* New upstream release (closes: #395507, #397961, #420035). Important

  changes not previously backported to 4.3p2:
  - 4.4/4.4p1 (http://www.openssh.org/txt/release-4.4):
    + On portable OpenSSH, fix a GSSAPI authentication abort that could be
      used to determine the validity of usernames on some platforms.
    + Implemented conditional configuration in sshd_config(5) using the
      "Match" directive. This allows some configuration options to be
      selectively overridden if specific criteria (based on user, group,
      hostname and/or address) are met. So far a useful subset of
      post-authentication options are supported and more are expected to
      be added in future releases.
    + Add support for Diffie-Hellman group exchange key agreement with a
      final hash of SHA256.
    + Added a "ForceCommand" directive to sshd_config(5). Similar to the
      command="..." option accepted in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, this forces
      the execution of the specified command regardless of what the user
      requested. This is very useful in conjunction with the new "Match"
      option.
    + Add a "PermitOpen" directive to sshd_config(5). This mirrors the
      permitopen="..." authorized_keys option, allowing fine-grained
      control over the port-forwardings that a user is allowed to
      establish.
    + Add optional logging of transactions to sftp-server(8).
    + ssh(1) will now record port numbers for hosts stored in
      ~/.ssh/known_hosts when a non-standard port has been requested
      (closes: #50612).
    + Add an "ExitOnForwardFailure" option to cause ssh(1) to exit (with a
      non-zero exit code) when requested port forwardings could not be
      established.
    + Extend sshd_config(5) "SubSystem" declarations to allow the
      specification of command-line arguments.
    + Replacement of all integer overflow susceptible invocations of
      malloc(3) and realloc(3) with overflow-checking equivalents.
    + Many manpage fixes and improvements.
    + Add optional support for OpenSSL hardware accelerators (engines),
      enabled using the --with-ssl-engine configure option.
    + Tokens in configuration files may be double-quoted in order to
      contain spaces (closes: #319639).
    + Move a debug() call out of a SIGCHLD handler, fixing a hang when the
      session exits very quickly (closes: #307890).
    + Fix some incorrect buffer allocation calculations (closes: #410599).
    + ssh-add doesn't ask for a passphrase if key file permissions are too
      liberal (closes: #103677).
    + Likewise, ssh doesn't ask either (closes: #99675).
  - 4.6/4.6p1 (http://www.openssh.org/txt/release-4.6):
    + sshd now allows the enabling and disabling of authentication methods
      on a per user, group, host and network basis via the Match directive
      in sshd_config.
    + Fixed an inconsistent check for a terminal when displaying scp
      progress meter (closes: #257524).
    + Fix "hang on exit" when background processes are running at the time
      of exit on a ttyful/login session (closes: #88337).
* Update to current GSSAPI patch from
  http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-4.6p1-gsskex-20070312.patch;
  install ChangeLog.gssapi.

1 files changed, 50 insertions, 28 deletions

diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index 827ae16b3..bc1b658ca 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.145 2006/09/19 21:14:08 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -37,26 +38,39 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.120 2005/10/30 08:52:17 djm Exp $");
-
+ 
+#include <sys/types.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
 #include "crc32.h"
-#include "getput.h"
-
 #include "compress.h"
 #include "deattack.h"
 #include "channels.h"
-
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
-
 #include "cipher.h"
+#include "key.h"
 #include "kex.h"
 #include "mac.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -261,6 +275,7 @@ packet_get_keyiv_len(int mode)
 
         return (cipher_get_keyiv_len(cc));
 }
+
 void
 packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
 {
@@ -273,6 +288,7 @@ packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
 
         cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat);
 }
+
 int
 packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void)
 {
@@ -474,31 +490,37 @@ packet_put_char(int value)
 
         buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, &ch, 1);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_int(u_int value)
 {
         buffer_put_int(&outgoing_packet, value);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len)
 {
         buffer_put_string(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_cstring(const char *str)
 {
         buffer_put_cstring(&outgoing_packet, str);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len)
 {
         buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, len);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
 {
         buffer_put_bignum(&outgoing_packet, value);
 }
+
 void
 packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
 {
@@ -552,7 +574,7 @@ packet_send1(void)
         /* Add check bytes. */
         checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
             buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
-        PUT_32BIT(buf, checksum);
+        put_u32(buf, checksum);
         buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, 4);
 
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
@@ -561,7 +583,7 @@ packet_send1(void)
 #endif
 
