Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 8 insertions, 17 deletions

diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
index 5cc97f0da..0e298898a 100644
--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.101 2014/02/23 20:11:36 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.102 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -16,21 +16,12 @@
 #ifndef READCONF_H
 #define READCONF_H
 
-/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
-
-typedef struct {
-        char     *listen_host;          /* Host (address) to listen on. */
-        int       listen_port;          /* Port to forward. */
-        char     *connect_host;         /* Host to connect. */
-        int       connect_port;         /* Port to connect on connect_host. */
-        int       allocated_port;       /* Dynamically allocated listen port */
-        int       handle;               /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */
-}       Forward;
 /* Data structure for representing option data. */
 
 #define MAX_SEND_ENV            256
 #define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES     32
 #define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS       32
+#define PATH_MAX_SUN            (sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path)
 
 struct allowed_cname {
         char *source_list;
@@ -44,7 +35,7 @@ typedef struct {
         int     forward_x11_trusted;    /* Trust Forward X11 display. */
         int     exit_on_forward_failure;        /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */
         char   *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */
-        int     gateway_ports;  /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
+        struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */
         int     use_privileged_port;    /* Don't use privileged port if false. */
         int     rhosts_rsa_authentication;      /* Try rhosts with RSA
                                                  * authentication. */
@@ -111,11 +102,11 @@ typedef struct {
 
         /* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */
         int     num_local_forwards;
-        Forward *local_forwards;
+        struct Forward *local_forwards;
 
         /* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */
         int     num_remote_forwards;
-        Forward *remote_forwards;
+        struct Forward *remote_forwards;
         int     clear_forwardings;
 
         int     enable_ssh_keysign;
@@ -186,12 +177,12 @@ int	 process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *, char *,
     const char *, int, int *, int);
 int      read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *,
     Options *, int);
-int      parse_forward(Forward *, const char *, int, int);
+int      parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int);
 int      default_ssh_port(void);
 int      option_clear_or_none(const char *);
 
-void     add_local_forward(Options *, const Forward *);
-void     add_remote_forward(Options *, const Forward *);
+void     add_local_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
+void     add_remote_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
 void     add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int);
 
 #endif                          /* READCONF_H */