Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 133 insertions, 127 deletions

diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
index c6f25b3ee..fec1953b4 100644
--- a/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.51 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.52 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
  *
@@ -25,163 +25,167 @@
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "compat.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "digest.h"
 
-static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int, RSA *);
+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
 
 /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */
 int
-ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
-    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
 {
         int hash_alg;
-        u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig;
-        u_int slen, dlen, len;
-        int ok, nid;
-        Buffer b;
+        u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
+        size_t slen;
+        u_int dlen, len;
+        int nid, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 
-        if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
-            key->rsa == NULL) {
-                error("%s: no RSA key", __func__);
-                return -1;
-        }
+        if (lenp != NULL)
+                *lenp = 0;
+        if (sigp != NULL)
+                *sigp = NULL;
+
+        if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL ||
+            sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
+                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+        if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 
         /* hash the data */
         hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
         nid = NID_sha1;
-        if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
-                error("%s: bad hash algorithm %d", __func__, hash_alg);
-                return -1;
-        }
-        if (ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
-            digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) {
-                error("%s: ssh_digest_memory failed", __func__);
-                return -1;
-        }
-
-        slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
-        sig = xmalloc(slen);
-
-        ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa);
-        explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+        if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+                return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+            digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+                goto out;
 
-        if (ok != 1) {
-                int ecode = ERR_get_error();
+        if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
+                ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                goto out;
+        }
 
-                error("%s: RSA_sign failed: %s", __func__,
-                    ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
-                free(sig);
-                return -1;
+        if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
+                ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+                goto out;
         }
         if (len < slen) {
-                u_int diff = slen - len;
-                debug("slen %u > len %u", slen, len);
+                size_t diff = slen - len;
                 memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
                 explicit_bzero(sig, diff);
         } else if (len > slen) {
-                error("%s: slen %u slen2 %u", __func__, slen, len);
-                free(sig);
-                return -1;
+                ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto out;
         }
         /* encode signature */
-        buffer_init(&b);
-        buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-rsa");
-        buffer_put_string(&b, sig, slen);
-        len = buffer_len(&b);
+        if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+                ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                goto out;
+        }
+        if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-rsa")) != 0 ||
+            (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, slen)) != 0)
+                goto out;
+        len = sshbuf_len(b);
+        if (sigp != NULL) {
+                if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+                        ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                        goto out;
+                }
+                memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+        }
         if (lenp != NULL)
                 *lenp = len;
-        if (sigp != NULL) {
-                *sigp = xmalloc(len);
-                memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+        ret = 0;
+ out:
+        explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+        if (sig != NULL) {
+                explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
+                free(sig);
         }
-        buffer_free(&b);
-        explicit_bzero(sig, slen);
-        free(sig);
-
+        if (b != NULL)
+                sshbuf_free(b);
         return 0;
 }
 
 int
-ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
-    const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
 {
-        Buffer b;
-        int hash_alg;
-        char *ktype;
-        u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob;
-        u_int len, dlen, modlen;
-        int rlen, ret;
+        char *ktype = NULL;
+        int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        size_t len, diff, modlen, dlen;
+        struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+        u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
 
-        if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
-            key->rsa == NULL) {
-                error("%s: no RSA key", __func__);
-                return -1;
-        }
+        if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL ||
+            sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
+            BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 
-        if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
-                error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
-                    __func__, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n),
-                    SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
-                return -1;
+        if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+        if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
+                ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+                goto out;
         }
-        buffer_init(&b);
-        buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
-        ktype = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
         if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) {
-                error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype);
-                buffer_free(&b);
-                free(ktype);
-                return -1;
+                ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+                goto out;
         }
-        free(ktype);
-        sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
-        rlen = buffer_len(&b);
-        buffer_free(&b);
-        if (rlen != 0) {
-                error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
-                free(sigblob);
-                return -1;
+        if (sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) {
+                ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+                goto out;
+        }
+        if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+                ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+                goto out;
         }
         /* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */
         modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
         if (len > modlen) {
-                error("%s: len %u > modlen %u", __func__, len, modlen);
-                free(sigblob);
-                return -1;
+                ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
+                goto out;
         } else if (len < modlen) {
-                u_int diff = modlen - len;
-                debug("%s: add padding: modlen %u > len %u", __func__,
-                    modlen, len);
-                sigblob = xrealloc(sigblob, 1, modlen);
+                diff = modlen - len;
+                osigblob = sigblob;
+                if ((sigblob = realloc(sigblob, modlen)) == NULL) {
+                        sigblob = osigblob; /* put it back for clear/free */
+                        ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                        goto out;
+                }
                 memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len);
                 explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
                 len = modlen;
         }
-        /* hash the data */
         hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
         if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
-                error("%s: bad hash algorithm %d", __func__, hash_alg);
-                return -1;
-        }
-        if (ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
-            digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) {
-                error("%s: ssh_digest_memory failed", __func__);
-                return -1;
+                ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto out;
         }
+        if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+            digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+                goto out;
 
         ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
             key->rsa);
+ out:
+        if (sigblob != NULL) {
+                explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
+                free(sigblob);
+        }
+        if (ktype != NULL)
+                free(ktype);
+        if (b != NULL)
+                sshbuf_free(b);
         explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-        explicit_bzero(sigblob, len);
-        free(sigblob);
-        debug("%s: signature %scorrect", __func__, (ret == 0) ? "in" : "");
         return ret;
 }
 
@@ -204,15 +208,15 @@ static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
 };
 
 static int
-openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
-    u_char *sigbuf, u_int siglen, RSA *rsa)
+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
+    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
 {
-        u_int ret, rsasize, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
+        size_t ret, rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
         int len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
         const u_char *oid = NULL;
         u_char *decrypted = NULL;
 
-        ret = 0;
+        ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
         switch (hash_alg) {
         case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
                 oid = id_sha1;
@@ -223,37 +227,39 @@ openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
                 goto done;
         }
         if (hashlen != hlen) {
-                error("bad hashlen");
+                ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
                 goto done;
         }
         rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
-        if (siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
-                error("bad siglen");
+        if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
+            siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
+                ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+                goto done;
+        }
+        if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
+                ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
                 goto done;
         }
-        decrypted = xmalloc(rsasize);
         if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
             RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
-                error("RSA_public_decrypt failed: %s",
-                    ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+                ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
                 goto done;
         }
-        if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != hlen + oidlen) {
-                error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen);
+        if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
+                ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
                 goto done;
         }
         oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
         hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
-        if (!oidmatch) {
-                error("oid mismatch");
-                goto done;
-        }
-        if (!hashmatch) {
-                error("hash mismatch");
+        if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
+                ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
                 goto done;
         }
-        ret = 1;
+        ret = 0;
 done:
-        free(decrypted);
+        if (decrypted) {
+                explicit_bzero(decrypted, rsasize);
+                free(decrypted);
+        }
         return ret;
 }