* New upstream release (closes: #474301). Important changes not previously

  backported to 4.7p1:
  - 4.9/4.9p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.9):
    + Added chroot(2) support for sshd(8), controlled by a new option
      "ChrootDirectory" (closes: #139047, LP: #24777).
    + Linked sftp-server(8) into sshd(8). The internal sftp server is used
      when the command "internal-sftp" is specified in a Subsystem or
      ForceCommand declaration. When used with ChrootDirectory, the
      internal sftp server requires no special configuration of files
      inside the chroot environment.
    + Added a protocol extension method "posix-rename@openssh.com" for
      sftp-server(8) to perform POSIX atomic rename() operations; sftp(1)
      prefers this if available (closes: #308561).
    + Removed the fixed limit of 100 file handles in sftp-server(8).
    + ssh(8) will now skip generation of SSH protocol 1 ephemeral server
      keys when in inetd mode and protocol 2 connections are negotiated.
      This speeds up protocol 2 connections to inetd-mode servers that
      also allow Protocol 1.
    + Accept the PermitRootLogin directive in a sshd_config(5) Match
      block. Allows for, e.g. permitting root only from the local network.
    + Reworked sftp(1) argument splitting and escaping to be more
      internally consistent (i.e. between sftp commands) and more
      consistent with sh(1). Please note that this will change the
      interpretation of some quoted strings, especially those with
      embedded backslash escape sequences.
    + Support "Banner=none" in sshd_config(5) to disable sending of a
      pre-login banner (e.g. in a Match block).
    + ssh(1) ProxyCommands are now executed with $SHELL rather than
      /bin/sh.
    + ssh(1)'s ConnectTimeout option is now applied to both the TCP
      connection and the SSH banner exchange (previously it just covered
      the TCP connection). This allows callers of ssh(1) to better detect
      and deal with stuck servers that accept a TCP connection but don't
      progress the protocol, and also makes ConnectTimeout useful for
      connections via a ProxyCommand.
    + scp(1) incorrectly reported "stalled" on slow copies (closes:
      #140828).
    + scp(1) date underflow for timestamps before epoch.
    + ssh(1) used the obsolete SIG DNS RRtype for host keys in DNS,
      instead of the current standard RRSIG.
    + Correctly drain ACKs when a sftp(1) upload write fails midway,
      avoids a fatal() exit from what should be a recoverable condition.
    + Fixed ssh-keygen(1) selective host key hashing (i.e. "ssh-keygen -HF
      hostname") to not include any IP address in the data to be hashed.
    + Make ssh(1) skip listening on the IPv6 wildcard address when a
      binding address of 0.0.0.0 is used against an old SSH server that
      does not support the RFC4254 syntax for wildcard bind addresses.
    + Enable IPV6_V6ONLY socket option on sshd(8) listen socket, as is
      already done for X11/TCP forwarding sockets (closes: #439661).
    + Fix FD leak that could hang a ssh(1) connection multiplexing master.
    + Make ssh(1) -q option documentation consistent with reality.
    + Fixed sshd(8) PAM support not calling pam_session_close(), or
      failing to call it with root privileges (closes: #372680).
    + Fix activation of OpenSSL engine support when requested in configure
      (LP: #119295).
  - 5.1/5.1p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.1):
    + Introduce experimental SSH Fingerprint ASCII Visualisation to ssh(1)
      and ssh-keygen(1). Visual fingerprint display is controlled by a new
      ssh_config(5) option "VisualHostKey". The intent is to render SSH
      host keys in a visual form that is amenable to easy recall and
      rejection of changed host keys.
    + sshd_config(5) now supports CIDR address/masklen matching in "Match
      address" blocks, with a fallback to classic wildcard matching.
    + sshd(8) now supports CIDR matching in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
      from="..." restrictions, also with a fallback to classic wildcard
      matching.
    + Added an extended test mode (-T) to sshd(8) to request that it write
      its effective configuration to stdout and exit. Extended test mode
