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+SSH(1)                     OpenBSD Reference Manual                     SSH(1)
+
+NAME
+     ssh - OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh [-1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxY] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]
+         [-D [bind_address:]port] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile]
+         [-i identity_file] [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport]
+         [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]
+         [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path]
+         [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] [user@]hostname [command]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+     executing commands on a remote machine.  It is intended to replace rlogin
+     and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrust-
+     ed hosts over an insecure network.  X11 connections and arbitrary TCP
+     ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+     ssh connects and logs into the specified hostname (with optional user
+     name).  The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using
+     one of several methods depending on the protocol version used (see be-
+     low).
+
+     If command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a
+     login shell.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -1      Forces ssh to try protocol version 1 only.
+
+     -2      Forces ssh to try protocol version 2 only.
+
+     -4      Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+     -6      Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+     -A      Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.  This
+             can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration
+             file.
+
+             Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.  Users with the
+             ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+             agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through
+             the forwarded connection.  An attacker cannot obtain key material
+             from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
+             that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
+             the agent.
+
+     -a      Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+
+     -b bind_address
+             Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of
+             the connection.  Only useful on systems with more than one ad-
+             dress.
+
+     -C      Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout,
+             stderr, and data for forwarded X11 and TCP connections).  The
+             compression algorithm is the same used by gzip(1), and the
+             ``level'' can be controlled by the CompressionLevel option for
+             protocol version 1.  Compression is desirable on modem lines and
+             other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast
+             networks.  The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis
+             in the configuration files; see the Compression option.
+
+     -c cipher_spec
+             Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
+
+             Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher.  The
+             supported values are ``3des'', ``blowfish'', and ``des''.  3des
+             (triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three dif-
+             ferent keys.  It is believed to be secure.  blowfish is a fast
+             block cipher; it appears very secure and is much faster than
+             3des.  des is only supported in the ssh client for interoperabil-
+             ity with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do not support
+             the 3des cipher.  Its use is strongly discouraged due to crypto-
+             graphic weaknesses.  The default is ``3des''.
+
+             For protocol version 2, cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of
+             ciphers listed in order of preference.  The supported ciphers
+             are: 3des-cbc, aes128-cbc, aes192-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr,
+             aes192-ctr, aes256-ctr, arcfour128, arcfour256, arcfour, blow-
+             fish-cbc, and cast128-cbc.  The default is:
+
+                   aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour128,
+                   arcfour256,arcfour,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,aes128-ctr,
+                   aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr
+
+     -D [bind_address:]port
+             Specifies a local ``dynamic'' application-level port forwarding.
+             This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local
+             side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address.  Whenever a
+             connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
+             the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
+             determine where to connect to from the remote machine.  Currently
+             the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act
+             as a SOCKS server.  Only root can forward privileged ports.  Dy-
+             namic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration
+             file.
+
+             IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
+             [bind_address/]port or by enclosing the address in square brack-
+             ets.  Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.  By de-
+             fault, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+             GatewayPorts setting.  However, an explicit bind_address may be
+             used to bind the connection to a specific address.  The
+             bind_address of ``localhost'' indicates that the listening port
+             be bound for local use only, while an empty address or `*' indi-
+             cates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+
+     -e escape_char
+             Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: `~').
+             The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a
+             line.  The escape character followed by a dot (`.') closes the
+             connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and
+             followed by itself sends the escape character once.  Setting the
+             character to ``none'' disables any escapes and makes the session
+             fully transparent.
+
+     -F configfile
+             Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.  If a con-
+             figuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
+             configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored.  The
+             default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config.
+
+     -f      Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
+             This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or passphras-
+             es, but the user wants it in the background.  This implies -n.
+             The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is
+             with something like ssh -f host xterm.
+
+             If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to
+             ``yes'', then a client started with -f will wait for all remote
+             port forwards to be successfully established before placing it-
+             self in the background.
