121 files changed, 16414 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/.git-dpm b/debian/.git-dpm
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8a18e26dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/.git-dpm
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# see git-dpm(1) from git-dpm package
+125924e47db3713a85a70e0f8d6c23818d2ea054
+125924e47db3713a85a70e0f8d6c23818d2ea054
+3d246f10429fc9a37b98eabef94fe8dc7c61002b
+3d246f10429fc9a37b98eabef94fe8dc7c61002b
+openssh_7.9p1.orig.tar.gz
+993aceedea8ecabb1d0dd7293508a361891c4eaa
+1565384
+debianTag="debian/%e%%%V"
+patchedTag="patched/%e%%%V"
+upstreamTag="upstream/%U"
diff --git a/debian/.gitignore b/debian/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..988323b00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/*.debhelper*
+/*substvars
+/build-deb
+/build-udeb
+/files
+/keygen-test/key1
+/keygen-test/key1.pub
+/keygen-test/key2
+/keygen-test/key2.pub
+/openssh-client
+/openssh-client-udeb
+/openssh-server
+/openssh-server-udeb
+/ssh
+/ssh-askpass-gnome
+/ssh-krb5
+/tmp
diff --git a/debian/.gitlab-ci.yml b/debian/.gitlab-ci.yml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..845003caf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/.gitlab-ci.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+image: registry.gitlab.com/eighthave/ci-image-git-buildpackage:latest
+build:
+  artifacts:
+    paths:
+    - "*.deb"
+    expire_in: 1 day
+  script:
+    - gitlab-ci-git-buildpackage-all
diff --git a/debian/NEWS b/debian/NEWS
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c0a535cf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/NEWS
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+openssh (1:7.9p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  OpenSSH 7.9 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+   * ssh(1), sshd(8): the setting of the new CASignatureAlgorithms option
+     bans the use of DSA keys as certificate authorities.
+   * sshd(8): the authentication success/failure log message has changed
+     format slightly.  It now includes the certificate fingerprint
+     (previously it included only key ID and CA key fingerprint).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 21 Oct 2018 10:39:24 +0100
+openssh (1:7.8p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  OpenSSH 7.8 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+   * ssh-keygen(1): Write OpenSSH format private keys by default instead of
+     using OpenSSL's PEM format.  The OpenSSH format, supported in OpenSSH
+     releases since 2014 and described in the PROTOCOL.key file in the
+     source distribution, offers substantially better protection against
+     offline password guessing and supports key comments in private keys.
+     If necessary, it is possible to write old PEM-style keys by adding "-m
+     PEM" to ssh-keygen's arguments when generating or updating a key.
+   * sshd(8): Remove internal support for S/Key multiple factor
+     authentication.  S/Key may still be used via PAM or BSD auth.
+   * ssh(1): Remove vestigial support for running ssh(1) as setuid.  This
+     used to be required for hostbased authentication and the (long gone)
+     rhosts-style authentication, but has not been necessary for a long
+     time.  Attempting to execute ssh as a setuid binary, or with uid !=
+     effective uid will now yield a fatal error at runtime.
+   * sshd(8): The semantics of PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and the similar
+     HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options have changed.  These now specify
+     signature algorithms that are accepted for their respective
+     authentication mechanism, where previously they specified accepted key
+     types.  This distinction matters when using the RSA/SHA2 signature
+     algorithms "rsa-sha2-256", "rsa-sha2-512" and their certificate
+     counterparts.  Configurations that override these options but omit
+     these algorithm names may cause unexpected authentication failures (no
+     action is required for configurations that accept the default for these
+     options).
+   * sshd(8): The precedence of session environment variables has changed.
+     ~/.ssh/environment and environment="..." options in authorized_keys
+     files can no longer override SSH_* variables set implicitly by sshd.
+   * ssh(1)/sshd(8): The default IPQoS used by ssh/sshd has changed.  They
+     will now use DSCP AF21 for interactive traffic and CS1 for bulk.  For a
+     detailed rationale, please see the commit message:
+     https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.c#rev1.284
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 30 Aug 2018 15:35:27 +0100
+openssh (1:7.6p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  OpenSSH 7.6 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+   * ssh(1): Delete SSH protocol version 1 support, associated configuration
+     options and documentation.
+   * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Remove support for the hmac-ripemd160 MAC.
+   * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Remove support for the arcfour, blowfish and CAST
+     ciphers.
+   * Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in length and improve reporting for keys
+     that do not meet this requirement.
+   * ssh(1): Do not offer CBC ciphers by default.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 06 Oct 2017 12:36:48 +0100
+openssh (1:7.5p1-1) experimental; urgency=medium
+  OpenSSH 7.5 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+   * This release deprecates the sshd_config UsePrivilegeSeparation option,
+     thereby making privilege separation mandatory.
+   * The format of several log messages emitted by the packet code has
+     changed to include additional information about the user and their
+     authentication state. Software that monitors ssh/sshd logs may need to
+     account for these changes. For example:
+       Connection closed by user x 1.1.1.1 port 1234 [preauth]
+       Connection closed by authenticating user x 10.1.1.1 port 1234 [preauth]
+       Connection closed by invalid user x 1.1.1.1 port 1234 [preauth]
+     Affected messages include connection closure, timeout, remote
+     disconnection, negotiation failure and some other fatal messages
+     generated by the packet code.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 02 Apr 2017 02:58:01 +0100
+openssh (1:7.4p1-7) unstable; urgency=medium
+  This version restores the default for AuthorizedKeysFile to search both
+  ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2, as was the case in
+  Debian configurations before 1:7.4p1-1.  Upstream intends to phase out
+  searching ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 by default, so you should ensure that
+  you are only using ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, at least for critical
+  administrative access; do not assume that the current default will remain
+  in place forever.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 05 Mar 2017 02:12:42 +0000
+openssh (1:7.4p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  OpenSSH 7.4 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+   * ssh(1): Remove 3des-cbc from the client's default proposal.  64-bit
+     block ciphers are not safe in 2016 and we don't want to wait until
+     attacks like SWEET32 are extended to SSH.  As 3des-cbc was the only
+     mandatory cipher in the SSH RFCs, this may cause problems connecting to
+     older devices using the default configuration, but it's highly likely
+     that such devices already need explicit configuration for key exchange
+     and hostkey algorithms already anyway.
+   * sshd(8): Remove support for pre-authentication compression.  Doing
+     compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the
+     1990s, but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography
+     (cf. multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
+     Pre-auth compression support has been disabled by default for >10
+     years.  Support remains in the client.
+   * ssh-agent will refuse to load PKCS#11 modules outside a whitelist of
+     trusted paths by default.  The path whitelist may be specified at
+     run-time.
+   * sshd(8): When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and an
+     authorized keys/principals command= restriction, sshd will now refuse
+     to accept the certificate unless they are identical.  The previous
+     (documented) behaviour of having the certificate forced-command
+     override the other could be a bit confusing and error-prone.
+   * sshd(8): Remove the UseLogin configuration directive and support for
+     having /bin/login manage login sessions.
+  The unprivileged sshd process that deals with pre-authentication network
+  traffic is now subject to additional sandboxing restrictions by default:
+  that is, the default sshd_config now sets UsePrivilegeSeparation to
+  "sandbox" rather than "yes".  This has been the case upstream for a while,
+  but until now the Debian configuration diverged unnecessarily.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 27 Dec 2016 18:01:46 +0000
+openssh (1:7.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  OpenSSH 7.2 disables a number of legacy cryptographic algorithms by
+  default in ssh:
+   * Several ciphers blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants and the
+     rijndael-cbc aliases for AES.
+   * MD5-based and truncated HMAC algorithms.
+  These algorithms are already disabled by default in sshd.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 08 Mar 2016 11:47:20 +0000
+openssh (1:7.1p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  OpenSSH 7.0 disables several pieces of weak, legacy, and/or unsafe
+  cryptography.
+   * Support for the legacy SSH version 1 protocol is disabled by default at
+     compile time.  Note that this also means that the Cipher keyword in
+     ssh_config(5) is effectively no longer usable; use Ciphers instead for
+     protocol 2.  The openssh-client-ssh1 package includes "ssh1", "scp1",
+     and "ssh-keygen1" binaries which you can use if you have no alternative
+     way to connect to an outdated SSH1-only server; please contact the
+     server administrator or system vendor in such cases and ask them to
+     upgrade.
+   * Support for the 1024-bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange is
+     disabled by default at run-time.  It may be re-enabled using the
+     instructions at http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
+   * Support for ssh-dss, ssh-dss-cert-* host and user keys is disabled by
+     default at run-time.  These may be re-enabled using the instructions at
+     http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
+   * Support for the legacy v00 cert format has been removed.
+  Future releases will retire more legacy cryptography, including:
+   * Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum is
+     768 bits).
+   * Several ciphers will be disabled by default: blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc,
+     all arcfour variants, and the rijndael-cbc aliases for AES.
+   * MD5-based HMAC algorithms will be disabled by default.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 08 Dec 2015 15:33:08 +0000
+openssh (1:6.9p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  UseDNS now defaults to 'no'.  Configurations that match against the client
+  host name (via sshd_config or authorized_keys) may need to re-enable it or
+  convert to matching against addresses.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 20 Aug 2015 10:38:58 +0100
+openssh (1:6.7p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  openssh-server 1:6.7p1-4 changed the default setting of AcceptEnv to list
+  a number of specific LC_FOO variables rather than the wildcard LC_*.  I
+  have since been persuaded that this was a bad idea and have reverted it,
+  but it is difficult to automatically undo the change to
+  /etc/ssh/sshd_config without compounding the problem (that of modifying
+  configuration that some users did not want to be modified) further.  Most
+  users who upgraded via version 1:6.7p1-4 should restore the previous value
+  of "AcceptEnv LANG LC_*" in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 22 Mar 2015 23:09:32 +0000
+openssh (1:5.4p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  Smartcard support is now available using PKCS#11 tokens.  If you were
+  previously using an unofficial build of Debian's OpenSSH package with
+  OpenSC-based smartcard support added, then note that commands like
+  'ssh-add -s 0' will no longer work; you need to use 'ssh-add -s
+  /usr/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so' instead.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 10 Apr 2010 01:08:59 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-9) experimental; urgency=low
+  The ssh package has been split into openssh-client and openssh-server. If
+  you had previously requested that the sshd server should not be run, then
+  that request will still be honoured. However, the recommended approach is
+  now to remove the openssh-server package if you do not want to run sshd.
+  You can remove the old /etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run marker file after doing
+  that.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon,  2 Aug 2004 20:48:54 +0100
+openssh (1:3.5p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  This version of OpenSSH disables the environment option for public keys by
+  default, in order to avoid certain attacks (for example, LD_PRELOAD). If
+  you are using this option in an authorized_keys file, beware that the keys
+  in question will no longer work until the option is removed.
+  To re-enable this option, set "PermitUserEnvironment yes" in
+  /etc/ssh/sshd_config after the upgrade is complete, taking note of the
+  warning in the sshd_config(5) manual page.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 26 Oct 2002 19:41:51 +0100
+openssh (1:3.0.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=high
+  As of version 3, OpenSSH no longer uses separate files for ssh1 and ssh2
+  keys. This means the authorized_keys2 and known_hosts2 files are no longer
+  needed. They will still be read in order to maintain backward
+  compatibility.
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Thu, 28 Nov 2001 17:43:01 +0000
diff --git a/debian/README.Debian b/debian/README.Debian
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..48f42c4e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/README.Debian
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+OpenSSH for Debian
+------------------
+UPGRADE ISSUES
+==============
+PermitRootLogin
+---------------
+As of 1:6.6p1-1, new installations will be set to "PermitRootLogin
+without-password" (or the synonymous "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password" as
+of 1:7.1p1-1).  This disables password authentication for root, foiling
+password dictionary attacks on the root user.  Some sites may wish to use
+the stronger "PermitRootLogin forced-commands-only" or "PermitRootLogin no",
+but note that "PermitRootLogin no" will break setups that SSH to root with a
+forced command to take full-system backups.  You can use PermitRootLogin in
+a Match block if you want finer-grained control here.
+For many years Debian's OpenSSH packaging used "PermitRootLogin yes", in
+line with upstream.  To avoid breaking local setups, this is still true for
+installations upgraded from before 1:6.6p1-1.  If you wish to change this,
+you should edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config, change it manually, and run "service
+ssh restart" as root.
+Disabling PermitRootLogin means that an attacker possessing credentials for
+the root account (any credentials in the case of "yes", or private key
+material in the case of "prohibit-password") must compromise a normal user
+account rather than being able to SSH directly to root.  Be careful to avoid
+a false illusion of security if you change this setting; any account you
+escalate to root from should be considered equivalent to root for the
+purposes of security against external attack.  You might for example disable
+it if you know you will only ever log in as root from the physical console.
+Since the root account does not generally have non-password credentials
+unless you explicitly install an SSH public key in its
+~/.ssh/authorized_keys, which you presumably only do if you want to SSH to
+it, "prohibit-password" should be a reasonable default for most sites.
+As of OpenSSH 7.0, this is the upstream default.
+For further discussion, see:
+  https://bugs.debian.org/298138
+  https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2164
+X11 Forwarding
+--------------
+ssh's default for ForwardX11 has been changed to ``no'' because it has
+been pointed out that logging into remote systems administered by
+untrusted people is likely to open you up to X11 attacks, so you
+should have to actively decide that you trust the remote machine's
+root, before enabling X11.  I strongly recommend that you do this on a
+machine-by-machine basis, rather than just enabling it in the default
+host settings.
+In order for X11 forwarding to work, you need to install xauth on the
+server. In Debian this is in the xbase-clients package.
+As of OpenSSH 3.1, the remote $DISPLAY uses localhost by default to reduce
+the security risks of X11 forwarding. Look up X11UseLocalhost in
+sshd_config(8) if this is a problem.
+OpenSSH 3.8 invented ForwardX11Trusted, which when set to no causes the
+ssh client to create an untrusted X cookie so that attacks on the
+forwarded X11 connection can't become attacks on X clients on the remote
+machine. However, this has some problems in implementation - notably a
+very short timeout of the untrusted cookie - breaks large numbers of
+existing setups, and generally seems immature. The Debian package
+therefore sets the default for this option to "yes" (in ssh itself,
+rather than in ssh_config).
+Fallback to RSH
+---------------
+The default for this setting has been changed from Yes to No, for
+security reasons, and to stop the delay attempting to rsh to machines
+that don't offer the service.  Simply switch it back on in either
+/etc/ssh/ssh_config or ~/.ssh/config for those machines that you need
+it for.
+Setgid ssh-agent and environment variables
+------------------------------------------
+As of version 1:3.5p1-1, ssh-agent is installed setgid to prevent ptrace()
+attacks retrieving private key material. This has the side-effect of causing
+glibc to remove certain environment variables which might have security
+implications for set-id programs, including LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, and
+TMPDIR.
+If you need to set any of these environment variables, you will need to do
+so in the program exec()ed by ssh-agent. This may involve creating a small
+wrapper script.
+Symlink Hostname invocation
+---------------------------
+This version of ssh no longer includes support for invoking ssh with the
+hostname as the name of the file run.  People wanting this support should
+use the ssh-argv0 script.
+=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
+OTHER ISSUES
+============
+Authorization Forwarding
+------------------------
+Similarly, root on a remote server could make use of your ssh-agent
+(while you're logged into their machine) to obtain access to machines
+which trust your keys.  This feature is therefore disabled by default.
+You should only re-enable it for those hosts (in your ~/.ssh/config or
+/etc/ssh/ssh_config) where you are confident that the remote machine
+is not a threat.
+Problems logging in with RSA authentication
+-------------------------------------------
+If you have trouble logging in with RSA authentication then the
+problem is probably caused by the fact that you have your home
+directory writable by group, as well as user (this is the default on
+Debian systems).
+Depending upon other settings on your system (i.e. other users being
+in your group) this could open a security hole, so you will need to
+make your home directory writable only by yourself.  Run this command,
+as yourself:
+  chmod g-w ~/
+to remove group write permissions.  If you use ssh-copy-id to install your
+keys, it does this for you.
+-L option of ssh nonfree
+------------------------
+non-free ssh supported the usage of the option -L to use a non privileged
+port for scp. This option will not be supported by scp from openssh.
+Please use instead scp -o "UsePrivilegedPort=no" as documented in the
+manpage to scp itself.
+Problem logging in because of TCP-Wrappers
+------------------------------------------
+ssh is compiled with support for tcp-wrappers. So if you can no longer
+log into your system, please check that /etc/hosts.allow and /etc/hosts.deny
+are configured so that ssh is not blocked.
+Kerberos support
+----------------
+ssh is now compiled with Kerberos support. Unfortunately, privilege
+separation is incompatible with parts of Kerberos support for protocol 2;
+you may need to run kinit after logging in.
+Interoperability between scp and the ssh.com SSH server
+-------------------------------------------------------
+In version 2 and greater of the commercial SSH server produced by SSH
+Communications Security, scp was changed to use SFTP (SSH2's file transfer
+protocol) instead of the traditional rcp-over-ssh, thereby breaking
+compatibility. The OpenSSH developers regard this as a bug in the ssh.com
+server, and do not currently intend to change OpenSSH's scp to match.
+Workarounds for this problem are to install scp1 on the server (scp2 will
+fall back to it), to use sftp, or to use some other transfer mechanism such
+as rsync-over-ssh or tar-over-ssh.
+Running sshd from inittab
+-------------------------
+Some people find it useful to run the sshd server from inittab, to make sure
+that it always stays running. To do this, stop sshd ('service ssh stop'),
+add the following line to /etc/inittab, and run 'telinit q':
+  ss:2345:respawn:/usr/sbin/sshd -D
+If you do this, note that you will need to stop sshd being started in the
+normal way ('update-rc.d ssh disable') and that you will need to restart
+this sshd manually on upgrades.
+Per-connection sshd instances with systemd
+------------------------------------------
+If you want to reconfigure systemd to listen on port 22 itself and launch an
+instance of sshd for each connection (inetd-style socket activation), then
+you can run:
+  systemctl stop ssh.service
+  systemctl start ssh.socket
+To make this permanent:
+  systemctl disable ssh.service
+  systemctl enable ssh.socket
+This may be appropriate in environments where minimal footprint is critical
+(e.g. cloud guests).  Be aware that this bypasses MaxStartups, and systemd's
+MaxConnections cannot quite replace this as it cannot distinguish between
+authenticated and unauthenticated connections; see
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=963268 for more discussion.
+The provided ssh.socket unit file sets ListenStream=22.  If you need to have
+it listen on a different address or port, then you will need to do this as
+follows (modifying ListenStream to match your requirements):
+  mkdir -p /etc/systemd/system/ssh.socket.d
+  cat >/etc/systemd/system/ssh.socket.d/listen.conf <<EOF
+  [Socket]
+  ListenStream=2222
+  EOF
+  systemctl daemon-reload
+See systemd.socket(5) for details.
+Terminating SSH sessions cleanly on shutdown/reboot with systemd
+----------------------------------------------------------------
+If you have libpam-systemd >= 230 installed (following openssh-server's
+Recommends) and "UsePAM yes" in sshd_config (the default configuration
+shipped by this package), then SSH sessions will be terminated cleanly when
+the server is shut down or rebooted.
+If either of these conditions does not hold, then you may find that SSH
+sessions hang silently when the server is shut down or rebooted.  If you do
+not want to use PAM or configure it properly for whatever reason, then you
+can instead copy
+/usr/share/doc/openssh-server/examples/ssh-session-cleanup.service to
+/etc/systemd/system/ and run "systemctl enable ssh-session-cleanup.service".
+Non-systemd users may find /usr/lib/openssh/ssh-session-cleanup helpful if
+they have a similar problem, although at present there is no system
+integration for this for anything other than systemd.
+SSH protocol 1 server support removed
+-------------------------------------
+sshd(8) no longer supports the old SSH protocol 1, so all the configuration
+options related to it are now deprecated and should be removed from
+/etc/ssh/sshd_config.  These are:
+  KeyRegenerationInterval
+  RSAAuthentication
+  RhostsRSAAuthentication
+  ServerKeyBits
+The Protocol option is also no longer needed, although it is silently
+ignored rather than deprecated.
+if-up hook removed
+------------------
+openssh-server previously shipped an if-up hook that restarted sshd when a
+network interface came up.  This generally caused more problems than it
+solved: for instance, it means that sshd stops listening briefly while being
+restarted, which can cause problems in some environments, particularly
+automated tests.
+The only known situation where the if-up hook was useful was when
+sshd_config was changed to add ListenAddress entries for particular IP
+addresses, overriding the default of listening on all addresses, and the
+system is one that often roams between networks.  In such a situation, it is
+better to remove ListenAddress entries from sshd_config (restoring it to the
+default behaviour) and instead use firewall rules to restrict incoming SSH
+connections to only the desired interfaces or addresses.
+For further discussion, see:
+  https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1674330
+-- 
+Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
+Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
diff --git a/debian/adjust-openssl-dependencies b/debian/adjust-openssl-dependencies
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..1cd7f2997
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/adjust-openssl-dependencies
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# Attempt to tighten libssl dependencies to match the check in entropy.c.
+# Must be run after dpkg-shlibdeps.
+client=debian/openssh-client.substvars
+server=debian/openssh-server.substvars
+libssl_version="$(dpkg-query -W libssl-dev 2>/dev/null | cut -f2)"
+if [ -z "$libssl_version" ]; then
+        echo "Can't find libssl-dev version; leaving dependencies alone."
+        exit 0
+fi
+libssl_version="$(echo "$libssl_version" | sed 's/[a-z-].*//')"
+libssl_package="$(sed -n 's/.*[= ]\(libssl[0-9][a-z0-9+.-]*\).*/\1/p' "$client")"
+if [ "$libssl_package" ]; then
+        new_dep="$libssl_package (>= $libssl_version)"
+        sed -i "/^shlibs:Depends=/s/\$/, $new_dep/" "$client"
+        sed -i "/^shlibs:Depends=/s/\$/, $new_dep/" "$server"
+fi
+client_udeb=debian/openssh-client-udeb.substvars
+server_udeb=debian/openssh-server-udeb.substvars
+libcrypto_package="$(sed -n 's/.*[= ]\(libcrypto[0-9][a-z0-9+.-]*\).*/\1/p' "$client_udeb")"
+if [ "$libcrypto_package" ]; then
+        new_dep="$libcrypto_package (>= $libssl_version)"
+        if [ -e "$client_udeb" ]; then
+                sed -i "/^shlibs:Depends=/s/\$/, $new_dep/" "$client_udeb"
+        fi
+        if [ -e "$server_udeb" ]; then
+                sed -i "/^shlibs:Depends=/s/\$/, $new_dep/" "$server_udeb"
+        fi
+fi
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/agent-launch b/debian/agent-launch
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..f3cbfaef8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/agent-launch
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# helper script for launching ssh-agent, used by systemd unit
+set -e
+if [ ! -d "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" ]; then
+    echo 'This needs $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to be set' >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if [ "$1" = start ]; then
+    if [ -z "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && grep -s -q '^use-ssh-agent$' /etc/X11/Xsession.options; then
+        S="$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/openssh_agent"
+        dbus-update-activation-environment --verbose --systemd SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$S SSH_AGENT_LAUNCHER=openssh
+        exec ssh-agent -D -a $S
+    fi
+elif [ "$1" = stop ]; then
+    if [ "$SSH_AGENT_LAUNCHER" = openssh ]; then
+        dbus-update-activation-environment --systemd  SSH_AUTH_SOCK=
+    fi
+else
+    echo "Unknown command $1" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..41b42221d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -0,0 +1,5369 @@
+openssh (1:7.9p1-6) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
+  * CVE-2019-6109: Apply upstream patches to sanitize scp filenames via
+    snmprintf (closes: #793412).
+  * CVE-2019-6111: Apply upstream patch to check in scp client that
+    filenames sent during remote->local directory copies satisfy the
+    wildcard specified by the user.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 08 Feb 2019 15:41:25 +0000
+openssh (1:7.9p1-5) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Move /etc/ssh/moduli to openssh-server, since it's reasonably large and
+    only used by sshd (closes: #858050).
+  * Drop obsolete alternate build-dependency on libssl1.0-dev (closes:
+    #917342).
+  * CVE-2018-20685: Apply upstream scp patch to disallow empty incoming
+    filename or ones that refer to the current directory (closes: #919101).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 13 Jan 2019 11:22:45 +0000
+openssh (1:7.9p1-4) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Fix Ubuntu detection in debian/rules, since the documentation comment
+    for dpkg_vendor_derives_from is wrong (thanks, Jeremy Bicha; see
+    #913816).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 16 Nov 2018 11:27:28 +0000
+openssh (1:7.9p1-3) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Be more specific about what files to install in openssh-tests, to avoid
+    installing a symlink into the build tree.
+  * Re-export debian/upstream/signing-key.asc without extra signatures.
+  * Restore direct test dependencies on openssl, putty-tools, and
+    python-twisted-conch; these are really only indirect dependencies via
+    openssh-tests, but including them means that this package will be
+    retested when they change.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 15 Nov 2018 01:30:56 +0000
+openssh (1:7.9p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Add GitLab CI configuration.
+  * Make the autopkgtest create /run/sshd if it doesn't already exist.
+  * Drop "set -x" verbosity from the autopkgtest; I think we can do without
+    this in most cases nowadays.
+  * Add an openssh-tests binary package containing enough files to run the
+    upstream regression tests.  This allows autopkgtest to run more
+    efficiently, as it doesn't have to build part of the source tree again.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 14 Nov 2018 15:55:48 +0000
+openssh (1:7.9p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.9):
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): allow most port numbers to be specified using service
+      names from getservbyname(3) (typically /etc/services; closes:
+      #177406).
+    - ssh(1): allow the IdentityAgent configuration directive to accept
+      environment variable names.  This supports the use of multiple agent
+      sockets without needing to use fixed paths.
+    - sshd(8): support signalling sessions via the SSH protocol.  A limited
+      subset of signals is supported and only for login or command sessions
+      (i.e. not subsystems) that were not subject to a forced command via
+      authorized_keys or sshd_config.
+    - ssh(1): support "ssh -Q sig" to list supported signature options.
+      Also "ssh -Q help" to show the full set of supported queries.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): add a CASignatureAlgorithms option for the client and
+      server configs to allow control over which signature formats are
+      allowed for CAs to sign certificates.  For example, this allows
+      banning CAs that sign certificates using the RSA-SHA1 signature
+      algorithm.
+    - sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): allow key revocation lists (KRLs) to revoke
+      keys specified by SHA256 hash.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): allow creation of key revocation lists directly from
+      base64-encoded SHA256 fingerprints.  This supports revoking keys using
+      only the information contained in sshd(8) authentication log messages.
+    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): avoid spurious "invalid format" errors when
+      attempting to load PEM private keys while using an incorrect
+      passphrase.
+    - sshd(8): when a channel closed message is received from a client,
+      close the stderr file descriptor at the same time stdout is closed.
+      This avoids stuck processes if they were waiting for stderr to close
+      and were insensitive to stdin/out closing (closes: #844494).
+    - ssh(1): allow ForwardX11Timeout=0 to disable the untrusted X11
+      forwarding timeout and support X11 forwarding indefinitely.
+      Previously the behaviour of ForwardX11Timeout=0 was undefined.
+    - sshd(8): when compiled with GSSAPI support, cache supported method
+      OIDs regardless of whether GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the
+      main section of sshd_config.  This avoids sandbox violations if GSSAPI
+      authentication was later enabled in a Match block.
+    - sshd(8): do not fail closed when configured with a text key revocation
+      list that contains a too-short key.
+    - ssh(1): treat connections with ProxyJump specified the same as ones
+      with a ProxyCommand set with regards to hostname canonicalisation
+      (i.e. don't try to canonicalise the hostname unless
+      CanonicalizeHostname is set to 'always').
+    - ssh(1): fix regression in OpenSSH 7.8 that could prevent public-key
+      authentication using certificates hosted in a ssh-agent(1) or against
+      sshd(8) from OpenSSH <7.8 (LP: #1790963).
+    - All: support building against the openssl-1.1 API (releases 1.1.0g and
+      later).  The openssl-1.0 API will remain supported at least until
+      OpenSSL terminates security patch support for that API version
+      (closes: #828475).
+    - sshd(8): allow the futex(2) syscall in the Linux seccomp sandbox;
+      apparently required by some glibc/OpenSSL combinations.
+  * Remove dh_builddeb override to use xz compression; this has been the
+    default since dpkg 1.17.0.
+  * Simplify debian/rules using /usr/share/dpkg/default.mk.
