diff options
author | Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> | 2008-07-22 19:45:18 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> | 2008-07-22 19:45:18 +0000 |
commit | 137d76ba65883aa8143af1fcad83b57e7badef0c (patch) | |
tree | f426e804bb5248ceafedfab7bb78ae6e6752942c /sshd.c | |
parent | dac7d049dad31f5f84d421d4eb628a7e13f977d7 (diff) | |
parent | ef94e5613d37bcbf880f21ee6094e4b1c7683a4c (diff) |
* New upstream release (closes: #474301). Important changes not previously
backported to 4.7p1:
- 4.9/4.9p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.9):
+ Added chroot(2) support for sshd(8), controlled by a new option
"ChrootDirectory" (closes: #139047, LP: #24777).
+ Linked sftp-server(8) into sshd(8). The internal sftp server is used
when the command "internal-sftp" is specified in a Subsystem or
ForceCommand declaration. When used with ChrootDirectory, the
internal sftp server requires no special configuration of files
inside the chroot environment.
+ Added a protocol extension method "posix-rename@openssh.com" for
sftp-server(8) to perform POSIX atomic rename() operations; sftp(1)
prefers this if available (closes: #308561).
+ Removed the fixed limit of 100 file handles in sftp-server(8).
+ ssh(8) will now skip generation of SSH protocol 1 ephemeral server
keys when in inetd mode and protocol 2 connections are negotiated.
This speeds up protocol 2 connections to inetd-mode servers that
also allow Protocol 1.
+ Accept the PermitRootLogin directive in a sshd_config(5) Match
block. Allows for, e.g. permitting root only from the local network.
+ Reworked sftp(1) argument splitting and escaping to be more
internally consistent (i.e. between sftp commands) and more
consistent with sh(1). Please note that this will change the
interpretation of some quoted strings, especially those with
embedded backslash escape sequences.
+ Support "Banner=none" in sshd_config(5) to disable sending of a
pre-login banner (e.g. in a Match block).
+ ssh(1) ProxyCommands are now executed with $SHELL rather than
/bin/sh.
+ ssh(1)'s ConnectTimeout option is now applied to both the TCP
connection and the SSH banner exchange (previously it just covered
the TCP connection). This allows callers of ssh(1) to better detect
and deal with stuck servers that accept a TCP connection but don't
progress the protocol, and also makes ConnectTimeout useful for
connections via a ProxyCommand.
+ scp(1) incorrectly reported "stalled" on slow copies (closes:
#140828).
+ scp(1) date underflow for timestamps before epoch.
+ ssh(1) used the obsolete SIG DNS RRtype for host keys in DNS,
instead of the current standard RRSIG.
+ Correctly drain ACKs when a sftp(1) upload write fails midway,
avoids a fatal() exit from what should be a recoverable condition.
+ Fixed ssh-keygen(1) selective host key hashing (i.e. "ssh-keygen -HF
hostname") to not include any IP address in the data to be hashed.
+ Make ssh(1) skip listening on the IPv6 wildcard address when a
binding address of 0.0.0.0 is used against an old SSH server that
does not support the RFC4254 syntax for wildcard bind addresses.
+ Enable IPV6_V6ONLY socket option on sshd(8) listen socket, as is
already done for X11/TCP forwarding sockets (closes: #439661).
+ Fix FD leak that could hang a ssh(1) connection multiplexing master.
+ Make ssh(1) -q option documentation consistent with reality.
+ Fixed sshd(8) PAM support not calling pam_session_close(), or
failing to call it with root privileges (closes: #372680).
+ Fix activation of OpenSSL engine support when requested in configure
(LP: #119295).
- 5.1/5.1p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.1):
+ Introduce experimental SSH Fingerprint ASCII Visualisation to ssh(1)
and ssh-keygen(1). Visual fingerprint display is controlled by a new
ssh_config(5) option "VisualHostKey". The intent is to render SSH
host keys in a visual form that is amenable to easy recall and
rejection of changed host keys.
+ sshd_config(5) now supports CIDR address/masklen matching in "Match
address" blocks, with a fallback to classic wildcard matching.
+ sshd(8) now supports CIDR matching in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
from="..." restrictions, also with a fallback to classic wildcard
matching.
+ Added an extended test mode (-T) to sshd(8) to request that it write
its effective configuration to stdout and exit. Extended test mode
also supports the specification of connection parameters (username,
source address and hostname) to test the application of
sshd_config(5) Match rules.