+
+     -g      Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
+
+     -I smartcard_device
+             Specify the device ssh should use to communicate with a smartcard
+             used for storing the user's private RSA key.  This option is only
+             available if support for smartcard devices is compiled in (de-
+             fault is no support).
+
+     -i identity_file
+             Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for RSA or
+             DSA authentication is read.  The default is ~/.ssh/identity for
+             protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/id_dsa for pro-
+             tocol version 2.  Identity files may also be specified on a per-
+             host basis in the configuration file.  It is possible to have
+             multiple -i options (and multiple identities specified in config-
+             uration files).
+
+     -K      Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation)
+             of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
+
+     -k      Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the
+             server.
+
+     -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+             Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be
+             forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side.  This
+             works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local side,
+             optionally bound to the specified bind_address.  Whenever a con-
+             nection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
+             the secure channel, and a connection is made to host port
+             hostport from the remote machine.  Port forwardings can also be
+             specified in the configuration file.  IPv6 addresses can be spec-
+             ified with an alternative syntax: [bind_address/]port/host/host-
+             port or by enclosing the address in square brackets.  Only the
+             superuser can forward privileged ports.  By default, the local
+             port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting.  How-
+             ever, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection
+             to a specific address.  The bind_address of ``localhost'' indi-
+             cates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while
+             an empty address or `*' indicates that the port should be avail-
+             able from all interfaces.
+
+     -l login_name
+             Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.  This also
+             may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+     -M      Places the ssh client into ``master'' mode for connection shar-
+             ing.  Multiple -M options places ssh into ``master'' mode with
+             confirmation required before slave connections are accepted.  Re-
+             fer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for de-
+             tails.
+
+     -m mac_spec
+             Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of
+             MAC (message authentication code) algorithms can be specified in
+             order of preference.  See the MACs keyword for more information.
+
+     -N      Do not execute a remote command.  This is useful for just for-
+             warding ports (protocol version 2 only).
+
+     -n      Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
+             stdin).  This must be used when ssh is run in the background.  A
+             common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote ma-
+             chine.  For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start
+             an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be au-
+             tomatically forwarded over an encrypted channel.  The ssh program
+             will be put in the background.  (This does not work if ssh needs
+             to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f option.)
+
+     -O ctl_cmd
+             Control an active connection multiplexing master process.  When
+             the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted
+             and passed to the master process.  Valid commands are: ``check''
+             (check that the master process is running) and ``exit'' (request
+             the master to exit).
+
+     -o option
+             Can be used to give options in the format used in the configura-
+             tion file.  This is useful for specifying options for which there
+             is no separate command-line flag.  For full details of the op-
+             tions listed below, and their possible values, see ssh_config(5).
+
+                   AddressFamily
+                   BatchMode
+                   BindAddress
+                   ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+                   CheckHostIP
+                   Cipher
+                   Ciphers
+                   ClearAllForwardings
+                   Compression
+                   CompressionLevel
+                   ConnectionAttempts
+                   ConnectTimeout
+                   ControlMaster
+                   ControlPath
+                   DynamicForward
+                   EscapeChar
+                   ExitOnForwardFailure
+                   ForwardAgent
+                   ForwardX11
+                   ForwardX11Trusted
+                   GatewayPorts
+                   GlobalKnownHostsFile
+                   GSSAPIAuthentication
+                   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+                   HashKnownHosts
+                   Host
+                   HostbasedAuthentication
+                   HostKeyAlgorithms
+                   HostKeyAlias
+                   HostName
+                   IdentityFile
+                   IdentitiesOnly
+                   KbdInteractiveDevices
+                   LocalCommand
+                   LocalForward
+                   LogLevel
+                   MACs
+                   NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+                   NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+                   PasswordAuthentication
+                   PermitLocalCommand
+                   Port
+                   PreferredAuthentications
+                   Protocol
+                   ProxyCommand
+                   PubkeyAuthentication
+                   RekeyLimit
+                   RemoteForward
+                   RhostsRSAAuthentication
+                   RSAAuthentication
+                   SendEnv
+                   ServerAliveInterval
+                   ServerAliveCountMax
+                   SmartcardDevice
+                   StrictHostKeyChecking
+                   TCPKeepAlive
+                   Tunnel
+                   TunnelDevice
+                   UsePrivilegedPort
+                   User
+                   UserKnownHostsFile
+                   VerifyHostKeyDNS
+                   VisualHostKey
+                   XAuthLocation
+
+     -p port
+             Port to connect to on the remote host.  This can be specified on
+             a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+     -q      Quiet mode.  Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be
+             suppressed.