+  * Remove /etc/network/if-up.d/openssh-server, as it causes more problems
+    than it solves (thanks, Christian Ehrhardt, Andreas Hasenack, and David
+    Britton; closes: #789532, LP: #1037738, #1674330, #1718227).  Add an
+    "if-up hook removed" section to README.Debian documenting the corner
+    case that may need configuration adjustments.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 21 Oct 2018 10:39:24 +0100
+openssh (1:7.8p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.8, closes:
+    #907534):
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Write OpenSSH format private keys by default instead of
+      using OpenSSL's PEM format (closes: #905407).  The OpenSSH format,
+      supported in OpenSSH releases since 2014 and described in the
+      PROTOCOL.key file in the source distribution, offers substantially
+      better protection against offline password guessing and supports key
+      comments in private keys.  If necessary, it is possible to write old
+      PEM-style keys by adding "-m PEM" to ssh-keygen's arguments when
+      generating or updating a key.
+    - sshd(8): Remove internal support for S/Key multiple factor
+      authentication.  S/Key may still be used via PAM or BSD auth.
+    - ssh(1): Remove vestigial support for running ssh(1) as setuid.  This
+      used to be required for hostbased authentication and the (long gone)
+      rhosts-style authentication, but has not been necessary for a long
+      time.  Attempting to execute ssh as a setuid binary, or with uid !=
+      effective uid will now yield a fatal error at runtime.
+    - sshd(8): The semantics of PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and the similar
+      HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options have changed.  These now specify
+      signature algorithms that are accepted for their respective
+      authentication mechanism, where previously they specified accepted key
+      types.  This distinction matters when using the RSA/SHA2 signature
+      algorithms "rsa-sha2-256", "rsa-sha2-512" and their certificate
+      counterparts.  Configurations that override these options but omit
+      these algorithm names may cause unexpected authentication failures (no
+      action is required for configurations that accept the default for
+      these options).
+    - sshd(8): The precedence of session environment variables has changed.
+      ~/.ssh/environment and environment="..." options in authorized_keys
+      files can no longer override SSH_* variables set implicitly by sshd.
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): The default IPQoS used by ssh/sshd has changed.  They
+      will now use DSCP AF21 for interactive traffic and CS1 for bulk.  For
+      a detailed rationale, please see the commit message:
+      https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.c#rev1.284
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-
+      v01@openssh.com" and "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to explicitly
+      force use of RSA/SHA2 signatures in authentication.
+    - sshd(8): Extend the PermitUserEnvironment option to accept a whitelist
+      of environment variable names in addition to global "yes" or "no"
+      settings.
+    - sshd(8): Add a PermitListen directive to sshd_config(5) and a
+      corresponding permitlisten= authorized_keys option that control which
+      listen addresses and port numbers may be used by remote forwarding
+      (ssh -R ...).
+    - sshd(8): Add some countermeasures against timing attacks used for
+      account validation/enumeration.  sshd will enforce a minimum time or
+      each failed authentication attempt consisting of a global 5ms minimum
+      plus an additional per-user 0-4ms delay derived from a host secret.
+    - sshd(8): Add a SetEnv directive to allow an administrator to
+      explicitly specify environment variables in sshd_config.  Variables
+      set by SetEnv override the default and client-specified environment.
+    - ssh(1): Add a SetEnv directive to request that the server sets an
+      environment variable in the session.  Similar to the existing SendEnv
+      option, these variables are set subject to server configuration.
+    - ssh(1): Allow "SendEnv -PATTERN" to clear environment variables
+      previously marked for sending to the server (closes: #573316).
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Make UID available as a %-expansion everywhere that
+      the username is available currently.
+    - ssh(1): Allow setting ProxyJump=none to disable ProxyJump
+      functionality.
+    - sshd(8): Avoid observable differences in request parsing that could be
+      used to determine whether a target user is valid.
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Fix some memory leaks.
+    - ssh(1): Fix a pwent clobber (introduced in openssh-7.7) that could
+      occur during key loading, manifesting as crash on some platforms.
+    - sshd_config(5): Clarify documentation for AuthenticationMethods
+      option.
+    - ssh(1): Ensure that the public key algorithm sent in a public key
+      SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST matches the content of the signature blob.
+      Previously, these could be inconsistent when a legacy or non-OpenSSH
+      ssh-agent returned a RSA/SHA1 signature when asked to make a RSA/SHA2
+      signature.
+    - sshd(8): Fix failures to read authorized_keys caused by faulty
+      supplemental group caching.
+    - scp(1): Apply umask to directories, fixing potential mkdir/chmod race
+      when copying directory trees.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Return correct exit code when searching for and hashing
+      known_hosts entries in a single operation.
+    - ssh(1): Prefer the ssh binary pointed to via argv[0] to $PATH when
+      re-executing ssh for ProxyJump.
+    - sshd(8): Do not ban PTY allocation when a sshd session is restricted
+      because the user password is expired as it breaks password change
+      dialog.
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Fix error reporting from select() failures.
+    - ssh(1): Improve documentation for -w (tunnel) flag, emphasising that
+      -w implicitly sets Tunnel=point-to-point.
+    - ssh-agent(1): Implement EMFILE mitigation for ssh-agent.  ssh-agent
+      will no longer spin when its file descriptor limit is exceeded.
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Disable SSH2_MSG_DEBUG messages for Twisted Conch
+      clients.  Twisted Conch versions that lack a version number in their
+      identification strings will mishandle these messages when running on
+      Python 2.x (https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9422).
+    - sftp(1): Notify user immediately when underlying ssh process dies
+      expectedly.
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Fix tunnel forwarding; regression in 7.7 release.
+    - ssh-agent(1): Don't kill ssh-agent's listening socket entirely if it
+      fails to accept(2) a connection.
+    - ssh(1): Add some missing options in the configuration dump output (ssh
+      -G).
+    - sshd(8): Expose details of completed authentication to PAM auth
+      modules via SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 in the PAM environment.
+  * Switch debian/watch to HTTPS.
+  * Temporarily work around https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9515 in
+    regression tests.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 30 Aug 2018 15:35:27 +0100
+openssh (1:7.7p1-4) unstable; urgency=high
+  * CVE-2018-15473: Apply upstream patch to delay bailout for invalid
+    authenticating user until after the packet containing the request has
+    been fully parsed (closes: #906236).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 17 Aug 2018 14:09:32 +0100
+openssh (1:7.7p1-3) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Adjust git-dpm tagging configuration.
+  * Remove no-longer-used Lintian overrides from openssh-server and ssh.
+  * Add Documentation keys to ssh-agent.service, ssh.service, and
+    ssh@.service.
+  [ Juri Grabowski ]
+  * Add rescue.target with ssh support.
+  [ Christian Ehrhardt ]
+  * Fix unintentional restriction of authorized keys environment options
+    to be alphanumeric (closes: #903474, LP: #1771011).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:07:16 +0100
+openssh (1:7.7p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Fix parsing of DebianBanner option (closes: #894730).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 04 Apr 2018 00:47:29 +0100
+openssh (1:7.7p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.7):
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Drop compatibility support for some very old SSH
+      implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*.  These
+      versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the final SSH
+      RFCs.  The support in question isn't necessary for RFC-compliant SSH
+      implementations.
+    - Add experimental support for PQC XMSS keys (Extended Hash-Based
+      Signatures).
+    - sshd(8): Add an "rdomain" criterion for the sshd_config Match keyword
+      to allow conditional configuration that depends on which routing
+      domain a connection was received on.
+    - sshd_config(5): Add an optional rdomain qualifier to the ListenAddress
+      directive to allow listening on different routing domains.
+    - sshd(8): Add "expiry-time" option for authorized_keys files to allow
+      for expiring keys.
+    - ssh(1): Add a BindInterface option to allow binding the outgoing
+      connection to an interface's address (basically a more usable
+      BindAddress; closes: #289592).
+    - ssh(1): Expose device allocated for tun/tap forwarding via a new %T
+      expansion for LocalCommand.  This allows LocalCommand to be used to
+      prepare the interface.
+    - sshd(8): Expose the device allocated for tun/tap forwarding via a new
+      SSH_TUNNEL environment variable.  This allows automatic setup of the
+      interface and surrounding network configuration automatically on the
+      server.
+    - ssh(1)/scp(1)/sftp(1): Add URI support to ssh, sftp and scp, e.g.
+      ssh://user@host or sftp://user@host/path.  Additional connection
+      parameters described in draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04 are not
+      implemented since the ssh fingerprint format in the draft uses the
+      deprecated MD5 hash with no way to specify any other algorithm.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Allow certificate validity intervals that specify only
+      a start or stop time (instead of both or neither).
+    - sftp(1): Allow "cd" and "lcd" commands with no explicit path argument.
+      lcd will change to the local user's home directory as usual.  cd will
+      change to the starting directory for session (because the protocol
+      offers no way to obtain the remote user's home directory).
+    - sshd(8): When doing a config test with sshd -T, only require the
+      attributes that are actually used in Match criteria rather than (an
+      incomplete list of) all criteria.
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): More strictly check signature types during key
+      exchange against what was negotiated.  Prevents downgrade of RSA
+      signatures made with SHA-256/512 to SHA-1.
+    - sshd(8): Fix support for client that advertise a protocol version of
+      "1.99" (indicating that they are prepared to accept both SSHv1 and
+      SSHv2).  This was broken in OpenSSH 7.6 during the removal of SSHv1
+      support.
+    - ssh(1): Warn when the agent returns a ssh-rsa (SHA1) signature when a
+      rsa-sha2-256/512 signature was requested.  This condition is possible
+      when an old or non-OpenSSH agent is in use.
+    - ssh-agent(1): Fix regression introduced in 7.6 that caused ssh-agent
+      to fatally exit if presented an invalid signature request message.
+    - sshd_config(5): Accept yes/no flag options case-insensitively, as has
+      been the case in ssh_config(5) for a long time (LP: #1656557).
+    - ssh(1): Improve error reporting for failures during connection.  Under
+      some circumstances misleading errors were being shown.
+    - ssh-keyscan(1): Add -D option to allow printing of results directly in
+      SSHFP format.
+    - ssh(1): Compatibility fix for some servers that erroneously drop the
+      connection when the IUTF8 (RFC8160) option is sent.
+    - scp(1): Disable RemoteCommand and RequestTTY in the ssh session
+      started by scp (sftp was already doing this).
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Refuse to create a certificate with an unusable number
+      of principals.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Fatally exit if ssh-keygen is unable to write all the
+      public key during key generation.  Previously it would silently ignore
+      errors writing the comment and terminating newline.
+    - ssh(1): Do not modify hostname arguments that are addresses by
+      automatically forcing them to lower-case.  Instead canonicalise them
+      jo resolve ambiguities (e.g. ::0001 => ::1) before they are matched
+      against known_hosts.
+    - ssh(1): Don't accept junk after "yes" or "no" responses to hostkey
+      prompts.
+    - sftp(1): Have sftp print a warning about shell cleanliness when
+      decoding the first packet fails, which is usually caused by shells
+      polluting stdout of non-interactive startups.
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Switch timers in packet code from using wall-clock
+      time to monotonic time, allowing the packet layer to better function
+      over a clock step and avoiding possible integer overflows during
+      steps.
+    - sshd(8): Correctly detect MIPS ABI in use at configure time.  Fixes
+      sandbox violations on some environments.
+    - Build and link with "retpoline" flags when available to mitigate the
+      "branch target injection" style (variant 2) of the Spectre
+      branch-prediction vulnerability.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 03 Apr 2018 12:40:24 +0100
+openssh (1:7.6p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Explicitly build-depend on pkg-config, rather than implicitly
+    build-depending on it via libgtk-3-dev (thanks, Aurelien Jarno; closes:
+    #894558).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 01 Apr 2018 21:37:19 +0100
+openssh (1:7.6p1-4) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Move VCS to salsa.debian.org.
+  * Add a preseeding-only openssh-server/password-authentication debconf
+    template that can be used to disable password authentication (closes:
+    #878945).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 10 Feb 2018 02:31:46 +0000
+openssh (1:7.6p1-3) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Remove the decade-old ssh-krb5 transitional package; upgrades of
+    openssh-server will preserve existing configuration, and new
+    installations should just enable GSSAPIAuthentication and
+    GSSAPIKeyExchange in sshd_config (closes: #878626).
+  * Support the "noudeb" build profile.
+  * Fix putty-transfer regression test.
+  [ Anders Kaseorg ]
+  * debian/systemd/ssh-agent.service: Add missing dbus dependency.
+  [ Jason Duerstock ]
+  * Add a "pkg.openssh.nognome" build profile, which disables building the
+    ssh-askpass-gnome binary package and avoids the build-dependency on
+    libgtk-3-dev (closes: #883819).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 16 Jan 2018 17:41:08 +0000
+openssh (1:7.6p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Apply upstream patch to fix PermitOpen argument handling.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 07 Oct 2017 13:44:13 +0100
+openssh (1:7.6p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.6):
+    - CVE-2017-15906: sftp-server(8): In read-only mode, sftp-server was
+      incorrectly permitting creation of zero-length files. Reported by
+      Michal Zalewski.
+    - ssh(1): Delete SSH protocol version 1 support, associated
+      configuration options and documentation (LP: #1584321).
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Remove support for the hmac-ripemd160 MAC.
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Remove support for the arcfour, blowfish and CAST
+      ciphers.
+    - Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in length and improve reporting for keys
+      that do not meet this requirement.
+    - ssh(1): Do not offer CBC ciphers by default.
+    - ssh(1): Add RemoteCommand option to specify a command in the ssh
+      config file instead of giving it on the client's command line.  This
+      allows the configuration file to specify the command that will be
+      executed on the remote host.
+    - sshd(8): Add ExposeAuthInfo option that enables writing details of the
+      authentication methods used (including public keys where applicable)
+      to a file that is exposed via a $SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable in
+      the subsequent session.
+    - ssh(1): Add support for reverse dynamic forwarding.  In this mode, ssh
+      will act as a SOCKS4/5 proxy and forward connections to destinations
+      requested by the remote SOCKS client.  This mode is requested using
+      extended syntax for the -R and RemoteForward options and, because it
+      is implemented solely at the client, does not require the server be
+      updated to be supported.
+    - sshd(8): Allow LogLevel directive in sshd_config Match blocks.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Allow inclusion of arbitrary string or flag certificate
+      extensions and critical options.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Allow ssh-keygen to use a key held in ssh-agent as a CA
+      when signing certificates.
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Allow IPQoS=none in ssh/sshd to not set an explicit
+      ToS/DSCP value and just use the operating system default.
+    - ssh-add(1): Add -q option to make ssh-add quiet on success.
+    - ssh(1): Expand the StrictHostKeyChecking option with two new settings.
+      The first "accept-new" will automatically accept hitherto-unseen keys
+      but will refuse connections for changed or invalid hostkeys.  This is
+      a safer subset of the current behaviour of StrictHostKeyChecking=no.
+      The second setting "off", is a synonym for the current behaviour of
+      StrictHostKeyChecking=no: accept new host keys, and continue
+      connection for hosts with incorrect hostkeys.  A future release will
+      change the meaning of StrictHostKeyChecking=no to the behaviour of
+      "accept-new".
+    - ssh(1): Add SyslogFacility option to ssh(1) matching the equivalent
+      option in sshd(8).
+    - ssh(1): Use HostKeyAlias if specified instead of hostname for matching
+      host certificate principal names.
+    - sftp(1): Implement sorting for globbed ls.
+    - ssh(1): Add a user@host prefix to client's "Permission denied"
+      messages, useful in particular when using "stacked" connections (e.g.
+      ssh -J) where it's not clear which host is denying.
+    - ssh(1): Accept unknown EXT_INFO extension values that contain \0
+      characters.  These are legal, but would previously cause fatal
+      connection errors if received.
+    - sftp(1): Print '?' instead of incorrect link count (that the protocol
+      doesn't provide) for remote listings.
+    - ssh(1): Return failure rather than fatal() for more cases during
+      session multiplexing negotiations.  Causes the session to fall back to
+      a non-mux connection if they occur.
+    - ssh(1): Mention that the server may send debug messages to explain
+      public key authentication problems under some circumstances.
+    - Translate OpenSSL error codes to better report incorrect passphrase
+      errors when loading private keys.
+    - sshd(8): Adjust compatibility patterns for WinSCP to correctly
+      identify versions that implement only the legacy DH group exchange
+      scheme (closes: #877800).
+    - ssh(1): Print the "Killed by signal 1" message only at LogLevel
+      verbose so that it is not shown at the default level; prevents it from
+      appearing during ssh -J and equivalent ProxyCommand configs.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): When generating all hostkeys (ssh-keygen -A), clobber
+      existing keys if they exist but are zero length.  Zero-length keys
+      could previously be made if ssh-keygen failed or was interrupted part
+      way through generating them.
+    - ssh-keyscan(1): Avoid double-close() on file descriptors.
+    - sshd(8): Avoid reliance on shared use of pointers shared between
+      monitor and child sshd processes.
+    - sshd_config(8): Document available AuthenticationMethods.
+    - ssh(1): Avoid truncation in some login prompts.
+    - ssh(1): Make "--" before the hostname terminate argument processing
+      after the hostname too (closes: #873201).
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Switch from aes256-cbc to aes256-ctr for encrypting
+      new-style private keys.
+    - ssh(1): Warn and do not attempt to use keys when the public and
+      private halves do not match.
+    - sftp(1): Don't print verbose error message when ssh disconnects from
+      under sftp.
+    - sshd(8): Fix keepalive scheduling problem: prevent activity on a
+      forwarded port from preventing the keepalive from being sent.
+    - sshd(8): When started without root privileges, don't require the
+      privilege separation user or path to exist.
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Correctness fix for channels implementation: accept
+      channel IDs greater than 0x7FFFFFFF.
+    - sshd(8): Expose list of completed authentication methods to PAM via
+      the SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 PAM environment variable.
+    - ssh(1)/sshd(8): Fix several problems in the tun/tap forwarding code,
+      mostly to do with host/network byte order confusion.
+    - sshd(8): Avoid Linux seccomp violations on ppc64le over the socketcall
+      syscall.
+  * Build-depend on debhelper (>= 9.20160709~) rather than dh-systemd.
+  * Change priorities of ssh and ssh-krb5 binary packages to optional, since
+    "Priority: extra" is now deprecated.
+  * Use HTTPS form of copyright-format URL.
+  * Adjust "Running sshd from inittab" instructions in README.Debian to
+    recommend using service(8) rather than calling the init script directly.
+  * Policy version 4.1.0.
+  * Adjust "Per-connection sshd instances with systemd" instructions in
+    README.Debian to recommend using a drop-in file rather than copying and
+    modifying the ssh.socket unit file.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 06 Oct 2017 12:36:48 +0100
+openssh (1:7.5p1-10) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Tell haveged to create the pid file we expect.
+  * Give up and use systemctl to start haveged if running under systemd;
+    this shouldn't be necessary, but I can't seem to get things working in
+    the Ubuntu autopkgtest environment otherwise.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 01 Sep 2017 11:17:19 +0100
+openssh (1:7.5p1-9) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Run debian/tests/regress with "set -x".
+  * Run haveged without "-w 1024", as setting the low water mark doesn't
+    seem possible in all autopkgtest virtualisation environments.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 31 Aug 2017 13:23:04 +0100
+openssh (1:7.5p1-8) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Drop openssh-client-ssh1, now built by a separate source package.
+  * Run haveged during autopkgtests to ensure that they have enough entropy
+    for key generation (LP: #1712921).
+  * Apply patches from https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752 to
+    allow some extra syscalls for crypto cards on s390x (LP: #1686618).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 28 Aug 2017 12:16:35 +0100
+openssh (1:7.5p1-7) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Fix spelling of RuntimeDirectoryMode (closes: #872976).
+  * Add RuntimeDirectory and RuntimeDirectoryMode to ssh@.service as well as
+    ssh.service (closes: #872978).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 23 Aug 2017 12:12:59 +0100
+openssh (1:7.5p1-6) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Test configuration before starting or reloading sshd under systemd
+    (closes: #865770).
+  * Create /run/sshd under systemd using RuntimeDirectory rather than
+    tmpfiles.d (thanks, Dmitry Smirnov; closes: #864190).
+  [ Dimitri John Ledkov ]
+  * Drop upstart system and user jobs (closes: #872851).
+  [ Chris Lamb ]
+  * Quote IP address in suggested "ssh-keygen -f" calls (closes: #872643).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 23 Aug 2017 01:41:06 +0100
+openssh (1:7.5p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Upload to unstable.
+  * Fix syntax error in debian/copyright.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 18 Jun 2017 12:08:42 +0100
+openssh (1:7.5p1-4) experimental; urgency=medium
+  * Drop README.Debian section on privilege separation, as it's no longer
+    optional.
+  * Only call "initctl set-env" from agent-launch if $UPSTART_SESSION is set
+    (LP: #1689299).
+  * Fix incoming compression statistics (thanks, Russell Coker; closes:
+    #797964).
+  * Relicense debian/* under a two-clause BSD licence for bidirectional
+    compatibility with upstream, with permission from Matthew Vernon and
+    others.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 06 Jun 2017 15:17:58 +0100
+openssh (1:7.5p1-3) experimental; urgency=medium
+  * Fix debian/adjust-openssl-dependencies to account for preferring
+    libssl1.0-dev.
+  * Adjust OpenSSL dependencies for openssh-client-ssh1 too.
+  * Fix purge failure when /etc/ssh has already somehow been removed
+    (LP: #1682817).
+  * Ensure that /etc/ssh exists before trying to create /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+    (LP: #1685022).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 02 May 2017 13:51:27 +0100
+openssh (1:7.5p1-2) experimental; urgency=medium
+  * Add missing header on Linux/s390.
+  * Fix syntax error on Linux/X32.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 02 Apr 2017 13:20:11 +0100
+openssh (1:7.5p1-1) experimental; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.5):
+    - SECURITY: ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix weakness in CBC padding oracle
+      countermeasures that allowed a variant of the attack fixed in OpenSSH
+      7.3 to proceed.  Note that the OpenSSH client disables CBC ciphers by
+      default, sshd offers them as lowest-preference options and will remove
+      them by default entirely in the next release.
+    - This release deprecates the sshd_config UsePrivilegeSeparation option,
+      thereby making privilege separation mandatory (closes: #407754).
+    - The format of several log messages emitted by the packet code has
+      changed to include additional information about the user and their
+      authentication state.  Software that monitors ssh/sshd logs may need
+      to account for these changes.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Support "=-" syntax to easily remove methods from
+      algorithm lists, e.g. Ciphers=-*cbc.
+    - sshd(1): Fix NULL dereference crash when key exchange start messages
+      are sent out of sequence.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Allow form-feed characters to appear in configuration
+      files.
+    - sshd(8): Fix regression in OpenSSH 7.4 support for the server-sig-algs
+      extension, where SHA2 RSA signature methods were not being correctly
+      advertised.
+    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Fix a number of case-sensitivity bugs in
+      known_hosts processing.
+    - ssh(1): Allow ssh to use certificates accompanied by a private key
+      file but no corresponding plain *.pub public key.
+    - ssh(1): When updating hostkeys using the UpdateHostKeys option, accept
+      RSA keys if HostkeyAlgorithms contains any RSA keytype.  Previously,
+      ssh could ignore RSA keys when only the ssh-rsa-sha2-* methods were
+      enabled in HostkeyAlgorithms and not the old ssh-rsa method.
+    - ssh(1): Detect and report excessively long configuration file lines.
+    - Merge a number of fixes found by Coverity and reported via Redhat and
+      FreeBSD.  Includes fixes for some memory and file descriptor leaks in
+      error paths.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): When logging long messages to stderr, don't truncate
+      "\r\n" if the length of the message exceeds the buffer.
+    - ssh(1): Fully quote [host]:port in generated ProxyJump/-J command-
+      line; avoid confusion over IPv6 addresses and shells that treat square
+      bracket characters specially.
+    - Fix various fallout and sharp edges caused by removing SSH protocol 1
+      support from the server, including the server banner string being
+      incorrectly terminated with only \n (instead of \r\n), confusing error
+      messages from ssh-keyscan, and a segfault in sshd if protocol v.1 was
+      enabled for the client and sshd_config contained references to legacy
+      keys.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Free fd_set on connection timeout.
+    - sftp(1): Fix division by zero crash in "df" output when server returns
+      zero total filesystem blocks/inodes.
+    - ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): Translate OpenSSL errors
+      encountered during key loading to more meaningful error codes.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Sanitise escape sequences in key comments sent to
+      printf but preserve valid UTF-8 when the locale supports it.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Return reason for port forwarding failures where
+      feasible rather than always "administratively prohibited".
+    - sshd(8): Fix deadlock when AuthorizedKeysCommand or
+      AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand produces a lot of output and a key is
+      matched early.
+    - ssh(1): Fix typo in ~C error message for bad port forward
+      cancellation.
+    - ssh(1): Show a useful error message when included config files can't
+      be opened.
+    - sshd_config(5): Repair accidentally-deleted mention of %k token in
+      AuthorizedKeysCommand.
+    - sshd(8): Remove vestiges of previously removed LOGIN_PROGRAM.
+    - ssh-agent(1): Relax PKCS#11 whitelist to include libexec and common
+      32-bit compatibility library directories.
+    - sftp-client(1): Fix non-exploitable integer overflow in SSH2_FXP_NAME
+      response handling.
+    - ssh-agent(1): Fix regression in 7.4 of deleting PKCS#11-hosted keys.
+      It was not possible to delete them except by specifying their full
+      physical path.
+    - sshd(8): Avoid sandbox errors for Linux S390 systems using an ICA
+      crypto coprocessor.
+    - sshd(8): Fix non-exploitable weakness in seccomp-bpf sandbox arg
+      inspection.
+    - ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sftp(1): Fix output truncation for various that
+      contain non-printable characters where the codeset in use is ASCII.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 02 Apr 2017 02:58:01 +0100
+openssh (1:7.4p1-11) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Fix incoming compression statistics (thanks, Russell Coker; closes:
+    #797964).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 06 Jun 2017 15:03:48 +0100
+openssh (1:7.4p1-10) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Move privilege separation directory and PID file from /var/run/ to /run/
+    (closes: #760422, #856825).
+  * Unbreak Unix domain socket forwarding for root (closes: #858252).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 30 Mar 2017 11:19:04 +0100
+openssh (1:7.4p1-9) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Fix null pointer dereference in ssh-keygen; this fixes an autopkgtest
+    regression introduced in 1:7.4p1-8.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 16 Mar 2017 13:43:15 +0000
+openssh (1:7.4p1-8) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Fix ssh-keygen -H accidentally corrupting known_hosts that contained
+    already-hashed entries (closes: #851734, LP: #1668093).
+  * Fix ssh-keyscan to correctly hash hosts with a port number (closes:
+    #857736, LP: #1670745).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 14 Mar 2017 13:49:14 +0000
+openssh (1:7.4p1-7) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Don't set "PermitRootLogin yes" on fresh installations (regression
+    introduced in 1:7.4p1-1; closes: #852781).
+  * Restore reading authorized_keys2 by default.  Upstream seems to intend
+    to gradually phase this out, so don't assume that this will remain the
+    default forever.  However, we were late in adopting the upstream
+    sshd_config changes, so it makes sense to extend the grace period
+    (closes: #852320).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 05 Mar 2017 02:12:42 +0000
+openssh (1:7.4p1-6) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Remove temporary file on exit from postinst (closes: #850275).
+  * Remove LOGIN_PROGRAM and LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT definitions, since UseLogin is
+    gone.
+  * Document sshd_config changes that may be needed following the removal of
+    protocol 1 support from sshd (closes: #851573).
+  * Remove ssh_host_dsa_key from HostKey default (closes: #850614).
+  * Fix rekeying failure with GSSAPI key exchange (thanks, Harald Barth;
+    closes: #819361, LP: #1608965).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 16 Jan 2017 15:11:10 +0000
+openssh (1:7.4p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Create mux socket for regression tests in a temporary directory.
+  * Work around clock_gettime kernel bug on Linux x32 (closes: #849923).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 03 Jan 2017 14:43:28 +0000
+openssh (1:7.4p1-4) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Run regression tests inside annotate-output to try to diagnose timeout
+    issues.
+  * Make integrity tests more robust against timeouts in the case where the
+    first test in a series for a given MAC happens to modify the low bytes
+    of a packet length.
+  * Fix race conditions in forwarding tests.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 02 Jan 2017 19:37:23 +0000
+openssh (1:7.4p1-3) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Revert attempted hack around regress/forwarding.sh test failure, since
+    it doesn't seem to help.
+  * Run regression tests using 'sh -x' to try to get more information about
+    failures.
+  * Dump some useful log files if regression tests fail.
+  * Tweak regression test setup to cope with the case where some of the
+    source directory is unreadable by the openssh-tests user.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 31 Dec 2016 02:48:17 +0000
+openssh (1:7.4p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Attempt to hack around regress/forwarding.sh test failure in some
+    environments.
