Import openssh_7.7p1.orig.tar.gz

1 files changed, 64 insertions, 56 deletions

diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 4bccb62d1..58826db16 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.292 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.294 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
 extern int startup_pipe;
 extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
+char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
 
 /* original command from peer. */
 const char *original_command = NULL;
@@ -287,14 +289,42 @@ prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info)
         restore_uid();
 }
 
+static void
+set_permitopen_from_authopts(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshauthopt *opts)
+{
+        char *tmp, *cp, *host;
+        int port;
+        size_t i;
+
+        if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
+                return;
+        channel_clear_permitted_opens(ssh);
+        for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitopen; i++) {
+                tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitopen[i]);
+                /* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
+                if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+                        fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__);
+                host = cleanhostname(host);
+                if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
+                        fatal("%s: internal error: permitopen port",
+                            __func__);
+                channel_add_permitted_opens(ssh, host, port);
+                free(tmp);
+        }
+}
+
 void
 do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
         setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
 
+        auth_log_authopts("active", auth_opts, 0);
+
         /* setup the channel layer */
         /* XXX - streamlocal? */
-        if (no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding ||
+        set_permitopen_from_authopts(ssh, auth_opts);
+        if (!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
+            options.disable_forwarding ||
             (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
                 channel_disable_adm_local_opens(ssh);
         else
@@ -334,7 +364,6 @@ int
 do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
 {
         pid_t pid;
-
 #ifdef USE_PIPES
         int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
 
@@ -450,11 +479,6 @@ do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
                 close(err[0]);
 #endif
 
-
-#ifdef _UNICOS
-                cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
-#endif
-
                 /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
                 do_child(ssh, s, command);
                 /* NOTREACHED */
@@ -462,9 +486,6 @@ do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
                 break;
         }
 
-#ifdef _UNICOS
-        signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
         cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
 #endif
@@ -576,9 +597,6 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
                 close(ttyfd);
 
                 /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
-#ifdef _UNICOS
-                cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
 #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
                 do_login(ssh, s, command);
 #endif
@@ -592,9 +610,6 @@ do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
                 break;
         }
 
-#ifdef _UNICOS
-        signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler);
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
         cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
 #endif
@@ -656,9 +671,9 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
                 original_command = command;
                 command = options.adm_forced_command;
                 forced = "(config)";
-        } else if (forced_command) {
+        } else if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
                 original_command = command;
-                command = forced_command;
+                command = auth_opts->force_command;
                 forced = "(key-option)";
         }
         if (forced != NULL) {
@@ -961,8 +976,9 @@ static char **
 do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
 {
         char buf[256];
+        size_t n;
         u_int i, envsize;
-        char **env, *laddr;
+        char *ocp, *cp, **env, *laddr;
         struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
 #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
         char *path = NULL;
@@ -1037,20 +1053,17 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
         if (getenv("TZ"))
                 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
 
-        /* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */
-        while (custom_environment) {
-                struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
-                char *str = ce->s;
-
-                for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++)
-                        ;
-                if (str[i] == '=') {
-                        str[i] = 0;
-                        child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1);
+        /* Set custom environment options from pubkey authentication. */
+        if (options.permit_user_env) {
+                for (n = 0 ; n < auth_opts->nenv; n++) {
+                        ocp = xstrdup(auth_opts->env[n]);
+                        cp = strchr(ocp, '=');
+                        if (*cp == '=') {
+                                *cp = '\0';
+                                child_set_env(&env, &envsize, ocp, cp + 1);
+                        }
+                        free(ocp);
                 }
-                custom_environment = ce->next;
-                free(ce->s);
-                free(ce);
         }
 
         /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
@@ -1066,6 +1079,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
         free(laddr);
         child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
 
+        if (tun_fwd_ifnames != NULL)
+                child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TUNNEL", tun_fwd_ifnames);
         if (auth_info_file != NULL)
                 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH", auth_info_file);
         if (s->ttyfd != -1)
@@ -1078,11 +1093,6 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
                 child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
                     original_command);
 
-#ifdef _UNICOS
-        if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0')
-                child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir);
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-
         /*
          * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
          * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
@@ -1155,7 +1165,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
  * first in this order).
  */
 static void
-do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
+do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
 {
         FILE *f = NULL;
         char cmd[1024];
@@ -1167,7 +1177,7 @@ do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell)
 
         /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
         if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
-            !no_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
+            auth_opts->permit_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
             stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
                 snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
                     shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
@@ -1248,10 +1258,10 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
         /* /etc/nologin exists.  Print its contents if we can and exit. */
         logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);
         if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) {
-                while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
-                        fputs(buf, stderr);
-                fclose(f);
-        }
+                while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+                        fputs(buf, stderr);
+                fclose(f);
+        }
         exit(254);
 }
 
@@ -1483,10 +1493,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
                 exit(1);
         }
 
-#ifdef _UNICOS
-        cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command);
-#endif /* _UNICOS */
-
         /*
          * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
          * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us.
@@ -1591,7 +1597,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
 
         closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
 
-        do_rc_files(s, shell);
+        do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
 
         /* restore SIGPIPE for child */
         signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
@@ -1854,8 +1860,8 @@ session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
         u_int len;
         int n_bytes;
 
-        if (no_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
-                debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication.");
+        if (!auth_opts->permit_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
+                debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection.");
                 return 0;
         }
         if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
@@ -2043,9 +2049,11 @@ static int
 session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
 {
         static int called = 0;
+
         packet_check_eom();
-        if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
-                debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag");
+        if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
+            !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
+                debug("%s: agent forwarding disabled", __func__);
                 return 0;
         }
         if (called) {
@@ -2423,8 +2431,8 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
         char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
         u_int i;
 
-        if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
-                packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file.");
+        if (!auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag) {
+                packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
                 return 0;
         }
         if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
@@ -2433,7 +2441,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
         }
         if (options.xauth_location == NULL ||
             (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
-                packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing.");
+                packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward X11.");
                 return 0;
         }
         if (s->display != NULL) {