+ ssh(1) now prints the number of bytes transferred and the overall
connection throughput for SSH protocol 2 sessions when in verbose
mode (previously these statistics were displayed for protocol 1
connections only).
+ sftp-server(8) now supports extension methods statvfs@openssh.com
and fstatvfs@openssh.com that implement statvfs(2)-like operations.
+ sftp(1) now has a "df" command to the sftp client that uses the
statvfs@openssh.com to produce a df(1)-like display of filesystem
space and inode utilisation (requires statvfs@openssh.com support on
the server).
+ Added a MaxSessions option to sshd_config(5) to allow control of the
number of multiplexed sessions supported over a single TCP
connection. This allows increasing the number of allowed sessions
above the previous default of 10, disabling connection multiplexing
(MaxSessions=1) or disallowing login/shell/subsystem sessions
entirely (MaxSessions=0).
+ Added a no-more-sessions@openssh.com global request extension that
is sent from ssh(1) to sshd(8) when the client knows that it will
never request another session (i.e. when session multiplexing is
disabled). This allows a server to disallow further session requests
and terminate the session in cases where the client has been
hijacked.
+ ssh-keygen(1) now supports the use of the -l option in combination
with -F to search for a host in ~/.ssh/known_hosts and display its
fingerprint.
+ ssh-keyscan(1) now defaults to "rsa" (protocol 2) keys, instead of
"rsa1".
+ Added an AllowAgentForwarding option to sshd_config(8) to control
whether authentication agent forwarding is permitted. Note that this
is a loose control, as a client may install their own unofficial
forwarder.
+ ssh(1) and sshd(8): avoid unnecessary malloc/copy/free when
receiving network data, resulting in a ~10% speedup.
+ ssh(1) and sshd(8) will now try additional addresses when connecting
to a port forward destination whose DNS name resolves to more than
one address. The previous behaviour was to try the only first
address and give up if that failed.
+ ssh(1) and sshd(8) now support signalling that channels are
half-closed for writing, through a channel protocol extension
notification "eow@openssh.com". This allows propagation of closed
file descriptors, so that commands such as "ssh -2 localhost od
/bin/ls | true" do not send unnecessary data over the wire.
+ sshd(8): increased the default size of ssh protocol 1 ephemeral keys
from 768 to 1024 bits.
+ When ssh(1) has been requested to fork after authentication ("ssh
-f") with ExitOnForwardFailure enabled, delay the fork until after
replies for any -R forwards have been seen. Allows for robust
detection of -R forward failure when using -f.
+ "Match group" blocks in sshd_config(5) now support negation of
groups. E.g. "Match group staff,!guests".
+ sftp(1) and sftp-server(8) now allow chmod-like operations to set
set[ug]id/sticky bits.
+ The MaxAuthTries option is now permitted in sshd_config(5) match
blocks.
+ Multiplexed ssh(1) sessions now support a subset of the ~ escapes
that are available to a primary connection.
+ ssh(1) connection multiplexing will now fall back to creating a new
connection in most error cases (closes: #352830).
+ Make ssh(1) deal more gracefully with channel requests that fail.
Previously it would optimistically assume that requests would always
succeed, which could cause hangs if they did not (e.g. when the
server runs out of file descriptors).
+ ssh(1) now reports multiplexing errors via the multiplex slave's
stderr where possible (subject to LogLevel in the mux master).
+ Prevent sshd(8) from erroneously applying public key restrictions
leaned from ~/.ssh/authorized_keys to other authentication methods
when public key authentication subsequently fails (LP: #161047).
+ Fixed an UMAC alignment problem that manifested on Itanium
platforms.