+
+     -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+             Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to
+             be forwarded to the given host and port on the local side.  This
+             works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the remote
+             side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the connec-
+             tion is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
+             made to host port hostport from the local machine.
+
+             Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+             Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on
+             the remote machine.  IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing
+             the address in square braces or using an alternative syntax:
+             [bind_address/]host/port/hostport.
+
+             By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to
+             the loopback interface only.  This may be overriden by specifying
+             a bind_address.  An empty bind_address, or the address `*', indi-
+             cates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
+             Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the serv-
+             er's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)).
+
+     -S ctl_path
+             Specifies the location of a control socket for connection shar-
+             ing.  Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster
+             in ssh_config(5) for details.
+
+     -s      May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote
+             system.  Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which fa-
+             cilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other applica-
+             tions (eg. sftp(1)).  The subsystem is specified as the remote
+             command.
+
+     -T      Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
+
+     -t      Force pseudo-tty allocation.  This can be used to execute arbi-
+             trary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
+             very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services.  Multiple -t
+             options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
+
+     -V      Display the version number and exit.
+
+     -v      Verbose mode.  Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its
+             progress.  This is helpful in debugging connection, authentica-
+             tion, and configuration problems.  Multiple -v options increase
+             the verbosity.  The maximum is 3.
+
+     -w local_tun[:remote_tun]
+             Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4) de-
+             vices between the client (local_tun) and the server (remote_tun).
+
+             The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+             ``any'', which uses the next available tunnel device.  If
+             remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to ``any''.  See also
+             the Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5).  If the
+             Tunnel directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode,
+             which is ``point-to-point''.
+
+     -X      Enables X11 forwarding.  This can also be specified on a per-host
+             basis in a configuration file.
+
+             X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.  Users with the
+             ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+             user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display
+             through the forwarded connection.  An attacker may then be able
+             to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
+
+             For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY ex-
+             tension restrictions by default.  Please refer to the ssh -Y op-
+             tion and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for
+             more information.
+
+     -x      Disables X11 forwarding.
+
+     -Y      Enables trusted X11 forwarding.  Trusted X11 forwardings are not
+             subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
+
+     ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configura-
+     tion file and a system-wide configuration file.  The file format and con-
+     figuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+     ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an
+     error occurred.
+
+AUTHENTICATION
+     The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2.  Protocol 2 is the
+     default, with ssh falling back to protocol 1 if it detects protocol 2 is
+     unsupported.  These settings may be altered using the Protocol option in
+     ssh_config(5), or enforced using the -1 and -2 options (see above).  Both
+     protocols support similar authentication methods, but protocol 2 is pre-
+     ferred since it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the
+     traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) and
+     integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, hmac-ripemd160).  Protocol 1
+     lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the connection.
+
+     The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentica-
+     tion, host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-re-
+     sponse authentication, and password authentication.  Authentication meth-
+     ods are tried in the order specified above, though protocol 2 has a con-
+     figuration option to change the default order: PreferredAuthentications.
+
+     Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs
+     in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote
+     machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files
+     ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote
+     machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and
+     the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login.
+     Additionally, the server must be able to verify the client's host key
+     (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts,
+     below) for login to be permitted.  This authentication method closes se-
+     curity holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
+     [Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the
+     rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
+     disabled if security is desired.]
