8 files changed, 80 insertions, 31 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 32f82369d..87fee3bf0 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -49,6 +49,19 @@
      gcc, at least in earlier versions, but this does not forgive your current
      transgressions) seen between zlib and openssl
      ok djm
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/09 10:45:45
+     [kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
+     ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use
+     (SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous
+     code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases.
+     
+     This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve
+     keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve
+     keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms
+     when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded
+     client.
+     
+     ok naddy@
 
 20100831
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index abe9b9f5d..7c8763191 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.84 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.85 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -325,10 +325,10 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
         } else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA256) == 0) {
                 k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
                 k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
-        } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_ECDH_SHA256,
-            sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA256) - 1) == 0) {
-                k->kex_type = KEX_ECDH_SHA2;
-                k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
+        } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM,
+            sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM) - 1) == 0) {
+                k->kex_type = KEX_ECDH_SHA2;
+                k->evp_md = kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(k->name);
 #endif
         } else
                 fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index a183ffda2..f5dcc8791 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.50 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.51 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
 #define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256        "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
 #define KEX_RESUME              "resume@appgate.com"
 /* The following represents the family of ECDH methods */
-#define KEX_ECDH_SHA256         "ecdh-sha2-"
+#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM      "ecdh-sha2-"
 
 #define COMP_NONE       0
 #define COMP_ZLIB       1
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ kex_ecdh_hash(const EVP_MD *, const EC_GROUP *, char *, char *, char *, int,
     const BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
 
 int     kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(const char *);
+const EVP_MD *kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(const char *);
 
 void
 derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]);
diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c
index bd5718136..f59d7b903 100644
--- a/kexecdh.c
+++ b/kexecdh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.1 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.2 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -48,15 +48,23 @@ kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(const char *kexname)
 {
         int ret;
 
-        if (strlen(kexname) < sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA256) - 1)
+        if (strlen(kexname) < sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM) - 1)
                 fatal("%s: kexname too short \"%s\"", __func__, kexname);
-        ret = key_curve_name_to_nid(kexname + sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA256) - 1);
+        ret = key_curve_name_to_nid(kexname + sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM) - 1);
         if (ret == -1)
                 fatal("%s: unsupported curve negotiated \"%s\"", __func__,
                     kexname);
         return ret;
 }
 
+const EVP_MD *
+kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(const char *kexname)
+{
+        int nid = kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(kexname);
+
+        return key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(nid);
+}
+
 void
 kex_ecdh_hash(
     const EVP_MD *evp_md,
diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
index 842280a9f..b9dc2355b 100644
--- a/key.c
+++ b/key.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.92 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.93 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * read_bignum():
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -978,17 +978,7 @@ key_size(const Key *k)
                 return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
         case KEY_ECDSA:
         case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
-                switch (k->ecdsa_nid) {
-                case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
-                        return 256;
-                case NID_secp384r1:
-                        return 384;
-                case NID_secp521r1:
-                        return 521;
-                default:
-                        break;
-                }
-                break;
+                return key_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid);
         }
         return 0;
 }
@@ -1961,6 +1951,7 @@ key_cert_is_legacy(Key *k)
         }
 }
 
+/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
 int
 key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
 {
@@ -1975,6 +1966,22 @@ key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
         return -1;
 }
 
+u_int
+key_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid)
+{
+        switch (nid) {
+        case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+                return 256;
+        case NID_secp384r1:
+                return 384;
+        case NID_secp521r1:
+                return 521;
+        default:
+                error("%s: unsupported EC curve nid %d", __func__, nid);
+                return 0;
+        }
+}
+
 const char *
 key_curve_nid_to_name(int nid)
 {
@@ -1989,6 +1996,22 @@ key_curve_nid_to_name(int nid)
         return NULL;
 }
 
+const EVP_MD *
+key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(int nid)
+{
+        int kbits = key_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
+
+        if (kbits == 0)
+                fatal("%s: invalid nid %d", __func__, nid);
+        /* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */
+        if (kbits <= 256)
+                return EVP_sha256();
+        else if (kbits <= 384)
+                return EVP_sha384();
+        else
+                return EVP_sha512();
+}
+
 int
 key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
 {
diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
index 2eb124364..ba1a20c07 100644
--- a/key.h
+++ b/key.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.31 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.32 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -112,8 +112,10 @@ int	 key_cert_is_legacy(Key *);
 int              key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
 int              key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
 const char *     key_curve_nid_to_name(int);
+u_int            key_curve_nid_to_bits(int);
 int              key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
 int              key_ecdsa_group_to_nid(const EC_GROUP *);
+const EVP_MD *   key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(int nid);
 int              key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
 int              key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
 
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 32395ee44..29d987c70 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.109 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.110 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -590,10 +590,10 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
         p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
 
         /*
-         * Supported KEX types will only return SHA1 (20 byte) or
-         * SHA256 (32 byte) hashes
+         * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
+         * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
          */
-        if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32)
+        if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
                 fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
 
         /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
index 0627ee5c0..5c4ce2311 100644
--- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD$ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.4 2010/09/10 01:04:10 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
     const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
         ECDSA_SIG *sig;
-        const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha256();
+        const EVP_MD *evp_md;
         EVP_MD_CTX md;
         u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
         u_int len, dlen;
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
                 error("%s: no ECDSA key", __func__);
                 return -1;
         }
+        evp_md = key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(key->ecdsa_nid);
         EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
         EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
         EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
@@ -94,21 +95,22 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
     const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
         ECDSA_SIG *sig;
-        const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha256();
+        const EVP_MD *evp_md;
         EVP_MD_CTX md;
         u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
         u_int len, dlen;
         int rlen, ret;
         Buffer b, bb;
+        char *ktype;
 
         if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
             (key->type != KEY_ECDSA && key->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT)) {
                 error("%s: no ECDSA key", __func__);
                 return -1;
         }
+        evp_md = key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(key->ecdsa_nid);
 
         /* fetch signature */
-        char *ktype;
         buffer_init(&b);
         buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
         ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);