+  * Avoid calling into Kerberos libraries from ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms
+    in the privsep monitor.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 29 Dec 2016 12:02:12 +0000
+openssh (1:7.4p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.4):
+    - ssh(1): Remove 3des-cbc from the client's default proposal.  64-bit
+      block ciphers are not safe in 2016 and we don't want to wait until
+      attacks like SWEET32 are extended to SSH.  As 3des-cbc was the only
+      mandatory cipher in the SSH RFCs, this may cause problems connecting
+      to older devices using the default configuration, but it's highly
+      likely that such devices already need explicit configuration for key
+      exchange and hostkey algorithms already anyway.
+    - sshd(8): When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and an
+      authorized keys/principals command= restriction, sshd will now refuse
+      to accept the certificate unless they are identical.  The previous
+      (documented) behaviour of having the certificate forced-command
+      override the other could be a bit confusing and error-prone.
+    - sshd(8): Remove the UseLogin configuration directive and support for
+      having /bin/login manage login sessions.
+    - CVE-2016-10009: ssh-agent(1): Will now refuse to load PKCS#11 modules
+      from paths outside a trusted whitelist (run-time configurable).
+      Requests to load modules could be passed via agent forwarding and an
+      attacker could attempt to load a hostile PKCS#11 module across the
+      forwarded agent channel: PKCS#11 modules are shared libraries, so this
+      would result in code execution on the system running the ssh-agent if
+      the attacker has control of the forwarded agent-socket (on the host
+      running the sshd server) and the ability to write to the filesystem of
+      the host running ssh-agent (usually the host running the ssh client)
+      (closes: #848714).
+    - CVE-2016-10010: sshd(8): When privilege separation is disabled,
+      forwarded Unix-domain sockets would be created by sshd(8) with the
+      privileges of 'root' instead of the authenticated user.  This release
+      refuses Unix-domain socket forwarding when privilege separation is
+      disabled (Privilege separation has been enabled by default for 14
+      years) (closes: #848715).
+    - CVE-2016-10011: sshd(8): Avoid theoretical leak of host private key
+      material to privilege-separated child processes via realloc() when
+      reading keys.  No such leak was observed in practice for normal-sized
+      keys, nor does a leak to the child processes directly expose key
+      material to unprivileged users (closes: #848716).
+    - CVE-2016-10012: sshd(8): The shared memory manager used by
+      pre-authentication compression support had a bounds checks that could
+      be elided by some optimising compilers.  Additionally, this memory
+      manager was incorrectly accessible when pre-authentication compression
+      was disabled.  This could potentially allow attacks against the
+      privileged monitor process from the sandboxed privilege-separation
+      process (a compromise of the latter would be required first).  This
+      release removes support for pre-authentication compression from
+      sshd(8) (closes: #848717).
+    - SECURITY: sshd(8): Validate address ranges for AllowUser and DenyUsers
+      directives at configuration load time and refuse to accept invalid
+      ones.  It was previously possible to specify invalid CIDR address
+      ranges (e.g. user@127.1.2.3/55) and these would always match, possibly
+      resulting in granting access where it was not intended.
+    - ssh(1): Add a proxy multiplexing mode to ssh(1) inspired by the
+      version in PuTTY by Simon Tatham.  This allows a multiplexing client
+      to communicate with the master process using a subset of the SSH
+      packet and channels protocol over a Unix-domain socket, with the main
+      process acting as a proxy that translates channel IDs, etc.  This
+      allows multiplexing mode to run on systems that lack file-descriptor
+      passing (used by current multiplexing code) and potentially, in
+      conjunction with Unix-domain socket forwarding, with the client and
+      multiplexing master process on different machines.  Multiplexing proxy
+      mode may be invoked using "ssh -O proxy ...".
+    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config DisableForwarding option that disables X11,
+      agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket forwarding, as well as
+      anything else we might implement in the future.  Like the 'restrict'
+      authorized_keys flag, this is intended to be a simple and future-proof
+      way of restricting an account.
+    - sshd(8), ssh(1): Support the "curve25519-sha256" key exchange method.
+      This is identical to the currently-supported method named
+      "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org".
+    - sshd(8): Improve handling of SIGHUP by checking to see if sshd is
+      already daemonised at startup and skipping the call to daemon(3) if it
+      is.  This ensures that a SIGHUP restart of sshd(8) will retain the
+      same process-ID as the initial execution.  sshd(8) will also now
+      unlink the PidFile prior to SIGHUP restart and re-create it after a
+      successful restart, rather than leaving a stale file in the case of a
+      configuration error.
+    - sshd(8): Allow ClientAliveInterval and ClientAliveCountMax directives
+      to appear in sshd_config Match blocks.
+    - sshd(8): Add %-escapes to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand to match those
+      supported by AuthorizedKeysCommand (key, key type, fingerprint, etc.)
+      and a few more to provide access to the contents of the certificate
+      being offered.
+    - ssh(1): Allow IdentityFile to successfully load and use certificates
+      that have no corresponding bare public key.
+    - ssh(1): Fix public key authentication when multiple authentication is
+      in use and publickey is not just the first method attempted.
+    - ssh(1): Improve reporting when attempting to load keys from PKCS#11
+      tokens with fewer useless log messages and more detail in debug
+      messages.
+    - ssh(1): When tearing down ControlMaster connections, don't pollute
+      stderr when LogLevel=quiet.
+    - sftp(1): On ^Z wait for underlying ssh(1) to suspend before suspending
+      sftp(1) to ensure that ssh(1) restores the terminal mode correctly if
+      suspended during a password prompt.
+    - ssh(1): Avoid busy-wait when ssh(1) is suspended during a password
+      prompt (LP: #1646813).
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Correctly report errors during sending of ext-info
+      messages.
+    - sshd(8): Fix NULL-deref crash if sshd(8) received an out-of-sequence
+      NEWKEYS message.
+    - sshd(8): Correct list of supported signature algorithms sent in the
+      server-sig-algs extension.
+    - sshd(8): Fix sending ext_info message if privsep is disabled.
+    - sshd(8): More strictly enforce the expected ordering of privilege
+      separation monitor calls used for authentication and allow them only
+      when their respective authentication methods are enabled in the
+      configuration.
+    - sshd_config(5): Use 2001:db8::/32, the official IPv6 subnet for
+      configuration examples.
+    - On environments configured with Turkish locales, fall back to the
+      C/POSIX locale to avoid errors in configuration parsing caused by that
+      locale's unique handling of the letters 'i' and 'I' (LP: #1638338).
+    - contrib: Add a gnome-ssh-askpass3 with GTK+3 support.
+    - sshd(8): Improve PRNG reseeding across privilege separation and force
+      libcrypto to obtain a high-quality seed before chroot or sandboxing.
+  * Apply "wrap-and-sort -at -f debian/control -f debian/tests/control".
+  * Remove entries related to protocol 1 from the default sshd_config
+    generated on new installations.
+  * Remove some advice related to protocol 1 from README.Debian.
+  * Start handling /etc/ssh/sshd_config using ucf.  The immediate motivation
+    for this is to deal with deprecations of options related to protocol 1,
+    but something like this has been needed for a long time (closes:
+    #419574, #848089):
+    - sshd_config is now a slightly-patched version of upstream's, and only
+      contains non-default settings (closes: #147201).
+    - I've included as many historical md5sums of default versions of
+      sshd_config as I could reconstruct from version control, but I'm sure
+      I've missed some.
+    - Explicitly synchronise the debconf database with the current
+      configuration file state in openssh-server.config, to ensure that the
+      PermitRootLogin setting is properly preserved.
+    - UsePrivilegeSeparation now defaults to the stronger "sandbox" rather
+      than "yes", per upstream.
+  * Remove redundant "GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no" from ssh_config (already
+    the upstream default), and document that setting ServerAliveInterval to
+    300 by default if BatchMode is set is Debian-specific (closes: #765630).
+  * Build gnome-ssh-askpass with GTK+ 3 (LP: #801187).
+  * When running regression tests under autopkgtest, use a non-root user
+    with passwordless sudo.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 27 Dec 2016 18:01:46 +0000
+openssh (1:7.3p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * debian/tests/control: Add dependency on openssl, required by the PuTTY
+    interoperability tests.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 03 Dec 2016 03:43:21 +0000
+openssh (1:7.3p1-4) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Adjust Build-Depends further to avoid considering libssl-dev >= 1.1.0~
+    as sufficient.
+  * Move build directories under debian/.
+  * Remove the non-upstream .gitignore file and add the relevant entries to
+    debian/.gitignore, in order to make the source tree more
+    dgit-compatible.
+  * Build all upstream regression test binaries using the new
+    "regress-binaries" target.
+  * Fix and enable PuTTY interoperability tests under autopkgtest.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 02 Dec 2016 20:49:30 +0000
+openssh (1:7.3p1-3) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Avoid building with OpenSSL 1.1 for now (see #828475).
+  * Add a missing License line to debian/copyright.
+  * Policy version 3.9.8: no changes required.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 05 Nov 2016 15:37:15 +0000
+openssh (1:7.3p1-2) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Rewrite debian/copyright using copyright-format 1.0.
+  * CVE-2016-8858: Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been
+    received (closes: #841884).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 24 Oct 2016 11:18:00 +0100
+openssh (1:7.3p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.3):
+    - SECURITY: sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack
+      against the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8).  An attacker could
+      send very long passwords that would cause excessive CPU use in
+      crypt(3).  sshd(8) now refuses to accept password authentication
+      requests of length greater than 1024 characters.
+    - SECURITY: ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC
+      padding oracle countermeasures.  Note that CBC ciphers are disabled by
+      default and only included for legacy compatibility.
+    - SECURITY: ssh(1), sshd(8): Improve operation ordering of MAC
+      verification for Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode transport MAC algorithms
+      to verify the MAC before decrypting any ciphertext.  This removes the
+      possibility of timing differences leaking facts about the plaintext,
+      though no such leakage has been observed.
+    - ssh(1): Add a ProxyJump option and corresponding -J command-line flag
+      to allow simplified indirection through a one or more SSH bastions or
+      "jump hosts".
+    - ssh(1): Add an IdentityAgent option to allow specifying specific agent
+      sockets instead of accepting one from the environment.
+    - ssh(1): Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to be
+      optionally overridden when using ssh -W.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Implement support for the IUTF8 terminal mode as per
+      draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00 (closes: #337041, LP: #394570).
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for additional fixed Diffie-Hellman 2K,
+      4K and 8K groups from draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03.
+    - ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): Support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA
+      signatures in certificates.
+    - ssh(1): Add an Include directive for ssh_config(5) files (closes:
+      #536031).
+    - ssh(1): Permit UTF-8 characters in pre-authentication banners sent
+      from the server.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Reduce the syslog level of some relatively common
+      protocol events from LOG_CRIT.
+    - sshd(8): Refuse AuthenticationMethods="" in configurations and accept
+      AuthenticationMethods=any for the default behaviour of not requiring
+      multiple authentication.
+    - sshd(8): Remove obsolete and misleading "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!"
+      message when forward and reverse DNS don't match.
+    - ssh(1): Deduplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward entries to fix
+      failures when both ExitOnForwardFailure and hostname canonicalisation
+      are enabled.
+    - sshd(8): Remove fallback from moduli to obsolete "primes" file that
+      was deprecated in 2001 (LP: #1528251).
+    - sshd_config(5): Correct description of UseDNS: it affects ssh hostname
+      processing for authorized_keys, not known_hosts.
+    - sshd(8): Send ClientAliveInterval pings when a time-based RekeyLimit
+      is set; previously keepalive packets were not being sent.
+    - sshd(8): Whitelist more architectures to enable the seccomp-bpf
+      sandbox.
+    - scp(1): Respect the local user's LC_CTYPE locale (closes: #396295).
+    - Take character display widths into account for the progressmeter
+      (closes: #407088).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 07 Aug 2016 22:45:26 +0100
+openssh (1:7.2p2-8) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Stop enabling ssh-session-cleanup.service by default; instead, ship it
+    as an example and add a section to README.Debian.  libpam-systemd >= 230
+    and "UsePAM yes" should take care of the original problem for most
+    systemd users (thanks, Michael Biebl; closes: #832155).
+  [ Martin Pitt ]
+  * Add debian/agent-launch: Helper script for conditionally starting the SSH
+    agent in the user session. Use it in ssh-agent.user-session.upstart.
+  * Add systemd user unit for graphical sessions that use systemd. Override
+    the corresponding upstart job in that case (closes: #832445).
+  * debian/openssh-server.if-up: Don't block on a finished reload of
+    openssh.service, to avoid deadlocking with restarting networking.
+    (closes: #832557, LP: #1584393)
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 29 Jul 2016 02:51:32 +0100
+openssh (1:7.2p2-7) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Don't stop the ssh-session-cleanup service on upgrade (closes: #832155).
+    This may cause SSH sessions to be killed on upgrade to *this* version if
+    you had previously installed 1:7.2p2-6.  Sorry!  If your session is
+    killed, you can recover using "dpkg --unpack" on this openssh-server
+    .deb, followed by "dpkg --configure -a".
+  * Recommend libpam-systemd from openssh-server.  It's a much better
+    solution than the above for systemd users, but I'm wary of depending on
+    it in case I cause an assortment of exciting dependency problems on
+    upgrade for non-systemd users.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 23 Jul 2016 11:46:33 +0100
+openssh (1:7.2p2-6) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * debian/watch: Switch to HTTP (thanks, Nicholas Luedtke; closes:
+    #822997).
+  * Copy summary of supported SFTP protocol versions from upstream's
+    PROTOCOL file into the openssh-sftp-server package description (closes:
+    #766887).
+  * Set SSH_PROGRAM=/usr/bin/ssh1 when building openssh-client-ssh1 so that
+    scp1 works (reported by Olivier MATZ).
+  * Retroactively add a NEWS.Debian entry for the UseDNS change in 6.9 (see
+    LP #1588457).
+  * CVE-2016-6210: Mitigate user enumeration via covert timing channel
+    (closes: #831902).
+  * Backport upstream patch to close ControlPersist background process
+    stderr when not in debug mode or when logging to a file or syslog
+    (closes: #714526).
+  * Add a session cleanup script and a systemd unit file to trigger it,
+    which serves to terminate SSH sessions cleanly if systemd doesn't do
+    that itself, often because libpam-systemd is not installed (thanks,
+    Vivek Das Mohapatra, Tom Hutter, and others; closes: #751636).
+  * Stop generating DSA host keys by default (thanks, Santiago Vila; closes:
+    #823827).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 22 Jul 2016 17:06:19 +0100
+openssh (1:7.2p2-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Backport upstream patch to unbreak authentication using lone certificate
+    keys in ssh-agent: when attempting pubkey auth with a certificate, if no
+    separate private key is found among the keys then try with the
+    certificate key itself (thanks, Paul Querna; LP: #1575961).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 28 Apr 2016 01:52:01 +0100
+openssh (1:7.2p2-4) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Drop dependency on libnss-files-udeb (closes: #819686).
+  * Policy version 3.9.7: no changes required.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 15 Apr 2016 16:40:07 +0100
+openssh (1:7.2p2-3) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Change all openssh.org references to openssh.com (closes: #819213).
+  * CVE-2015-8325: Ignore PAM environment vars when UseLogin=yes.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 13 Apr 2016 16:42:28 +0100
+openssh (1:7.2p2-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Fix kexgss_server to cope with DH_GRP_MIN/DH_GRP_MAX being stricter on
+    the server end than the client (thanks, Damien Miller; closes: #817870,
+    LP: #1558576).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 21 Mar 2016 12:08:55 +0000
+openssh (1:7.2p2-1) unstable; urgency=high
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.2p2):
+    - CVE-2016-3115: sshd(8): Sanitise X11 authentication credentials to
+      avoid xauth command injection when X11Forwarding is enabled
+      (http://www.openssh.com/txt/x11fwd.adv).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 10 Mar 2016 13:04:29 +0000
+openssh (1:7.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.2):
+    - This release disables a number of legacy cryptographic algorithms by
+      default in ssh:
+      + Several ciphers blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants and
+        the rijndael-cbc aliases for AES.
+      + MD5-based and truncated HMAC algorithms.
+      These algorithms are already disabled by default in sshd.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Remove unfinished and unused roaming code (was
+      already forcibly disabled in OpenSSH 7.1p2).
+    - ssh(1): Eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted
+      forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Increase the minimum modulus size supported for
+      diffie-hellman-group-exchange to 2048 bits.
+    - sshd(8): Pre-auth sandboxing is now enabled by default (previous
+      releases enabled it for new installations via sshd_config).
+    - all: Add support for RSA signatures using SHA-256/512 hash algorithms
+      based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt.
+    - ssh(1): Add an AddKeysToAgent client option which can be set to 'yes',
+      'no', 'ask', or 'confirm', and defaults to 'no'.  When enabled, a
+      private key that is used during authentication will be added to
+      ssh-agent if it is running (with confirmation enabled if set to
+      'confirm').
+    - sshd(8): Add a new authorized_keys option "restrict" that includes all
+      current and future key restrictions (no-*-forwarding, etc.).  Also add
+      permissive versions of the existing restrictions, e.g.  "no-pty" ->
+      "pty".  This simplifies the task of setting up restricted keys and
+      ensures they are maximally-restricted, regardless of any permissions
+      we might implement in the future.
+    - ssh(1): Add ssh_config CertificateFile option to explicitly list
+      certificates.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Allow ssh-keygen to change the key comment for all
+      supported formats (closes: #811125).
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Allow fingerprinting from standard input, e.g.
+      "ssh-keygen -lf -" (closes: #509058).
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Allow fingerprinting multiple public keys in a file,
+      e.g. "ssh-keygen -lf ~/.ssh/authorized_keys".
+    - sshd(8): Support "none" as an argument for sshd_config Foreground and
+      ChrootDirectory.  Useful inside Match blocks to override a global
+      default.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Support multiple certificates (one per line) and
+      reading from standard input (using "-f -") for "ssh-keygen -L"
+    - ssh-keyscan(1): Add "ssh-keyscan -c ..." flag to allow fetching
+      certificates instead of plain keys.
+    - ssh(1): Better handle anchored FQDNs (e.g. 'cvs.openbsd.org.') in
+      hostname canonicalisation - treat them as already canonical and remove
+      the trailing '.' before matching ssh_config.
+    - sftp(1): Existing destination directories should not terminate
+      recursive uploads (regression in OpenSSH 6.8; LP: #1553378).
+  * Use HTTPS for Vcs-* URLs, and link to cgit rather than gitweb.
+  * Restore slogin symlinks for compatibility, although they were removed
+    upstream.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 08 Mar 2016 11:47:20 +0000
+openssh (1:7.1p2-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Remove protocol 1 host key generation from openssh-server.postinst
+    (closes: #811265).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 17 Jan 2016 14:10:19 +0000
+openssh (1:7.1p2-1) unstable; urgency=high
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.1p2):
+    - CVE-2016-0777, CVE-2016-0778: Disable experimental client-side support
+      for roaming, which could be tricked by a malicious server into leaking
+      client memory to the server, including private client user keys; this
+      information leak is restricted to connections to malicious or
+      compromised servers (closes: #810984).
+    - SECURITY: Fix an out of-bound read access in the packet handling code.
+      Reported by Ben Hawkes.
+    - Further use of explicit_bzero has been added in various buffer
+      handling code paths to guard against compilers aggressively doing
+      dead-store removal.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 14 Jan 2016 15:28:03 +0000
+openssh (1:7.1p1-6) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Remove explicit "XS-Testsuite: autopkgtest" from debian/control;
+    dpkg-source now figures that out automatically based on the existence of
+    debian/tests/control.
+  * Allow authenticating as root using gssapi-keyex even with
+    "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password" (closes: #809695).
+  * Shuffle PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS mangling for GSSAPI key exchange a little
+    later in ssh_kex2 so that it's actually effective (closes: #809696).
+  [ Michael Biebl ]
+  * Don't call sd_notify when sshd is re-execed (closes: #809035).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 04 Jan 2016 15:09:10 +0000
+openssh (1:7.1p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Michael Biebl ]
+  * Add systemd readiness notification support (closes: #778913).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 21 Dec 2015 22:10:07 +0000
+openssh (1:7.1p1-4) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Backport upstream patch to unbreak connections with peers that set
+    first_kex_follows (LP: #1526357).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 15 Dec 2015 15:40:18 +0000
+openssh (1:7.1p1-3) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Drop priority of openssh-client-ssh1 to extra (closes: #807518).
+  * Redirect regression test input from /dev/zero, since otherwise conch
+    will immediately send EOF.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 10 Dec 2015 15:12:10 +0000
+openssh (1:7.1p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Really enable conch interoperability tests under autopkgtest.
+  * Drop SSH1 keepalive patch.  Now that SSH1 is disabled at compile-time,
+    it's been rejected upstream and there isn't much point carrying it any
+    more.
+  * Add NEWS.Debian documenting cryptographic changes in OpenSSH 7.0
+    (closes: #806962).
+  * Add an openssh-client-ssh1 binary package for people who need to connect
+    to outdated SSH1-only servers (closes: #807107).
+  * Update "Subsystem sftp" path in example sshd_config (closes: #691004,
+    LP: #1437005).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 08 Dec 2015 15:33:08 +0000
+openssh (1:7.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.0, closes:
+    #785190):
+    - Support for the legacy SSH version 1 protocol is disabled by default
+      at compile time.
+    - Support for the 1024-bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange is
+      disabled by default at run-time.  It may be re-enabled using the
+      instructions at http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
+    - Support for ssh-dss, ssh-dss-cert-* host and user keys is disabled by
+      default at run-time.  These may be re-enabled using the instructions
+      at http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
+    - Support for the legacy v00 cert format has been removed.
+    - The default for the sshd_config(5) PermitRootLogin option has changed
+      from "yes" to "prohibit-password".
+    - PermitRootLogin=without-password/prohibit-password now bans all
+      interactive authentication methods, allowing only public-key,
+      hostbased and GSSAPI authentication (previously it permitted
+      keyboard-interactive and password-less authentication if those were
+      enabled).
+    - ssh_config(5): Add PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes option to control which
+      public key types are available for user authentication.
+    - sshd_config(5): Add HostKeyAlgorithms option to control which public
+      key types are offered for host authentications.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Extend Ciphers, MACs, KexAlgorithms,
+      HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and HostbasedKeyTypes
+      options to allow appending to the default set of algorithms instead of
+      replacing it.  Options may now be prefixed with a '+' to append to the
+      default, e.g. "HostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-dss".
+    - sshd_config(5): PermitRootLogin now accepts an argument of
+      'prohibit-password' as a less-ambiguous synonym of 'without-
+      password'.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add compatability workarounds for Cisco and more
+      PuTTY versions.
+    - Fix some omissions and errors in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.mux
+      documentation relating to Unix domain socket forwarding.
+    - ssh(1): Improve the ssh(1) manual page to include a better description
+      of Unix domain socket forwarding (closes: #779068).
+    - ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): Skip uninitialised PKCS#11 slots, fixing
+      failures to load keys when they are present.
+    - ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): Do not ignore PKCS#11 hosted keys that wth empty
+      CKA_ID.
+    - sshd(8): Clarify documentation for UseDNS option.
+    - Check realpath(3) behaviour matches what sftp-server requires and use
+      a replacement if necessary.
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.1):
+    - sshd(8): OpenSSH 7.0 contained a logic error in PermitRootLogin=
+      prohibit-password/without-password that could, depending on
+      compile-time configuration, permit password authentication to root
+      while preventing other forms of authentication.  This problem was
+      reported by Mantas Mikulenas.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add compatibility workarounds for FuTTY.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Refine compatibility workarounds for WinSCP.
+    - Fix a number of memory faults (double-free, free of uninitialised
+      memory, etc) in ssh(1) and ssh-keygen(1).  Reported by Mateusz
+      Kocielski.
+  * Change "PermitRootLogin without-password" to the new preferred spelling
+    of "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password" in sshd_config, and update
+    documentation to reflect the new upstream default.
+  * Enable conch interoperability tests under autopkgtest.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 02 Dec 2015 20:18:35 +0000
+openssh (1:6.9p1-3) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * ssh_config(5): Fix markup errors in description of GSSAPITrustDns
+    (closes: #799271).
+  * Fix dh_install and dh_fixperms overrides to work properly with an
+    architecture-independent-only build (closes: #806090).
+  * Do much less work in architecture-independent-only builds.
+  * Drop ConsoleKit session registration patch; it was only ever enabled for
+    Ubuntu, which no longer needs it (LP: #1334916, #1502045).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 24 Nov 2015 22:48:53 +0000
+openssh (1:6.9p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch: Move example ssh-keygen
+    invocation onto a separate line to make it easier to copy and paste
+    (LP: #1491532).
+  [ Tyler Hicks ]
+  * Build with audit support on Linux (closes: #797727, LP: #1478087).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 10 Sep 2015 12:26:11 +0100
+openssh (1:6.9p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.8):
+    - sshd(8): UseDNS now defaults to 'no'.  Configurations that match
+      against the client host name (via sshd_config or authorized_keys) may
+      need to re-enable it or convert to matching against addresses.
+    - Add FingerprintHash option to ssh(1) and sshd(8), and equivalent
+      command-line flags to the other tools to control algorithm used for
+      key fingerprints.  The default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format
+      from hex to base64.
+      Fingerprints now have the hash algorithm prepended.  An example of the
+      new format: SHA256:mVPwvezndPv/ARoIadVY98vAC0g+P/5633yTC4d/wXE
+      Please note that visual host keys will also be different.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Experimental host key rotation support.  Add a
+      protocol extension for a server to inform a client of all its
+      available host keys after authentication has completed.  The client
+      may record the keys in known_hosts, allowing it to upgrade to better
+      host key algorithms and a server to gracefully rotate its keys.
+      The client side of this is controlled by a UpdateHostkeys config
+      option (default off).
+    - ssh(1): Add a ssh_config HostbasedKeyType option to control which host
+      public key types are tried during host-based authentication.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix connection-killing host key mismatch errors when
+      sshd offers multiple ECDSA keys of different lengths.
+    - ssh(1): When host name canonicalisation is enabled, try to parse host
+      names as addresses before looking them up for canonicalisation.  Fixes
+      bz#2074 and avoids needless DNS lookups in some cases.
+    - ssh(1), ssh-keysign(8): Make ed25519 keys work for host based
+      authentication.
+    - sshd(8): SSH protocol v.1 workaround for the Meyer, et al,
+      Bleichenbacher Side Channel Attack.  Fake up a bignum key before RSA
+      decryption.
+    - sshd(8): Remember which public keys have been used for authentication
+      and refuse to accept previously-used keys.  This allows
+      AuthenticationMethods=publickey,publickey to require that users
+      authenticate using two _different_ public keys.
+    - sshd(8): add sshd_config HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
+      PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options to allow sshd to control what public
+      key types will be accepted (closes: #481133).  Currently defaults to
+      all.
+    - sshd(8): Don't count partial authentication success as a failure
+      against MaxAuthTries.
+    - ssh(1): Add RevokedHostKeys option for the client to allow text-file
+      or KRL-based revocation of host keys.
+    - ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8): Permit KRLs that revoke certificates by serial
+      number or key ID without scoping to a particular CA.
+    - ssh(1): Add a "Match canonical" criteria that allows ssh_config Match
+      blocks to trigger only in the second config pass.
+    - ssh(1): Add a -G option to ssh that causes it to parse its
+      configuration and dump the result to stdout, similar to "sshd -T".
+    - ssh(1): Allow Match criteria to be negated. E.g. "Match !host".
+    - ssh-keyscan(1): ssh-keyscan has been made much more robust against
+      servers that hang or violate the SSH protocol (closes: #241119).
+    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Fix regression bz#2306: Key path names were
+      being lost as comment fields (closes: #787776).
+    - ssh(1): Allow ssh_config Port options set in the second config parse
+      phase to be applied (they were being ignored; closes: #774369).
+    - ssh(1): Tweak config re-parsing with host canonicalisation - make the
+      second pass through the config files always run when host name
+      canonicalisation is enabled (and not whenever the host name changes)
+    - ssh(1): Fix passing of wildcard forward bind addresses when connection
+      multiplexing is in use.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Fix broken private key conversion from non-OpenSSH
+      formats.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Fix KRL generation bug when multiple CAs are in use.
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.9):
+    - CVE-2015-5352: ssh(1): When forwarding X11 connections with
+      ForwardX11Trusted=no, connections made after ForwardX11Timeout expired
+      could be permitted and no longer subject to XSECURITY restrictions
+      because of an ineffective timeout check in ssh(1) coupled with "fail
+      open" behaviour in the X11 server when clients attempted connections
+      with expired credentials (closes: #790798).  This problem was reported
+      by Jann Horn.
+    - SECURITY: ssh-agent(1): Fix weakness of agent locking (ssh-add -x) to
+      password guessing by implementing an increasing failure delay, storing
+      a salted hash of the password rather than the password itself and
+      using a timing-safe comparison function for verifying unlock attempts.