+
+     Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on pub-
+     lic-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and decryption
+     are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive the decryp-
+     tion key from the encryption key.  The idea is that each user creates a
+     public/private key pair for authentication purposes.  The server knows
+     the public key, and only the user knows the private key.  ssh implements
+     public key authentication protocol automatically, using either the RSA or
+     DSA algorithms.  Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys, but
+     protocol 2 may use either.  The HISTORY section of ssl(8) contains a
+     brief discussion of the two algorithms.
+
+     The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted
+     for logging in.  When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server
+     which key pair it would like to use for authentication.  The client
+     proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that
+     the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account.
+
+     The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1).  This stores
+     the private key in ~/.ssh/identity (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa (protocol
+     2 DSA), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa (protocol 2 RSA) and stores the public key in
+     ~/.ssh/identity.pub (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (protocol 2 DSA), or
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (protocol 2 RSA) in the user's home directory.  The us-
+     er should then copy the public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her
+     home directory on the remote machine.  The authorized_keys file corre-
+     sponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file, and has one key per line,
+     though the lines can be very long.  After this, the user can log in with-
+     out giving the password.
+
+     The most convenient way to use public key authentication may be with an
+     authentication agent.  See ssh-agent(1) for more information.
+
+     Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an
+     arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response.  Protocol 2 al-
+     lows multiple challenges and responses; protocol 1 is restricted to just
+     one challenge/response.  Examples of challenge-response authentication
+     include BSD Authentication (see login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD
+     systems).
+
+     Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a
+     password.  The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however,
+     since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by
+     someone listening on the network.
+
+     ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing identifica-
+     tion for all hosts it has ever been used with.  Host keys are stored in
+     ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory.  Additionally, the file
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known hosts.  Any
+     new hosts are automatically added to the user's file.  If a host's iden-
+     tification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables password au-
+     thentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks,
+     which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption.  The
+     StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines
+     whose host key is not known or has changed.
+
+     When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server ei-
+     ther executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives the
+     user a normal shell on the remote machine.  All communication with the
+     remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
+
+     If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the user
+     may use the escape characters noted below.
+
+     If no pseudo-tty has been allocated, the session is transparent and can
+     be used to reliably transfer binary data.  On most systems, setting the
+     escape character to ``none'' will also make the session transparent even
+     if a tty is used.
+
+     The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine
+     exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
+
+ESCAPE CHARACTERS
+     When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of func-
+     tions through the use of an escape character.
+
+     A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a
+     character other than those described below.  The escape character must
+     always follow a newline to be interpreted as special.  The escape charac-
+     ter can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar configura-
+     tion directive or on the command line by the -e option.
+
+     The supported escapes (assuming the default `~') are:
+
+     ~.      Disconnect.
+
+     ~^Z     Background ssh.
+
+     ~#      List forwarded connections.
+
+     ~&      Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection /
+             X11 sessions to terminate.
+
+     ~?      Display a list of escape characters.
+
+     ~B      Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful for SSH protocol
+             version 2 and if the peer supports it).
+
+     ~C      Open command line.  Currently this allows the addition of port
+             forwardings using the -L and -R options (see above).  It also al-
+             lows the cancellation of existing remote port-forwardings using
+             -KR[bind_address:]port.  !command allows the user to execute a
+             local command if the PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in
+             ssh_config(5).  Basic help is available, using the -h option.
+
+     ~R      Request rekeying of the connection (only useful for SSH protocol
+             version 2 and if the peer supports it).
+
+TCP FORWARDING
+     Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can be
+     specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.  One
+     possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail
+     server; another is going through firewalls.
+
+     In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between an IRC
+     client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly support
+     encrypted communications.  This works as follows: the user connects to
+     the remote host using ssh, specifying a port to be used to forward con-
+     nections to the remote server.  After that it is possible to start the
+     service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the
+     same local port, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection.
+
+     The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine
+     ``127.0.0.1'' (localhost) to remote server ``server.example.com'':
+
+         $ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
+         $ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1
+
+     This tunnels a connection to IRC server ``server.example.com'', joining
+     channel ``#users'', nickname ``pinky'', using port 1234.  It doesn't mat-
+     ter which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember, only
+     root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any
+     ports already in use.  The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the
+     remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services.