         /* Append to output. */
-        PUT_32BIT(buf, len);
+        put_u32(buf, len);
         buffer_append(&output, buf, 4);
         cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
         cipher_crypt(&send_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
@@ -657,7 +679,7 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 
 /*
  * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
- * This happans on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
+ * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
  * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
  */
 static void
@@ -672,6 +694,9 @@ packet_enable_delayed_compress(void)
          */
         after_authentication = 1;
         for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+                /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
+                if (newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+                        continue;
                 comp = &newkeys[mode]->comp;
                 if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
                         packet_init_compression();
@@ -764,7 +789,7 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
         /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
         packet_length = buffer_len(&outgoing_packet) - 4;
         cp = buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet);
-        PUT_32BIT(cp, packet_length);
+        put_u32(cp, packet_length);
         cp[4] = padlen;
         DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d)", packet_length+4, padlen));
 
@@ -781,7 +806,7 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
             buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
         /* append unencrypted MAC */
         if (mac && mac->enabled)
-                buffer_append(&output, (char *)macbuf, mac->mac_len);
+                buffer_append(&output, macbuf, mac->mac_len);
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
         fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
         buffer_dump(&output);
@@ -872,7 +897,7 @@ packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
         struct timeval tv, *tvp;
         DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
 
-        setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS) *
+        setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(connection_in+1, NFDBITS),
             sizeof(fd_mask));
 
         /* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */
@@ -902,11 +927,11 @@ packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
                 FD_SET(connection_in, setp);
 
                 if (setup_timeout > 0) {
-                  tvp = &tv;
-                  tv.tv_sec = setup_timeout;
-                  tv.tv_usec = 0;
+                        tvp = &tv;
+                        tv.tv_sec = setup_timeout;
+                        tv.tv_usec = 0;
                 } else
-                  tvp = 0;
+                        tvp = NULL;
 
                 /* Wait for some data to arrive. */
                 while (select(connection_in + 1, setp, NULL, NULL, tvp) == -1 &&
@@ -914,7 +939,7 @@ packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
                         ;
 
                 if (!FD_ISSET(connection_in, setp))
-                  fatal("packet_read: Setup timeout expired, giving up");
+                        fatal("packet_read: Setup timeout expired, giving up");
 
                 /* Read data from the socket. */
                 len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
@@ -973,7 +998,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
                 return SSH_MSG_NONE;
         /* Get length of incoming packet. */
         cp = buffer_ptr(&input);
-        len = GET_32BIT(cp);
+        len = get_u32(cp);
         if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024)
                 packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", len);
         padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
@@ -993,7 +1018,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
          * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
          */
         if (!receive_context.plaintext) {
-                switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len, NULL)) {
+                switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&input), padded_len)) {
                 case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
                         packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
                             "network attack detected");
@@ -1028,7 +1053,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
                     len, buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
 
         cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet) + len - 4;
-        stored_checksum = GET_32BIT(cp);
+        stored_checksum = get_u32(cp);
         if (checksum != stored_checksum)
                 packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input.");
         buffer_consume_end(&incoming_packet, 4);
@@ -1077,7 +1102,7 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
                 cipher_crypt(&receive_context, cp, buffer_ptr(&input),
                     block_size);
                 cp = buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet);
-                packet_length = GET_32BIT(cp);
+                packet_length = get_u32(cp);
                 if (packet_length < 1 + 4 || packet_length > 256 * 1024) {
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
                         buffer_dump(&incoming_packet);
@@ -1208,7 +1233,6 @@ packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
                                 break;
                         default:
                                 return type;
-                                break;
                         }
                 } else {
                         type = packet_read_poll1();
@@ -1231,7 +1255,6 @@ packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
                                 if (type)
                                         DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type));
                                 return type;
-                                break;
                         }
                 }
         }
@@ -1433,7 +1456,7 @@ packet_write_wait(void)
 {
         fd_set *setp;
 
-        setp = (fd_set *)xmalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) *
+        setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(connection_out + 1, NFDBITS),
             sizeof(fd_mask));
         packet_write_poll();
         while (packet_have_data_to_write()) {
@@ -1501,8 +1524,7 @@ packet_set_interactive(int interactive)
         /* Only set socket options if using a socket.  */
         if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
                 return;
-        if (interactive)
-                set_nodelay(connection_in);
+        set_nodelay(connection_in);
         packet_set_tos(interactive);
 }
 
@@ -1563,7 +1585,7 @@ packet_send_ignore(int nbytes)
         for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
                 if (i % 4 == 0)
                         rnd = arc4random();
-                packet_put_char(rnd & 0xff);
+                packet_put_char((u_char)rnd & 0xff);
                 rnd >>= 8;
         }
 }