- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:13:21

     [Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c
     [auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c
     [cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h
     [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h
     [hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h
     [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c
     [ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c
     [ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c
     [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h
     [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
     New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like,
     existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.

     with and ok markus@

     Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
     Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.

     NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL
     <0.9.8e.

1 files changed, 100 insertions, 83 deletions

diff --git a/ssh-ed25519.c b/ssh-ed25519.c
index 160d1f23b..cb87d4790 100644
--- a/ssh-ed25519.c
+++ b/ssh-ed25519.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.3 2014/02/23 20:03:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.4 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2013 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -18,132 +18,149 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 #include "crypto_api.h"
 
-#include <limits.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 
 int
-ssh_ed25519_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
-    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
 {
-        u_char *sig;
-        u_int slen, len;
+        u_char *sig = NULL;
+        size_t slen = 0, len;
         unsigned long long smlen;
-        int ret;
-        Buffer b;
+        int r, ret;
+        struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 
-        if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
-            key->ed25519_sk == NULL) {
-                error("%s: no ED25519 key", __func__);
-                return -1;
-        }
+        if (lenp != NULL)
+                *lenp = 0;
+        if (sigp != NULL)
+                *sigp = NULL;
 
-        if (datalen >= UINT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
-                error("%s: datalen %u too long", __func__, datalen);
-                return -1;
-        }
+        if (key == NULL ||
+            sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
+            key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
+            datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
         smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
-        sig = xmalloc(slen);
+        if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 
         if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, data, datalen,
             key->ed25519_sk)) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) {
-                error("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519 failed: %d", __func__, ret);
-                free(sig);
-                return -1;
+                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */
+                goto out;
         }
         /* encode signature */
-        buffer_init(&b);
-        buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-ed25519");
-        buffer_put_string(&b, sig, smlen - datalen);
-        len = buffer_len(&b);
+        if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+                r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                goto out;
+        }
+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-ed25519")) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0)
+                goto out;
+        len = sshbuf_len(b);
+        if (sigp != NULL) {
+                if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+                        r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                        goto out;
+                }
+                memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+        }
         if (lenp != NULL)
                 *lenp = len;
-        if (sigp != NULL) {
-                *sigp = xmalloc(len);
-                memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+        /* success */
+        r = 0;
+ out:
+        sshbuf_free(b);
+        if (sig != NULL) {
+                explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
+                free(sig);
         }
-        buffer_free(&b);
-        explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
-        free(sig);
 
-        return 0;
+        return r;
 }
 
 int
-ssh_ed25519_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
-    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
 {
-        Buffer b;
-        char *ktype;
-        u_char *sigblob, *sm, *m;
-        u_int len;
-        unsigned long long smlen, mlen;
-        int rlen, ret;
+        struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+        char *ktype = NULL;
+        const u_char *sigblob;
+        u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL;
+        size_t len;
+        unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0;
+        int r, ret;
 
-        if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
-            key->ed25519_pk == NULL) {
-                error("%s: no ED25519 key", __func__);
-                return -1;
-        }
-        buffer_init(&b);
-        buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
-        ktype = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
+        if (key == NULL ||
+            sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
+            key->ed25519_pk == NULL ||
+            datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+        if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+        if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0)
+                goto out;
         if (strcmp("ssh-ed25519", ktype) != 0) {
-                error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype);
-                buffer_free(&b);
-                free(ktype);
-                return -1;
+                r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+                goto out;
         }
-        free(ktype);
-        sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
-        rlen = buffer_len(&b);
-        buffer_free(&b);
-        if (rlen != 0) {
-                error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
-                free(sigblob);
-                return -1;
+        if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+                r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+                goto out;
         }
         if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
-                error("%s: len %u > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES %u", __func__,
-                    len, crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES);
-                free(sigblob);
-                return -1;
+                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+                goto out;
         }
+        if (datalen >= SIZE_MAX - len)
+                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
         smlen = len + datalen;
-        sm = xmalloc(smlen);
+        mlen = smlen;
+        if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = xmalloc(mlen)) == NULL) {
+                r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                goto out;
+        }
         memcpy(sm, sigblob, len);
         memcpy(sm+len, data, datalen);
-        mlen = smlen;
-        m = xmalloc(mlen);
         if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen,
             key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) {
                 debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d",
                     __func__, ret);
         }
-        if (ret == 0 && mlen != datalen) {
-                debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open "
-                    "mlen != datalen (%llu != %u)", __func__, mlen, datalen);
-                ret = -1;
+        if (ret != 0 || mlen != datalen) {
+                r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+                goto out;
         }
         /* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */
-
-        explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
-        explicit_bzero(sm, smlen);
-        explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB. mlen may be invalid if ret != 0 */
-        free(sigblob);
-        free(sm);
-        free(m);
-        debug("%s: signature %scorrect", __func__, (ret != 0) ? "in" : "");
-
-        /* translate return code carefully */
-        return (ret == 0) ? 1 : -1;
+        /* success */
+        r = 0;
+ out:
+        if (sm != NULL) {
+                explicit_bzero(sm, smlen);
+                free(sm);
+        }
+        if (m != NULL) {
+                explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */
+                free(m);
+        }
+        sshbuf_free(b);
+        free(ktype);
+        return r;
 }
+