+
+     The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command ``sleep 10'' is
+     specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to
+     start the service which is to be tunnelled.  If no connections are made
+     within the time specified, ssh will exit.
+
+X11 FORWARDING
+     If the ForwardX11 variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of
+     the -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY
+     environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is auto-
+     matically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 pro-
+     grams started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted
+     channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the
+     local machine.  The user should not manually set DISPLAY.  Forwarding of
+     X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration
+     files.
+
+     The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a
+     display number greater than zero.  This is normal, and happens because
+     ssh creates a ``proxy'' X server on the server machine for forwarding the
+     connections over the encrypted channel.
+
+     ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
+     For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store
+     it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections
+     carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection
+     is opened.  The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server
+     machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
+
+     If the ForwardAgent variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of
+     the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication
+     agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the re-
+     mote side.
+
+VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+     When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the
+     server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option
+     StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled).  Fingerprints can be determined
+     using ssh-keygen(1):
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+
+     If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be
+     accepted or rejected.  Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys
+     just by looking at hex strings, there is also support to compare host
+     keys visually, using random art.  By setting the VisualHostKey option to
+     ``yes'', a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server,
+     no matter if the session itself is interactive or not.  By learning the
+     pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out that the host
+     key has changed when a completely different pattern is displayed.  Be-
+     cause these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks
+     similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the
+     host key is the same, not guaranteed proof.
+
+     To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all
+     known hosts, the following command line can be used:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+
+     If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is
+     available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS.  An additional resource
+     record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is
+     able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented.
+
+     In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
+     ``host.example.com''.  The SSHFP resource records should first be added
+     to the zonefile for host.example.com:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
+
+     The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.  To check that
+     the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
+
+           $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
+
+     Finally the client connects:
+
+           $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
+           [...]
+           Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
+           Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
+
+     See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information.
+
+SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
+     ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using
+     the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined se-
+     curely.  The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls
+     whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traf-
+     fic).
+
+     The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with re-
+     mote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from 10.1.1.1
+     to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the
+     remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
+
+     On the client:
+
+           # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
+           # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
+           # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
+
+     On the server:
+
+           # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
+           # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
+
+     Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
+     file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option.  The following
+     entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user ``jane'' and
+     on tun device 2 from user ``john'', if PermitRootLogin is set to
+     ``forced-commands-only'':
+
+       tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
+       tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
+
+     Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be
+     more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs.  More perma-
+     nent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and
+     isakmpd(8).
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+     ssh will normally set the following environment variables:
+
+     DISPLAY               The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the
+                           X11 server.  It is automatically set by ssh to
+                           point to a value of the form ``hostname:n'', where
+                           ``hostname'' indicates the host where the shell
+                           runs, and `n' is an integer >= 1.  ssh uses this
+                           special value to forward X11 connections over the
+                           secure channel.  The user should normally not set
+                           DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11
+                           connection insecure (and will require the user to
+                           manually copy any required authorization cookies).
+
+     HOME                  Set to the path of the user's home directory.
+
+     LOGNAME               Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with sys-
+                           tems that use this variable.
+
+     MAIL                  Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
+
+     PATH                  Set to the default PATH, as specified when compil-
+                           ing ssh.
+
+     SSH_ASKPASS           If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the
+                           passphrase from the current terminal if it was run
+                           from a terminal.  If ssh does not have a terminal
+                           associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are
+                           set, it will execute the program specified by
+                           SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the
+                           passphrase.  This is particularly useful when call-
+                           ing ssh from a .xsession or related script.  (Note
+                           that on some machines it may be necessary to redi-
+                           rect the input from /dev/null to make this work.)
+
+     SSH_AUTH_SOCK         Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to
+                           communicate with the agent.
