upstream commit

Replace <sys/param.h> with <limits.h> and other less
 dirty headers where possible.  Annotate <sys/param.h> lines with their
 current reasons.  Switch to PATH_MAX, NGROUPS_MAX, HOST_NAME_MAX+1,
 LOGIN_NAME_MAX, etc.  Change MIN() and MAX() to local definitions of
 MINIMUM() and MAXIMUM() where sensible to avoid pulling in the pollution.
 These are the files confirmed through binary verification. ok guenther,
 millert, doug (helped with the verification protocol)

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index c8b05e079..9f6106d47 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.252 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.253 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
 
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -37,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "sshkey.h"
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name)
         FILE *in, *out = stdout;
         struct sshkey *pub;
         char *cp, *cp2, *kp, *kp2;
-        char line[16*1024], tmp[MAXPATHLEN], old[MAXPATHLEN];
+        char line[16*1024], tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX];
         int c, skip = 0, inplace = 0, num = 0, invalid = 0, has_unhashed = 0;
         int r, ca, revoked;
         int found_key = 0;
@@ -2291,9 +2291,9 @@ usage(void)
 int
 main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
-        char dotsshdir[MAXPATHLEN], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+        char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
         char *checkpoint = NULL;
-        char out_file[MAXPATHLEN], *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep;
+        char out_file[PATH_MAX], *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep;
         struct sshkey *private, *public;
         struct passwd *pw;
         struct stat st;
@@ -2513,7 +2513,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
                                 fatal("Output filename too long");
                         break;
                 case 'K':
-                        if (strlen(optarg) >= MAXPATHLEN)
+                        if (strlen(optarg) >= PATH_MAX)
                                 fatal("Checkpoint filename too long");
                         checkpoint = xstrdup(optarg);
                         break;