      also supports the specification of connection parameters (username,
      source address and hostname) to test the application of
      sshd_config(5) Match rules.
    + ssh(1) now prints the number of bytes transferred and the overall
      connection throughput for SSH protocol 2 sessions when in verbose
      mode (previously these statistics were displayed for protocol 1
      connections only).
    + sftp-server(8) now supports extension methods statvfs@openssh.com
      and fstatvfs@openssh.com that implement statvfs(2)-like operations.
    + sftp(1) now has a "df" command to the sftp client that uses the
      statvfs@openssh.com to produce a df(1)-like display of filesystem
      space and inode utilisation (requires statvfs@openssh.com support on
      the server).
    + Added a MaxSessions option to sshd_config(5) to allow control of the
      number of multiplexed sessions supported over a single TCP
      connection. This allows increasing the number of allowed sessions
      above the previous default of 10, disabling connection multiplexing
      (MaxSessions=1) or disallowing login/shell/subsystem sessions
      entirely (MaxSessions=0).
    + Added a no-more-sessions@openssh.com global request extension that
      is sent from ssh(1) to sshd(8) when the client knows that it will
      never request another session (i.e. when session multiplexing is
      disabled). This allows a server to disallow further session requests
      and terminate the session in cases where the client has been
      hijacked.
    + ssh-keygen(1) now supports the use of the -l option in combination
      with -F to search for a host in ~/.ssh/known_hosts and display its
      fingerprint.
    + ssh-keyscan(1) now defaults to "rsa" (protocol 2) keys, instead of
      "rsa1".
    + Added an AllowAgentForwarding option to sshd_config(8) to control
      whether authentication agent forwarding is permitted. Note that this
      is a loose control, as a client may install their own unofficial
      forwarder.
    + ssh(1) and sshd(8): avoid unnecessary malloc/copy/free when
      receiving network data, resulting in a ~10% speedup.
    + ssh(1) and sshd(8) will now try additional addresses when connecting
      to a port forward destination whose DNS name resolves to more than
      one address. The previous behaviour was to try the only first
      address and give up if that failed.
    + ssh(1) and sshd(8) now support signalling that channels are
      half-closed for writing, through a channel protocol extension
      notification "eow@openssh.com". This allows propagation of closed
      file descriptors, so that commands such as "ssh -2 localhost od
      /bin/ls | true" do not send unnecessary data over the wire.
    + sshd(8): increased the default size of ssh protocol 1 ephemeral keys
      from 768 to 1024 bits.
    + When ssh(1) has been requested to fork after authentication ("ssh
      -f") with ExitOnForwardFailure enabled, delay the fork until after
      replies for any -R forwards have been seen. Allows for robust
      detection of -R forward failure when using -f.
    + "Match group" blocks in sshd_config(5) now support negation of
      groups. E.g. "Match group staff,!guests".
    + sftp(1) and sftp-server(8) now allow chmod-like operations to set
      set[ug]id/sticky bits.
    + The MaxAuthTries option is now permitted in sshd_config(5) match
      blocks.
    + Multiplexed ssh(1) sessions now support a subset of the ~ escapes
      that are available to a primary connection.
    + ssh(1) connection multiplexing will now fall back to creating a new
      connection in most error cases (closes: #352830).
    + Make ssh(1) deal more gracefully with channel requests that fail.
      Previously it would optimistically assume that requests would always
      succeed, which could cause hangs if they did not (e.g. when the
      server runs out of file descriptors).
    + ssh(1) now reports multiplexing errors via the multiplex slave's
      stderr where possible (subject to LogLevel in the mux master).
    + Prevent sshd(8) from erroneously applying public key restrictions
      leaned from ~/.ssh/authorized_keys to other authentication methods
      when public key authentication subsequently fails (LP: #161047).
    + Fixed an UMAC alignment problem that manifested on Itanium
      platforms.