+
+     SSH_CONNECTION        Identifies the client and server ends of the con-
+                           nection.  The variable contains four space-separat-
+                           ed values: client IP address, client port number,
+                           server IP address, and server port number.
+
+     SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND  This variable contains the original command line if
+                           a forced command is executed.  It can be used to
+                           extract the original arguments.
+
+     SSH_TTY               This is set to the name of the tty (path to the de-
+                           vice) associated with the current shell or command.
+                           If the current session has no tty, this variable is
+                           not set.
+
+     TZ                    This variable is set to indicate the present time
+                           zone if it was set when the daemon was started
+                           (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new connec-
+                           tions).
+
+     USER                  Set to the name of the user logging in.
+
+     Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format
+     ``VARNAME=value'' to the environment if the file exists and users are al-
+     lowed to change their environment.  For more information, see the
+     PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
+
+FILES
+     ~/.rhosts
+             This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).  On
+             some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the us-
+             er's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8) reads
+             it as root.  Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
+             and must not have write permissions for anyone else.  The recom-
+             mended permission for most machines is read/write for the user,
+             and not accessible by others.
+
+     ~/.shosts
+             This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
+             host-based authentication without permitting login with
+             rlogin/rsh.
+
+     ~/.ssh/
+             This directory is the default location for all user-specific con-
+             figuration and authentication information.  There is no general
+             requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret,
+             but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the
+             user, and not accessible by others.
+
+     ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+             Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in
+             as this user.  The format of this file is described in the
+             sshd(8) manual page.  This file is not highly sensitive, but the
+             recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not ac-
+             cessible by others.
+
+     ~/.ssh/config
+             This is the per-user configuration file.  The file format and
+             configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).  Because of
+             the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+             read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+
+     ~/.ssh/environment
+             Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
+             ENVIRONMENT, above.
+
+     ~/.ssh/identity
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+             Contains the private key for authentication.  These files contain
+             sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not acces-
+             sible by others (read/write/execute).  ssh will simply ignore a
+             private key file if it is accessible by others.  It is possible
+             to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be
+             used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using 3DES.
+
+     ~/.ssh/identity.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+             Contains the public key for authentication.  These files are not
+             sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
+
+     ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+             Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
+             into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
+             keys.  See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this
+             file.
+
+     ~/.ssh/rc
+             Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
+             just before the user's shell (or command) is started.  See the
+             sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+     /etc/hosts.equiv
+             This file is for host-based authentication (see above).  It
+             should only be writable by root.
+
+     /etc/shosts.equiv
+             This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but al-
+             lows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+             rlogin/rsh.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+             Systemwide configuration file.  The file format and configuration
+             options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+             These three files contain the private parts of the host keys and
+             are used for host-based authentication.  If protocol version 1 is
+             used, ssh must be setuid root, since the host key is readable on-
+             ly by root.  For protocol version 2, ssh uses ssh-keysign(8) to
+             access the host keys, eliminating the requirement that ssh be se-
+             tuid root when host-based authentication is used.  By default ssh
+             is not setuid root.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+             Systemwide list of known host keys.  This file should be prepared
+             by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
+             all machines in the organization.  It should be world-readable.
+             See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file.
+
+     /etc/ssh/sshrc
+             Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
+             just before the user's shell (or command) is started.  See the
+             sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1),
+     tun(4), hosts.equiv(5), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8)
+
+     The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers, RFC 4250, 2006.
+
+     The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, RFC 4251, 2006.
+
+     The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, RFC 4252, 2006.
+
+     The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4253, 2006.
+
+     The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC 4254, 2006.
+
+     Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC
+     4255, 2006.
+
+     Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol
+     (SSH), RFC 4256, 2006.
+
+     The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension, RFC 4335, 2006.
+
+     The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, 2006.
+
+     Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
+     Protocol, RFC 4345, 2006.
+
+     Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
+     Protocol, RFC 4419, 2006.
+
+     The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006.
+
+     A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve
+     Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
+     Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99).
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 4.4                      July 2, 2008                               14