* New upstream release (closes: #395507, #397961, #420035). Important

  changes not previously backported to 4.3p2:
  - 4.4/4.4p1 (http://www.openssh.org/txt/release-4.4):
    + On portable OpenSSH, fix a GSSAPI authentication abort that could be
      used to determine the validity of usernames on some platforms.
    + Implemented conditional configuration in sshd_config(5) using the
      "Match" directive. This allows some configuration options to be
      selectively overridden if specific criteria (based on user, group,
      hostname and/or address) are met. So far a useful subset of
      post-authentication options are supported and more are expected to
      be added in future releases.
    + Add support for Diffie-Hellman group exchange key agreement with a
      final hash of SHA256.
    + Added a "ForceCommand" directive to sshd_config(5). Similar to the
      command="..." option accepted in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, this forces
      the execution of the specified command regardless of what the user
      requested. This is very useful in conjunction with the new "Match"
      option.
    + Add a "PermitOpen" directive to sshd_config(5). This mirrors the
      permitopen="..." authorized_keys option, allowing fine-grained
      control over the port-forwardings that a user is allowed to
      establish.
    + Add optional logging of transactions to sftp-server(8).
    + ssh(1) will now record port numbers for hosts stored in
      ~/.ssh/known_hosts when a non-standard port has been requested
      (closes: #50612).
    + Add an "ExitOnForwardFailure" option to cause ssh(1) to exit (with a
      non-zero exit code) when requested port forwardings could not be
      established.
    + Extend sshd_config(5) "SubSystem" declarations to allow the
      specification of command-line arguments.
    + Replacement of all integer overflow susceptible invocations of
      malloc(3) and realloc(3) with overflow-checking equivalents.
    + Many manpage fixes and improvements.
    + Add optional support for OpenSSL hardware accelerators (engines),
      enabled using the --with-ssl-engine configure option.
    + Tokens in configuration files may be double-quoted in order to
      contain spaces (closes: #319639).
    + Move a debug() call out of a SIGCHLD handler, fixing a hang when the
      session exits very quickly (closes: #307890).
    + Fix some incorrect buffer allocation calculations (closes: #410599).
    + ssh-add doesn't ask for a passphrase if key file permissions are too
      liberal (closes: #103677).
    + Likewise, ssh doesn't ask either (closes: #99675).
  - 4.6/4.6p1 (http://www.openssh.org/txt/release-4.6):
    + sshd now allows the enabling and disabling of authentication methods
      on a per user, group, host and network basis via the Match directive
      in sshd_config.
    + Fixed an inconsistent check for a terminal when displaying scp
      progress meter (closes: #257524).
    + Fix "hang on exit" when background processes are running at the time
      of exit on a ttyful/login session (closes: #88337).
* Update to current GSSAPI patch from
  http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-4.6p1-gsskex-20070312.patch;
  install ChangeLog.gssapi.

1 files changed, 178 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d153f8fb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/* $Id: port-linux.c,v 1.3 2006/09/01 05:38:41 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include "log.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/flask.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+
+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+static int
+ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+{
+        static int enabled = -1;
+
+        if (enabled == -1) {
+                enabled = is_selinux_enabled();
+                debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+        }
+
+        return (enabled);
+}
+
+/* Return the default security context for the given username */
+static security_context_t
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+{
+        security_context_t sc;
+        char *sename = NULL, *role = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+        int r;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+        if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
+                return NULL;
+#else
+        sename = pwname;
+        lvl = NULL;
+#endif
+        if (the_authctxt)
+                role = the_authctxt->role;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+        if (role != NULL && role[0])
+                r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
+                                                       &sc);
+        else
+                r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+#else
+        if (role != NULL && role[0])
+                r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
+        else
+                r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+#endif
+
+        if (r != 0) {
+                switch (security_getenforce()) {
+                case -1:
+                        fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
+                            "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+                case 0:
+                        error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+                            "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+                default:
+                        fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+                            "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
+                            __func__, pwname);
+                }
+        }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+        if (sename != NULL)
+                xfree(sename);
+        if (lvl != NULL)
+                xfree(lvl);
+#endif
+
+        return (sc);
+}
+
+/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+{
+        security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+
+        if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+                return;
+
+        debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+        user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+        if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+                switch (security_getenforce()) {
+                case -1:
+                        fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+                case 0:
+                        error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+                            "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+                default:
+                        fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+                            "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+                }
+        }
+        if (user_ctx != NULL)
+                freecon(user_ctx);
+
+        debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+/* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+{
+        security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
+        security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+        security_context_t old_tty_ctx = NULL;
+
+        if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+                return;
+
+        debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+
+        user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+
+        /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+
+        if (getfilecon(tty, &old_tty_ctx) == -1) {
+                error("%s: getfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+                goto out;
+        }
+
+        if (security_compute_relabel(user_ctx, old_tty_ctx,
+            SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_ctx) != 0) {
+                error("%s: security_compute_relabel: %s",
+                    __func__, strerror(errno));
+                goto out;
+        }
+
+        if (setfilecon(tty, new_tty_ctx) != 0)
+                error("%s: setfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ out:
+        if (new_tty_ctx != NULL)
+                freecon(new_tty_ctx);
+        if (old_tty_ctx != NULL)
+                freecon(old_tty_ctx);
+        if (user_ctx != NULL)
+                freecon(user_ctx);
+        debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */