3 files changed, 23 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index baae286ae..9ca87fda0 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
    - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/30 11:05:17
      [ssh-keygen.c]
      Correctly handle truncated files while converting keys; ok djm@
+   - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/30 11:40:21
+     [auth.c monitor.c]
+     Prevent duplicate log messages when privsep=yes; ok djm@
 
 20060326
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
@@ -4486,4 +4489,4 @@
    - (djm) Trim deprecated options from INSTALL. Mention UsePAM
    - (djm) Fix quote handling in sftp; Patch from admorten AT umich.edu
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.4297 2006/03/31 12:13:35 djm Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.4298 2006/03/31 12:14:23 djm Exp $
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index bf2948a84..e43c81658 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.66 2006/03/25 13:17:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.67 2006/03/30 11:40:21 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int use_privsep;
 extern Buffer loginmsg;
 
 /* Debugging messages */
@@ -237,6 +238,9 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
         void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
         char *authmsg;
 
+        if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
+                return;
+
         /* Raise logging level */
         if (authenticated == 1 ||
             !authctxt->valid ||
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index d672aeb72..894523da3 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.76 2006/03/25 13:17:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.77 2006/03/30 11:40:21 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ struct mon_table {
 #define MON_ISAUTH      0x0004  /* Required for Authentication */
 #define MON_AUTHDECIDE  0x0008  /* Decides Authentication */
 #define MON_ONCE        0x0010  /* Disable after calling */
+#define MON_ALOG        0x0020  /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
 
 #define MON_AUTH        (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
 
@@ -239,8 +240,8 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
     {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
-    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
     {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
     {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
@@ -334,6 +335,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
         /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
         while (!authenticated) {
+                auth_method = "unknown";
                 authenticated = monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent);
                 if (authenticated) {
                         if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
@@ -356,7 +358,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 #endif
                 }
 
-                if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
+                if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
                         auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
                             compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
                         if (!authenticated)
@@ -366,6 +368,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
 
         if (!authctxt->valid)
                 fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
+        if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
+                fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
 
         debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
             __func__, authctxt->user);
@@ -992,17 +996,20 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 case MM_USERKEY:
                         allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
                             user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+                        auth_method = "publickey";
                         break;
                 case MM_HOSTKEY:
                         allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
                             hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
                             cuser, chost, key);
+                        auth_method = "hostbased";
                         break;
                 case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
                         key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
                         allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
                             auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
                             cuser, chost, key);
+                        auth_method = "rsa";
                         break;
                 default:
                         fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
@@ -1023,6 +1030,8 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
                 hostbased_cuser = cuser;
                 hostbased_chost = chost;
         } else {
+                /* Log failed attempt */
+                auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
                 xfree(blob);
                 xfree(cuser);
                 xfree(chost);
@@ -1390,6 +1399,7 @@ mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
         debug3("%s entering", __func__);
 
+        auth_method = "rsa";
         if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
                 if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
                         fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);