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authorColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2014-10-07 13:33:15 +0100
committerColin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>2014-10-07 14:27:30 +0100
commitf0b009aea83e9ff3a50be30f51012099a5143c16 (patch)
tree3825e6f7e3b7ea4481d06ed89aba9a7a95150df5 /regress/rekey.sh
parent47f0bad4330b16ec3bad870fcf9839c196e42c12 (diff)
parent762c062828f5a8f6ed189ed6e44ad38fd92f8b36 (diff)
Merge 6.7p1.
* New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7): - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to remove unsafe algorithms. In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are disabled by default. The full set of algorithms remains available if configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options. - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718). - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519 key types. - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads. - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is the same as the one sent during initial key exchange. - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family. - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys option. - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local host, remote user, hostname, port). Helps avoid exceeding miserly pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths. - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the authentication success / failure messages. - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes: #734553). - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing /proc/self/{mem,maps}. * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7. It is true that dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd. On the other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice. It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze. * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status field.
Diffstat (limited to 'regress/rekey.sh')
-rw-r--r--regress/rekey.sh20
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/regress/rekey.sh b/regress/rekey.sh
index cf9401ea0..fd452b034 100644
--- a/regress/rekey.sh
+++ b/regress/rekey.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
1# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.14 2013/11/21 03:18:51 djm Exp $ 1# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.15 2014/04/21 22:15:37 djm Exp $
2# Placed in the Public Domain. 2# Placed in the Public Domain.
3 3
4tid="rekey" 4tid="rekey"
@@ -6,14 +6,22 @@ tid="rekey"
6LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} 6LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
7 7
8rm -f ${LOG} 8rm -f ${LOG}
9cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
9 10
10# Test rekeying based on data volume only. 11# Test rekeying based on data volume only.
11# Arguments will be passed to ssh. 12# Arguments will be passed to ssh.
12ssh_data_rekeying() 13ssh_data_rekeying()
13{ 14{
15 _kexopt=$1 ; shift
16 _opts="$@"
17 if ! test -z "$_kexopts" ; then
18 cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
19 echo "$_kexopt" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
20 _opts="$_opts -o$_kexopt"
21 fi
14 rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} 22 rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
15 ${SSH} <${DATA} -oCompression=no $@ -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \ 23 _opts="$_opts -oCompression=no"
16 "cat > ${COPY}" 24 ${SSH} <${DATA} $_opts -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}"
17 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then 25 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
18 fail "ssh failed ($@)" 26 fail "ssh failed ($@)"
19 fi 27 fi
@@ -41,7 +49,7 @@ done
41 49
42for opt in $opts; do 50for opt in $opts; do
43 verbose "client rekey $opt" 51 verbose "client rekey $opt"
44 ssh_data_rekeying -oRekeyLimit=256k -o$opt 52 ssh_data_rekeying "$opt" -oRekeyLimit=256k
45done 53done
46 54
47# AEAD ciphers are magical so test with all KexAlgorithms 55# AEAD ciphers are magical so test with all KexAlgorithms
@@ -49,14 +57,14 @@ if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
49 for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do 57 for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do
50 for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do 58 for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
51 verbose "client rekey $c $kex" 59 verbose "client rekey $c $kex"
52 ssh_data_rekeying -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c -oKexAlgorithms=$kex 60 ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c
53 done 61 done
54 done 62 done
55fi 63fi
56 64
57for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do 65for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do
58 verbose "client rekeylimit ${s}" 66 verbose "client rekeylimit ${s}"
59 ssh_data_rekeying -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s 67 ssh_data_rekeying "" -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s
60done 68done
61 69
62for s in 5 10; do 70for s in 5 10; do