +833,7 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
 int
 mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
+        struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
         static int call_count;
         char *passwd;
         int authenticated;
@@ -838,7 +844,7 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
         passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
         /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
         authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
-            auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
+            auth_password(ssh, passwd);
         explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
         free(passwd);
 
@@ -1129,15 +1135,16 @@ mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
 int
 mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
+        struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
         struct sshkey *key;
         char *cuser, *chost;
         u_char *blob;
         u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
         enum mm_keytype type = 0;
-        int allowed = 0;
+        int r, allowed = 0;
+        struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
 
         debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
         type = buffer_get_int(m);
         cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
         chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
@@ -1156,28 +1163,31 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
                 switch (type) {
                 case MM_USERKEY:
-                        allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
-                            !auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
-                            match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-                            options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
-                            user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
-                            pubkey_auth_attempt);
                         auth_method = "publickey";
-                        if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
-                            (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
-                                auth_clear_options();
+                        if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
+                                break;
+                        if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
+                                break;
+                        if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+                            options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1)
+                                break;
+                        allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
+                            pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
                         break;
                 case MM_HOSTKEY:
-                        allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
-                            !auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
-                            match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-                            options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
-                            hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+                        auth_method = "hostbased";
+                        if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
+                                break;
+                        if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
+                                break;
+                        if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+                            options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1)
+                                break;
+                        allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
                             cuser, chost, key);
                         auth2_record_info(authctxt,
                             "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
                             cuser, chost);
-                        auth_method = "hostbased";
                         break;
                 default:
                         fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
@@ -1185,7 +1195,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 }
         }
 
-        debug3("%s: key is %s", __func__, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
+        debug3("%s: %s authentication%s: %s key is %s", __func__,
+            auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
+            (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
+            allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
 
         auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
         sshkey_free(key);
@@ -1198,6 +1211,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 key_blob = blob;
                 key_bloblen = bloblen;
                 key_blobtype = type;
+                key_opts = opts;
                 hostbased_cuser = cuser;
                 hostbased_chost = chost;
         } else {
@@ -1210,10 +1224,13 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
         buffer_clear(m);
         buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
-        buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-
+        if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: sshauthopt_serialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
         mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
 
+        if (!allowed)
+                sshauthopt_free(opts);
+
         return (0);
 }
 
@@ -1336,6 +1353,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
 int
 mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
 {
+        struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
         struct sshkey *key;
         u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
         char *sigalg;
@@ -1390,6 +1408,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
         free(data);
         free(sigalg);
 
+        if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
+                auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
         monitor_reset_key_state();
 
         sshkey_free(key);