+      This problem was reported by Ryan Castellucci.
+    - sshd(8): Support admin-specified arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand
+      (closes: #740494).
+    - sshd(8): Add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows retrieving
+      authorized principals information from a subprocess rather than a
+      file.
+    - ssh(1), ssh-add(1): Support PKCS#11 devices with external PIN entry
+      devices.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Support "ssh-keygen -lF hostname" to search known_hosts
+      and print key hashes rather than full keys.
+    - ssh-agent(1): Add -D flag to leave ssh-agent in foreground without
+      enabling debug mode.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Deprecate legacy SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD
+      message and do not try to use it against some 3rd-party SSH
+      implementations that use it (older PuTTY, WinSCP).
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Cap DH-GEX group size at 4Kbits for Cisco
+      implementations as some would fail when attempting to use group sizes
+      >4K (closes: #740307, LP: #1287222).
+    - ssh(1): Fix out-of-bound read in EscapeChar configuration option
+      parsing.
+    - sshd(8): Fix application of PermitTunnel, LoginGraceTime,
+      AuthenticationMethods and StreamLocalBindMask options in Match blocks.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Improve disconnection message on TCP reset.
+    - ssh(1): Remove failed remote forwards established by multiplexing from
+      the list of active forwards.
+    - sshd(8): Make parsing of authorized_keys "environment=" options
+      independent of PermitUserEnv being enabled.
+    - sshd(8): Fix post-auth crash with permitopen=none (closes: #778807).
+    - ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): Allow new-format private keys to be
+      encrypted with AEAD ciphers.
+    - ssh(1): Allow ListenAddress, Port and AddressFamily configuration
+      options to appear in any order.
+    - sshd(8): Check for and reject missing arguments for VersionAddendum
+      and ForceCommand.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Don't treat unknown certificate extensions as fatal.
+    - ssh-keygen(1): Make stdout and stderr output consistent.
+    - ssh(1): Mention missing DISPLAY environment in debug log when X11
+      forwarding requested.
+    - sshd(8): Correctly record login when UseLogin is set.
+    - sshd(8): Add some missing options to sshd -T output and fix output of
+      VersionAddendum and HostCertificate.
+    - Document and improve consistency of options that accept a "none"
+      argument: TrustedUserCAKeys, RevokedKeys, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile.
+    - ssh(1): Include remote username in debug output.
+    - sshd(8): Avoid compatibility problem with some versions of Tera Term,
+      which would crash when they received the hostkeys notification message
+      (hostkeys-00@openssh.com).
+    - sshd(8): Mention ssh-keygen -E as useful when comparing legacy MD5
+      host key fingerprints.
+    - ssh(1): Clarify pseudo-terminal request behaviour and make manual
+      language consistent.
+    - ssh(1): Document that the TERM environment variable is not subject to
+      SendEnv and AcceptEnv; bz#2386
+    - sshd(8): Format UsePAM setting when using sshd -T (closes: #767648).
+    - moduli(5): Update DH-GEX moduli (closes: #787037).
+  * There are some things I want to fix before upgrading to 7.0p1, though I
+    intend to do that soon.  In the meantime, backport some patches, mainly
+    to fix security issues:
+    - SECURITY: sshd(8): OpenSSH 6.8 and 6.9 incorrectly set TTYs to be
+      world-writable.  Local attackers may be able to write arbitrary
+      messages to logged-in users, including terminal escape sequences.
+      Reported by Nikolay Edigaryev.
+    - SECURITY: sshd(8): Fixed a privilege separation weakness related to
+      PAM support.  Attackers who could successfully compromise the
+      pre-authentication process for remote code execution and who had valid
+      credentials on the host could impersonate other users.  Reported by
+      Moritz Jodeit.
+    - SECURITY: sshd(8): Fixed a use-after-free bug related to PAM support
+      that was reachable by attackers who could compromise the
+      pre-authentication process for remote code execution (closes:
+      #795711).  Also reported by Moritz Jodeit.
+    - CVE-2015-5600: sshd(8): Fix circumvention of MaxAuthTries using
+      keyboard-interactive authentication (closes: #793616).  By specifying
+      a long, repeating keyboard-interactive "devices" string, an attacker
+      could request the same authentication method be tried thousands of
+      times in a single pass.  The LoginGraceTime timeout in sshd(8) and any
+      authentication failure delays implemented by the authentication
+      mechanism itself were still applied.  Found by Kingcope.
+    - Let principals-command.sh work for noexec /var/run.
+  * Thanks to Jakub Jelen of Red Hat for Fedora's rebased version of the
+    GSSAPI key exchange patch.
+  * Document the Debian-specific change to the default value of
+    ForwardX11Trusted in ssh(1) (closes: #781469).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 20 Aug 2015 10:38:58 +0100
+openssh (1:6.7p1-6) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Martin Pitt ]
+  * openssh-server.postinst: Quiesce "Unable to connect to Upstart" error
+    message from initctl if upstart is installed, but not the current init
+    system. (LP: #1440070)
+  * openssh-server.postinst: Fix version comparisons of upgrade adjustments
+    to not apply to fresh installs.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 19 Apr 2015 14:32:43 +0100
+openssh (1:6.7p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Revert change from previous upload, which causes far more trouble than
+    it is worth (closes: #780797):
+    - Send/accept only specific known LC_* variables, rather than using a
+      wildcard.
+  * Add a NEWS.Debian entry documenting this reversion, as it is too
+    difficult to undo the sshd_config change automatically without
+    compounding the problem of (arguably) overwriting user configuration.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 22 Mar 2015 23:20:56 +0000
+openssh (1:6.7p1-4) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Send/accept only specific known LC_* variables, rather than using a
+    wildcard (closes: #765633).
+  * Document interactions between ListenAddress/Port and ssh.socket in
+    README.Debian (closes: #764842).
+  * Debconf translations:
+    - Brazilian Portuguese (thanks, José de Figueiredo; closes: #771859).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 18 Mar 2015 15:34:13 +0000
+openssh (1:6.7p1-3) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Debconf translations:
+    - Dutch (thanks, Frans Spiesschaert; closes: #765851).
+  * Assume that dpkg-statoverride exists and drop the test for an obsolete
+    compatibility path.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 03 Nov 2014 20:29:52 +0000
+openssh (1:6.7p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * debian/tests/control: Drop isolation-container, since the tests run on a
+    high port.  They're still not guaranteed to run correctly in an schroot,
+    but may manage to work, so this lets the tests at least try to run on
+    ci.debian.net.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 10 Oct 2014 10:47:19 +0100
+openssh (1:6.7p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
+    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
+      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
+      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
+      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
+    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
+      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
+      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
+    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
+      key types.
+    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
+    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
+      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
+    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
+      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
+    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
+      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
+      option.
+    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
+      expands to a unique identifier based on a hash of the tuple of (local
+      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
+      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
+    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
+      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
+      authentication success / failure messages.
+    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
+      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
+      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
+      #734553).
+    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
+      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
+  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
+    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
+    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
+    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
+    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
+    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
+    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
+  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
+    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
+    field.
+  * Build-depend on a new enough dpkg-dev for dpkg-buildflags, rather than
+    simply a new enough dpkg.
+  * Simplify debian/rules using /usr/share/dpkg/buildflags.mk.
+  * Use Package-Type rather than XC-Package-Type, now that it is an official
+    field.
+  * Run a subset of the upstream regression test suite at package build
+    time, and the rest of it under autopkgtest.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 09 Oct 2014 14:05:56 +0100
+openssh (1:6.6p1-8) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Make the if-up hook use "reload" rather than "restart" if the system was
+    booted using systemd (closes: #756547).
+  * Show fingerprints of new keys after creating them in the postinst
+    (closes: #762128).
+  * Policy version 3.9.6: no changes required.
+  * Don't link /usr/share/doc/ssh to openssh-client, as this is not safe
+    between Architecture: all and Architecture: any binary packages (closes:
+    #763375).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 03 Oct 2014 12:23:57 +0100
+openssh (1:6.6p1-7) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Make sure that DEB_HOST_ARCH is set, even when invoking debian/rules
+    directly.
+  * Use dh-exec to simplify override_dh_install target.
+  * Remove several unnecessary entries in debian/*.dirs.
+  * Pass noupdate to the second call to pam_motd, not the first (thanks, Ken
+    T Takusagawa; closes: #757059).
+  * Debconf translations:
+    - Turkish (thanks, Mert Dirik; closes: #756757).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 05 Aug 2014 09:10:04 +0100
+openssh (1:6.6p1-6) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Upgrade to debhelper v9.
+  * Only use pam_keyinit on Linux architectures (closes: #747245).
+  * Make get_config_option more robust against trailing whitespace (thanks,
+    LaMont Jones).
+  * Debconf translations:
+    - Czech (thanks, Michal Šimůnek; closes: #751419).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 28 Jun 2014 14:50:04 +0100
+openssh (1:6.6p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Force ssh-agent Upstart job to use sh syntax regardless of the user's
+    shell (thanks, Steffen Stempel; LP: #1312928).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 01 May 2014 16:27:53 +0100
+openssh (1:6.6p1-4) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Debconf translations:
+    - Spanish (thanks, Matías Bellone; closes: #744867).
+  * Apply upstream-recommended patch to fix bignum encoding for
+    curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, fixing occasional key exchange failures.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 21 Apr 2014 21:29:53 +0100
+openssh (1:6.6p1-3) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Debconf translations:
+    - French (thanks, Étienne Gilli; closes: #743242).
+  * Never signal the service supervisor with SIGSTOP more than once, to
+    prevent a hang on re-exec (thanks, Robie Basak; LP: #1306877).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 14 Apr 2014 12:11:50 +0100
+openssh (1:6.6p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * If no root password is set, then switch to "PermitRootLogin
+    without-password" without asking (LP: #1300127).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 31 Mar 2014 12:20:46 +0100
+openssh (1:6.6p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Apply various warning-suppression and regression-test fixes to
+    gssapi.patch from Damien Miller.
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.6,
+    LP: #1298280):
+    - CVE-2014-2532: sshd(8): when using environment passing with an
+      sshd_config(5) AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard, OpenSSH prior to 6.6
+      could be tricked into accepting any environment variable that contains
+      the characters before the wildcard character.
+  * Re-enable btmp logging, as its permissions were fixed a long time ago in
+    response to #370050 (closes: #341883).
+  * Change to "PermitRootLogin without-password" for new installations, and
+    ask a debconf question when upgrading systems with "PermitRootLogin yes"
+    from previous versions (closes: #298138).
+  * Debconf translations:
+    - Danish (thanks, Joe Hansen).
+    - Portuguese (thanks, Américo Monteiro).
+    - Russian (thanks, Yuri Kozlov; closes: #742308).
+    - Swedish (thanks, Andreas Rönnquist).
+    - Japanese (thanks, victory).
+    - German (thanks, Stephan Beck; closes: #742541).
+    - Italian (thanks, Beatrice Torracca).
+  * Don't start ssh-agent from the Upstart user session job if something
+    like Xsession has already done so (based on work by Bruno Vasselle;
+    LP: #1244736).
+  [ Matthew Vernon ]
+  * CVE-2014-2653: Fix failure to check SSHFP records if server presents a
+    certificate (bug reported by me, patch by upstream's Damien Miller;
+    thanks also to Mark Wooding for his help in fixing this) (Closes:
+    #742513)
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 28 Mar 2014 18:04:41 +0000
+openssh (1:6.5p1-6) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Fix Breaks/Replaces versions of openssh-sftp-server on openssh-server
+    (thanks, Axel Beckert).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 06 Mar 2014 16:18:44 +0000
+openssh (1:6.5p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Add Alias=sshd.service to systemd ssh.service file, to match "Provides:
+    sshd" in the sysvinit script (thanks, Michael Biebl).
+  * Add Before=ssh.service to systemd ssh.socket file, since otherwise
+    nothing guarantees that ssh.service has stopped before ssh.socket starts
+    (thanks, Uoti Urpala).
+  [ Axel Beckert ]
+  * Split sftp-server into its own package to allow it to also be used by
+    other SSH server implementations like dropbear (closes: #504290).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 05 Mar 2014 13:53:08 +0000
+openssh (1:6.5p1-4) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Configure --without-hardening on hppa, to work around
+    http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=60155 (closes: #738798).
+  * Amend "Running sshd from inittab" instructions in README.Debian to
+    recommend 'update-rc.d ssh disable', rather than manual removal of rc*.d
+    symlinks that won't work with dependency-based sysv-rc.
+  * Remove code related to non-dependency-based sysv-rc ordering, since that
+    is no longer supported.
+  * Apply patch from https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2200 to
+    fix getsockname errors when using "ssh -W" (closes: #738693).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 15 Feb 2014 02:19:36 +0000
+openssh (1:6.5p1-3) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Clarify socket activation mode in README.Debian, as suggested by Uoti
+    Urpala.
+  * Stop claiming that "Protocol 2" is a Debian-specific default; this has
+    been upstream's default since 5.4p1.
+  * Avoid stdout noise from which(1) on purge of openssh-client.
+  * Fix sysvinit->systemd transition code to cope with still-running
+    sysvinit jobs being considered active by systemd (thanks, Uoti Urpala
+    and Michael Biebl).
+  * Bump guard version for sysvinit->systemd transition to 1:6.5p1-3; we may
+    have got it wrong before, and it's fairly harmless to repeat it.
+  * Remove tests for whether /dev/null is a character device from the
+    Upstart job and the systemd service files; it's there to avoid a
+    confusing failure mode in daemon(), but with modern init systems we use
+    the -D option to suppress daemonisation anyway.
+  * Refer to /usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-2 in debian/copyright (for the
+    Debian patch) rather than plain GPL.
+  * Drop some very old Conflicts and Replaces (ssh (<< 1:3.8.1p1-9),
+    rsh-client (<< 0.16.1-1), ssh-krb5 (<< 1:4.3p2-7), ssh-nonfree (<< 2),
+    and openssh-client (<< 1:3.8.1p1-11)).  These all relate to pre-etch
+    versions, for which we no longer have maintainer script code, and per
+    policy they would have to become Breaks nowadays anyway.
+  * Policy version 3.9.5.
+  * Drop unnecessary -1 in zlib1g Build-Depends version.
+  * Tweak dh_systemd_enable invocations to avoid lots of error noise.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 12 Feb 2014 13:10:08 +0000
+openssh (1:6.5p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Only enable ssh.service for systemd, not both ssh.service and
+    ssh.socket.  Thanks to Michael Biebl for spotting this.
+  * Backport upstream patch to unbreak case-sensitive matching of ssh_config
+    (closes: #738619).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 11 Feb 2014 11:28:35 +0000
+openssh (1:6.5p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.5,
+    LP: #1275068):
+    - ssh(1): Add support for client-side hostname canonicalisation using a
+      set of DNS suffixes and rules in ssh_config(5).  This allows
+      unqualified names to be canonicalised to fully-qualified domain names
+      to eliminate ambiguity when looking up keys in known_hosts or checking
+      host certificate names (closes: #115286).
+  * Switch to git; adjust Vcs-* fields.
+  * Convert to git-dpm, and drop source package documentation associated
+    with the old bzr/quilt patch handling workflow.
+  * Drop ssh-vulnkey and the associated ssh/ssh-add/sshd integration code,
+    leaving only basic configuration file compatibility, since it has been
+    nearly six years since the original vulnerability and this code is not
+    likely to be of much value any more (closes: #481853, #570651).  See
+    https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2013/09/msg00240.html for my full
+    reasoning.
+  * Add OpenPGP signature checking configuration to watch file (thanks,
+    Daniel Kahn Gillmor; closes: #732441).
+  * Add the pam_keyinit session module, to create a new session keyring on
+    login (closes: #734816).
+  * Incorporate default path changes from shadow 1:4.0.18.1-8, removing
+    /usr/bin/X11 (closes: #644521).
+  * Generate ED25519 host keys on fresh installations.  Upgraders who wish
+    to add such host keys should manually add 'HostKey
+    /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key' to /etc/ssh/sshd_config and run
+    'ssh-keygen -q -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N "" -t ed25519'.
+  * Drop long-obsolete "SSH now uses protocol 2 by default" section from
+    README.Debian.
+  * Add systemd support (thanks, Sven Joachim; closes: #676830).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 10 Feb 2014 14:58:26 +0000
+openssh (1:6.4p1-2) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Increase ServerKeyBits value in package-generated sshd_config to 1024
+    (closes: #727622, LP: #1244272).
+  * Restore patch to disable OpenSSL version check (closes: #732940).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 23 Dec 2013 10:44:04 +0000
+openssh (1:6.4p1-1) unstable; urgency=high
+  * New upstream release.  Important changes:
+    - 6.3/6.3p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.3):
+      + sftp(1): add support for resuming partial downloads using the
+        "reget" command and on the sftp commandline or on the "get"
+        commandline using the "-a" (append) option (closes: #158590).
+      + ssh(1): add an "IgnoreUnknown" configuration option to selectively
+        suppress errors arising from unknown configuration directives
+        (closes: #436052).
+      + sftp(1): update progressmeter when data is acknowledged, not when
+        it's sent (partially addresses #708372).
+      + ssh(1): do not fatally exit when attempting to cleanup multiplexing-
+        created channels that are incompletely opened (closes: #651357).
+    - 6.4/6.4p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.4):
+      + CVE-2013-4548: sshd(8): fix a memory corruption problem triggered
+        during rekeying when an AES-GCM cipher is selected (closes:
+        #729029).  Full details of the vulnerability are available at:
+        http://www.openssh.com/txt/gcmrekey.adv
+  * When running under Upstart, only consider the daemon started once it is
+    ready to accept connections (by raising SIGSTOP at that point and using
+    "expect stop").
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 09 Nov 2013 18:24:16 +0000
+openssh (1:6.2p2-6) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Update config.guess and config.sub automatically at build time.
+    dh_autoreconf does not take care of that by default because openssh does
+    not use automake.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 02 Jul 2013 22:54:49 +0100
+openssh (1:6.2p2-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Document consequences of ssh-agent being setgid in ssh-agent(1); see
+    #711623.
+  * Use 'set -e' rather than '#! /bin/sh -e' in maintainer scripts and
+    ssh-argv0.
+  [ Yolanda Robla ]
+  * debian/rules: Include real distribution in SSH_EXTRAVERSION instead of
+    hardcoding Debian (LP: #1195342).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 27 Jun 2013 15:24:14 +0100
+openssh (1:6.2p2-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Fix non-portable shell in ssh-copy-id (closes: #711162).
+  * Rebuild against debhelper 9.20130604 with fixed dependencies for
+    invoke-rc.d and Upstart jobs (closes: #711159, #711364).
+  * Set SELinux context on private host keys as well as public host keys
+    (closes: #687436).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 06 Jun 2013 17:06:31 +0100
+openssh (1:6.2p2-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * If the running init daemon is Upstart, then, on the first upgrade to
+    this version, check whether sysvinit is still managing sshd; if so,
+    manually stop it so that it can be restarted under upstart.  We do this
+    near the end of the postinst, so it shouldn't result in any appreciable
+    extra window where sshd is not running during upgrade.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 22 May 2013 17:42:10 +0100
+openssh (1:6.2p2-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Change start condition of Upstart job to be just the standard "runlevel
+    [2345]", rather than "filesystem or runlevel [2345]"; the latter makes
+    it unreasonably difficult to ensure that urandom starts before ssh, and
+    is not really necessary since one of static-network-up and failsafe-boot
+    is guaranteed to happen and will trigger entry to the default runlevel,
+    and we don't care about ssh starting before the network (LP: #1098299).
+  * Drop conffile handling for direct upgrades from pre-split ssh package;
+    this was originally added in 1:4.3p2-7 / 1:4.3p2-8, and contained a
+    truly ghastly hack around a misbehaviour in sarge's dpkg.  Since this is
+    now four Debian releases ago, we can afford to drop this and simplify
+    the packaging.
+  * Remove ssh/use_old_init_script, which was a workaround for a very old
+    bug in /etc/init.d/ssh.  If anyone has ignored this for >10 years then
+    they aren't going to be convinced now (closes: #214182).
+  * Remove support for upgrading directly from ssh-nonfree.
+  * Remove lots of maintainer script support for direct upgrades from
+    pre-etch (three releases before current stable).
+  * Add #DEBHELPER# tokens to openssh-client.postinst and
+    openssh-server.postinst.
+  * Replace old manual conffile handling code with dpkg-maintscript-helper,
+    via dh_installdeb.
+  * Switch to new unified layout for Upstart jobs as documented in
+    https://wiki.ubuntu.com/UpstartCompatibleInitScripts: the init script
+    checks for a running Upstart, and we now let dh_installinit handle most
+    of the heavy lifting in maintainer scripts.  Ubuntu users should be
+    essentially unaffected except that sshd may no longer start
+    automatically in chroots if the running Upstart predates 0.9.0; but the
+    main goal is simply not to break when openssh-server is installed in a
+    chroot.
+  * Remove the check for vulnerable host keys; this was first added five
+    years ago, and everyone should have upgraded through a version that
+    applied these checks by now.  The ssh-vulnkey tool and the blacklisting
+    support in sshd are still here, at least for the moment.
+  * This removes the last of our uses of debconf (closes: #221531).
+  * Use the pam_loginuid session module (thanks, Laurent Bigonville; closes:
+    #677440, LP: #1067779).
+  * Bracket our session stack with calls to pam_selinux close/open (thanks,
+    Laurent Bigonville; closes: #679458).
+  * Fix dh_builddeb invocation so that we really use xz compression for
+    binary packages, as intended since 1:6.1p1-2.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 22 May 2013 09:07:42 +0100
+openssh (1:6.2p2-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.2p2):
+    - Only warn for missing identity files that were explicitly specified
+      (closes: #708275).
+    - Fix bug in contributed contrib/ssh-copy-id script that could result in
+      "rm *" being called on mktemp failure (closes: #708419).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 16 May 2013 14:05:06 +0100
+openssh (1:6.2p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Renumber Debian-specific additions to enum monitor_reqtype so that they
+    fit within a single byte (thanks, Jason Conti; LP: #1179202).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 13 May 2013 10:56:04 +0100
+openssh (1:6.2p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Fix build failure on Ubuntu:
+    - Include openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h from consolekit.c.
+    - Fix consolekit mismerges in monitor.c and monitor_wrap.c.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 09 May 2013 09:45:57 +0100
+openssh (1:6.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.2).
+    - Add support for multiple required authentication in SSH protocol 2 via
+      an AuthenticationMethods option (closes: #195716).
+    - Fix Sophie Germain formula in moduli(5) (closes: #698612).
+    - Update ssh-copy-id to Phil Hands' greatly revised version (closes:
+      #99785, #322228, #620428; LP: #518883, #835901, #1074798).
+  * Use dh-autoreconf.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 07 May 2013 11:48:16 +0100
+openssh (1:6.1p1-4) experimental; urgency=low
+  [ Gunnar Hjalmarsson ]
+  * debian/openssh-server.sshd.pam: Explicitly state that ~/.pam_environment
+    should be read, and move the pam_env calls from "auth" to "session" so
+    that it's also read when $HOME is encrypted (LP: #952185).
+  [ Stéphane Graber ]
+  * Add ssh-agent upstart user job.  This implements something similar to
+    the 90x11-common_ssh-agent Xsession script.  That is, start ssh-agent
+    and set the appropriate environment variables (closes: #703906).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 25 Mar 2013 16:58:04 +0000
+openssh (1:6.1p1-3) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Give ssh and ssh-krb5 versioned dependencies on openssh-client and
+    openssh-server, to try to reduce confusion when people run 'apt-get
+    install ssh' or similar and expect that to upgrade everything relevant.
+  * CVE-2010-5107: Improve DoS resistance by changing default of MaxStartups
+    to 10:30:100 (closes: #700102).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 08 Feb 2013 21:07:31 +0000
+openssh (1:6.1p1-2) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Use xz compression for binary packages.
+  * Merge from Ubuntu:
+    - Add support for registering ConsoleKit sessions on login.  (This is
+      currently enabled only when building for Ubuntu.)
+    - Drop openssh-blacklist and openssh-blacklist-extra to Suggests.  It's
+      been long enough since the relevant vulnerability that we shouldn't
+      need these installed by default nowadays.
+    - Add an Upstart job (not currently used by default in Debian).
+    - Add mention of ssh-keygen in ssh connect warning (Scott Moser).
+    - Install apport hooks.
+  * Only build with -j if DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS=parallel=* is used (closes:
+    #694282).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 26 Nov 2012 16:39:07 +0000
+openssh (1:6.1p1-1) experimental; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.1).
+    - Enable pre-auth sandboxing by default for new installs.
+    - Allow "PermitOpen none" to refuse all port-forwarding requests
+      (closes: #543683).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 07 Sep 2012 00:22:44 +0100
+openssh (1:6.0p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Add Indonesian (thanks, Andika Triwidada; closes: #681670).
+  * Call restorecon on copied ~/.ssh/authorized_keys if possible, since some
+    SELinux policies require this (closes: #658675).
+  * Add ncurses-term to openssh-server's Recommends, since it's often needed
+    to support unusual terminal emulators on clients (closes: #675362).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 24 Aug 2012 06:55:36 +0100
+openssh (1:6.0p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Tighten libssl1.0.0 and libcrypto1.0.0-udeb dependencies to the current
+    "fix" version at build time (closes: #678661).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 24 Jun 2012 12:16:06 +0100
+openssh (1:6.0p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  [ Roger Leigh ]
+  * Display dynamic part of MOTD from /run/motd.dynamic, if it exists
+    (closes: #669699).
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Update OpenSSH FAQ to revision 1.113, fixing missing line break (closes:
+    #669667).
+  * New upstream release (closes: #671010,
+    http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.0).
+    - Fix IPQoS not being set on non-mapped v4-in-v6 addressed connections
+      (closes: #643312, #650512, #671075).
+    - Add a new privilege separation sandbox implementation for Linux's new
+      seccomp sandbox, automatically enabled on platforms that support it.
+      (Note: privilege separation sandboxing is still experimental.)
+  * Fix a bashism in configure's seccomp_filter check.
+  * Add a sandbox fallback mechanism, so that behaviour on Linux depends on
+    whether the running system's kernel has seccomp_filter support, not the
+    build system's kernel (forwarded upstream as
+    https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2011).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 26 May 2012 13:48:14 +0100
+openssh (1:5.9p1-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Use dpkg-buildflags, including for hardening support; drop use of
+    hardening-includes.
+  * Fix cross-building:
+    - Allow using a cross-architecture pkg-config.
+    - Pass default LDFLAGS to contrib/Makefile.
+    - Allow dh_strip to strip gnome-ssh-askpass, rather than calling
+      'install -s'.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 02 Apr 2012 11:20:33 +0100
+openssh (1:5.9p1-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Disable OpenSSL version check again, as its SONAME is sufficient
+    nowadays (closes: #664383).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 19 Mar 2012 11:06:30 +0000
+openssh (1:5.9p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Polish (thanks, Michał Kułach; closes: #659829).
+  * Ignore errors writing to console in init script (closes: #546743).
+  * Move ssh-krb5 to Section: oldlibs.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 24 Feb 2012 08:56:18 +0000
+openssh (1:5.9p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Mark openssh-client and openssh-server as Multi-Arch: foreign.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 09 Nov 2011 02:06:48 +0000
+openssh (1:5.9p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.9).
+    - Introduce sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep child using an optional
+      sshd_config(5) "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" mode that enables
+      mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the privsep child can perform.
+    - Add new SHA256-based HMAC transport integrity modes from
+      http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-dbider-sha2-mac-for-ssh-02.txt.
+    - The pre-authentication sshd(8) privilege separation slave process now
+      logs via a socket shared with the master process, avoiding the need to
+      maintain /dev/log inside the chroot (closes: #75043, #429243,
+      #599240).
+    - ssh(1) now warns when a server refuses X11 forwarding (closes:
+      #504757).
+    - sshd_config(5)'s AuthorizedKeysFile now accepts multiple paths,
+      separated by whitespace (closes: #76312).  The authorized_keys2
+      fallback is deprecated but documented (closes: #560156).
+    - ssh(1) and sshd(8): set IPv6 traffic class from IPQoS, as well as IPv4
+      ToS/DSCP (closes: #498297).
+    - ssh-add(1) now accepts keys piped from standard input.  E.g. "ssh-add
+      - < /path/to/key" (closes: #229124).
+    - Clean up lost-passphrase text in ssh-keygen(1) (closes: #444691).
+    - Say "required" rather than "recommended" in unprotected-private-key
+      warning (LP: #663455).
+  * Update OpenSSH FAQ to revision 1.112.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 07 Sep 2011 23:46:00 +0100
+openssh (1:5.8p1-7) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Only recommend ssh-import-id when built on Ubuntu (closes: #635887).
