- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/08 05:07:56

     [ssh.c]
     nuke ptrace comment

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 0afdba7b5..8b77a8101 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.174 2002/05/23 19:39:34 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.175 2002/06/08 05:07:56 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -717,14 +717,6 @@ again:
          * user's home directory if it happens to be on a NFS volume where
          * root is mapped to nobody.
          */
-
-        /*
-         * Note that some legacy systems need to postpone the following call
-         * to permanently_set_uid() until the private hostkey is destroyed
-         * with RSA_free().  Otherwise the calling user could ptrace() the
-         * process, read the private hostkey and impersonate the host.
-         * OpenBSD does not allow ptracing of setuid processes.
-         */
         permanently_set_uid(pw);
 
         /*