Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 421 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/sshbuf-getput-basic.c b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b7d0758c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
+/*      $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $     */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+int
+sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len)
+{
+        const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+        int r;
+
+        if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        if (v != NULL)
+                memcpy(v, p, len);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp)
+{
+        const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+        int r;
+
+        if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 8)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        if (valp != NULL)
+                *valp = PEEK_U64(p);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp)
+{
+        const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+        int r;
+
+        if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 4)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        if (valp != NULL)
+                *valp = PEEK_U32(p);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp)
+{
+        const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+        int r;
+
+        if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 2)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        if (valp != NULL)
+                *valp = PEEK_U16(p);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp)
+{
+        const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+        int r;
+
+        if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 1)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        if (valp != NULL)
+                *valp = (u_int8_t)*p;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+        const u_char *val;
+        size_t len;
+        int r;
+
+        if (valp != NULL)
+                *valp = NULL;
+        if (lenp != NULL)
+                *lenp = 0;
+        if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &val, &len)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        if (valp != NULL) {
+                if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
+                        SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
+                        return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                }
+                memcpy(*valp, val, len);
+                (*valp)[len] = '\0';
+        }
+        if (lenp != NULL)
+                *lenp = len;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+        size_t len;
+        const u_char *p;
+        int r;
+
+        if (valp != NULL)
+                *valp = NULL;
+        if (lenp != NULL)
+                *lenp = 0;
+        if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        if (valp != 0)
+                *valp = p;
+        if (lenp != NULL)
+                *lenp = len;
+        if (sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4) != 0) {
+                /* Shouldn't happen */
+                SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+                SSHBUF_ABORT();
+                return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
+    size_t *lenp)
+{
+        u_int32_t len;
+        const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+
+        if (valp != NULL)
+                *valp = NULL;
+        if (lenp != NULL)
+                *lenp = 0;
+        if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 4) {
+                SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
+                return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+        }
+        len = PEEK_U32(p);
+        if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
+                SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE"));
+                return SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE;
+        }
+        if (sshbuf_len(buf) - 4 < len) {
+                SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
+                return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+        }
+        if (valp != 0)
+                *valp = p + 4;
+        if (lenp != NULL)
+                *lenp = len;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+        size_t len;
+        const u_char *p, *z;
+        int r;
+
+        if (valp != NULL)
+                *valp = NULL;
+        if (lenp != NULL)
+                *lenp = 0;
+        if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
+                return r;
+        /* Allow a \0 only at the end of the string */
+        if (len > 0 &&
+            (z = memchr(p , '\0', len)) != NULL && z < p + len - 1) {
+                SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT"));
+                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+        }
+        if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
+                return -1;
+        if (valp != NULL) {
+                if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
+                        SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
+                        return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+                }
+                memcpy(*valp, p, len);
+                (*valp)[len] = '\0';
+        }
+        if (lenp != NULL)
+                *lenp = (size_t)len;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v)
+{
+        u_int32_t len;
+        u_char *p;
+        int r;
+
+        /*
+         * Use sshbuf_peek_string_direct() to figure out if there is
+         * a complete string in 'buf' and copy the string directly
+         * into 'v'.
+         */
+        if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &len)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_reserve(v, len, &p)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_get(buf, p, len)) != 0)
+                return r;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+        u_char *p;
+        int r;
+
+        if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len, &p)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        memcpy(p, v, len);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
+{
+        return sshbuf_put(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+        va_list ap;
+        int r;
+
+        va_start(ap, fmt);
+        r = sshbuf_putfv(buf, fmt, ap);
+        va_end(ap);
+        return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+        va_list ap2;
+        int r, len;
+        u_char *p;
+
+        va_copy(ap2, ap);
+        if ((len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ap2)) < 0) {
+                r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+                goto out;
+        }
+        if (len == 0) {
+                r = 0;
+                goto out; /* Nothing to do */
+        }
+        va_end(ap2);
+        va_copy(ap2, ap);
+        if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, (size_t)len + 1, &p)) < 0)
+                goto out;
+        if ((r = vsnprintf((char *)p, len + 1, fmt, ap2)) != len) {
+                r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto out; /* Shouldn't happen */
+        }
+        /* Consume terminating \0 */
+        if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(buf, 1)) != 0)
+                goto out;
+        r = 0;
+ out:
+        va_end(ap2);
+        return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val)
+{
+        u_char *p;
+        int r;
+
+        if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 8, &p)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        POKE_U64(p, val);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val)
+{
+        u_char *p;
+        int r;
+
+        if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 4, &p)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        POKE_U32(p, val);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val)
+{
+        u_char *p;
+        int r;
+
+        if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 2, &p)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        POKE_U16(p, val);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val)
+{
+        u_char *p;
+        int r;
+
+        if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 1, &p)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        p[0] = val;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+        u_char *d;
+        int r;
+
+        if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
+                SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
+                return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+        }
+        if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4, &d)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        POKE_U32(d, len);
+        memcpy(d + 4, v, len);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v)
+{
+        return sshbuf_put_string(buf, (u_char *)v, strlen(v));
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
+{
+        return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp)
+{
+        const u_char *p;
+        size_t len;
+        struct sshbuf *ret;
+        int r;
+
+        if (buf == NULL || bufp == NULL)
+                return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+        *bufp = NULL;
+        if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
+                return r;
+        if ((ret = sshbuf_from(p, len)) == NULL)
+                return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+        if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4)) != 0 ||  /* Shouldn't happen */
+            (r = sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf)) != 0) {
+                sshbuf_free(ret);
+                return r;
+        }
+        *bufp = ret;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+        u_char *d;
+        const u_char *s = (const u_char *)v;
+        int r, prepend;
+
+        if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 5) {
+                SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
+                return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+        }
+        /* Skip leading zero bytes */
+        for (; len > 0 && *s == 0; len--, s++)
+                ;
+        /*
+         * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
+         * avoid interpretation as a negative number.
+         */
+        prepend = len > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0;
+        if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4 + prepend, &d)) < 0)
+                return r;
+        POKE_U32(d, len + prepend);
+        if (prepend)
+                d[4] = 0;
+        memcpy(d + 4 + prepend, s, len);
+        return 0;
+}