Diffstat (limited to 'sshd.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sshd.c | 160 |
1 files changed, 119 insertions, 41 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.351 2007/05/22 10:18:52 djm Exp $ */ | 1 | /* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.364 2008/07/10 18:08:11 markus Exp $ */ |
2 | /* | 2 | /* |
3 | * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> | 3 | * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> |
4 | * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland | 4 | * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland |
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ | |||
54 | # include <sys/time.h> | 54 | # include <sys/time.h> |
55 | #endif | 55 | #endif |
56 | #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" | 56 | #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" |
57 | #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" | ||
57 | #include <sys/wait.h> | 58 | #include <sys/wait.h> |
58 | 59 | ||
59 | #include <errno.h> | 60 | #include <errno.h> |
@@ -75,6 +76,8 @@ | |||
75 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | 76 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
76 | #include <openssl/md5.h> | 77 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
77 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | 78 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
79 | #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" | ||
80 | |||
78 | #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE | 81 | #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE |
79 | #include <sys/security.h> | 82 | #include <sys/security.h> |
80 | #include <prot.h> | 83 | #include <prot.h> |
@@ -124,8 +127,8 @@ | |||
124 | #ifdef LIBWRAP | 127 | #ifdef LIBWRAP |
125 | #include <tcpd.h> | 128 | #include <tcpd.h> |
126 | #include <syslog.h> | 129 | #include <syslog.h> |
127 | int allow_severity = LOG_INFO; | 130 | int allow_severity; |
128 | int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; | 131 | int deny_severity; |
129 | #endif /* LIBWRAP */ | 132 | #endif /* LIBWRAP */ |
130 | 133 | ||
131 | #ifndef O_NOCTTY | 134 | #ifndef O_NOCTTY |
@@ -375,9 +378,6 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig) | |||
375 | static void | 378 | static void |
376 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) | 379 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) |
377 | { | 380 | { |
378 | u_int32_t rnd = 0; | ||
379 | int i; | ||
380 | |||
381 | verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", | 381 | verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", |
382 | sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits); | 382 | sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits); |
383 | if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) | 383 | if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) |
@@ -386,12 +386,7 @@ generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) | |||
386 | options.server_key_bits); | 386 | options.server_key_bits); |
387 | verbose("RSA key generation complete."); | 387 | verbose("RSA key generation complete."); |
388 | 388 | ||
389 | for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { | 389 | arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); |
390 | if (i % 4 == 0) | ||
391 | rnd = arc4random(); | ||
392 | sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff; | ||
393 | rnd >>= 8; | ||
394 | } | ||
395 | arc4random_stir(); | 390 | arc4random_stir(); |
396 | } | 391 | } |
397 | 392 | ||
@@ -413,7 +408,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) | |||
413 | int mismatch; | 408 | int mismatch; |
414 | int remote_major, remote_minor; | 409 | int remote_major, remote_minor; |
415 | int major, minor; | 410 | int major, minor; |
416 | char *s; | 411 | char *s, *newline = "\n"; |
417 | char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ | 412 | char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ |
418 | char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ | 413 | char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ |
419 | 414 | ||
@@ -424,11 +419,13 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) | |||
424 | } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { | 419 | } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { |
425 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; | 420 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; |
426 | minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; | 421 | minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; |
422 | newline = "\r\n"; | ||
427 | } else { | 423 | } else { |
428 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; | 424 | major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; |
429 | minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; | 425 | minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; |
430 | } | 426 | } |
431 | snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_RELEASE); | 427 | snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s", major, minor, |
428 | SSH_RELEASE, newline); | ||
432 | server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); | 429 | server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); |
433 | 430 | ||
434 | /* Send our protocol version identification. */ | 431 | /* Send our protocol version identification. */ |
@@ -590,15 +587,14 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void) | |||
590 | static void | 587 | static void |
591 | privsep_preauth_child(void) | 588 | privsep_preauth_child(void) |
592 | { | 589 | { |
593 | u_int32_t rnd[256]; | 590 | u_int32_t rnd[256]; |
594 | gid_t gidset[1]; | 591 | gid_t gidset[1]; |
595 | int i; | ||
596 | 592 | ||
597 | /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ | 593 | /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ |
598 | privsep_challenge_enable(); | 594 | privsep_challenge_enable(); |
599 | 595 | ||
600 | for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) | 596 | arc4random_stir(); |
601 | rnd[i] = arc4random(); | 597 | arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); |
602 | RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); | 598 | RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); |
603 | 599 | ||
