3 files changed, 11 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 9b21a8598..ff710913b 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@
    - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/19 20:54:52
      [log.h]
      extra commas in enum not 100% portable
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/22 23:18:25
+     [ssh.c sshd.c]
+     spelling; abishoff@arc.nasa.gov
 
 20020604
  - (stevesk) [channels.c] bug #164 patch from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki (changed
@@ -697,4 +700,4 @@
  - (stevesk) entropy.c: typo in debug message
  - (djm) ssh-keygen -i needs seeded RNG; report from markus@
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2147 2002/06/06 19:51:06 mouring Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2148 2002/06/06 19:51:58 mouring Exp $
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index f442c43af..4b82d1e7e 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.171 2002/05/16 22:09:59 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.172 2002/05/22 23:18:25 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ int stdin_null_flag = 0;
 
 /*
  * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication.  This is useful
- * so that the pasphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
+ * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
  * background.
  */
 int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
                         debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command));
                         channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", /*want reply*/ 1);
                         /* register callback for reply */
-                        /* XXX we asume that client_loop has already been called */
+                        /* XXX we assume that client_loop has already been called */
                         dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &client_subsystem_reply);
                         dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &client_subsystem_reply);
                 } else {
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index afb872665..437e0f970 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.242 2002/05/15 15:47:49 mouring Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.243 2002/05/22 23:18:25 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
                         fatal_cleanup();
                 }
 
-                /* Read other side's version identification. */
+                /* Read other sides version identification. */
                 memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
                 for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
                         if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
         sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
         /*
          * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
-         * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged
+         * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from privileged
          * programs.  Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
          * machine, he can connect from any port.  So do not use these
          * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
@@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
 
         debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
 
-        /* Send an acknowledgement packet.  Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
+        /* Send an acknowledgment packet.  Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
         packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
         packet_send();
         packet_write_wait();