Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 52 insertions, 18 deletions

diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index 54c0558f9..6e7b87757 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.192 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.198 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@
 #include "crc32.h"
 #include "compress.h"
 #include "deattack.h"
-#include "channels.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -77,7 +76,9 @@
 #include "log.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "channels.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 #include "roaming.h"
 
 #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
@@ -222,6 +223,7 @@ void
 packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
 {
         const Cipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
+        int r;
 
         if (none == NULL)
                 fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'");
@@ -229,10 +231,11 @@ packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out)
                 active_state = alloc_session_state();
         active_state->connection_in = fd_in;
         active_state->connection_out = fd_out;
-        cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
-            0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
-        cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"",
-            0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
+        if ((r = cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, none,
+            (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
+            (r = cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, none,
+            (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: cipher_init: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
         active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
         if (!active_state->initialized) {
                 active_state->initialized = 1;
@@ -329,13 +332,15 @@ void
 packet_get_keyiv(int mode, u_char *iv, u_int len)
 {
         CipherContext *cc;
+        int r;
 
         if (mode == MODE_OUT)
                 cc = &active_state->send_context;
         else
                 cc = &active_state->receive_context;
 
-        cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len);
+        if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: cipher_get_keyiv: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 }
 
 int
@@ -381,13 +386,15 @@ void
 packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat)
 {
         CipherContext *cc;
+        int r;
 
         if (mode == MODE_OUT)
                 cc = &active_state->send_context;
         else
                 cc = &active_state->receive_context;
 
-        cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat);
+        if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: cipher_set_keyiv: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 }
 
 int
@@ -552,6 +559,7 @@ void
 packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number)
 {
         const Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number);
+        int r;
 
         if (cipher == NULL)
                 fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: unknown cipher number %d", number);
@@ -561,10 +569,11 @@ packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number)
                 fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too big: %d", keylen);
         memcpy(active_state->ssh1_key, key, keylen);
         active_state->ssh1_keylen = keylen;
-        cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
-            0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT);
-        cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL,
-            0, CIPHER_DECRYPT);
+        if ((r = cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, cipher,
+            key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
+            (r = cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, cipher,
+            key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: cipher_init: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 }
 
 u_int
@@ -630,6 +639,7 @@ packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len)
         buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len);
 }
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 void
 packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
 {
@@ -641,6 +651,7 @@ packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
 {
         buffer_put_bignum2(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
 }
+#endif
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 void
@@ -742,7 +753,7 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
         Comp *comp;
         CipherContext *cc;
         u_int64_t *max_blocks;
-        int crypt_type;
+        int r, crypt_type;
 
         debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
 
@@ -784,8 +795,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
         if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0 && mac_init(mac) == 0)
                 mac->enabled = 1;
         DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
-        cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
-            enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type);
+        if ((r = cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
+            enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: cipher_init: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
         /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
         /* explicit_bzero(enc->iv,  enc->block_size);
            explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
@@ -912,8 +924,8 @@ packet_send2_wrapped(void)
                     roundup(active_state->extra_pad, block_size);
                 pad = active_state->extra_pad -
                     ((len + padlen) % active_state->extra_pad);
-                debug3("packet_send2: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
-                    pad, len, padlen, active_state->extra_pad);
+                DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
+                    __func__, pad, len, padlen, active_state->extra_pad));
                 padlen += pad;
                 active_state->extra_pad = 0;
         }
@@ -1569,6 +1581,7 @@ packet_get_int64(void)
  * must have been initialized before this call.
  */
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 void
 packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value)
 {
@@ -1598,6 +1611,7 @@ packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr)
                 *length_ptr = bytes;
         return buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet);
 }
+#endif
 
 int
 packet_remaining(void)
@@ -1618,7 +1632,7 @@ packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr)
         return buffer_get_string(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
 }
 
-void *
+const void *
 packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr)
 {
         return buffer_get_string_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr);
@@ -2055,3 +2069,23 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
                 add_recv_bytes(len);
         }
 }
+
+/* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
+void
+packet_set_postauth(void)
+{
+        Comp *comp;
+        int mode;
+
+        debug("%s: called", __func__);
+        /* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
+        active_state->after_authentication = 1;
+        active_state->rekeying = 0;
+        for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+                if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+                        continue;
+                comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+                if (comp && comp->enabled)
+                        packet_init_compression();
+        }
+}