1 files changed, 121 insertions, 85 deletions

diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 3c888e36a..01337fe40 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.200 2006/10/10 10:12:45 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.211 2008/07/01 07:24:22 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -74,13 +74,6 @@ extern pid_t proxy_command_pid;
 #define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
 #endif
 
-static sig_atomic_t banner_timedout;
-
-static void banner_alarm_catch (int signum)
-{
-        banner_timedout = 1;
-}
-
 static int show_other_keys(const char *, Key *);
 static void warn_changed_key(Key *);
 
@@ -93,7 +86,10 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
         char *command_string, *tmp;
         int pin[2], pout[2];
         pid_t pid;
-        char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+        char *shell, strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+        if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
+                shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
 
         /* Convert the port number into a string. */
         snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%hu", port);
@@ -139,7 +135,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
 
                 /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
                    printed on the user's terminal. */
-                argv[0] = _PATH_BSHELL;
+                argv[0] = shell;
                 argv[1] = "-c";
                 argv[2] = command_string;
                 argv[3] = NULL;
@@ -164,7 +160,9 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
         xfree(command_string);
 
         /* Set the connection file descriptors. */
-        packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1], options.setuptimeout);
+        packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]);
+        packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
+            options.server_alive_count_max);
 
         /* Indicate OK return */
         return 0;
@@ -208,10 +206,10 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
         hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
         hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
         hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
-        gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, "0", &hints, &res);
+        gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, &hints, &res);
         if (gaierr) {
                 error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
-                    gai_strerror(gaierr));
+                    ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
                 close(sock);
                 return -1;
         }
@@ -227,30 +225,36 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
 
 static int
 timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
-    socklen_t addrlen, int timeout)
+    socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp)
 {
         fd_set *fdset;
-        struct timeval tv;
+        struct timeval tv, t_start;
         socklen_t optlen;
         int optval, rc, result = -1;
 
-        if (timeout <= 0)
-                return (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen));
+        gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL);
+
+        if (*timeoutp <= 0) {
+                result = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
+                goto done;
+        }
 
         set_nonblock(sockfd);
         rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
         if (rc == 0) {
                 unset_nonblock(sockfd);
-                return (0);
+                result = 0;
+                goto done;
+        }
+        if (errno != EINPROGRESS) {
+                result = -1;
+                goto done;
         }
-        if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
-                return (-1);
 
         fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS),
             sizeof(fd_mask));
         FD_SET(sockfd, fdset);
-        tv.tv_sec = timeout;
-        tv.tv_usec = 0;
+        ms_to_timeval(&tv, *timeoutp);
 
         for (;;) {
                 rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv);
@@ -289,6 +293,16 @@ timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
         }
 
         xfree(fdset);
+
+ done:
+        if (result == 0 && *timeoutp > 0) {
+                ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp);
+                if (*timeoutp <= 0) {
+                        errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+                        result = -1;
+                }
+        }
+
         return (result);
 }
 
@@ -305,8 +319,8 @@ timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
  */
 int
 ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
-    u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts,
-    int needpriv, const char *proxy_command)
+    u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms,
+    int want_keepalive, int needpriv, const char *proxy_command)
 {
         int gaierr;
         int on = 1;
@@ -327,8 +341,8 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
         hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
         snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
         if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
-                fatal("%s: %.100s: %s", __progname, host,
-                    gai_strerror(gaierr));
+                fatal("%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname,
+                    host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
 
         for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
                 if (attempt > 0) {
@@ -359,7 +373,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
                                 continue;
 
                         if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
-                            options.connection_timeout) >= 0) {
+                            timeout_ms) >= 0) {
                                 /* Successful connection. */
                                 memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
                                 break;
@@ -386,13 +400,15 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
         debug("Connection established.");
 
