Merge 6.7p1.

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.

1 files changed, 233 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b573e7f33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:16:58 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SSHKEY_H
+#define SSHKEY_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#  include <openssl/ec.h>
+# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#  define EC_KEY        void
+#  define EC_GROUP      void
+#  define EC_POINT      void
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+# define RSA            void
+# define DSA            void
+# define EC_KEY         void
+# define EC_GROUP       void
+# define EC_POINT       void
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE    768
+#define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE      (1 << 20)
+
+struct sshbuf;
+
+/* Key types */
+enum sshkey_types {
+        KEY_RSA1,
+        KEY_RSA,
+        KEY_DSA,
+        KEY_ECDSA,
+        KEY_ED25519,
+        KEY_RSA_CERT,
+        KEY_DSA_CERT,
+        KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
+        KEY_ED25519_CERT,
+        KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
+        KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
+        KEY_NULL,
+        KEY_UNSPEC
+};
+
+/* Fingerprint hash algorithms */
+enum sshkey_fp_type {
+        SSH_FP_SHA1,
+        SSH_FP_MD5,
+        SSH_FP_SHA256
+};
+
+/* Fingerprint representation formats */
+enum sshkey_fp_rep {
+        SSH_FP_HEX,
+        SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
+        SSH_FP_RANDOMART
+};
+
+/* key is stored in external hardware */
+#define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT         0x0001
+
+#define SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS      256
+/* XXX opaquify? */
+struct sshkey_cert {
+        struct sshbuf   *certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
+        u_int            type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
+        u_int64_t        serial;
+        char            *key_id;
+        u_int            nprincipals;
+        char            **principals;
+        u_int64_t        valid_after, valid_before;
+        struct sshbuf   *critical;
+        struct sshbuf   *extensions;
+        struct sshkey   *signature_key;
+};
+
+/* XXX opaquify? */
+struct sshkey {
+        int      type;
+        int      flags;
+        RSA     *rsa;
+        DSA     *dsa;
+        int      ecdsa_nid;     /* NID of curve */
+        EC_KEY  *ecdsa;
+        u_char  *ed25519_sk;
+        u_char  *ed25519_pk;
+        struct sshkey_cert *cert;
+};
+
+#define ED25519_SK_SZ   crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES
+#define ED25519_PK_SZ   crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES
+
+struct sshkey   *sshkey_new(int);
+int              sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *);
+struct sshkey   *sshkey_new_private(int);
+void             sshkey_free(struct sshkey *);
+int              sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **);
+int              sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *,
+    const struct sshkey *);
+int              sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *);
+char            *sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *,
+    enum sshkey_fp_type, enum sshkey_fp_rep);
+int              sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k,
+    enum sshkey_fp_type dgst_type, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp);
+const char      *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *);
+const char      *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *);
+int              sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);
+int              sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **);
+u_int            sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *);
+
+int              sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp);
+int              sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **);
+int      sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
+int      sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
+int      sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
+int      sshkey_type_plain(int);
+int      sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *, int);
+int      sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *);
+int      sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
+int      sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
+int      sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int,
+    const char *, const char **);
+int      sshkey_cert_is_legacy(const struct sshkey *);
+
+int              sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
+int              sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
+const char *     sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int);
+u_int            sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int);
+int              sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
+int              sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *);
+int              sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid);
+int              sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+int              sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
+const char      *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
+const char      *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
+int              sshkey_names_valid2(const char *);
+char            *key_alg_list(int, int);
+
+int      sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
+int      sshkey_to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+int      sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
+int      sshkey_plain_to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+int      sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
+
+int      sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+    const u_char *, size_t, u_int);
+int      sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+    const u_char *, size_t, u_int);
+
+/* for debug */
+void    sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+void    sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *);
+
+/* private key parsing and serialisation */
+int     sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf);
+int     sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf,  struct sshkey **keyp);
+
+/* private key file format parsing and serialisation */
+int     sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
+    const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
+    int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds);
+int     sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
+int     sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+    const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
+int     sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer,
+    const char *passphrase, const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp,
+    char **commentp);
+int     sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+    const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
+
+#ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+# undef RSA
+# undef DSA
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#endif
+
+#endif /* SSHKEY_H */