* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.org/txt/release-5.9).

  - Introduce sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep child using an optional
    sshd_config(5) "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" mode that enables
    mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the privsep child can perform.
  - Add new SHA256-based HMAC transport integrity modes from
    http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-dbider-sha2-mac-for-ssh-02.txt.
  - The pre-authentication sshd(8) privilege separation slave process now
    logs via a socket shared with the master process, avoiding the need to
    maintain /dev/log inside the chroot (closes: #75043, #429243,
    #599240).
  - ssh(1) now warns when a server refuses X11 forwarding (closes:
    #504757).
  - sshd_config(5)'s AuthorizedKeysFile now accepts multiple paths,
    separated by whitespace (closes: #76312).  The authorized_keys2
    fallback is deprecated but documented (closes: #560156).
  - ssh(1) and sshd(8): set IPv6 traffic class from IPQoS, as well as IPv4
    ToS/DSCP (closes: #498297).
  - ssh-add(1) now accepts keys piped from standard input.  E.g. "ssh-add
    - < /path/to/key" (closes: #229124).
  - Clean up lost-passphrase text in ssh-keygen(1) (closes: #444691).
  - Say "required" rather than "recommended" in unprotected-private-key
    warning (LP: #663455).

1 files changed, 19 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
index dc8b1fa55..ef91e4446 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.11.4.2 2011/02/04 00:43:08 djm Exp $ */
+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.16 2011/08/29 06:09:57 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@
 #include <selinux/flask.h>
 #include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
 
+#ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE
+# define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:"
+#endif
+
 /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 int
 ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
@@ -190,12 +194,13 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
 {
         int len, newlen;
         char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx;
+        void (*switchlog) (const char *fmt,...) = logit;
 
         if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
                 return;
 
         if (getcon((security_context_t *)&oldctx) < 0) {
-                logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
+                logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
                 return;
         }
         if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) ==
@@ -204,6 +209,14 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
                 return;
         }
 
+        /*
+         * Check whether we are attempting to switch away from an unconfined
+         * security context.
+         */
+        if (strncmp(cx, SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE,
+            sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0)
+                switchlog = debug3;
+
         newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1;
         newctx = xmalloc(newlen);
         len = cx - oldctx + 1;
@@ -211,10 +224,11 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
         strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
         if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
                 strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
-        debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__, oldctx,
-            newctx);
+        debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
+            oldctx, newctx);
         if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
-                logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno));
+                switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+                    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
         xfree(oldctx);
         xfree(newctx);
 }