Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 50 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index fe78d7b66..23d5a64f0 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.420 2014/02/26 21:53:37 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.428 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -72,10 +72,12 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
 
 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
 #include <sys/security.h>
@@ -91,6 +93,7 @@
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
+#include "misc.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "compat.h"
@@ -98,7 +101,6 @@
 #include "digest.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "kex.h"
-#include "dh.h"
 #include "myproposal.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
@@ -107,7 +109,6 @@
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
-#include "misc.h"
 #include "msg.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "channels.h"
@@ -267,7 +268,9 @@ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
 
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
+#endif
 static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
 
 /*
@@ -943,7 +946,13 @@ static void
 usage(void)
 {
         fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
-            SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+            SSH_RELEASE,
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+            SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
+#else
+            "without OpenSSL"
+#endif
+        );
         fprintf(stderr,
 "usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
 "            [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
@@ -976,6 +985,7 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
         buffer_init(&m);
         buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf));
 
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
         if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
             sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
                 buffer_put_int(&m, 1);
@@ -986,6 +996,7 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
                 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
                 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
         } else
+#endif
                 buffer_put_int(&m, 0);
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
@@ -1022,6 +1033,7 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
         free(cp);
 
         if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
                 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
                         key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
                 sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
@@ -1031,8 +1043,13 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
                 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
                 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
                 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
-                rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa);
+                if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
+                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
+                        fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters "
+                            "error", __func__);
+#else
+                fatal("ssh1 not supported");
+#endif
         }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
@@ -1555,7 +1572,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         else
                 closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
 
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
         OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
 
         /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
         if (logfile != NULL) {
@@ -1660,7 +1679,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         }
 
         debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
-            SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+            SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
+#else
+            "without OpenSSL"
+#endif
+        );
 
         /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
         if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
@@ -1785,6 +1809,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
                 debug("host certificate: #%d type %d %s", j, key->type,
                     key_type(key));
         }
+
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
         /* Check certain values for sanity. */
         if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
                 if (options.server_key_bits < 512 ||
@@ -1809,6 +1835,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
                             options.server_key_bits);
                 }
         }
+#endif
 
         if (use_privsep) {
                 struct stat st;
@@ -2174,8 +2201,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
                 do_ssh2_kex();
                 do_authentication2(authctxt);
         } else {
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
                 do_ssh1_kex();
                 do_authentication(authctxt);
+#else
+                fatal("ssh1 not supported");
+#endif
         }
         /*
          * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
@@ -2259,6 +2290,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         exit(0);
 }
 
+#ifdef WITH_SSH1
 /*
  * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
  * (key with larger modulus first).
@@ -2282,10 +2314,10 @@ ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
                             SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
                 }
                 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
+                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
                         rsafail++;
                 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-                    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
+                    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
                         rsafail++;
         } else {
                 /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
@@ -2300,14 +2332,15 @@ ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
                             SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
                 }
                 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-                    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
+                    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
                         rsafail++;
                 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
+                    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
                         rsafail++;
         }
         return (rsafail);
 }
+
 /*
  * SSH1 key exchange
  */
@@ -2485,6 +2518,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
         packet_send();
         packet_write_wait();
 }
+#endif
 
 void
 sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, u_int *slen,
@@ -2509,6 +2543,7 @@ sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, u_int *slen,
 static void
 do_ssh2_kex(void)
 {
+        char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
         Kex *kex;
 
         if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
@@ -2588,11 +2623,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
 
         /* start key exchange */
         kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
         kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+#endif
         kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
 #ifdef GSSAPI
         if (options.gss_keyex) {
@@ -2632,7 +2669,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
 {
         if (the_authctxt) {
                 do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
-                if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
+                if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
+                    pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
                         debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
                         if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
                             errno != ESRCH)