         /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
-        if (options.tcp_keep_alive &&
+        if (want_keepalive &&
             setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
             sizeof(on)) < 0)
                 error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 
         /* Set the connection. */
-        packet_set_connection(sock, sock, options.setuptimeout);
+        packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
+        packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
+            options.server_alive_count_max);
 
         return 0;
 }
@@ -402,7 +418,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
  * identification string.
  */
 static void
-ssh_exchange_identification(void)
+ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
 {
         char buf[256], remote_version[256];     /* must be same size! */
         int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch;
@@ -410,40 +426,44 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(void)
         int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
         int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
         u_int i, n;
-        struct sigaction sa, osa;
+        size_t len;
+        int fdsetsz, remaining, rc;
+        struct timeval t_start, t_remaining;
+        fd_set *fdset;
+
+        fdsetsz = howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+        fdset = xcalloc(1, fdsetsz);
 
-        /* Read other side's version identification.
-         * If SetupTimeOut has been set, give up after the specified amount
-         * of time.
-         */
-        if (options.setuptimeout > 0) {
-                memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-                sa.sa_handler = banner_alarm_catch;
-                /* throw away any pending alarms, since we'd block otherwise */
-                alarm(0);
-                sigaction(SIGALRM, &sa, &osa);
-                alarm(options.setuptimeout);
-        }
         /* Read other side's version identification. */
+        remaining = timeout_ms;
         for (n = 0;;) {
-                for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; ) {
-                        ssize_t len = read(connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
-                        if (banner_timedout)
-                                fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: Timeout waiting for version information.");
-                        if (len == 0)
-                                errno = EPIPE;
+                for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
+                        if (timeout_ms > 0) {
+                                gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL);
+                                ms_to_timeval(&t_remaining, remaining);
+                                FD_SET(connection_in, fdset);
+                                rc = select(connection_in + 1, fdset, NULL,
+                                    fdset, &t_remaining);
+                                ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, &remaining);
+                                if (rc == 0 || remaining <= 0)
+                                        fatal("Connection timed out during "
+                                            "banner exchange");
+                                if (rc == -1) {
+                                        if (errno == EINTR)
+                                                continue;
+                                        fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+                                            "select: %s", strerror(errno));
+                                }
+                        }
+
+                        len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
 
                         if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE)
-                                fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host");
-                        else if (len != 1) {
-#ifdef EWOULDBLOCK
-                                if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
-#else
-                                if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
-#endif
-                                        continue;
-                                fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-                        }
+                                fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+                                    "Connection closed by remote host");
+                        else if (len != 1)
+                                fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+                                    "read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
                         if (buf[i] == '\r') {
                                 buf[i] = '\n';
                                 buf[i + 1] = 0;
@@ -453,13 +473,9 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(void)
                                 buf[i + 1] = 0;
                                 break;
                         }
-                        if (buf[i] == '\r') {
-                                buf[i] = '\n';
-                                buf[i + 1] = 0;         /**XXX wait for \n */
-                        }
                         if (++n > 65536)
-                                fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: No banner received");
-                        i++;
+                                fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
+                                    "No banner received");
                 }
                 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
                 if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
@@ -467,14 +483,7 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(void)
                 debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf);
         }
         server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
-
-        /* If SetupTimeOut has been set, unset the alarm now, and
-         * put the correct handler for SIGALRM back.
-         */
-        if (options.setuptimeout > 0) {
-                alarm(0);
-                sigaction(SIGALRM, &osa, NULL);
-        }
+        xfree(fdset);
 
         /*
          * Check that the versions match.  In future this might accept
@@ -528,10 +537,10 @@ ssh_exchange_identification(void)
                     (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
                     remote_major);
         /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
-        snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
+        snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s",
             compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1,
             compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1,
-            SSH_RELEASE);
+            SSH_RELEASE, compat20 ? "\r\n" : "\n");
         if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf))
                 fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
         client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
@@ -580,14 +589,14 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
         Key *file_key;
         const char *type = key_type(host_key);
         char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
-        char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp;
+        char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra;
         HostStatus host_status;
         HostStatus ip_status;
         int r, local = 0, host_ip_differ = 0;
         int salen;
         char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
         char msg[1024];
-        int len, host_line, ip_line;
+        int len, host_line, ip_line, cancelled_forwarding = 0;
         const char *host_file = NULL, *ip_file = NULL;
 