+  * Use 'dpkg-vendor --derives-from Ubuntu' to detect Ubuntu systems rather
+    than 'lsb_release -is' so that Ubuntu derivatives behave the same way as
+    Ubuntu itself.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 29 Jul 2011 14:27:52 +0100
+openssh (1:5.8p1-6) unstable; urgency=low
+  * openssh-client and openssh-server Suggests: monkeysphere.
+  * Quieten logs when multiple from= restrictions are used in different
+    authorized_keys lines for the same key; it's still not ideal, but at
+    least you'll only get one log entry per key (closes: #630606).
+  * Merge from Ubuntu (Dustin Kirkland):
+    - openssh-server Recommends: ssh-import-id (no-op in Debian since that
+      package doesn't exist there, but this reduces the Ubuntu delta).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 28 Jul 2011 17:10:18 +0100
+openssh (1:5.8p1-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Drop openssh-server's dependency on openssh-blacklist to a
+    recommendation (closes: #622604).
+  * Update Vcs-* fields and README.source for Alioth changes.
+  * Backport from upstream:
+    - Make hostbased auth with ECDSA keys work correctly (closes: #633368).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 24 Jul 2011 11:06:47 +0100
+openssh (1:5.8p1-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Drop hardcoded dependencies on libssl0.9.8 and libcrypto0.9.8-udeb,
+    since the required minimum versions are rather old now anyway and
+    openssl has bumped its SONAME (thanks, Julien Cristau; closes: #620828).
+  * Remove unreachable code from openssh-server.postinst.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 04 Apr 2011 15:56:18 +0100
+openssh (1:5.8p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Correct ssh-keygen instruction in the changelog for 1:5.7p1-1 (thanks,
+    Joel Stanley).
+  * Allow ssh-add to read from FIFOs (thanks, Daniel Kahn Gillmor; closes:
+    #614897).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 18 Mar 2011 16:42:42 +0000
+openssh (1:5.8p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Upload to unstable.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 08 Feb 2011 10:59:17 +0000
+openssh (1:5.8p1-1) experimental; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.8):
+    - Fix stack information leak in legacy certificate signing
+      (http://www.openssh.com/txt/legacy-cert.adv).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 05 Feb 2011 11:13:11 +0000
+openssh (1:5.7p1-2) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Fix crash in ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon when SELinux is disabled
+    (LP: #708571).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 27 Jan 2011 12:14:17 +0000
+openssh (1:5.7p1-1) experimental; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.7):
+    - Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH)
+      and host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656.  ECDH and ECDSA
+      offer better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent
+      symmetric key length, as well as much shorter keys.
+    - sftp(1)/sftp-server(8): add a protocol extension to support a hard
+      link operation.  It is available through the "ln" command in the
+      client.  The old "ln" behaviour of creating a symlink is available
+      using its "-s" option or through the preexisting "symlink" command.
+    - scp(1): Add a new -3 option to scp: Copies between two remote hosts
+      are transferred through the local host (closes: #508613).
+    - ssh(1): "atomically" create the listening mux socket by binding it on
+      a temporary name and then linking it into position after listen() has
+      succeeded.  This allows the mux clients to determine that the server
+      socket is either ready or stale without races (closes: #454784).
+      Stale server sockets are now automatically removed (closes: #523250).
+    - ssh(1): install a SIGCHLD handler to reap expired child process
+      (closes: #594687).
+    - ssh(1)/ssh-agent(1): honour $TMPDIR for client xauth and ssh-agent
+      temporary directories (closes: #357469, although only if you arrange
+      for ssh-agent to actually see $TMPDIR since the setgid bit will cause
+      it to be stripped off).
+  * Update to current GSSAPI patch from
+    http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-5.7p1-gsskex-all-20110125.patch:
+    - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option.
+  * Generate ECDSA host keys on fresh installations.  Upgraders who wish to
+    add such host keys should manually add 'HostKey
+    /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key' to /etc/ssh/sshd_config and run 'ssh-keygen
+    -q -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N "" -t ecdsa'.
+  * Build-depend on libssl-dev (>= 0.9.8g) to ensure sufficient ECC support.
+  * Backport SELinux build fix from CVS.
+  * Rearrange selinux-role.patch so that it links properly given this
+    SELinux build fix.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 26 Jan 2011 23:48:02 +0000
+openssh (1:5.6p1-3) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Drop override for desktop-file-but-no-dh_desktop-call, which Lintian no
+    longer issues.
+  * Merge 1:5.5p1-6.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 30 Dec 2010 11:48:00 +0000
+openssh (1:5.6p1-2) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Backport upstream patch to install a SIGCHLD handler to reap expired ssh
+    child processes, preventing lots of zombies when using ControlPersist
+    (closes: #594687).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 26 Oct 2010 14:46:40 +0100
+openssh (1:5.6p1-1) experimental; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.6):
+    - Added a ControlPersist option to ssh_config(5) that automatically
+      starts a background ssh(1) multiplex master when connecting.  This
+      connection can stay alive indefinitely, or can be set to automatically
+      close after a user-specified duration of inactivity (closes: #335697,
+      #350898, #454787, #500573, #550262).
+    - Support AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+      HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, and PermitTunnel in sshd_config(5)
+      Match blocks (closes: #549858).
+    - sftp(1): fix ls in working directories that contain globbing
+      characters in their pathnames (LP: #530714).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 24 Aug 2010 00:37:54 +0100
+openssh (1:5.5p1-6) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Touch /var/run/sshd/.placeholder in the preinst so that /var/run/sshd,
+    which is intentionally no longer shipped in the openssh-server package
+    due to /var/run often being a temporary directory, is not removed on
+    upgrade (closes: #575582).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 26 Dec 2010 18:09:29 +0000
+openssh (1:5.5p1-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Use an architecture wildcard for libselinux1-dev (closes: #591740).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Danish (thanks, Joe Hansen; closes: #592800).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 23 Aug 2010 22:59:03 +0100
+openssh (1:5.5p1-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  [ Sebastian Andrzej Siewior ]
+  * Add powerpcspe to architecture list for libselinux1-dev build-dependency
+    (closes: #579843).
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Allow ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and other secure files to be
+    group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the
+    file's owner; this extends a patch previously applied to ~/.ssh/config
+    (closes: #581919).
+  * Check primary group memberships as well as supplementary group
+    memberships, and only allow group-writability by groups with exactly one
+    member, as zero-member groups are typically used by setgid binaries
+    rather than being user-private groups (closes: #581697).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 22 May 2010 23:37:20 +0100
+openssh (1:5.5p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Discard error messages while checking whether rsh, rlogin, and rcp
+    alternatives exist (closes: #579285).
+  * Drop IDEA key check; I don't think it works properly any more due to
+    textual changes in error output, it's only relevant for direct upgrades
+    from truly ancient versions, and it breaks upgrades if
+    /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key can't be loaded (closes: #579570).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 28 Apr 2010 22:12:47 +0100
+openssh (1:5.5p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Use dh_installinit -n, since our maintainer scripts already handle this
+    more carefully (thanks, Julien Cristau).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 17 Apr 2010 12:55:56 +0100
+openssh (1:5.5p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release:
+    - Unbreak sshd_config's AuthorizedKeysFile option for $HOME-relative
+      paths.
+    - Include a language tag when sending a protocol 2 disconnection
+      message.
+    - Make logging of certificates used for user authentication more clear
+      and consistent between CAs specified using TrustedUserCAKeys and
+      authorized_keys.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 16 Apr 2010 10:27:30 +0100
+openssh (1:5.4p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Borrow patch from Fedora to add DNSSEC support: if glibc 2.11 is
+    installed, the host key is published in an SSHFP RR secured with DNSSEC,
+    and VerifyHostKeyDNS=yes, then ssh will no longer prompt for host key
+    verification (closes: #572049).
+  * Convert to dh(1), and use dh_installdocs --link-doc.
+  * Drop lpia support, since Ubuntu no longer supports this architecture.
+  * Use dh_install more effectively.
+  * Add a NEWS.Debian entry about changes in smartcard support relative to
+    previous unofficial builds (closes: #231472).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 10 Apr 2010 01:08:59 +0100
+openssh (1:5.4p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (LP: #535029).
+    - After a transition period of about 10 years, this release disables SSH
+      protocol 1 by default.  Clients and servers that need to use the
+      legacy protocol must explicitly enable it in ssh_config / sshd_config
+      or on the command-line.
+    - Remove the libsectok/OpenSC-based smartcard code and add support for
+      PKCS#11 tokens.  This support is enabled by default in the Debian
+      packaging, since it now doesn't involve additional library
+      dependencies (closes: #231472, LP: #16918).
+    - Add support for certificate authentication of users and hosts using a
+      new, minimal OpenSSH certificate format (closes: #482806).
+    - Added a 'netcat mode' to ssh(1): "ssh -W host:port ...".
+    - Add the ability to revoke keys in sshd(8) and ssh(1).  (For the Debian
+      package, this overlaps with the key blacklisting facility added in
+      openssh 1:4.7p1-9, but with different file formats and slightly
+      different scopes; for the moment, I've roughly merged the two.)
+    - Various multiplexing improvements, including support for requesting
+      port-forwardings via the multiplex protocol (closes: #360151).
+    - Allow setting an explicit umask on the sftp-server(8) commandline to
+      override whatever default the user has (closes: #496843).
+    - Many sftp client improvements, including tab-completion, more options,
+      and recursive transfer support for get/put (LP: #33378).  The old
+      mget/mput commands never worked properly and have been removed
+      (closes: #270399, #428082).
+    - Do not prompt for a passphrase if we fail to open a keyfile, and log
+      the reason why the open failed to debug (closes: #431538).
+    - Prevent sftp from crashing when given a "-" without a command.  Also,
+      allow whitespace to follow a "-" (closes: #531561).
+  * Fix 'debian/rules quilt-setup' to avoid writing .orig files if some
+    patches apply with offsets.
+  * Include debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.png in the Debian tarball now that
+    we're using a source format that permits this, rather than messing
+    around with uudecode.
+  * Drop compatibility with the old gssapi mechanism used in ssh-krb5 <<
+    3.8.1p1-1.  Simon Wilkinson refused this patch since the old gssapi
+    mechanism was removed due to a serious security hole, and since these
+    versions of ssh-krb5 are no longer security-supported by Debian I don't
+    think there's any point keeping client compatibility for them.
+  * Fix substitution of ETC_PAM_D_SSH, following the rename in 1:4.7p1-4.
+  * Hardcode the location of xauth to /usr/bin/xauth rather than
+    /usr/bin/X11/xauth (thanks, Aron Griffis; closes: #575725, LP: #8440).
+    xauth no longer depends on x11-common, so we're no longer guaranteed to
+    have the /usr/bin/X11 symlink available.  I was taking advantage of the
+    /usr/bin/X11 symlink to smooth X's move to /usr/bin, but this is far
+    enough in the past now that it's probably safe to just use /usr/bin.
+  * Remove SSHD_OOM_ADJUST configuration.  sshd now unconditionally makes
+    itself non-OOM-killable, and doesn't require configuration to avoid log
+    spam in virtualisation containers (closes: #555625).
+  * Drop Debian-specific removal of OpenSSL version check.  Upstream ignores
+    the two patchlevel nybbles now, which is sufficient to address the
+    original reason this change was introduced, and it appears that any
+    change in the major/minor/fix nybbles would involve a new libssl package
+    name.  (We'd still lose if the status nybble were ever changed, but that
+    would mean somebody had packaged a development/beta version rather than
+    a proper release, which doesn't appear to be normal practice.)
+  * Drop most of our "LogLevel SILENT" (-qq) patch.  This was originally
+    introduced to match the behaviour of non-free SSH, in which -q does not
+    suppress fatal errors, but matching the behaviour of OpenSSH upstream is
+    much more important nowadays.  We no longer document that -q does not
+    suppress fatal errors (closes: #280609).  Migrate "LogLevel SILENT" to
+    "LogLevel QUIET" in sshd_config on upgrade.
+  * Policy version 3.8.4:
+    - Add a Homepage field.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 06 Apr 2010 22:38:31 +0100
+openssh (1:5.3p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Convert to source format 3.0 (quilt).
+  * Update README.source to match, and add a 'quilt-setup' target to
+    debian/rules for the benefit of those checking out the package from
+    revision control.
+  * All patches are now maintained separately and tagged according to DEP-3.
+  * Add GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey to 'sshd -T' configuration dump.
+  * Remove documentation of building for Debian 3.0 in README.Debian.
+    Support for this was removed in 1:4.7p1-2.
+  * Remove obsolete header from README.Debian dating from when people
+    expected non-free SSH.
+  * Update copyright years for GSSAPI patch.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 28 Feb 2010 01:35:53 +0000
+openssh (1:5.3p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Link with -Wl,--as-needed (closes: #560155).
+  * Install upstream sshd_config as an example (closes: #415008).
+  * Use dh_lintian.
+  * Honour DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS=nocheck.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 22 Feb 2010 12:43:24 +0000
+openssh (1:5.3p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release.
+  * Update to GSSAPI patch from
+    http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex-all-20100124.patch.
+  * Backport from upstream:
+    - Do not fall back to adding keys without constraints (ssh-add -c / -t
+      ...) when the agent refuses the constrained add request. This was a
+      useful migration measure back in 2002 when constraints were new, but
+      just adds risk now (LP: #209447).
+  * Drop change from 1:3.8p1-3 to avoid setresuid() and setresgid() system
+    calls.  This only applied to Linux 2.2, which it's no longer feasible to
+    run anyway (see 1:5.2p1-2 changelog).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 26 Jan 2010 11:55:29 +0000
+openssh (1:5.2p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Backport from upstream:
+    - After sshd receives a SIGHUP, ignore subsequent HUPs while sshd
+      re-execs itself.  Prevents two HUPs in quick succession from resulting
+      in sshd dying (LP: #497781).
+    - Output a debug if we can't open an existing keyfile (LP: #505301).
+  * Use host compiler for ssh-askpass-gnome when cross-compiling.
+  * Don't run tests when cross-compiling.
+  * Drop change from 1:3.6.1p2-5 to disable cmsg_type check for file
+    descriptor passing when running on Linux 2.0.  The previous stable
+    release of Debian dropped support for Linux 2.4, let alone 2.0, so this
+    very likely has no remaining users depending on it.
+  [ Kees Cook ]
+  * Implement DebianBanner server configuration flag that can be set to "no"
+    to allow sshd to run without the Debian-specific extra version in the
+    initial protocol handshake (closes: #562048).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 16 Jan 2010 01:28:58 +0000
+openssh (1:5.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (closes: #536182). Yes, I know 5.3p1 has been out
+    for a while, but there's no GSSAPI patch available for it yet.
+    - Change the default cipher order to prefer the AES CTR modes and the
+      revised "arcfour256" mode to CBC mode ciphers that are susceptible to
+      CPNI-957037 "Plaintext Recovery Attack Against SSH".
+    - Add countermeasures to mitigate CPNI-957037-style attacks against the
+      SSH protocol's use of CBC-mode ciphers. Upon detection of an invalid
+      packet length or Message Authentication Code, ssh/sshd will continue
+      reading up to the maximum supported packet length rather than
+      immediately terminating the connection. This eliminates most of the
+      known differences in behaviour that leaked information about the
+      plaintext of injected data which formed the basis of this attack
+      (closes: #506115, LP: #379329).
+    - ForceCommand directive now accepts commandline arguments for the
+      internal-sftp server (closes: #524423, LP: #362511).
+    - Add AllowAgentForwarding to available Match keywords list (closes:
+      #540623).
+    - Make ssh(1) send the correct channel number for
+      SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS and SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE messages to
+      avoid triggering 'Non-public channel' error messages on sshd(8) in
+      openssh-5.1.
+    - Avoid printing 'Non-public channel' warnings in sshd(8), since the
+      ssh(1) has sent incorrect channel numbers since ~2004 (this reverts a
+      behaviour introduced in openssh-5.1; closes: #496017).
+    - Disable nonfunctional ssh(1) ~C escape handler in multiplex slave
+      connections (closes: #507541).
+    - Fix "whitepsace" typo in ssh_config(5) (closes: #514313, LP: #303835).
+  * Update to GSSAPI patch from
+    http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-5.2p1-gsskex-all-20090726.patch,
+    including cascading credentials support (LP: #416958).
+  * Use x11.pc when compiling/linking gnome-ssh-askpass2 (closes: #555951).
+  * Moved to bzr.debian.org; add Vcs-Bzr and Vcs-Browser control fields.
+  * Add debian/README.source with instructions on bzr handling.
+  * Make ChrootDirectory work with SELinux (thanks, Russell Coker; closes:
+    #556644).
+  * Initialise sc to NULL in ssh_selinux_getctxbyname (thanks, Václav Ovsík;
+    closes: #498684).
+  * Don't duplicate backslashes when displaying server banner (thanks,
+    Michał Górny; closes: #505378, LP: #425346).
+  * Use hardening-includes for hardening logic (thanks, Kees Cook; closes:
+    #561887).
+  * Update OpenSSH FAQ to revision 1.110.
+  * Remove ssh/new_config, only needed for direct upgrades from potato which
+    are no longer particularly feasible anyway (closes: #420682).
+  * Cope with insserv reordering of init script links.
+  * Remove init script stop link in rc1, as killprocs handles it already.
+  * Adjust short descriptions to avoid relying on previous experience with
+    rsh, based on suggestions from Reuben Thomas (closes: #512198).
+  * Remove manual page references to login.conf, which aren't applicable on
+    non-BSD systems (closes: #154434).
+  * Remove/adjust manual page references to BSD-specific /etc/rc (closes:
+    #513417).
+  * Refer to sshd_config(5) rather than sshd(8) in postinst-written
+    /etc/ssh/sshd_config, and add UsePAM commentary from upstream-shipped
+    configuration file (closes: #415008, although unfortunately this will
+    only be conveniently visible on new installations).
+  * Include URL to OpenBSD's ssl(8) in ssh(1), since I don't see a better
+    source for the same information among Debian's manual pages (closes:
+    #530692, LP: #456660).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 04 Jan 2010 13:23:35 +0000
+openssh (1:5.1p1-8) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Build with just -fPIC on mips/mipsel, not -fPIE as well (thanks, LIU Qi;
+    closes: #538313).
+  * Build-depend on libselinux1-dev on sh4 too (thanks, Nobuhiro Iwamatsu;
+    closes: #547103).
+  * Fix grammar in if-up script (closes: #549128).
+  * Pass $SSHD_OPTS when checking configuration too (thanks, "sobtwmxt";
+    closes: #548662).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 05 Oct 2009 13:30:49 +0100
+openssh (1:5.1p1-7) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Update config.guess and config.sub from autotools-dev 20090611.1
+    (closes: #538301).
+  * Set umask to 022 in the init script as well as postinsts (closes:
+    #539030).
+  * Add ${misc:Depends} to keep Lintian happy.
+  * Use 'which' rather than 'type' in maintainer scripts.
+  * Upgrade to debhelper v7.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 31 Jul 2009 16:28:10 +0100
+openssh (1:5.1p1-6) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Open /proc/self/oom_adj with O_RDONLY or O_WRONLY as necessary, rather
+    than O_RDWR.
+  * Disable OOM adjustment for vserver/OpenVZ (thanks, Karl Chen; closes:
+    #511771).
+  * Add ufw integration (thanks, Didier Roche; see
+    https://wiki.ubuntu.com/UbuntuFirewall#Integrating%20UFW%20with%20Packages;
+    LP: #261884).
+  * Add a comment above PermitRootLogin in sshd_config pointing to
+    README.Debian.
+  * Check if delgroup is present in openssh-client.postrm (closes: #530501).
+  * Build with -fPIC on mips/mipsel (thanks, Luk Claes; closes: #531942).
+  * Remove /var/run/sshd from openssh-server package; it will be created at
+    run-time before starting the server.
+  * Use invoke-rc.d in openssh-server's if-up script.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 05 Jun 2009 11:56:03 +0100
+openssh (1:5.1p1-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Backport from upstream CVS (Markus Friedl):
+    - packet_disconnect() on padding error, too. Should reduce the success
+      probability for the CPNI-957037 Plaintext Recovery Attack to 2^-18.
+  * Check that /var/run/sshd.pid exists and that the process ID listed there
+    corresponds to sshd before running '/etc/init.d/ssh reload' from if-up
+    script; SIGHUP is racy if called at boot before sshd has a chance to
+    install its signal handler, but fortunately the pid file is written
+    after that which lets us avoid the race (closes: #502444).
+  * While the above is a valuable sanity-check, it turns out that it doesn't
+    really fix the bug (thanks to Kevin Price for testing), so for the
+    meantime we'll just use '/etc/init.d/ssh restart', even though it is
+    unfortunately heavyweight.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 14 Jan 2009 00:34:08 +0000
+openssh (1:5.1p1-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * ssh-copy-id: Strip trailing colons from hostname (closes: #226172,
+    LP: #249706; thanks to Karl Goetz for nudging this along; forwarded
+    upstream as https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1530).
+  * Backport from upstream CVS (Markus Friedl):
+    - Only send eow and no-more-sessions requests to openssh 5 and newer;
+      fixes interop problems with broken ssh v2 implementations (closes:
+      #495917).
+  * Fix double-free when failing to parse a forwarding specification given
+    using ~C (closes: #505330; forwarded upstream as
+    https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1539).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 23 Nov 2008 14:46:10 +0000
+openssh (1:5.1p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Remove unnecessary ssh-vulnkey output in non-verbose mode when no
+    compromised or unknown keys were found (closes: #496495).
+  * Configure with --disable-strip; dh_strip will deal with stripping
+    binaries and will honour DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS (thanks, Bernhard R. Link;
+    closes: #498681).
+  * Fix handling of zero-length server banners (thanks, Tomas Mraz; closes:
+    #497026).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 30 Sep 2008 23:09:58 +0100
+openssh (1:5.1p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Look for $SHELL on the path when executing ProxyCommands or
+    LocalCommands (closes: #492728).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 29 Jul 2008 15:31:25 +0100
+openssh (1:5.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (closes: #474301). Important changes not previously
+    backported to 4.7p1:
+    - 4.9/4.9p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.9):
+      + Added chroot(2) support for sshd(8), controlled by a new option
+        "ChrootDirectory" (closes: #139047, LP: #24777).
+      + Linked sftp-server(8) into sshd(8). The internal sftp server is used
+        when the command "internal-sftp" is specified in a Subsystem or
+        ForceCommand declaration. When used with ChrootDirectory, the
+        internal sftp server requires no special configuration of files
+        inside the chroot environment.
+      + Added a protocol extension method "posix-rename@openssh.com" for
+        sftp-server(8) to perform POSIX atomic rename() operations; sftp(1)
+        prefers this if available (closes: #308561).
+      + Removed the fixed limit of 100 file handles in sftp-server(8).
+      + ssh(8) will now skip generation of SSH protocol 1 ephemeral server
+        keys when in inetd mode and protocol 2 connections are negotiated.
+        This speeds up protocol 2 connections to inetd-mode servers that
+        also allow Protocol 1.
+      + Accept the PermitRootLogin directive in a sshd_config(5) Match
+        block. Allows for, e.g. permitting root only from the local network.
+      + Reworked sftp(1) argument splitting and escaping to be more
+        internally consistent (i.e. between sftp commands) and more
+        consistent with sh(1). Please note that this will change the
+        interpretation of some quoted strings, especially those with
+        embedded backslash escape sequences.
+      + Support "Banner=none" in sshd_config(5) to disable sending of a
+        pre-login banner (e.g. in a Match block).
+      + ssh(1) ProxyCommands are now executed with $SHELL rather than
+        /bin/sh.
+      + ssh(1)'s ConnectTimeout option is now applied to both the TCP
+        connection and the SSH banner exchange (previously it just covered
+        the TCP connection). This allows callers of ssh(1) to better detect
+        and deal with stuck servers that accept a TCP connection but don't
+        progress the protocol, and also makes ConnectTimeout useful for
+        connections via a ProxyCommand.
+      + scp(1) incorrectly reported "stalled" on slow copies (closes:
+        #140828).
+      + scp(1) date underflow for timestamps before epoch.
+      + ssh(1) used the obsolete SIG DNS RRtype for host keys in DNS,
+        instead of the current standard RRSIG.
+      + Correctly drain ACKs when a sftp(1) upload write fails midway,
+        avoids a fatal() exit from what should be a recoverable condition.
+      + Fixed ssh-keygen(1) selective host key hashing (i.e. "ssh-keygen -HF
+        hostname") to not include any IP address in the data to be hashed.
+      + Make ssh(1) skip listening on the IPv6 wildcard address when a
+        binding address of 0.0.0.0 is used against an old SSH server that
+        does not support the RFC4254 syntax for wildcard bind addresses.
+      + Enable IPV6_V6ONLY socket option on sshd(8) listen socket, as is
+        already done for X11/TCP forwarding sockets (closes: #439661).
+      + Fix FD leak that could hang a ssh(1) connection multiplexing master.
+      + Make ssh(1) -q option documentation consistent with reality.
+      + Fixed sshd(8) PAM support not calling pam_session_close(), or
+        failing to call it with root privileges (closes: #372680).
+      + Fix activation of OpenSSL engine support when requested in configure
+        (LP: #119295).
+      + Cache SELinux status earlier so we know if it's enabled after a
+        chroot (LP: #237557).
+    - 5.1/5.1p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.1):
+      + Introduce experimental SSH Fingerprint ASCII Visualisation to ssh(1)
+        and ssh-keygen(1). Visual fingerprint display is controlled by a new
+        ssh_config(5) option "VisualHostKey". The intent is to render SSH
+        host keys in a visual form that is amenable to easy recall and
+        rejection of changed host keys.
+      + sshd_config(5) now supports CIDR address/masklen matching in "Match
+        address" blocks, with a fallback to classic wildcard matching.
+      + sshd(8) now supports CIDR matching in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+        from="..." restrictions, also with a fallback to classic wildcard
+        matching.
+      + Added an extended test mode (-T) to sshd(8) to request that it write
+        its effective configuration to stdout and exit. Extended test mode
+        also supports the specification of connection parameters (username,
+        source address and hostname) to test the application of
+        sshd_config(5) Match rules.
+      + ssh(1) now prints the number of bytes transferred and the overall
+        connection throughput for SSH protocol 2 sessions when in verbose
+        mode (previously these statistics were displayed for protocol 1
+        connections only).
+      + sftp-server(8) now supports extension methods statvfs@openssh.com
+        and fstatvfs@openssh.com that implement statvfs(2)-like operations.
+      + sftp(1) now has a "df" command to the sftp client that uses the
+        statvfs@openssh.com to produce a df(1)-like display of filesystem
+        space and inode utilisation (requires statvfs@openssh.com support on
+        the server).
+      + Added a MaxSessions option to sshd_config(5) to allow control of the
+        number of multiplexed sessions supported over a single TCP
+        connection. This allows increasing the number of allowed sessions
+        above the previous default of 10, disabling connection multiplexing
+        (MaxSessions=1) or disallowing login/shell/subsystem sessions
+        entirely (MaxSessions=0).
+      + Added a no-more-sessions@openssh.com global request extension that
+        is sent from ssh(1) to sshd(8) when the client knows that it will
+        never request another session (i.e. when session multiplexing is
+        disabled). This allows a server to disallow further session requests
+        and terminate the session in cases where the client has been
+        hijacked.
+      + ssh-keygen(1) now supports the use of the -l option in combination
+        with -F to search for a host in ~/.ssh/known_hosts and display its
+        fingerprint.
+      + ssh-keyscan(1) now defaults to "rsa" (protocol 2) keys, instead of
+        "rsa1" (LP: #129794).
+      + Added an AllowAgentForwarding option to sshd_config(8) to control
+        whether authentication agent forwarding is permitted. Note that this
+        is a loose control, as a client may install their own unofficial
+        forwarder.
+      + ssh(1) and sshd(8): avoid unnecessary malloc/copy/free when
+        receiving network data, resulting in a ~10% speedup.
+      + ssh(1) and sshd(8) will now try additional addresses when connecting
+        to a port forward destination whose DNS name resolves to more than
+        one address. The previous behaviour was to try the only first
+        address and give up if that failed.
+      + ssh(1) and sshd(8) now support signalling that channels are
+        half-closed for writing, through a channel protocol extension
+        notification "eow@openssh.com". This allows propagation of closed
+        file descriptors, so that commands such as "ssh -2 localhost od
+        /bin/ls | true" do not send unnecessary data over the wire.
+      + sshd(8): increased the default size of ssh protocol 1 ephemeral keys
+        from 768 to 1024 bits.
+      + When ssh(1) has been requested to fork after authentication ("ssh
+        -f") with ExitOnForwardFailure enabled, delay the fork until after
+        replies for any -R forwards have been seen. Allows for robust
+        detection of -R forward failure when using -f.
+      + "Match group" blocks in sshd_config(5) now support negation of
+        groups. E.g. "Match group staff,!guests".
+      + sftp(1) and sftp-server(8) now allow chmod-like operations to set
+        set[ug]id/sticky bits.