604 | /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ | 600 | /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ |
@@ -671,6 +667,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) | |||
671 | static void | 667 | static void |
672 | privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) | 668 | privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) |
673 | { | 669 | { |
670 | u_int32_t rnd[256]; | ||
671 | |||
674 | #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING | 672 | #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING |
675 | if (1) { | 673 | if (1) { |
676 | #else | 674 | #else |
@@ -688,7 +686,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) | |||
688 | if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) | 686 | if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) |
689 | fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); | 687 | fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); |
690 | else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { | 688 | else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { |
691 | debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); | 689 | verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); |
692 | close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); | 690 | close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); |
693 | buffer_clear(&loginmsg); | 691 | buffer_clear(&loginmsg); |
694 | monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); | 692 | monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); |
@@ -702,6 +700,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) | |||
702 | /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ | 700 | /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ |
703 | demote_sensitive_data(); | 701 | demote_sensitive_data(); |
704 | 702 | ||
703 | arc4random_stir(); | ||
704 | arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); | ||
705 | RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); | ||
706 | |||
705 | /* Drop privileges */ | 707 | /* Drop privileges */ |
706 | do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); | 708 | do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); |
707 | 709 | ||
@@ -801,7 +803,7 @@ drop_connection(int startups) | |||
801 | p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; | 803 | p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; |
802 | p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin; | 804 | p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin; |
803 | p += options.max_startups_rate; | 805 | p += options.max_startups_rate; |
804 | r = arc4random() % 100; | 806 | r = arc4random_uniform(100); |
805 | 807 | ||
806 | debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r); | 808 | debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r); |
807 | return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; | 809 | return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; |
@@ -813,8 +815,9 @@ usage(void) | |||
813 | fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", | 815 | fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", |
814 | SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); | 816 | SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); |
815 | fprintf(stderr, | 817 | fprintf(stderr, |
816 | "usage: sshd [-46Ddeiqt] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n" | 818 | "usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-f config_file]\n" |
817 | " [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n" | 819 | " [-g login_grace_time] [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time]\n" |
820 | " [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n" | ||
818 | ); | 821 | ); |
819 | exit(1); | 822 | exit(1); |
820 | } | 823 | } |
@@ -987,8 +990,7 @@ server_listen(void) | |||
987 | ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), | 990 | ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), |
988 | NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { | 991 | NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { |
989 | error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", | 992 | error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", |
990 | (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) : | 993 | ssh_gai_strerror(ret)); |
991 | strerror(errno)); | ||
992 | continue; | 994 | continue; |
993 | } | 995 | } |
994 | /* Create socket for listening. */ | 996 | /* Create socket for listening. */ |
@@ -1011,6 +1013,16 @@ server_listen(void) | |||
1011 | &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) | 1013 | &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) |
1012 | error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno)); | 1014 | error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno)); |
1013 | 1015 | ||
1016 | #ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY | ||
1017 | /* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */ | ||
1018 | if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) { | ||
1019 | if (setsockopt(listen_sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, | ||
1020 | &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) | ||
1021 | error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", | ||
1022 | strerror(errno)); | ||
1023 | } | ||
1024 | #endif | ||
1025 | |||
1014 | debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); | 1026 | debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); |
1015 | 1027 | ||
1016 | /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ | 1028 | /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ |
@@ -1118,7 +1130,8 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) | |||
1118 | *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], | 1130 | *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], |
1119 | (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); | 1131 | (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); |
1120 | if (*newsock < 0) { | 1132 | if (*newsock < 0) { |
1121 | if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) | 1133 | if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN && |
1134 | errno != EWOULDBLOCK) | ||