         /*
@@ -634,6 +643,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
         } else {
                 ip = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy command>");
         }
+
         /*
          * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
          * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
@@ -718,6 +728,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
                                 logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
                                     "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
                                     "of known hosts.", type, ip);
+                } else if (options.visual_host_key) {
+                        fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+                        ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+                            SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+                        logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
+                        xfree(ra);
+                        xfree(fp);
                 }
                 break;
         case HOST_NEW:
@@ -753,6 +770,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
                                 snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
                         /* The default */
                         fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+                        ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
+                            SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
                         msg2[0] = '\0';
                         if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
                                 if (matching_host_key_dns)
@@ -767,10 +786,14 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
                         snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
                             "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
                             "established%s\n"
-                            "%s key fingerprint is %s.\n%s"
+                            "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
                             "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
                             "(yes/no)? ",
-                            host, ip, msg1, type, fp, msg2);
+                            host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
+                            options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
+                            options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
+                            msg2);
+                        xfree(ra);
                         xfree(fp);
                         if (!confirm(msg))
                                 goto fail;
@@ -823,7 +846,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
                         error("@       WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED!          @");
                         error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
                         error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
-                        error("and the key for the according IP address %s", ip);
+                        error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip);
                         error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
                         error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
                         error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
@@ -855,27 +878,32 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
                         error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
                             "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
                         options.password_authentication = 0;
+                        cancelled_forwarding = 1;
                 }
                 if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
                         error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
                             " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
                         options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
                         options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+                        cancelled_forwarding = 1;
                 }
                 if (options.challenge_response_authentication) {
                         error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled"
                             " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
                         options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
+                        cancelled_forwarding = 1;
                 }
                 if (options.forward_agent) {
                         error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
                             "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
                         options.forward_agent = 0;
+                        cancelled_forwarding = 1;
                 }
                 if (options.forward_x11) {
                         error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid "
                             "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
                         options.forward_x11 = 0;
+                        cancelled_forwarding = 1;
                 }
                 if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 ||
                     options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
@@ -883,12 +911,18 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
                             "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
                         options.num_local_forwards =
                             options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
+                        cancelled_forwarding = 1;
                 }
                 if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
                         error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid "
                             "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
                         options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+                        cancelled_forwarding = 1;
                 }
+                if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding)
+                        fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key "
+                            "check failure");
+                
                 /*
                  * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
                  * This could be done by converting the host key to an
@@ -987,7 +1021,7 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
  */
 void
 ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
-    struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct passwd *pw)
+    struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms)
 {
         char *host, *cp;
         char *server_user, *local_user;
@@ -1002,7 +1036,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
                         *cp = (char)tolower(*cp);
 
         /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
-        ssh_exchange_identification();
+        ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms);
 
         /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */
         packet_set_nonblocking();
@@ -1041,18 +1075,20 @@ static int
 show_key_from_file(const char *file, const char *host, int keytype)
 {
         Key *found;
-        char *fp;
+        char *fp, *ra;
         int line, ret;
 
         found = key_new(keytype);
         if ((ret = lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(file, host,
             keytype, found, &line))) {
                 fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+                ra = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
                 logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
                     "in %s:%d\n"
-                    "%s key fingerprint %s.",
+                    "%s key fingerprint %s.\n%s\n",
                     key_type(found), host, file, line,
-                    key_type(found), fp);
+                    key_type(found), fp, ra);
+                xfree(ra);
                 xfree(fp);
         }
         key_free(found);