+      + The MaxAuthTries option is now permitted in sshd_config(5) match
+        blocks.
+      + Multiplexed ssh(1) sessions now support a subset of the ~ escapes
+        that are available to a primary connection.
+      + ssh(1) connection multiplexing will now fall back to creating a new
+        connection in most error cases (closes: #352830).
+      + Make ssh(1) deal more gracefully with channel requests that fail.
+        Previously it would optimistically assume that requests would always
+        succeed, which could cause hangs if they did not (e.g. when the
+        server runs out of file descriptors).
+      + ssh(1) now reports multiplexing errors via the multiplex slave's
+        stderr where possible (subject to LogLevel in the mux master).
+      + Fixed an UMAC alignment problem that manifested on Itanium
+        platforms.
+  * Remove our local version of moduli(5) now that there's one upstream.
+  * Say "GTK+" rather than "GTK" in ssh-askpass-gnome's description.
+  * Add lintian overrides for empty /usr/share/doc/openssh-client
+    directories in openssh-server and ssh (necessary due to being symlink
+    targets).
+  * Merge from Ubuntu:
+    - Add 'status' action to openssh-server init script, requiring lsb-base
+      (>= 3.2-13) (thanks, Dustin Kirkland).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Korean (thanks, Sunjae Park; closes: #484821).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 25 Jul 2008 10:45:08 +0100
+openssh (1:4.7p1-13) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Add some helpful advice to the end of ssh-vulnkey's output if there are
+    unknown or compromised keys (thanks, Dan Jacobson; closes: #483756).
+  * Check compromised key blacklist in ssh or ssh-add, as well as in the
+    server (LP: #232391). To override the blacklist check in ssh
+    temporarily, use 'ssh -o UseBlacklistedKeys=yes'; there is no override
+    for the blacklist check in ssh-add.
+  * Add cross-references to ssh-vulnkey(1) to ssh(1), ssh-add(1),
+    ssh-keygen(1), and sshd(8) (closes: #484451).
+  * Change openssh-client-udeb's Installer-Menu-Item from 99900 to 99999
+    (thanks, Frans Pop).
+  * Drop openssh-client-udeb isinstallable hack, as main-menu (>= 1.26) now
+    takes care of that (thanks, Frans Pop; closes: #484404).
+  * Update DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS parsing code from policy 3.8.0.
+  * Add documentation on removing openssh-blacklist locally (see #484269).
+  * Clarify documentation of SSHD_OOM_ADJUST, and make setting it to the
+    empty string actually skip adjustment as intended (closes: #487325).
+  * Remove empty /usr/share/applications directory in ssh-askpass-gnome.
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Romanian (thanks, Cătălin Feștilă; closes: #485415).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 21 Jul 2008 12:18:28 +0100
+openssh (1:4.7p1-12) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Fill in CVE identifier for ssh-vulnkey bug fixed in 1:4.7p1-10.
+  * Refactor rejection of blacklisted user keys into a single
+    reject_blacklisted_key function in auth.c (thanks, Dmitry V. Levin).
+  * Fix memory leak of blacklisted host keys (thanks, Dmitry V. Levin).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Dutch (thanks, Bart Cornelis; closes: #483004).
+    - Update Brazilian Portuguese (thanks, Eder L. Marques; closes:
+      #483142).
+    - Update Slovak (thanks, Ivan Masár; closes: #483517).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 29 May 2008 21:41:29 +0100
+openssh (1:4.7p1-11) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Make init script depend on $syslog, and fix some other dependency
+    glitches (thanks, Petter Reinholdtsen; closes: #481018).
+  * Remove 0 and 6 from Default-Stop in init script (thanks, Kel Modderman;
+    closes: #481151).
+  * Restore OOM killer adjustment for child processes (thanks, Vaclav Ovsik;
+    closes: #480020).
+  * Allow building with heimdal-dev (LP: #125805).
+  * Check RSA1 keys without the need for a separate blacklist. Thanks to
+    Simon Tatham for the idea.
+  * Generate two keys with the PID forced to the same value and test that
+    they differ, to defend against recurrences of the recent Debian OpenSSL
+    vulnerability.
+  * Recommend openssh-blacklist from openssh-client (closes: #481187).
+  * Recommend openssh-blacklist-extra from openssh-client and
+    openssh-server.
+  * Make ssh-vulnkey report the file name and line number for each key
+    (thanks, Heiko Schlittermann and Christopher Perry; closes: #481398).
+  * Check for blacklists in /usr/share/ssh/ as well as /etc/ssh/ (see
+    #481283).
+  * Log IP addresses of hosts attempting to use blacklisted keys (closes:
+    #481721).
+  * Incorporate various ssh-vulnkey suggestions from Hugh Daniel:
+    - Add -v (verbose) option, and don't print output for keys that have a
+      blacklist file but that are not listed unless in verbose mode.
+    - Move exit status documentation to a separate section.
+    - Document key status descriptions.
+    - Add key type to output.
+    - Fix error output if ssh-vulnkey fails to read key files, with the
+      exception of host keys unless -a was given.
+    - In verbose mode, output the name of each file examined.
+  * Handle leading IP addresses in ssh-vulnkey input (LP: #230497).
+  * Fix various ssh-vulnkey problems pointed out by Solar Designer:
+    - Fix some buffer handling inconsistencies.
+    - Use xasprintf to build user key file names, avoiding truncation
+      problems.
+    - Drop to the user's UID when reading user keys with -a.
+    - Use EUID rather than UID when run with no file names and without -a.
+    - Reword "Unknown (no blacklist information)" to "Unknown (blacklist
+      file not installed)".
+  * Fix typo in ssh/vulnerable_host_keys message (thanks, Esko Arajärvi).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Finnish (thanks, Esko Arajärvi; closes: #481530).
+    - Update French (thanks, Christian Perrier; closes: #481576).
+    - Update Norwegian Bokmål (thanks, Bjørn Steensrud; closes: #481591).
+    - Update Galician (thanks, Jacobo Tarrio; closes: #481596).
+    - Update Japanese (thanks, Kenshi Muto; closes: #481621).
+    - Update Czech (thanks, Miroslav Kure; closes: #481624).
+    - Update German (thanks, Helge Kreutzmann; closes: #481676).
+    - Update Portuguese (thanks, Ricardo Silva; closes: #481781).
+    - Update Basque (thanks, Piarres Beobide; closes: #481836).
+    - Update Bulgarian (thanks, Damyan Ivanov; closes: #481870).
+    - Update Vietnamese (thanks, Clytie Siddall; closes: #481876).
+    - Update Spanish (thanks, Javier Fernandez-Sanguino Peña; closes:
+      #482341).
+    - Update Turkish (thanks, Mert Dirik; closes: #482548).
+    - Update Russian (thanks, Yuri Kozlov; closes: #482887).
+    - Update Swedish (thanks, Martin Bagge; closes: #482464).
+    - Update Italian (thanks, Luca Monducci; closes: #482808).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 26 May 2008 12:21:39 +0100
+openssh (1:4.7p1-10) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Add a FILES section to ssh-vulnkey(1) (thanks, Hugh Daniel).
+  * CVE-2008-2285: ssh-vulnkey handles options in authorized_keys
+    (LP: #230029), and treats # as introducing a comment even if it is
+    preceded by whitespace.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 14 May 2008 12:35:05 +0100
+openssh (1:4.7p1-9) unstable; urgency=critical
+  * Fill in CVE identifier for security vulnerability fixed in 1:4.7p1-8.
+  * Mitigate OpenSSL security vulnerability (CVE-2008-0166):
+    - Add key blacklisting support. Keys listed in
+      /etc/ssh/blacklist.TYPE-LENGTH will be rejected for authentication by
+      sshd, unless "PermitBlacklistedKeys yes" is set in
+      /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
+    - Add a new program, ssh-vulnkey, which can be used to check keys
+      against these blacklists.
+    - Depend on openssh-blacklist.
+    - Force dependencies on libssl0.9.8 / libcrypto0.9.8-udeb to at least
+      0.9.8g-9.
+    - Automatically regenerate known-compromised host keys, with a
+      critical-priority debconf note. (I regret that there was no time to
+      gather translations.)
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 13 May 2008 12:33:38 +0100
+openssh (1:4.7p1-8) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Fill in CVE identifier for security vulnerability fixed in 1:4.7p1-5.
+  * Rename KeepAlive to TCPKeepAlive in sshd_config, cleaning up from old
+    configurations (LP: #211400).
+  * Tweak scp's reporting of filenames in verbose mode to be a bit less
+    confusing with spaces (thanks, Nicolas Valcárcel; LP: #89945).
+  * Backport from 4.9p1:
+    - CVE-2008-1657: Ignore ~/.ssh/rc if a sshd_config ForceCommand is
+      specified.
+    - Add no-user-rc authorized_keys option to disable execution of
+      ~/.ssh/rc.
+  * Backport from Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI key exchange patch for 5.0p1:
+    - Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck, which had
+      somehow been omitted from a previous version of this patch (closes:
+      #474246).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 06 Apr 2008 12:34:19 +0100
+openssh (1:4.7p1-7) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Ignore errors writing to oom_adj (closes: #473573).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 31 Mar 2008 16:24:44 +0100
+openssh (1:4.7p1-6) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Disable the Linux kernel's OOM-killer for the sshd parent; tweak
+    SSHD_OOM_ADJUST in /etc/default/ssh to change this (closes: #341767).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 30 Mar 2008 21:14:12 +0100
+openssh (1:4.7p1-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Recommends: xauth rather than Suggests: xbase-clients.
+  * Document in ssh(1) that '-S none' disables connection sharing
+    (closes: #471437).
+  * Patch from Red Hat / Fedora:
+    - CVE-2008-1483: Don't use X11 forwarding port which can't be bound on
+      all address families, preventing hijacking of X11 forwarding by
+      unprivileged users when both IPv4 and IPv6 are configured (closes:
+      #463011).
+  * Use printf rather than echo -en (a bashism) in openssh-server.config and
+    openssh-server.preinst.
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Finnish (thanks, Esko Arajärvi; closes: #468563).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 22 Mar 2008 12:37:00 +0000
+openssh (1:4.7p1-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  [ Caleb Case ]
+  * Fix configure detection of getseuserbyname and
+    get_default_context_with_level (closes: #465614, LP: #188136).
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Include the autogenerated debian/copyright in the source package.
+  * Move /etc/pam.d/ssh to /etc/pam.d/sshd, allowing us to stop defining
+    SSHD_PAM_SERVICE (closes: #255870).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 13 Feb 2008 18:18:52 +0000
+openssh (1:4.7p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Improve grammar of ssh-askpass-gnome description.
+  * Backport from upstream:
+    - Use the correct packet maximum sizes for remote port and agent
+      forwarding. Prevents the server from killing the connection if too
+      much data is queued and an excessively large packet gets sent
+      (https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1360).
+  * Allow passing temporary daemon parameters on the init script's command
+    line, e.g. '/etc/init.d/ssh start "-o PermitRootLogin=yes"' (thanks,
+    Marc Haber; closes: #458547).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 01 Feb 2008 21:59:59 +0000
+openssh (1:4.7p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Adjust many relative links in faq.html to point to
+    http://www.openssh.com/ (thanks, Dan Jacobson; mentioned in #459807).
+  * Pass --with-mantype=doc to configure rather than build-depending on
+    groff (closes: #460121).
+  * Add armel to architecture list for libselinux1-dev build-dependency
+    (closes: #460136).
+  * Drop source-compatibility with Debian 3.0:
+    - Remove support for building with GNOME 1. This allows simplification
+      of our GNOME build-dependencies (see #460136).
+    - Remove hacks to support the old PAM configuration scheme.
+    - Remove compatibility for building without po-debconf.
+  * Build-depend on libgtk2.0-dev rather than libgnomeui-dev. As far as I
+    can see, the GTK2 version of ssh-askpass-gnome has never required
+    libgnomeui-dev.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 11 Jan 2008 00:14:10 +0000
+openssh (1:4.7p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (closes: #453367).
+    - CVE-2007-4752: Prevent ssh(1) from using a trusted X11 cookie if
+      creation of an untrusted cookie fails; found and fixed by Jan Pechanec
+      (closes: #444738).
+    - sshd(8) in new installations defaults to SSH Protocol 2 only. Existing
+      installations are unchanged.
+    - The SSH channel window size has been increased, and both ssh(1)
+      sshd(8) now send window updates more aggressively. These improves
+      performance on high-BDP (Bandwidth Delay Product) networks.
+    - ssh(1) and sshd(8) now preserve MAC contexts between packets, which
+      saves 2 hash calls per packet and results in 12-16% speedup for
+      arcfour256/hmac-md5.
+    - A new MAC algorithm has been added, UMAC-64 (RFC4418) as
+      "umac-64@openssh.com". UMAC-64 has been measured to be approximately
+      20% faster than HMAC-MD5.
+    - Failure to establish a ssh(1) TunnelForward is now treated as a fatal
+      error when the ExitOnForwardFailure option is set.
+    - ssh(1) returns a sensible exit status if the control master goes away
+      without passing the full exit status.
+    - When using a ProxyCommand in ssh(1), set the outgoing hostname with
+      gethostname(2), allowing hostbased authentication to work.
+    - Make scp(1) skip FIFOs rather than hanging (closes: #246774).
+    - Encode non-printing characters in scp(1) filenames. These could cause
+      copies to be aborted with a "protocol error".
+    - Handle SIGINT in sshd(8) privilege separation child process to ensure
+      that wtmp and lastlog records are correctly updated.
+    - Report GSSAPI mechanism in errors, for libraries that support multiple
+      mechanisms.
+    - Improve documentation for ssh-add(1)'s -d option.
+    - Rearrange and tidy GSSAPI code, removing server-only code being linked
+      into the client.
+    - Delay execution of ssh(1)'s LocalCommand until after all forwardings
+      have been established.
+    - In scp(1), do not truncate non-regular files.
+    - Improve exit message from ControlMaster clients.
+    - Prevent sftp-server(8) from reading until it runs out of buffer space,
+      whereupon it would exit with a fatal error (closes: #365541).
+    - pam_end() was not being called if authentication failed
+      (closes: #405041).
+    - Manual page datestamps updated (closes: #433181).
+  * Install the OpenSSH FAQ in /usr/share/doc/openssh-client.
+    - Includes documentation on copying files with colons using scp
+      (closes: #303453).
+  * Create /var/run/sshd on start even if /etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run exists
+    (closes: #453285).
+  * Fix "overriden" typo in ssh(1) (thanks, A. Costa; closes: #390699).
+  * Refactor debian/rules configure and make invocations to make development
+    easier.
+  * Remove the hideously old /etc/ssh/primes on upgrade (closes: #123013).
+  * Update moduli(5) to revision 1.11 from OpenBSD CVS.
+  * Document the non-default options we set as standard in ssh_config(5) and
+    sshd_config(5) (closes: #327886, #345628).
+  * Recode LICENCE to UTF-8 when concatenating it to debian/copyright.
+  * Override desktop-file-but-no-dh_desktop-call lintian warning; the
+    .desktop file is intentionally not installed (see 1:3.8.1p1-10).
+  * Update copyright dates for Kerberos patch in debian/copyright.head.
+  * Policy version 3.7.3: no changes required.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 24 Dec 2007 16:43:02 +0000
+openssh (1:4.6p1-7) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Don't build PIE executables on m68k (closes: #451192).
+  * Use autotools-dev's recommended configure --build and --host options.
+  * Adjust README.Debian to suggest mailing debian-ssh@lists.debian.org
+    rather than Matthew.
+  * Check whether deluser exists in postrm (closes: #454085).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 03 Dec 2007 11:11:02 +0000
+openssh (1:4.6p1-6) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Remove blank line between head comment and first template in
+    debian/openssh-server.templates.master; apparently it confuses some
+    versions of debconf.
+  * Install authorized_keys(5) as a symlink to sshd(8) (thanks, Tomas
+    Pospisek; closes: #441817).
+  * Discard error output from dpkg-query in preinsts, in case the ssh
+    metapackage is not installed.
+  * Fix sshd/inittab advice in README.Debian to account for rc.d movement
+    (closes: #450632).
+  * Suppress error from debian/rules if lsb-release is not installed.
+  * Don't ignore errors from 'make -C contrib clean'.
+  * Adjust categories in ssh-askpass-gnome.desktop to comply with the
+    Desktop Menu Specification.
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Add Slovak (thanks, Ivan Masár; closes: #441690).
+    - Update Brazilian Portuguese (thanks, Eder L. Marques;
+      closes: #447145).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 12 Nov 2007 11:47:28 +0000
+openssh (1:4.6p1-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Identify ssh as a metapackage rather than a transitional package. It's
+    still useful as a quick way to install both the client and the server.
+  * ssh-copy-id now checks the exit status of ssh-add -L (thanks, Adeodato
+    Simó; closes: #221675).
+  * ssh-copy-id no longer prints the output of expr (thanks, Peter
+    Eisentraut; closes: #291534).
+  * ssh-copy-id defaults to ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub rather than
+    ~/.ssh/identity.pub, in line with ssh-keygen (thanks, Greg Norris;
+    closes: #234627).
+  * Build-depend on libselinux1-dev on lpia.
+  * openssh-client Suggests: keychain.
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Catalan (thanks, Jordà Polo; closes: #431970).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 30 Jul 2007 09:34:38 +0100
+openssh (1:4.6p1-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Don't build PIE executables on hppa, as they crash.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 05 Jul 2007 11:06:54 +0100
+openssh (1:4.6p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Only build PIE executables on Linux and NetBSD (closes: #430455).
+  * Fix broken switch fallthrough when SELinux is running in permissive mode
+    (closes: #430838).
+  * Document that HashKnownHosts may break tab-completion (closes: #430154).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 29 Jun 2007 07:15:38 +0100
+openssh (1:4.6p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Fix ordering of SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET and SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL.
+  * Clarify that 'ssh -q -q' still prints errors caused by bad arguments
+    (i.e. before the logging system is initialised).
+  * Suppress "Connection to <host> closed" and "Connection to master closed"
+    messages at loglevel SILENT (thanks, Jaap Eldering; closes: #409788).
+  * Suppress "Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because stdin is not a
+    terminal" message at loglevels QUIET and SILENT (closes: #366814).
+  * Document the SILENT loglevel in sftp-server(8), ssh_config(5), and
+    sshd_config(5).
+  * Add try-restart action to init script.
+  * Add /etc/network/if-up.d/openssh-server to restart sshd when new
+    interfaces appear (LP: #103436).
+  * Backport from upstream:
+    - Move C/R -> kbdint special case to after the defaults have been
+      loaded, which makes ChallengeResponse default to yes again. This was
+      broken by the Match changes and not fixed properly subsequently
+      (closes: #428968).
+    - Silence spurious error messages from hang-on-exit fix
+      (http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1306, closes: #429531).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 20 Jun 2007 11:52:44 +0100
+openssh (1:4.6p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (closes: #395507, #397961, #420035). Important
+    changes not previously backported to 4.3p2:
+    - 4.4/4.4p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.4):
+      + On portable OpenSSH, fix a GSSAPI authentication abort that could be
+        used to determine the validity of usernames on some platforms.
+      + Implemented conditional configuration in sshd_config(5) using the
+        "Match" directive. This allows some configuration options to be
+        selectively overridden if specific criteria (based on user, group,
+        hostname and/or address) are met. So far a useful subset of
+        post-authentication options are supported and more are expected to
+        be added in future releases.
+      + Add support for Diffie-Hellman group exchange key agreement with a
+        final hash of SHA256.
+      + Added a "ForceCommand" directive to sshd_config(5). Similar to the
+        command="..." option accepted in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, this forces
+        the execution of the specified command regardless of what the user
+        requested. This is very useful in conjunction with the new "Match"
+        option.
+      + Add a "PermitOpen" directive to sshd_config(5). This mirrors the
+        permitopen="..." authorized_keys option, allowing fine-grained
+        control over the port-forwardings that a user is allowed to
+        establish.
+      + Add optional logging of transactions to sftp-server(8).
+      + ssh(1) will now record port numbers for hosts stored in
+        ~/.ssh/known_hosts when a non-standard port has been requested
+        (closes: #50612).
+      + Add an "ExitOnForwardFailure" option to cause ssh(1) to exit (with a
+        non-zero exit code) when requested port forwardings could not be
+        established.
+      + Extend sshd_config(5) "SubSystem" declarations to allow the
+        specification of command-line arguments.
+      + Replacement of all integer overflow susceptible invocations of
+        malloc(3) and realloc(3) with overflow-checking equivalents.
+      + Many manpage fixes and improvements.
+      + Add optional support for OpenSSL hardware accelerators (engines),
+        enabled using the --with-ssl-engine configure option.
+      + Tokens in configuration files may be double-quoted in order to
+        contain spaces (closes: #319639).
+      + Move a debug() call out of a SIGCHLD handler, fixing a hang when the
+        session exits very quickly (closes: #307890).
+      + Fix some incorrect buffer allocation calculations (closes: #410599).
+      + ssh-add doesn't ask for a passphrase if key file permissions are too
+        liberal (closes: #103677).
+      + Likewise, ssh doesn't ask either (closes: #99675).
+    - 4.6/4.6p1 (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-4.6):
+      + sshd now allows the enabling and disabling of authentication methods
+        on a per user, group, host and network basis via the Match directive
+        in sshd_config.
+      + Fixed an inconsistent check for a terminal when displaying scp
+        progress meter (closes: #257524).
+      + Fix "hang on exit" when background processes are running at the time
+        of exit on a ttyful/login session (closes: #88337).
+  * Update to current GSSAPI patch from
+    http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-4.6p1-gsskex-20070312.patch;
+    install ChangeLog.gssapi.
+  * Build the .deb --with-ssl-engine (closes: #408027, LP: #119295).
+  * Use LSB functions in init scripts, and add an LSB-style header (partly
+    from Ubuntu and partly thanks to Christian Perrier; closes: #389038).
+  * Move init script start links to S16, move rc1 stop link to K84, and
+    remove rc0 and rc6 stop links altogether (the last part from Ubuntu;
+    closes: #122188).
+  * Emit a slightly more informative message from the init script if
+    /dev/null has somehow become not a character device (closes: #369964).
+  * Belatedly build-depend on zlib1g-dev (>= 1:1.2.3-1) (closes: #333447).
+  * Merge from Ubuntu:
+    - Build position-independent executables (only for debs, not for udebs)
+      to take advantage of address space layout randomisation.
+    - If building on Ubuntu, add /sbin, /usr/sbin, and /usr/local/sbin to
+      the default path.
+  * Use ${binary:Version} rather than ${Source-Version} in openssh-server ->
+    openssh-client dependency.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 13 Jun 2007 00:28:26 +0100
+openssh (1:4.3p2-11) unstable; urgency=low
+  * It's been four and a half years now since I took over as "temporary"
+    maintainer, so the Maintainer field is getting a bit inaccurate. Set
+    Maintainer to debian-ssh@lists.debian.org and leave Matthew and myself
+    as Uploaders.
+  * Use dpkg-query to fetch conffile md5sums rather than parsing
+    /var/lib/dpkg/status directly.
+  * openssh-client Suggests: libpam-ssh (closes: #427840).
+  * Use 'start-stop-daemon --oknodo' so that openssh-server's init script
+    exits successfully if sshd is already running (closes: #426858).
+  * Apply results of debconf templates and package descriptions review by
+    debian-l10n-english (closes: #420107, #420742).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Dutch (thanks, Machteld de Kok; closes: #419260).
+    - Update Norwegian Bokmål (thanks, Bjørn Steensrud; closes: #420630).
+    - Update Galician (thanks, Jacobo Tarrio; closes: #420635).
+    - Update Spanish (thanks, Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña;
+      closes: #420651).
+    - Update Swedish (thanks, Daniel Nylander; closes: #420663).
+    - Add Bulgarian (thanks, Damyan Ivanov; closes: #420703).
+    - Add Tamil (thanks, Tirumurti Vasudevan; closes: #420739).
+    - Update German (thanks, Helge Kreutzmann; closes: #420743).
+    - Update Japanese (thanks, Kenshi Muto; closes: #420946).
+    - Add Basque (thanks, Piarres Beobide; closes: #421238).
+    - Update Italian (thanks, Luca Monducci; closes: #421348).
+    - Update Czech (thanks, Miroslav Kure; closes: #421484).
+    - Update Romanian (thanks, Igor Stirbu; closes: #421760).
+    - Update Russian (thanks, Yuriy Talakan' and Sergey Alyoshin;
+      closes: #420862).
+    - Update Dutch (thanks, Bart Cornelis; closes: #422767).
+    - Update Portuguese (thanks, Ricardo Silva; closes: #423112).
+    - Update French (thanks, Christian Perrier).
+    - Add Korean (thanks, Sunjae Park; closes: #424008).
+    - Update Vietnamese (thanks, Clytie Siddall; closes: #426991).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 10 Jun 2007 08:59:42 +0100
+openssh (1:4.3p2-10) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Multiply openssh-client-udeb's Installer-Menu-Item by 100.
+  * Increase MAX_SESSIONS to 64.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 10 Apr 2007 19:17:20 +0100
+openssh (1:4.3p2-9) unstable; urgency=high
+  [ Russ Allbery ]
+  * Fix GSSAPIKeyExchange configuration file handling logic in ssh-krb5
+    (closes: #404863).
+  * Fix uncommenting of GSSAPI options by ssh-krb5 (closes: #407766).
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Add Norwegian Bokmål (thanks, Bjørn Steensrud; closes: #412330).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon,  5 Mar 2007 16:13:50 +0000
+openssh (1:4.3p2-8) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Vincent Untz ]
+  * Give the ssh-askpass-gnome window a default icon; remove unnecessary
+    icon extension from .desktop file (closes:
+    https://launchpad.net/bugs/27152).
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Drop versioning on ssh/ssh-krb5 Replaces, as otherwise it isn't
+    sufficient to replace conffiles (closes: #402804).
+  * Make GSSAPICleanupCreds a compatibility alias for
+    GSSAPICleanupCredentials. Mark GSSUseSessionCCache and
+    GSSAPIUseSessionCredCache as known-but-unsupported options, and migrate
+    away from them on upgrade.
+  * It turns out that the people who told me that removing a conffile in the
+    preinst was sufficient to have dpkg replace it without prompting when
+    moving a conffile between packages were very much mistaken. As far as I
+    can tell, the only way to do this reliably is to write out the desired
+    new text of the conffile in the preinst. This is gross, and requires
+    shipping the text of all conffiles in the preinst too, but there's
+    nothing for it. Fortunately this nonsense is only required for smooth
+    upgrades from sarge.
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Add Romanian (thanks, Stan Ioan-Eugen; closes: #403528).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 23 Dec 2006 18:38:33 +0000
+openssh (1:4.3p2-7) unstable; urgency=medium
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Ignore errors from usermod when changing sshd's shell, since it will
+    fail if the sshd user is not local (closes: #398436).
+  * Remove version control tags from /etc/ssh/moduli and /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+    to avoid unnecessary conffile resolution steps for administrators
+    (thanks, Jari Aalto; closes: #335259).
+  * Fix quoting error in configure.ac and regenerate configure (thanks, Ben
+    Pfaff; closes: #391248).
+  * When installing openssh-client or openssh-server from scratch, remove
+    any unchanged conffiles from the pre-split ssh package to work around a
+    bug in sarge's dpkg (thanks, Justin Pryzby and others; closes: #335276).
+  [ Russ Allbery ]
+  * Create transitional ssh-krb5 package which enables GSSAPI configuration
+    in sshd_config (closes: #390986).
+  * Default client to attempting GSSAPI authentication.
+  * Remove obsolete GSSAPINoMICAuthentication from sshd_config if it's
+    found.
+  * Add ssh -K option, the converse of -k, to enable GSSAPI credential
+    delegation (closes: #401483).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed,  6 Dec 2006 23:00:49 +0000
+openssh (1:4.3p2-6) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Acknowledge NMU (thanks, Manoj; closes: #394795).
+  * Backport from 4.5p1:
+    - Fix a bug in the sshd privilege separation monitor that weakened its
+      verification of successful authentication. This bug is not known to be
+      exploitable in the absence of additional vulnerabilities.
+  * openssh-server Suggests: molly-guard (closes: #395473).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update German (thanks, Helge Kreutzmann; closes: #395947).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 15 Nov 2006 00:07:32 +0000
+openssh (1:4.3p2-5.1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * NMU to update SELinux patch, bringing it in line with current selinux
+    releases.  The patch for this NMU is simply the Bug#394795 patch,
+    and no other changes.                       (closes: #394795)
+ -- Manoj Srivastava <srivasta@debian.org>  Mon,  23 Oct 2006 14:11:24 -0500
+openssh (1:4.3p2-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Remove ssh/insecure_telnetd check altogether (closes: #391081).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Danish (thanks, Claus Hindsgaul; closes: #390612).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu,  5 Oct 2006 09:04:19 +0100
+openssh (1:4.3p2-4) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Backport from 4.4p1 (since I don't have an updated version of the GSSAPI
+    patch yet):
+    - CVE-2006-4924: Fix a pre-authentication denial of service found by
+      Tavis Ormandy, that would cause sshd(8) to spin until the login grace
+      time expired (closes: #389995).
