diff options
-rw-r--r-- | openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c | 26 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c b/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c index 91b6ba07b..5ed1cc531 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c +++ b/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c | |||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.4 2013/07/29 00:55:53 tedu Exp $ */ | 1 | /* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.9 2014/07/13 21:21:25 tedu Exp $ */ |
2 | /* | 2 | /* |
3 | * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu@openbsd.org> | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu@openbsd.org> |
4 | * | 4 | * |
@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ | |||
51 | * | 51 | * |
52 | * One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material | 52 | * One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material |
53 | * linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to | 53 | * linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to |
54 | * generate (i.e.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an | 54 | * generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an |
55 | * attacker can merely run once through the outer loop below, but the user | 55 | * attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user |
56 | * always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the | 56 | * always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the |
57 | * entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a | 57 | * entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a |
58 | * wise caller could do; we just do it for you. | 58 | * wise caller could do; we just do it for you. |
@@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out) | |||
97 | } | 97 | } |
98 | 98 | ||
99 | /* zap */ | 99 | /* zap */ |
100 | memset(ciphertext, 0, sizeof(ciphertext)); | 100 | explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext)); |
101 | memset(cdata, 0, sizeof(cdata)); | 101 | explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata)); |
102 | memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state)); | 102 | explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state)); |
103 | } | 103 | } |
104 | 104 | ||
105 | int | 105 | int |
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t salt | |||
113 | u_int8_t *countsalt; | 113 | u_int8_t *countsalt; |
114 | size_t i, j, amt, stride; | 114 | size_t i, j, amt, stride; |
115 | uint32_t count; | 115 | uint32_t count; |
116 | size_t origkeylen = keylen; | ||
116 | 117 | ||
117 | /* nothing crazy */ | 118 | /* nothing crazy */ |
118 | if (rounds < 1) | 119 | if (rounds < 1) |
@@ -155,14 +156,17 @@ bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t salt | |||
155 | * pbkdf2 deviation: ouput the key material non-linearly. | 156 | * pbkdf2 deviation: ouput the key material non-linearly. |
156 | */ | 157 | */ |
157 | amt = MIN(amt, keylen); | 158 | amt = MIN(amt, keylen); |
158 | for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) | 159 | for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) { |
159 | key[i * stride + (count - 1)] = out[i]; | 160 | size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1); |
160 | keylen -= amt; | 161 | if (dest >= origkeylen) |
162 | break; | ||
163 | key[dest] = out[i]; | ||
164 | } | ||
165 | keylen -= i; | ||
161 | } | 166 | } |
162 | 167 | ||
163 | /* zap */ | 168 | /* zap */ |
164 | memset(out, 0, sizeof(out)); | 169 | explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out)); |
165 | memset(countsalt, 0, saltlen + 4); | ||
166 | free(countsalt); | 170 | free(countsalt); |
167 | 171 | ||
168 | return 0; | 172 | return 0; |