Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 30 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 7c105e687..cc15ce486 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.131 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.135 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -40,9 +40,10 @@
 #endif
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
 #include <poll.h>
@@ -56,7 +57,9 @@
 #include <skey.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 #include "atomicio.h"
@@ -84,6 +87,7 @@
 #include "sshlogin.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
 #include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "monitor.h"
 #include "monitor_mm.h"
@@ -92,7 +96,6 @@
 #endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "misc.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "roaming.h"
@@ -195,7 +198,10 @@ int mm_answer_consolekit_register(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
 
 static Authctxt *authctxt;
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;   /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
+#endif
 
 /* local state for key verify */
 static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
@@ -225,7 +231,9 @@ struct mon_table {
 #define MON_PERMIT      0x1000  /* Request is permitted */
 
 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
+#endif
     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@@ -270,7 +278,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
 #endif
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+#endif
     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
@@ -286,6 +296,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
 };
 
 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
@@ -313,10 +324,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
 #endif
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
@@ -327,6 +340,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
 #ifdef USE_CONSOLEKIT
     {MONITOR_REQ_CONSOLEKIT_REGISTER, 0, mm_answer_consolekit_register},
 #endif
+#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -485,6 +499,9 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
         signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
         signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
         signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
+#ifdef SIGXFSZ
+        signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
+#endif
 
         if (compat20) {
                 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
@@ -665,6 +682,7 @@ monitor_reset_key_state(void)
         hostbased_chost = NULL;
 }
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 int
 mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
@@ -699,6 +717,7 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
         mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
         return (0);
 }
+#endif
 
 extern AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn;
 
@@ -1225,6 +1244,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                             cuser, chost);
                         auth_method = "hostbased";
                         break;
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
                 case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
                         key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
                         allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
@@ -1234,6 +1254,7 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                                 auth_clear_options();
                         auth_method = "rsa";
                         break;
+#endif
                 default:
                         fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
                         break;
@@ -1570,6 +1591,7 @@ mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
         return (0);
 }
 
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 int
 mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
 {
@@ -1747,6 +1769,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
         return (success);
 }
+#endif
 
 int
 mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
@@ -1851,6 +1874,8 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
         if (options.compression)
                 mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
 
+        packet_set_postauth();
+
         if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
                 packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
                     (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
@@ -1887,11 +1912,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
             timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
                 fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
         kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+#endif
         kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
 #ifdef GSSAPI
         if (options.gss_keyex) {