- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/16 14:07:35

     [ssh-rsa.c]
     more timing paranoia - compare all parts of the expected decrypted
     data before returning. AFAIK not exploitable in the SSH protocol.
     "groovy" deraadt@

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
index e3f156156..c471ff323 100644
--- a/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.43 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.44 2010/07/16 14:07:35 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
     u_char *sigbuf, u_int siglen, RSA *rsa)
 {
         u_int ret, rsasize, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
-        int len;
+        int len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
         const u_char *oid = NULL;
         u_char *decrypted = NULL;
 
@@ -250,11 +250,13 @@ openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
                 error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen);
                 goto done;
         }
-        if (timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) != 0) {
+        oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
+        hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
+        if (!oidmatch) {
                 error("oid mismatch");
                 goto done;
         }
-        if (timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) != 0) {
+        if (!hashmatch) {
                 error("hash mismatch");
                 goto done;
         }