+    - CVE-2006-5051: Fix an unsafe signal hander reported by Mark Dowd. The
+      signal handler was vulnerable to a race condition that could be
+      exploited to perform a pre-authentication denial of service. On
+      portable OpenSSH, this vulnerability could theoretically lead to
+      pre-authentication remote code execution if GSSAPI authentication is
+      enabled, but the likelihood of successful exploitation appears remote.
+  * Read /etc/default/locale as well as /etc/environment (thanks, Raphaël
+    Hertzog; closes: #369395).
+  * Remove no-longer-used ssh/insecure_rshd debconf template.
+  * Make ssh/insecure_telnetd Type: error (closes: #388946).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Portuguese (thanks, Rui Branco; closes: #381942).
+    - Update Spanish (thanks, Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña;
+      closes: #382966).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 29 Sep 2006 16:28:24 +0100
+openssh (1:4.3p2-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Document KeepAlive->TCPKeepAlive renaming in sshd_config(5) (closes:
+    https://launchpad.net/bugs/50702).
+  * Change sshd user's shell to /usr/sbin/nologin (closes: #366541).
+    Introduces dependency on passwd for usermod.
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update French (thanks, Denis Barbier; closes: #368503).
+    - Update Dutch (thanks, Bart Cornelis; closes: #375100).
+    - Update Japanese (thanks, Kenshi Muto; closes: #379950).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 27 Jul 2006 00:12:36 +0100
+openssh (1:4.3p2-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Include commented-out pam_access example in /etc/pam.d/ssh.
+  * On '/etc/init.d/ssh restart', create /var/run/sshd before checking the
+    server configuration, as otherwise 'sshd -t' will complain about the
+    lack of /var/run/sshd (closes: https://launchpad.net/bugs/45234).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Russian (thanks, Yuriy Talakan'; closes: #367143).
+    - Update Czech (thanks, Miroslav Kure; closes: #367161).
+    - Update Italian (thanks, Luca Monducci; closes: #367186).
+    - Update Galician (thanks, Jacobo Tarrio; closes: #367318).
+    - Update Swedish (thanks, Daniel Nylander; closes: #367971).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 19 May 2006 09:14:27 +0100
+openssh (1:4.3p2-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (closes: #361032).
+    - CVE-2006-0225: scp (as does rcp, on which it is based) invoked a
+      subshell to perform local to local, and remote to remote copy
+      operations. This subshell exposed filenames to shell expansion twice;
+      allowing a local attacker to create filenames containing shell
+      metacharacters that, if matched by a wildcard, could lead to execution
+      of attacker-specified commands with the privilege of the user running
+      scp (closes: #349645).
+    - Add support for tunneling arbitrary network packets over a connection
+      between an OpenSSH client and server via tun(4) virtual network
+      interfaces. This allows the use of OpenSSH (4.3+) to create a true VPN
+      between the client and server providing real network connectivity at
+      layer 2 or 3. This feature is experimental.
+    - Reduce default key length for new DSA keys generated by ssh-keygen
+      back to 1024 bits. DSA is not specified for longer lengths and does
+      not fully benefit from simply making keys longer. As per FIPS 186-2
+      Change Notice 1, ssh-keygen will refuse to generate a new DSA key
+      smaller or larger than 1024 bits.
+    - Fixed X forwarding failing to start when the X11 client is executed in
+      background at the time of session exit.
+    - Change ssh-keygen to generate a protocol 2 RSA key when invoked
+      without arguments (closes: #114894).
+    - Fix timing variance for valid vs. invalid accounts when attempting
+      Kerberos authentication.
+    - Ensure that ssh always returns code 255 on internal error
+      (closes: #259865).
+    - Cleanup wtmp files on SIGTERM when not using privsep.
+    - Set SO_REUSEADDR on X11 listeners to avoid problems caused by
+      lingering sockets from previous session (X11 applications can
+      sometimes not connect to 127.0.0.1:60xx) (closes:
+      https://launchpad.net/bugs/25528).
+    - Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are always attached in all programs, by
+      duping /dev/null to them if necessary.
+    - Xauth list invocation had bogus "." argument.
+    - Remove internal assumptions on key exchange hash algorithm and output
+      length, preparing OpenSSH for KEX methods with alternate hashes.
+    - Ignore junk sent by a server before it sends the "SSH-" banner.
+    - Many manual page improvements.
+    - Lots of cleanups, including fixes to memory leaks on error paths and
+      possible crashes.
+  * Update to current GSSAPI patch from
+    http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh-4.3p2-gsskex-20060223.patch
+    (closes: #352042).
+  * debian/rules: Resynchronise CFLAGS with that generated by configure.
+  * Restore pam_nologin to /etc/pam.d/ssh; sshd no longer checks this itself
+    when PAM is enabled, but relies on PAM to do it.
+  * Rename KeepAlive to TCPKeepAlive in default sshd_config
+    (closes: #349896).
+  * Rephrase ssh/new_config and ssh/encrypted_host_key_but_no_keygen debconf
+    templates to make boolean short descriptions end with a question mark
+    and to avoid use of the first person.
+  * Ship README.tun.
+  * Policy version 3.7.2: no changes required.
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Italian (thanks, Luca Monducci; closes: #360348).
+    - Add Galician (thanks, Jacobo Tarrio; closes: #361220).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 12 May 2006 12:48:24 +0100
+openssh (1:4.2p1-8) unstable; urgency=low
+  [ Frans Pop ]
+  * Use udeb support introduced in debhelper 4.2.0 (available in sarge)
+    rather than constructing udebs by steam.
+  * Require debhelper 5.0.22, which generates correct shared library
+    dependencies for udebs (closes: #360068). This build-dependency can be
+    ignored if building on sarge.
+  [ Colin Watson ]
+  * Switch to debhelper compatibility level 4, since we now require
+    debhelper 4 even on sarge anyway for udeb support.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 31 Mar 2006 09:44:55 +0100
+openssh (1:4.2p1-7) unstable; urgency=low
+  * I accidentally applied the default $PATH change in 1:4.2p1-6 to the udeb
+    rather than the deb. Fixed.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed,  1 Mar 2006 16:19:00 +0000
+openssh (1:4.2p1-6) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Sync default values of $PATH from shadow 1:4.0.12-6, adding /usr/bin/X11
+    to the normal and superuser paths and /usr/games to the normal path.
+  * When the client receives a signal, don't fatal() with "Killed by signal
+    %d." (which produces unhelpful noise on stderr and causes confusion for
+    users of some applications that wrap ssh); instead, generate a debug
+    message and exit with the traditional status (closes: #313371).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Add Swedish (thanks, Daniel Nylander; closes: #333133).
+    - Update Spanish (thanks, Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña;
+      closes: #341371).
+    - Correct erroneously-changed Last-Translator headers in Greek and
+      Spanish translations.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 20 Feb 2006 16:50:55 +0000
+openssh (1:4.2p1-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Add a CVE name to the 1:4.0p1-1 changelog entry.
+  * Build-depend on libselinux1-dev on armeb.
+  * Only send GSSAPI proposal if GSSAPIAuthentication is enabled.
+  * Build-depend on libssl-dev (>= 0.9.8-1) to cope with surprise OpenSSL
+    transition, since otherwise who knows what the buildds will do. If
+    you're building openssh yourself, you can safely ignore this and use an
+    older libssl-dev.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri,  7 Oct 2005 12:23:42 +0100
+openssh (1:4.2p1-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Initialise token to GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER in ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism
+    (closes: #328606).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 16 Sep 2005 12:50:16 +0100
+openssh (1:4.2p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Add prototype for ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms (closes: #328372).
+  * Interoperate with ssh-krb5 << 3.8.1p1-1 servers, which used a slightly
+    different version of the gssapi authentication method (thanks, Aaron M.
+    Ucko; closes: #328388).
+  * Explicitly tell po2debconf to use the 'popular' output encoding, so that
+    the woody-compatibility hack works even with po-debconf 0.9.0.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 15 Sep 2005 09:28:21 +0100
+openssh (1:4.2p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Annotate 1:4.2p1-1 changelog with CVE references.
+  * Add remaining pieces of Kerberos support (closes: #152657, #275472):
+    - Add GSSAPI key exchange support from
+      http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh.html (thanks, Stephen
+      Frost).
+    - Build-depend on libkrb5-dev and configure --with-kerberos5=/usr.
+    - openssh-client and openssh-server replace ssh-krb5.
+    - Update commented-out Kerberos/GSSAPI options in default sshd_config.
+    - Fix HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H/HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H typos in
+      gss-serv-krb5.c.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 14 Sep 2005 18:28:49 +0100
+openssh (1:4.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release.
+    - SECURITY (CAN-2005-2797): Fix a bug introduced in OpenSSH 4.0 that
+      caused GatewayPorts to be incorrectly activated for dynamic ("-D")
+      port forwardings when no listen address was explicitly specified
+      (closes: #326065).
+    - SECURITY (CAN-2005-2798): Fix improper delegation of GSSAPI
+      credentials. This code is only built in openssh-krb5, not openssh, but
+      I mention the CVE reference here anyway for completeness.
+    - Add a new compression method ("Compression delayed") that delays zlib
+      compression until after authentication, eliminating the risk of zlib
+      vulnerabilities being exploited by unauthenticated users. Note that
+      users of OpenSSH versions earlier than 3.5 will need to disable
+      compression on the client or set "Compression yes" (losing this
+      security benefit) on the server.
+    - Increase the default size of new RSA/DSA keys generated by ssh-keygen
+      from 1024 to 2048 bits (closes: #181162).
+    - Many bugfixes and improvements to connection multiplexing.
+    - Don't pretend to accept $HOME (closes: #208648).
+  * debian/rules: Resynchronise CFLAGS with that generated by configure.
+  * openssh-client and openssh-server conflict with pre-split ssh to avoid
+    problems when ssh is left un-upgraded (closes: #324695).
+  * Set X11Forwarding to yes in the default sshd_config (new installs only).
+    At least when X11UseLocalhost is turned on, which is the default, the
+    security risks of using X11 forwarding are risks to the client, not to
+    the server (closes: #320104).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 14 Sep 2005 15:16:14 +0100
+openssh (1:4.1p1-7) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Do the IDEA host key check on a temporary file to avoid altering
+    /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key itself (closes: #312312).
+  * Work around the ssh-askpass alternative somehow ending up in manual mode
+    pointing to the obsolete /usr/lib/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass.
+  * Add GNU/kFreeBSD support (thanks, Aurelien Jarno; closes: #318113).
+  * Fix XSIish uses of 'test' in openssh-server.preinst.
+  * Policy version 3.6.2: no changes required.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri,  2 Sep 2005 16:18:11 +0100
+openssh (1:4.1p1-6) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Fix one-character typo that meant the binaries in openssh-client and
+    openssh-server got recompiled with the wrong options during
+    'debian/rules install' (closes: #317088, #317238, #317241).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu,  7 Jul 2005 10:56:16 +0100
+openssh (1:4.1p1-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Build-depend on libselinux1-dev on ppc64 too (closes: #314625).
+  * Drop priority of ssh to extra to match the override file.
+  * Make /usr/share/doc/openssh-server and /usr/share/doc/ssh symlinks to
+    /usr/share/doc/openssh-client (closes: #314745).
+  * Ship README.dns (closes: #284874).
+  * Disable btmp logging, since Debian's /var/log/btmp has inappropriate
+    permissions (closes: #314956).
+  * Allow ~/.ssh/config to be group-writable, provided that the group in
+    question contains only the file's owner (closes: #314347).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Brazilian Portuguese (thanks, André Luís Lopes;
+      closes: #315477).
+    - Add Vietnamese (thanks, Clytie Siddall; closes: #316636).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun,  3 Jul 2005 17:08:08 +0100
+openssh (1:4.1p1-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * openssh-client and openssh-server conflict with ssh-krb5, as ssh-krb5
+    only conflicts with ssh (closes: #312475).
+  * SELinux support (thanks, Manoj Srivastava; closes: #308555):
+    - Added SELinux capability, and turned it on be default. Added
+      restorecon calls in preinst and postinst (should not matter if the
+      machine is not SELinux aware). By and large, the changes made should
+      have no effect unless the rules file calls --with-selinux; and even
+      then there should be no performance hit for machines not actively
+      running SELinux.
+    - Modified the preinst and postinst to call restorecon to set the
+      security context for the generated public key files.
+    - Added a comment to /etc/pam.d/ssh to indicate that an SELinux system
+      may want to also include pam_selinux.so.
+  * Re-enable ssh-askpass-gnome on the Hurd, now that its build-dependencies
+    are available.
+  * Restore /usr/lib/sftp-server temporarily, as a symlink to
+    /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server (closes: #312891).
+  * Switch to debhelper compatibility level 3, since 2 is deprecated.
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update German (thanks, Jens Seidel; closes: #313949).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 17 Jun 2005 14:20:20 +0100
+openssh (1:4.1p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Upload to unstable.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon,  6 Jun 2005 22:28:33 +0100
+openssh (1:4.1p1-2) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Drop debconf support for allowing SSH protocol 1, which is discouraged
+    and has not been the default since openssh 1:3.0.1p1-1. Users who need
+    this should edit sshd_config instead (closes: #147212).
+  * Since ssh-keysign isn't used by default (you need to set
+    EnableSSHKeysign to "yes" in /etc/ssh/ssh_config), having a debconf
+    question to ask whether it should be setuid is overkill, and the
+    question text had got out of date anyway. Remove this question, ship
+    ssh-keysign setuid in openssh-client.deb, and set a statoverride if the
+    debconf question was previously set to false.
+  * Add lintian overrides for the above (setuid-binary,
+    no-debconf-templates).
+  * Fix picky lintian errors about slogin symlinks.
+  * Fix DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS/DEB_HOST_GNU_SYSTEM compatibility handling.
+  * Apply Linux 2.2 workaround (see #239999) only on Linux.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu,  2 Jun 2005 00:55:58 +0100
+openssh (1:4.1p1-1) experimental; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release.
+    - Normalise socket addresses returned by get_remote_hostname(), fixing
+      4-in-6 mapping issues with AllowUsers et al (closes: #192234).
+  * Take upstream's hint and disable the unsupported USE_POSIX_THREADS
+    (closes: #295757, #308868, and possibly others; may open other bugs).
+    Use PAM password authentication to avoid #278394. In future I may
+    provide two sets of binaries built with and without this option, since
+    it seems I can't win.
+  * Disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication in new installations, returning
+    to PasswordAuthentication by default, since it now supports PAM and
+    apparently works better with a non-threaded sshd (closes: #247521).
+  * openssh-server Suggests: rssh (closes: #233012).
+  * Change libexecdir to /usr/lib/openssh, and fix up various alternatives
+    and configuration files to match (closes: #87900, #151321).
+  * Fix up very old sshd_config files that refer to /usr/libexec/sftp-server
+    (closes: #141979).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 31 May 2005 01:33:33 +0100
+openssh (1:4.0p1-1) experimental; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release.
+    - Port-forwarding specifications now take optional bind addresses, and
+      the server allows client-specified bind addresses for remote port
+      forwardings when configured with "GatewayPorts clientspecified"
+      (closes: #87253, #192206).
+    - ssh and ssh-keyscan now support hashing of known_hosts files for
+      improved privacy (CAN-2005-2666). ssh-keygen has new options for
+      managing known_hosts files, which understand hashing.
+    - sftp supports command history and editing support using libedit
+      (closes: #287013).
+    - Have scp and sftp wait for the spawned ssh to exit before they exit
+      themselves, allowing ssh to restore terminal modes (closes: #257130).
+    - Improved the handling of bad data in authorized_keys files,
+      eliminating fatal errors on corrupt or very large keys; e.g. linefeeds
+      in keys only produce errors in auth.log now (closes: #220726).
+    - Add "command mode" to ssh connection multiplexing (closes: #303452).
+    - Mention $HOME/.hushlogin in sshd(8) FILES section (closes: #163933).
+  * Make gnome-ssh-askpass stay above other windows (thanks, Liyang HU;
+    closes: #296487).
+  * Remove obsolete and unnecessary ssh/forward_warning debconf note.
+  * Hurd build fixes (although sshd still doesn't work):
+    - Restore X forwarding fix from #102991, lost somewhere along the way.
+    - Link with -lcrypt.
+    - Link with -lpthread rather than -pthread.
+    - Don't build ssh-askpass-gnome on the Hurd, until GNOME is available to
+      satisfy build-dependencies.
+  * Drop workaround for #242462 on amd64; it's been fixed properly upstream.
+  * Enable HashKnownHosts by default. This only affects new entries; use
+    'ssh-keygen -H' to convert an entire known_hosts file to hashed format.
+  * Note in ssh_config(5) that the SetupTimeOut option is Debian-specific
+    (closes: #307069).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Czech (thanks, Miroslav Kure; closes: #298744).
+    - Update Finnish (thanks, Matti Pöllä; closes: #303787).
+    - Synchronise Spanish with sarge branch (thanks, Javier
+      Fernández-Sanguino Peña; closes: #298536).
+    - Add Ukrainian (thanks, Eugeniy Meshcheryakov; closes: #301852).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 26 May 2005 11:23:18 +0100
+openssh (1:3.9p1-3) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Explain how to run sshd from inittab in README.Debian (closes: #147360).
+  * Add debian/watch file.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 18 Feb 2005 00:20:16 +0000
+openssh (1:3.9p1-2) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Remove pam_nologin from /etc/pam.d/ssh, as sshd's built-in support
+    appears to be sufficient and more useful (closes: #162996).
+  * Depend on debconf | debconf-2.0.
+  * Drop LoginGraceTime back to the upstream default of two minutes on new
+    installs (closes: #289573).
+  * debconf template translations from Ubuntu bug #1232:
+    - Update Greek (thanks, Logiotatidis George).
+    - Update Spanish (thanks, Santiago Erquicia).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 15 Jan 2005 12:37:54 +0000
+openssh (1:3.9p1-1) experimental; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release.
+    - PAM password authentication implemented again (closes: #238699,
+      #242119).
+    - Implemented the ability to pass selected environment variables between
+      the client and the server.
+    - Fix ssh-keyscan breakage when remote server doesn't speak SSH protocol
+      (closes: #228828).
+    - Fix res_query detection (closes: #242462).
+    - 'ssh -c' documentation improved (closes: #265627).
+  * Pass LANG and LC_* environment variables from the client by default, and
+    accept them to the server by default in new installs, although not on
+    upgrade (closes: #264024).
+  * Build ssh in binary-indep, not binary-arch (thanks, LaMont Jones).
+  * Expand on openssh-client package description (closes: #273831).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue,  4 Jan 2005 14:18:31 +0000
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-14) experimental; urgency=low
+  * We use DH_COMPAT=2, so build-depend on debhelper (>= 2).
+  * Fix timing information leak allowing discovery of invalid usernames in
+    PAM keyboard-interactive authentication (backported from a patch by
+    Darren Tucker; closes: #281595).
+  * Make sure that there's a delay in PAM keyboard-interactive
+    authentication when PermitRootLogin is not set to yes and the correct
+    root password is entered (closes: #248747).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 28 Nov 2004 18:09:37 +0000
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-13) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Enable threading for PAM, on Sam Hartman's advice (closes: #278394).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Dutch (thanks, cobaco; closes: #278715).
+  * Correct README.Debian's ForwardX11Trusted description (closes: #280190).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 12 Nov 2004 12:03:13 +0000
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-12) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Preserve /etc/ssh/sshd_config ownership/permissions (closes: #276754).
+  * Shorten the version string from the form "OpenSSH_3.8.1p1 Debian
+    1:3.8.1p1-8.sarge.1" to "OpenSSH_3.8.1p1 Debian-8.sarge.1", as some SSH
+    implementations apparently have problems with the long version string.
+    This is of course a bug in those implementations, but since the extent
+    of the problem is unknown it's best to play safe (closes: #275731).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Add Finnish (thanks, Matti Pöllä; closes: #265339).
+    - Update Danish (thanks, Morten Brix Pedersen; closes: #275895).
+    - Update French (thanks, Denis Barbier; closes: #276703).
+    - Update Japanese (thanks, Kenshi Muto; closes: #277438).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 24 Oct 2004 19:21:17 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-11) experimental; urgency=high
+  * Move sshd_config(5) to openssh-server, where it belongs.
+  * If PasswordAuthentication is disabled, then offer to disable
+    ChallengeResponseAuthentication too. The current PAM code will attempt
+    password-style authentication if ChallengeResponseAuthentication is
+    enabled (closes: #250369).
+  * This will ask a question of anyone who installed fresh with 1:3.8p1-2 or
+    later and then upgraded. Sorry about that ... for this reason, the
+    default answer is to leave ChallengeResponseAuthentication enabled.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed,  6 Oct 2004 14:28:20 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-10) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Don't install the ssh-askpass-gnome .desktop file by default; I've had
+    too many GNOME people tell me it's the wrong thing to be doing. I've
+    left it in /usr/share/doc/ssh-askpass-gnome/examples/ for now.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 25 Aug 2004 18:18:14 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-9) experimental; urgency=low
+  * Split the ssh binary package into openssh-client and openssh-server
+    (closes: #39741). openssh-server depends on openssh-client for some
+    common functionality; it didn't seem worth creating yet another package
+    for this. openssh-client is priority standard, openssh-server optional.
+  * New transitional ssh package, priority optional, depending on
+    openssh-client and openssh-server. May be removed once nothing depends
+    on it.
+  * When upgrading from ssh to openssh-{client,server}, it's very difficult
+    for the maintainer scripts to find out what version we're upgrading from
+    without dodgy dpkg hackery. I've therefore taken the opportunity to move
+    a couple of debconf notes into NEWS files, namely ssh/ssh2_keys_merged
+    and ssh/user_environment_tell.
+  * Add a heuristic to try to make sure the sshd_config upgrade to >= 3.7
+    happens even though we don't know what version we're upgrading from.
+  * Remove /etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run on purge of openssh-server. For now
+    (until sarge+2) it's still honoured to avoid breaking existing
+    configurations, but the right approach is now to remove the
+    openssh-server package if you don't want to run the server. Add a NEWS
+    item to that effect.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon,  2 Aug 2004 20:48:54 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-8.sarge.4) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Fix timing information leak allowing discovery of invalid usernames in
+    PAM keyboard-interactive authentication (backported from a patch by
+    Darren Tucker; closes: #281595).
+  * Make sure that there's a delay in PAM keyboard-interactive
+    authentication when PermitRootLogin is not set to yes and the correct
+    root password is entered (closes: #248747).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 28 Nov 2004 12:37:16 +0000
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-8.sarge.3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Enable threading for PAM, on Sam Hartman's advice (closes: #278394).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Update Dutch (thanks, cobaco; closes: #278715).
+  * Correct README.Debian's ForwardX11Trusted description (closes: #280190).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 12 Nov 2004 10:31:12 +0000
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-8.sarge.2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Preserve /etc/ssh/sshd_config ownership/permissions (closes: #276754).
+  * Shorten the version string from the form "OpenSSH_3.8.1p1 Debian
+    1:3.8.1p1-8.sarge.1" to "OpenSSH_3.8.1p1 Debian-8.sarge.1", as some SSH
+    implementations apparently have problems with the long version string.
+    This is of course a bug in those implementations, but since the extent
+    of the problem is unknown it's best to play safe (closes: #275731).
+  * debconf template translations:
+    - Add Finnish (thanks, Matti Pöllä; closes: #265339).
+    - Update Danish (thanks, Morten Brix Pedersen; closes: #275895).
+    - Update French (thanks, Denis Barbier; closes: #276703).
+    - Update Japanese (thanks, Kenshi Muto; closes: #277438).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 24 Oct 2004 17:57:14 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-8.sarge.1) unstable; urgency=high
+  * If PasswordAuthentication is disabled, then offer to disable
+    ChallengeResponseAuthentication too. The current PAM code will attempt
+    password-style authentication if ChallengeResponseAuthentication is
+    enabled (closes: #250369).
+  * This will ask a question of anyone who installed fresh with 1:3.8p1-2 or
+    later and then upgraded. Sorry about that ... for this reason, the
+    default answer is to leave ChallengeResponseAuthentication enabled.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed,  6 Oct 2004 14:21:55 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-8) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Matthew Vernon:
+    - Add a GPL exception to the licensing terms of the Debian patch
+      (closes: #211644).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 29 Jul 2004 13:28:47 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-7) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Re-enable shadow password support in openssh-server-udeb, at Bastian
+    Blank's request (closes: #260800).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 22 Jul 2004 10:56:06 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-6) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Implement hack in
+    http://lists.debian.org/debian-boot/2004/07/msg01207.html to get
+    openssh-client-udeb to show up as a retrievable debian-installer
+    component.
+  * Generate host keys in postinst only if the relevant HostKey directives
+    are found in sshd_config (closes: #87946).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 21 Jul 2004 15:14:46 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Update German debconf template translation (thanks, Helge Kreutzmann;
+    closes: #252226).
+  * Remove Suggests: dnsutils, as it was only needed for
+    make-ssh-known-hosts (#93265), which has been replaced by ssh-keyscan.
+  * Disable shadow password support in openssh-server-udeb.
+  * Fix non-portable shell constructs in maintainer scripts, Makefile, and
+    ssh-copy-id (thanks, David Weinehall; closes: #258517).
+  * Apply patch from Darren Tucker to make the PAM authentication SIGCHLD
+    handler kill the PAM thread if its waitpid() call returns 0, as well as
+    the previous check for -1 (closes: #252676).
+  * Add scp and sftp to openssh-client-udeb. It might not be very 'u' any
+    more; oh well.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 10 Jul 2004 13:57:27 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-4) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Kill off PAM thread if privsep slave dies (closes: #248125).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 28 May 2004 17:58:45 -0300
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Add ssh-keygen to openssh-server-udeb.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 20 May 2004 16:31:52 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Add Catalan debconf template translation (thanks, Aleix Badia i Bosch;
+    closes: #248748).
+  * openssh-client-udeb and openssh-server-udeb depend on libnss-files-udeb
+    (not yet uploaded).
+  * Restore ssh-askpass-gnome binary, lost by mistake.
+  * Don't link against libnsl in udeb builds.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 20 May 2004 11:15:58 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release.
+    - Use a longer buffer for tty names in utmp (closes: #247538).
+  * Make sure there's a newline at the end of sshd_config before adding
+    'UsePAM yes' (closes: #244829).
+  * Generate a new .orig.tar.gz without RFC.nroff, and remove
+    /usr/share/doc/ssh/RFC.gz (closes: #211640). It isn't DFSG-free and only
+    documents the obsolete SSH1 protocol, not to mention that it was never a
+    real RFC but only an Internet-Draft. It's available from
+    http://www.free.lp.se/bamse/draft-ylonen-ssh-protocol-00.txt if you want
+    it for some reason.
+  * Add openssh-client-udeb and openssh-server-udeb binary packages for use
+    in debian-installer. They still need libnss_files to be supplied in udeb
+    form by glibc.
+  * Work around lack of res_query weak alias in libresolv on amd64 (see
+    #242462, awaiting real fix upstream).
+  * Fix grammar in sshd(8) (closes: #238753).
+  * Add .desktop file and icon for ssh-askpass-gnome (closes: #232333).
+  * Update Polish debconf template translation (thanks, Emil Nowak;
+    closes: #242808).
+  * Add Turkish debconf template translation (thanks, Recai Oktaş;
+    closes: #246068).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 11 May 2004 23:38:10 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Remove deprecated ReverseMappingCheck option from newly generated
+    sshd_config files (closes: #239987).
+  * Build everything apart from contrib in a subdirectory, to allow for
+    multiple builds.
+  * Some older kernels are missing setresuid() and setresgid(), so don't try
+    to use them. setreuid() and setregid() will do well enough for our
+    purposes (closes: #239999).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon,  5 Apr 2004 21:23:43 +0100
+openssh (1:3.8p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Disable PasswordAuthentication for new installations (closes: #236810).
+  * Turn off the new ForwardX11Trusted by default, returning to the
+    semantics of 3.7 and earlier, since it seems immature and causes far too
+    many problems with existing setups. See README.Debian for details
+    (closes: #237021).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 10 Mar 2004 10:33:07 +0000
+openssh (1:3.8p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (closes: #232281):
+    - New PAM implementation based on that in FreeBSD. This runs PAM session
+      modules before dropping privileges (closes: #132681, #150968).
+    - Since PAM session modules are run as root, we can turn pam_limits back
+      on by default, and it no longer spits out "Operation not permitted" to
+      syslog (closes: #171673).