1122 | error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); | 1135 | error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); |
1123 | continue; | 1136 | continue; |
1124 | } | 1137 | } |
@@ -1265,9 +1278,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1265 | int opt, i, on = 1; | 1278 | int opt, i, on = 1; |
1266 | int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; | 1279 | int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; |
1267 | const char *remote_ip; | 1280 | const char *remote_ip; |
1281 | char *test_user = NULL, *test_host = NULL, *test_addr = NULL; | ||
1268 | int remote_port; | 1282 | int remote_port; |
1269 | char *line; | 1283 | char *line, *p, *cp; |
1270 | int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }; | 1284 | int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }; |
1285 | u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; | ||
1286 | mode_t new_umask; | ||
1271 | Key *key; | 1287 | Key *key; |
1272 | Authctxt *authctxt; | 1288 | Authctxt *authctxt; |
1273 | 1289 | ||
@@ -1301,7 +1317,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1301 | initialize_server_options(&options); | 1317 | initialize_server_options(&options); |
1302 | 1318 | ||
1303 | /* Parse command-line arguments. */ | 1319 | /* Parse command-line arguments. */ |
1304 | while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqrtQR46")) != -1) { | 1320 | while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:C:dDeiqrtQRT46")) != -1) { |
1305 | switch (opt) { | 1321 | switch (opt) { |
1306 | case '4': | 1322 | case '4': |
1307 | options.address_family = AF_INET; | 1323 | options.address_family = AF_INET; |
@@ -1384,6 +1400,25 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1384 | case 't': | 1400 | case 't': |
1385 | test_flag = 1; | 1401 | test_flag = 1; |
1386 | break; | 1402 | break; |
1403 | case 'T': | ||
1404 | test_flag = 2; | ||
1405 | break; | ||
1406 | case 'C': | ||
1407 | cp = optarg; | ||
1408 | while ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")) && *p != '\0') { | ||
1409 | if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) | ||
1410 | test_addr = xstrdup(p + 5); | ||
1411 | else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) | ||
1412 | test_host = xstrdup(p + 5); | ||
1413 | else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) | ||
1414 | test_user = xstrdup(p + 5); | ||
1415 | else { | ||
1416 | fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test " | ||
1417 | "mode specification %s\n", p); | ||
1418 | exit(1); | ||
1419 | } | ||
1420 | } | ||
1421 | break; | ||
1387 | case 'u': | 1422 | case 'u': |
1388 | utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, MAXHOSTNAMELEN+1, NULL); | 1423 | utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, MAXHOSTNAMELEN+1, NULL); |
1389 | if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { | 1424 | if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { |
@@ -1406,7 +1441,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1406 | } | 1441 | } |
1407 | if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag) | 1442 | if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag) |
1408 | rexec_flag = 0; | 1443 | rexec_flag = 0; |
1409 | if (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/')) | 1444 | if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))) |
1410 | fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path"); | 1445 | fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path"); |
1411 | if (rexeced_flag) | 1446 | if (rexeced_flag) |
1412 | closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD); | 1447 | closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD); |
@@ -1445,6 +1480,21 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1445 | sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; | 1480 | sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; |
1446 | sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; | 1481 | sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; |
1447 | 1482 | ||
1483 | /* | ||
1484 | * If we're doing an extended config test, make sure we have all of | ||
1485 | * the parameters we need. If we're not doing an extended test, | ||
1486 | * do not silently ignore connection test params. | ||
1487 | */ | ||
1488 | if (test_flag >= 2 && | ||
1489 | (test_user != NULL || test_host != NULL || test_addr != NULL) | ||
1490 | && (test_user == NULL || test_host == NULL || test_addr == NULL)) | ||
1491 | fatal("user, host and addr are all required when testing " | ||
1492 | "Match configs"); | ||
1493 | if (test_flag < 2 && (test_user != NULL || test_host != NULL || | ||
1494 | test_addr != NULL)) | ||
1495 | fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without " | ||
1496 | "test mode (-T)"); | ||
1497 | |||
1448 | /* Fetch our configuration */ | 1498 | /* Fetch our configuration */ |
1449 | buffer_init(&cfg); | 1499 | buffer_init(&cfg); |
1450 | if (rexeced_flag) | 1500 | if (rexeced_flag) |
@@ -1581,6 +1631,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1581 | "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); | 1631 | "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); |
1582 | } | 1632 | } |
1583 | 1633 | ||
1634 | if (test_flag > 1) { | ||
1635 | if (test_user != NULL && test_addr != NULL && test_host != NULL) | ||
1636 | parse_server_match_config(&options, test_user, | ||
1637 | test_host, test_addr); | ||
1638 | dump_config(&options); | ||
1639 | } | ||
1640 | |||
1584 | /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ | 1641 | /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ |
1585 | if (test_flag) | 1642 | if (test_flag) |
1586 | exit(0); | 1643 | exit(0); |
@@ -1605,6 +1662,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1605 | rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL; | 1662 | rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL; |
1606 | } | 1663 | } |
1607 | 1664 | ||
1665 | /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */ | ||
1666 | new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022; | ||
1667 | (void) umask(new_umask); | ||
1668 | |||
1608 | /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ | 1669 | /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ |
1609 | if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag)) | 1670 | if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag)) |
1610 | log_stderr = 1; | 1671 | log_stderr = 1; |
@@ -1652,10 +1713,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1652 | /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */ | 1713 | /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */ |
1653 | if (inetd_flag) { | 1714 | if (inetd_flag) { |
1654 | server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out); | 1715 | server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out); |
1655 | |||
1656 | if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && | ||
1657 | sensitive_data.server_key == NULL) | ||
1658 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(); | ||
1659 | } else { | 1716 | } else { |
1660 | server_listen(); | 1717 | server_listen(); |
1661 | 1718 | ||
@@ -1767,7 +1824,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1767 | * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do | 1824 | * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do |
1768 | * not have a key. | 1825 | * not have a key. |
1769 | */ | 1826 | */ |
1770 | packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out, -1); | 1827 | packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); |
1771 | packet_set_server(); | 1828 | packet_set_server(); |
1772 | 1829 | ||
1773 | /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ | 1830 | /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ |
@@ -1796,6 +1853,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1796 | audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port); | 1853 | audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port); |
1797 | #endif | 1854 | #endif |
1798 | #ifdef LIBWRAP | 1855 | #ifdef LIBWRAP |
1856 | allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO; | ||
1857 | deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING; | ||
1799 | /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ | 1858 | /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ |
1800 | if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { | 1859 | if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { |
1801 | struct request_info req; | 1860 | struct request_info req; |
@@ -1883,6 +1942,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1883 | 1942 | ||
1884 | sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); | 1943 | sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); |
1885 | 1944 | ||
1945 | /* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */ | ||
1946 | if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL) | ||
1947 | generate_ephemeral_server_key(); | ||
1948 | |||
1886 | packet_set_nonblocking(); | 1949 | packet_set_nonblocking(); |
1887 | 1950 | ||
1888 | /* allocate authentication context */ | 1951 | /* allocate authentication context */ |
@@ -1935,6 +1998,20 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1935 | audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); | 1998 | audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); |
1936 | #endif | 1999 | #endif |
1937 | 2000 | ||
2001 | #ifdef GSSAPI | ||
2002 | if (options.gss_authentication) { | ||
2003 | temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); | ||
2004 | ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); | ||
2005 | restore_uid(); | ||
2006 | } | ||
2007 | #endif | ||
2008 | #ifdef USE_PAM | ||
2009 | if (options.use_pam) { | ||
2010 | do_pam_setcred(1); | ||
2011 | do_pam_session(); | ||
2012 | } | ||
2013 | #endif | ||
2014 | |||
1938 | /* | 2015 | /* |
1939 | * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare | 2016 | * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare |
1940 | * file descriptor passing. | 2017 | * file descriptor passing. |
@@ -1946,11 +2023,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av) | |||
1946 | destroy_sensitive_data(); | 2023 | destroy_sensitive_data(); |
1947 | } | 2024 | } |
1948 | 2025 | ||
2026 | packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, | ||
2027 | options.client_alive_count_max); | ||
2028 | |||
1949 | /* Start session. */ | 2029 | /* Start session. */ |
1950 | do_authenticated(authctxt); | 2030 | do_authenticated(authctxt); |
1951 | 2031 | ||
1952 | /* The connection has been terminated. */ | 2032 | /* The connection has been terminated. */ |
1953 | verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip); | 2033 | packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes); |
2034 | packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes); | ||
2035 | verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", obytes, ibytes); | ||
2036 | |||
2037 | verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); | ||
1954 | 2038 | ||
1955 | #ifdef USE_PAM | 2039 | #ifdef USE_PAM |
1956 | if (options.use_pam) | 2040 | if (options.use_pam) |
@@ -2030,7 +2114,6 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) | |||
2030 | u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; | 2114 | u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; |
2031 | u_char cookie[8]; | 2115 | u_char cookie[8]; |
2032 | u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; | 2116 | u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; |
2033 | u_int32_t rnd = 0; | ||
2034 | 2117 | ||
2035 | /* | 2118 | /* |
2036 | * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user | 2119 | * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user |
@@ -2041,12 +2124,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) | |||
2041 | * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one | 2124 | * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one |
2042 | * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. | 2125 | * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. |
2043 | */ | 2126 | */ |
2044 | for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { | 2127 | arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie)); |
2045 | if (i % 4 == 0) | ||
2046 | rnd = arc4random(); | ||
2047 | cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff; | ||
2048 | rnd >>= 8; | ||
2049 | } | ||
2050 | 2128 | ||
2051 | /* | 2129 | /* |
2052 | * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random | 2130 | * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random |