- (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers

 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23
     [ssh.c]
     accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13
     [deattack.c crc32.c packet.c]
     rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash.  do not move to
     libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it;
     oneill@cs.sfu.ca
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08
     [scp.1 scp.c]
     -S prog support; tv@debian.org
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07
     [scp.c]
     knf
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33
     [log-client.c]
     shorten
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 12:48:11
     [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h]
     support for ~. in ssh2
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40
     [crc32.h]
     proper prototype
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 15:34:44
     [authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1]
     [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile]
     [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h]
     add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups.
     (note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents)
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 15:55:52
     [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c]
     more ~ support for ssh2
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 16:21:19
     [clientloop.c]
     oops
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53
     [session.c]
     We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we
     close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process
     will exit.  Only a problem for "UseLogin yes".
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59
     [session.c]
     Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its
     own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin
     is present.  Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define.
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43
     [auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c]
     Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*().  We basically call
     setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin().
     Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class.
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31
     [session.c]
     Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus.

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 8a03f0d8d..83450fe84 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.29 2000/07/15 04:01:37 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.30 2000/08/19 21:34:43 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.29 2000/07/15 04:01:37 djm Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "fingerprint.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
 #include "dsa.h"
@@ -228,8 +227,9 @@ do_print_public(struct passwd *pw)
 void
 do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
 {
+        /* XXX RSA1 only */
+
         FILE *f;
-        BIGNUM *e, *n;
         Key *public;
         char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024];
         int i, skip = 0, num = 1, invalid = 1;
@@ -249,13 +249,9 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
                 key_free(public);
                 exit(0);
         }
-        key_free(public);
 
-        /* XXX */
         f = fopen(identity_file, "r");
         if (f != NULL) {
-                n = BN_new();
-                e = BN_new();
                 while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
                         i = strlen(line) - 1;
                         if (line[i] != '\n') {
@@ -290,18 +286,17 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
                                 *cp++ = '\0';
                         }
                         ep = cp;
-                        if (auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &ignore, e, n)) {
+                        if (auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &ignore, public->rsa->e, public->rsa->n)) {
                                 invalid = 0;
                                 comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
-                                printf("%d %s %s\n", BN_num_bits(n),
-                                    fingerprint(e, n),
+                                printf("%d %s %s\n", key_size(public),
+                                    key_fingerprint(public),
                                     comment ? comment : "no comment");
                         }
                 }
-                BN_free(e);
-                BN_free(n);
                 fclose(f);
         }
+        key_free(public);
         if (invalid) {
                 printf("%s is not a valid key file.\n", identity_file);
                 exit(1);