+    - Password expiry works again (closes: #153235).
+    - 'ssh -q' suppresses login banner (closes: #134589).
+    - sshd doesn't lie to PAM about invalid usernames (closes: #157078).
+    - ssh-add prints key comment on each prompt (closes: #181869).
+    - Punctuation formatting fixed in man pages (closes: #191131).
+    - EnableSSHKeysign documented in ssh_config(5) (closes: #224457).
+  * Add 'UsePAM yes' to /etc/ssh/sshd_config on upgrade from versions older
+    than this, to maintain the standard Debian sshd configuration.
+  * Comment out PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt and RhostsAuthentication in
+    sshd_config on upgrade. Neither option is supported any more.
+  * Privilege separation and PAM are now properly supported together, so
+    remove both debconf questions related to them and simply set it
+    unconditionally in newly generated sshd_config files (closes: #228838).
+  * ServerAliveInterval implemented upstream, so ProtocolKeepAlives is now a
+    compatibility alias. The semantics differ slightly, though; see
+    ssh_config(5) for details.
+  * Implement SSH1 support for ServerAliveInterval using SSH_MSG_IGNORE. As
+    documented in ssh_config(5), it's not as good as the SSH2 version.
+  * Remove -fno-builtin-log, -DHAVE_MMAP_ANON_SHARED, and
+    -D__FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 compiler options, which are no longer necessary.
+  * Update config.guess and config.sub from autotools-dev 20040105.1.
+  * Darren Tucker:
+    - Reset signal status when starting pam auth thread, prevent hanging
+      during PAM keyboard-interactive authentications.
+    - Fix a non-security-critical segfault in PAM authentication.
+  * Add debconf template translations:
+    - Greek (thanks, Konstantinos Margaritis; closes: #232843).
+    - Italian (thanks, Renato Gini; closes: #234777).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat,  6 Mar 2004 18:43:44 +0000
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-12) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Update Spanish debconf template translation (thanks, Javier
+    Fernández-Sanguino Peña; closes: #228242).
+  * Add debconf template translations:
+    - Czech (thanks, Miroslav Kure; closes: #230110).
+    - Simplified Chinese (thanks, Hiei Xu; closes: #230726).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 11 Feb 2004 09:37:57 +0000
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-11) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Comment out pam_limits in default configuration, for now at least
+    (closes: #198254).
+  * Use invoke-rc.d (if it exists) to run the init script.
+  * Backport format string bug fix in sshconnect.c (closes: #225238).
+  * ssh-copy-id exits if ssh fails (closes: #215252).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun,  4 Jan 2004 18:59:21 +0000
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-10) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Use --retry in init script when restarting rather than sleeping, to make
+    sure the old process is dead (thanks, Herbert Xu; closes: #212117).
+    Depend on dpkg (>= 1.9.0) for start-stop-daemon's --retry option.
+  * Update debconf template translations:
+    - Brazilian Portuguese (thanks, Andre Luis Lopes; closes: #219844).
+    - Danish (thanks, Morten Brix Pedersen; closes: #217964).
+    - Japanese (thanks, Kenshi Muto; closes: #212497).
+    - Russian (thanks, Ilgiz Kalmetev).
+    - Spanish (thanks, Carlos Valdivia Yagüe; closes: #211832).
+  * Add Dutch debconf template translation (thanks, cobaco;
+    closes: #215372).
+  * Update config.guess and config.sub from autotools-dev 20031007.1
+    (closes: #217696).
+  * Implement New World Order for PAM configuration, including
+    /etc/pam.d/common-* from /etc/pam.d/ssh (closes: #212959).
+    - To backport this release to woody, you need to set DEB_BUILD_SSH_WOODY
+      in your environment. See README.Debian.
+  * Add more commentary to /etc/pam.d/ssh.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 16 Nov 2003 01:14:16 +0000
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-9) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Merge even more buffer allocation fixes from upstream (CAN-2003-0682;
+    closes: #211434).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 19 Sep 2003 10:25:25 +0100
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-8) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Merge more buffer allocation fixes from new upstream version 3.7.1p1
+    (closes: #211324).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 17 Sep 2003 03:07:19 +0100
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-7) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Update debconf template translations:
+    - French (thanks, Christian Perrier; closes: #208801).
+    - Japanese (thanks, Kenshi Muto; closes: #210380).
+  * Some small improvements to the English templates courtesy of Christian
+    Perrier. I've manually unfuzzied a few translations where it was
+    obvious, on Christian's advice, but the others will have to be updated.
+  * Document how to generate an RSA1 host key (closes: #141703).
+  * Incorporate NMU fix for early buffer expansion vulnerability,
+    CAN-2003-0693 (closes: #211205). Thanks to Michael Stone.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 16 Sep 2003 14:32:28 +0100
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-6.0) unstable; urgency=high
+  * SECURITY: fix for CAN-2003-0693, buffer allocation error
+ -- Michael Stone <mstone@debian.org>  Tue, 16 Sep 2003 08:27:07 -0400
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-6) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Use a more CVS-friendly means of setting SSH_VERSION.
+  * Update Brazilian Portuguese debconf template translation (thanks, Andre
+    Luis Lopes; closes: #208036).
+  * Don't run 'sshd -t' in init script if the server isn't to be run
+    (closes: #197576).
+  * Fix login delay, spurious auth.log entry, and PermitRootLogin
+    information leakage due to PAM issues with upstream's recent security
+    update (thanks, Darren Tucker; closes: #99168, #192207, #193546).
+  * Policy version 3.6.1: recode this changelog to UTF-8.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed,  3 Sep 2003 19:14:02 +0100
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Disable cmsg_type check for file descriptor passing when running on
+    Linux 2.0 (closes: #150976). Remove comments about non-functional
+    privilege separation on 2.0 from ssh/privsep_ask and ssh/privsep_tell
+    debconf questions and from README.Debian, since it should all now work.
+  * Fix "defails" typo in generated sshd_config (closes: #206484).
+  * Backport upstream patch to strip trailing whitespace (including
+    newlines) from configuration directives (closes: #192079).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 27 Aug 2003 02:19:57 +0100
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * getent can get just one key; no need to use grep (thanks, James Troup).
+  * Move /usr/local/bin to the front of the default path, following
+    /etc/login.defs (closes: #201150).
+  * Remove specifics of problematic countries from package description
+    (closes: #197040).
+  * Update Spanish debconf template translation (thanks, Carlos Valdivia
+    Yagüe; closes: #198456).
+  * Backport upstream patch to pass monitor signals through to child
+    (closes: #164797).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 27 Jul 2003 17:31:15 +0100
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Update French debconf template translation (thanks, Christian Perrier;
+    closes: #194323).
+  * Version the adduser dependency for --no-create-home (closes: #195756).
+  * Add a version of moduli(5), namely revision 1.7 of
+    http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/share/man/man5/moduli.5 with
+    '/etc/moduli' changed to '/etc/ssh/moduli' throughout (closes: #196061).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon,  9 Jun 2003 02:51:35 +0100
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Force /etc/default/ssh to be non-executable, since dpkg apparently
+    doesn't deal with permissions changes on conffiles (closes: #192966).
+  * Use debconf 0.5's seen flag rather than the deprecated isdefault.
+  * Add GPL location to copyright file.
+  * Remove debian/postinst.old.
+  * Switch to po-debconf, with some careful manual use of po2debconf to
+    ensure that the source package continues to build smoothly on woody
+    (closes: #183986).
+  * Update debconf template translations:
+    - Brazilian Portugese (thanks, Andre Luis Lopes; see #183986).
+    - Japanese (thanks, Tomohiro KUBOTA; closes: #192429).
+  * Compile with -fno-builtin-log for now, otherwise gcc-3.3 complains
+    "log.h:59: warning: conflicting types for built-in function `log'". The
+    OpenSSH log() function has been renamed in upstream CVS.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 19 May 2003 01:52:38 +0100
+openssh (1:3.6.1p2-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release, including fix for PAM user-discovery security hole
+    (closes: #191681).
+  * Fix ChallengeResponseAuthentication default in generated sshd_config
+    (closes: #106037).
+  * Put newlines after full stops in man page documentation for
+    ProtocolKeepAlives and SetupTimeOut.
+  * Policy version 3.5.9: support DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS=noopt, build
+    gnome-ssh-askpass with -g and -Wall flags.
+  * Really ask ssh/new_config debconf question before trying to fetch its
+    value (closes: #188721).
+  * On purge, remove only the files we know about in /etc/ssh rather than
+    the whole thing, and remove the directory if that leaves it empty
+    (closes: #176679).
+  * ssh has depended on debconf for some time now with no complaints, so:
+    - Simplify the postinst by relying on debconf being present. (The absent
+      case was buggy anyway.)
+    - Get rid of "if you have not installed debconf" text in README.Debian,
+      and generally update the "/usr/bin/ssh not SUID" entry.
+  * More README.Debian work:
+    - Reorganize into "UPGRADE ISSUES" and "OTHER ISSUES", in an effort to
+      make it easier for people to find the former. The upgrade issues
+      should probably be sorted by version somehow.
+    - Document X11UseLocalhost under "X11 Forwarding" (closes: #150913).
+  * Fix setting of IP flags for interactive sessions (upstream bug #541).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon,  5 May 2003 17:47:40 +0100
+openssh (1:3.6.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (thanks, Laurence J. Lane).
+  * debian/control: ssh-askpass-gnome is now Section: gnome, following the
+    override file.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed,  2 Apr 2003 00:51:02 +0100
+openssh (1:3.6p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release.
+    - Workaround applied upstream for a bug in the interaction of glibc's
+      getaddrinfo() with the Linux 2.2 kernel (closes: #155814).
+    - As such, it should now be safe to remove --with-ipv4-default, so
+      starting sshd with -6 is no longer necessary (closes: #79861 and lots
+      of other merged bugs).
+    - ssh-copy-id prints usage when run without arguments (closes: #71376).
+    - scp exits 1 if ssh fails (closes: #138400).
+    - sshd writes to utmp's ut_addr_v6 field in IPv6 mode (closes: #167867).
+    - 'ssh-add -c' causes ssh-agent to ask the user each time a key is used
+      (closes: #109795).
+  * Install /etc/default/ssh non-executable (closes: #185537).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 31 Mar 2003 23:00:59 +0100
+openssh (1:3.5p1-5) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Add /etc/default/ssh (closes: #161049).
+  * Run the init script under 'set -e' (closes: #175010).
+  * Change the default superuser path to include /sbin, /usr/sbin, and
+    /usr/local/sbin (closes: #128235, #151267). Using login.defs would be
+    nice, but that belongs to another package. Without a defined API to
+    retrieve its settings, parsing it is off-limits.
+  * Build ssh-askpass-gnome with GNOME 2. The source package should still
+    support building on stable with GNOME 1, using the alternate
+    libgnome-dev build-dependency (thanks, Colin Walters; closes: #167582).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun,  9 Mar 2003 20:12:10 +0000
+openssh (1:3.5p1-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Point rlogin and rcp alternatives at slogin and scp respectively rather
+    than ssh (closes: #121103, #151666). Fix alternative removal to match;
+    previously it was completely wrong anyway.
+  * Find out whether /etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run exists and set the debconf
+    question's default using that information, rather than using debconf as
+    a registry. Other solutions may be better in the long run, but this is
+    at least correct (thanks, Matthew Woodcraft; closes: #84725).
+  * Stop using pam_lastlog, as it doesn't currently work well as a session
+    module when privilege separation is enabled; it can usually read
+    /var/log/lastlog but can't write to it. Instead, just use sshd's
+    built-in support, already enabled by default (closes: #151297, #169938).
+  * Use 'ssh-keygen -q' rather than redirecting output to /dev/null.
+  * Add a "this may take some time" warning when creating host keys on
+    installation (part of #110094).
+  * When restarting via the init script, check for sshd_not_to_be_run after
+    stopping sshd (idea from Tomas Pospisek; closes: #149850).
+  * Append /usr/sbin:/sbin to the init script's $PATH, just in case of
+    strangeness (closes: #115138).
+  * Fix a dpkg-statoverride call to redirect stdout to /dev/null, not
+    stderr.
+  * Correct copyright file typo: "orignal" -> "original" (closes: #176490).
+  * Rebuild with libssl0.9.7 (closes: #176983).
+  * We're up to policy version 3.5.6. DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS stuff still needs to
+    be looked at.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 18 Jan 2003 01:37:23 +0000
+openssh (1:3.5p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Happy new year!
+  * Use getent rather than id to find out whether the sshd user exists
+    (closes: #150974).
+  * Remove some duplication from the postinst's ssh-keysign setuid code.
+  * Replace db_text with db_input throughout debian/config. (db_text has
+    been a compatibility wrapper since debconf 0.1.5.)
+  * Warn about PermitUserEnvironment on upgrade (closes: #167895).
+  * Use 'make install-nokeys', and disable unused debhelper commands,
+    thereby forward-porting the last pieces of Zack Weinberg's patch
+    (closes: #68341).
+  * Move the man page for gnome-ssh-askpass from the ssh package to
+    ssh-askpass-gnome (closes: #174449).
+  * Build with -DLOGIN_NO_ENDOPT, since Debian's /bin/login doesn't accept
+    '--' to terminate the list of options (closes: #171554).
+  * Add Jonathan Amery's ssh-argv0 script (closes: #111341).
+  * Update Danish debconf template (thanks, Morten Brix Pedersen;
+    closes: #174757).
+  * Document setgid ssh-agent's effect on certain environment variables in
+    README.Debian (closes: #167974).
+  * Document interoperability problems between scp and ssh.com's server in
+    README.Debian, and suggest some workarounds (closes: #174662).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed,  1 Jan 2003 14:18:30 +0000
+openssh (1:3.5p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Mention in the ssh package description that it provides both ssh and
+    sshd (closes: #99680).
+  * Create a system group for ssh-agent, not a user group (closes: #167669).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon,  4 Nov 2002 13:43:53 +0000
+openssh (1:3.5p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release.
+    - Fixes typo in ssh-add usage (closes: #152239).
+    - Fixes 'PermitRootLogin forced-commands-only' (closes: #166184).
+    - ~/.ssh/environment and environment= options in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+      are deprecated for security reasons and will eventually go away. For
+      now they can be re-enabled by setting 'PermitUserEnvironment yes' in
+      sshd_config.
+    - ssh-agent is installed setgid to prevent ptrace() attacks. The group
+      actually doesn't matter, as it drops privileges immediately, but to
+      avoid confusion the postinst creates a new 'ssh' group for it.
+  * Obsolete patches:
+    - Solar Designer's privsep+compression patch for Linux 2.2 (see
+      1:3.3p1-0.0woody1).
+    - Hostbased auth ssh-keysign backport (see 1:3.4p1-4).
+  * Remove duplicated phrase in ssh_config(5) (closes: #152404).
+  * Source the debconf confmodule at the top of the postrm rather than at
+    the bottom, to avoid making future non-idempotency problems worse (see
+    #151035).
+  * Debconf templates:
+    - Add Polish (thanks, Grzegorz Kusnierz).
+    - Update French (thanks, Denis Barbier; closes: #132509).
+    - Update Spanish (thanks, Carlos Valdivia Yagüe; closes: #164716).
+  * Write a man page for gnome-ssh-askpass, and link it to ssh-askpass.1 if
+    this is the selected ssh-askpass alternative (closes: #67775).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 26 Oct 2002 19:41:51 +0100
+openssh (1:3.4p1-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Allow ssh-krb5 in ssh-askpass-gnome's dependencies (closes: #129532).
+  * Restore Russia to list of countries where encryption is problematic (see
+    #148951 and http://www.average.org/freecrypto/).
+  * Drop ssh-askpass-gnome's priority to optional, per the override file.
+  * Drop the PAM special case for hurd-i386 (closes: #99157).
+  * s/dile/idle/ in ssh_config(5) (closes: #118331).
+  * Note in README.Debian that you need xauth from xbase-clients on the
+    server for X11 forwarding (closes: #140269).
+  * Use correct path to upstream README in copyright file (closes: #146037).
+  * Document the units for ProtocolKeepAlives (closes: #159479).
+  * Backport upstream patch to fix hostbased auth (closes: #117114).
+  * Add -g to CFLAGS.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 13 Oct 2002 18:58:53 +0100
+openssh (1:3.4p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Add myself to Uploaders: and begin acting as temporary maintainer, at
+    Matthew's request. (Normal service will resume in some months' time.)
+  * Add sharutils to Build-Depends (closes: #138465).
+  * Stop creating the /usr/doc/ssh symlink.
+  * Fix some debconf template typos (closes: #160358).
+  * Split debconf templates into one file per language.
+  * Add debconf template translations:
+    - Brazilian Portuguese (thanks, Andre Luis Lopes; closes: #106173).
+    - Danish (thanks, Claus Hindsgaul; closes: #126607).
+    - Japanese (thanks, Tomohiro KUBOTA; closes: #137427).
+    - Russian (thanks, Ilgiz Kalmetev; closes: #136610).
+    - Spanish (thanks, Carlos Valdivia Yagüe; closes: #129041).
+  * Update debconf template translations:
+    - French (thanks, Igor Genibel; closes: #151361).
+    - German (thanks, Axel Noetzold; closes: #147069).
+  * Some of these translations are fuzzy. Please send updates.
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 13 Oct 2002 14:09:57 +0100
+openssh (1:3.4p1-2) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Get a security-fixed version into unstable
+  * Also tidy README.Debian up a little
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Fri, 28 Jun 2002 17:20:59 +0100
+openssh (1:3.4p1-1) testing; urgency=high
+  * Extend my tendrils back into this package (Closes: #150915, #151098)
+  * thanks to the security team for their work
+  * no thanks to ISS/Theo de Raadt for their handling of these bugs
+  * save old sshd_configs to sshd_config.dpkg-old when auto-generating a
+    new one
+  * tell/ask the user about PriviledgeSeparation
+  * /etc/init.d/ssh run will now create the chroot empty dir if necessary
+  * Remove our previous statoverride on /usr/bin/ssh (only for people
+    upgrading from a version where we'd put one in ourselves!)
+  * Stop slandering Russia, since someone asked so nicely (Closes: #148951)
+  * Reduce the sleep time in /etc/init.d/ssh during a restart
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Fri, 28 Jun 2002 15:52:10 +0100
+openssh (1:3.4p1-0.0woody1) testing-security; urgency=high
+  * NMU by the security team.
+  * New upstream version
+ -- Michael Stone <mstone@debian.org>  Wed, 26 Jun 2002 15:40:38 -0400
+openssh (1:3.3p1-0.0woody4) testing-security; urgency=high
+  * NMU by the security team.
+  * fix error when /etc/ssh/sshd_config exists on new install
+  * check that user doesn't exist before running adduser
+  * use openssl internal random unconditionally
+ -- Michael Stone <mstone@debian.org>  Tue, 25 Jun 2002 19:44:39 -0400
+openssh (1:3.3p1-0.0woody3) testing-security; urgency=high
+  * NMU by the security team.
+  * use correct home directory when sshd user is created
+ -- Michael Stone <mstone@debian.org>  Tue, 25 Jun 2002 08:59:50 -0400
+openssh (1:3.3p1-0.0woody2) testing-security; urgency=high
+  * NMU by the security team.
+  * Fix rsa1 key creation (Closes: #150949)
+  * don't fail if sshd user removal fails
+  * depends: on adduser (Closes: #150907)
+ -- Michael Stone <mstone@debian.org>  Tue, 25 Jun 2002 08:59:50 -0400
+openssh (1:3.3p1-0.0woody1) testing-security; urgency=high
+  * NMU by the security team.
+  * New upstream version.
+    - Enable privilege separation by default.
+  * Include patch from Solar Designer for privilege separation and
+    compression on 2.2.x kernels.
+  * Remove --disable-suid-ssh from configure.
+  * Support setuid ssh-keysign binary instead of setuid ssh client.
+  * Check sshd configuration before restarting.
+ -- Daniel Jacobowitz <dan@debian.org>  Mon, 24 Jun 2002 13:43:44 -0400
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-9) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Thanks to those who NMUd
+  * The only change in this version is to debian/control - I've removed
+    the bit that says you can't export it from the US - it would look
+    pretty daft to say this about a package in main! Also, it's now OK
+    to use crypto in France, so I've edited that comment slightly
+  * Correct a path in README.Debian too (Closes: #138634)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Sun,  4 Apr 2002 09:52:59 +0100
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-8.3) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * NMU
+  * Really set urgency to medium this time (oops)
+  * Fix priority to standard per override while I'm at it
+ -- Aaron M. Ucko <ucko@debian.org>  Sun, 24 Mar 2002 09:00:08 -0500
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-8.2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * NMU with maintainer's permission
+  * Prepare for upcoming ssh-nonfree transitional packages per
+    <http://lists.debian.org/debian-ssh/2002/debian-ssh-200203/msg00008.html>
+  * Urgency medium because it would really be good to get this into woody
+    before it releases
+  * Fix sections to match override file
+  * Reissued due to clash with non-US -> main move
+ -- Aaron M. Ucko <ucko@debian.org>  Sat, 23 Mar 2002 21:21:52 -0500
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-8.1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * NMU
+  * Move from non-US to mani
+ -- LaMont Jones <lamont@debian.org>  Thu, 21 Mar 2002 09:33:50 -0700
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-8) unstable; urgency=critical
+  * Security fix - patch from upstream (Closes: #137209, #137210)
+  * Undo the changes in the unreleased -7, since they appear to break
+    things here. Accordingly, the code change is minimal, and I'm
+    happy to get it into testing ASAP
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Thu,  7 Mar 2002 14:25:23 +0000
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-7) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Build to support IPv6 and IPv4 by default again
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Sat,  2 Mar 2002 00:25:05 +0000
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-6) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Correct error in the clean target (Closes: #130868)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Sat, 26 Jan 2002 00:32:00 +0000
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Include the Debian version in our identification, to make it easier to
+    audit networks for patched versions in future
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Mon, 21 Jan 2002 17:16:10 +0000
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-4) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * If we're asked to not run sshd, stop any running sshd's first
+    (Closes: #129327)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Wed, 16 Jan 2002 21:24:16 +0000
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-3) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Fix /etc/pam.d/ssh to not set $MAIL (Closes: #128913)
+  * Remove extra debconf suggestion (Closes: #128094)
+  * Mmm. speedy bug-fixing :-)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Sat, 12 Jan 2002 17:23:58 +0000
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-2) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Fix postinst to not automatically overwrite sshd_config (!)
+    (Closes: #127842, #127867)
+  * Add section in README.Debian about the PermitRootLogin setting
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Sat,  5 Jan 2003 05:26:30 +0000
+openssh (1:3.0.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Incorporate fix from Colin's NMU
+  * New upstream version (fixes the bug Wichert fixed) (Closes: #124035)
+  * Capitalise IETF (Closes: #125379)
+  * Refer to the correct sftp-server location (Closes: #126854, #126224)
+  * Do what we're asked re SetUID ssh (Closes: #124065, #124154, #123247)
+  * Ask people upgrading from potato if they want a new conffile
+    (Closes: #125642)
+  * Fix a typo in postinst (Closes: #122192, #122410, #123440)
+  * Frob the default config a little (Closes: #122284, #125827, #125696,
+    #123854)
+  * Make /etc/init.d/ssh be more clear about ssh not running (Closes:
+    #123552)
+  * Fix typo in templates file (Closes: #123411)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Fri,  4 Jan 2002 16:01:52 +0000
+openssh (1:3.0.1p1-1.2) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Non-maintainer upload
+  * Prevent local users from passing environment variables to the login
+    process when UseLogin is enabled
+ -- Wichert Akkerman <wakkerma@debian.org>  Mon,  3 Dec 2001 19:34:45 +0100
+openssh (1:3.0.1p1-1.1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Non-maintainer upload, at Matthew's request.
+  * Remove sa_restorer assignment to fix compilation on alpha, hppa, and
+    ia64 (closes: #122086).
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun,  2 Dec 2001 18:54:16 +0000
+openssh (1:3.0.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=high
+  * New upstream version (Closes: #113646, #113513, #114707, #118564)
+  * Building with a libc that works (!) (Closes: #115228)
+  * Patches forward-ported are -1/-2 options for scp, the improvement to
+    'waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...'
+  * Fix /etc/init.d/ssh to stop sshd properly (Closes: #115228)
+  * /etc/ssh/sshd_config is no longer a conffile but generated in the postinst
+  * Remove suidregister leftover from postrm
+  * Mention key we are making in the postinst
+  * Default to not enable SSH protocol 1 support, since protocol 2 is
+    much safer anyway.
+  * New version of the vpn-fixes patch, from Ian Jackson
+  * New handling of -q, and added new -qq option; thanks to Jon Amery
+  * Experimental smartcard support not enabled, since I have no way of
+    testing it.
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Thu, 28 Nov 2001 17:43:01 +0000
+openssh (1:2.9p2-6) unstable; urgency=low
+  * check for correct file in /etc/init.d/ssh (Closes: #110876)
+  * correct location of version 2 keys in ssh.1 (Closes: #110439)
+  * call update-alternatives --quiet (Closes: #103314)
+  * hack ssh-copy-id to chmod go-w (Closes: #95551)
+  * TEMPORARY fix to provide largefile support using a -D in the cflags
+    line. long-term, upstream will patch the autoconf stuff
+    (Closes: #106809, #111849)
+  * remove /etc/rc references in ssh-keygen.1 (Closes: #68350)
+  * scp.1 patch from Adam McKenna to document -r properly (Closes: #76054)
+  * Check for files containing a newline character (Closes: #111692)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Thu, 13 Sep 2001 16:47:36 +0100
+openssh (1:2.9p2-5) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Thanks to all the bug-fixers who helped!
+  * remove sa_restorer assignment (Closes: #102837)
+  * patch from Peter Benie to DTRT wrt X forwarding if the server refuses
+    us access (Closes: #48297)
+  * patch from upstream CVS to fix port forwarding (Closes: #107132)
+  * patch from Jonathan Amery to document ssh-keygen behaviour
+    (Closes:#106643, #107512)
+  * patch to postinst from Jonathan Amery (Closes: #106411)
+  * patch to manpage from Jonathan Amery (Closes: #107364)
+  * patch from Matthew Vernon to make -q emit fatal errors as that is the
+    documented behaviour (Closes: #64347)
+  * patch from Ian Jackson to cause us to destroy a file when we scp it
+    onto itself, rather than dumping bits of our memory into it, which was
+    a security hole (see #51955)
+  * patch from Jonathan Amery to document lack of Kerberos support
+    (Closes: #103726)
+  * patch from Matthew Vernon to make the 'waiting for connections to
+    terminate' message more helpful (Closes: #50308)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Thu, 23 Aug 2001 02:14:09 +0100
+openssh (1:2.9p2-4) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Today's build of ssh is strawberry flavoured
+  * Patch from mhp to reduce length of time sshd is stopped for (Closes: #106176)
+  * Tidy up debconf template (Closes: #106152)
+  * If called non-setuid, then setgid()'s failure should not be fatal (see
+    #105854)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Sun, 22 Jul 2001 14:19:43 +0100
+openssh (1:2.9p2-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Patch from yours truly to add -1 and -2 options to scp (Closes: #106061)
+  * Improve the IdentityFile section in the man page (Closes: #106038)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Sat, 21 Jul 2001 14:47:27 +0100
+openssh (1:2.9p2-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Document the protocol version 2 and IPV6 changes (Closes: #105845, #105868)
+  * Make PrintLastLog 'no' by default (Closes: #105893)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Thu, 19 Jul 2001 18:36:41 +0100
+openssh (1:2.9p2-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * new (several..) upstream version (Closes: #96726, #81856, #96335)
+  * Hopefully, this will close some other bugs too
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Tue, 17 Jul 2001 19:41:58 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.2p2-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Taking Over this package
+  * Patches from Robert Bihlmeyer for the Hurd (Closes: #102991)
+  * Put PermitRootLogin back to yes (Closes: #67334, #67371, #78274)
+  * Don't fiddle with conf-files any more (Closes: #69501)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Tue, 03 Jul 2001 02:58:13 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.2p2-2.2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * NMU
+  * Include Hurd compatibility patches from Robert Bihlmeyer (Closes: #76033)
+  * Patch from Richard Kettlewell for protocolkeepalives (Closes: #99273)
+  * Patch from Matthew Vernon for BannerTimeOut, batchmode, and
+    documentation for protocolkeepalives. Makes ssh more generally useful
+    for scripting uses (Closes: #82877, #99275)
+  * Set a umask, so ourpidfile isn't world-writable (closes: #100012,
+    #98286, #97391)
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Thu, 28 Jun 2001 23:15:42 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.2p2-2.1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * NMU
+  * Remove duplicate Build-Depends for libssl096-dev and change it to
+    depend on libssl-dev instaed.  Also adding in virtual | real package
+    style build-deps.  (Closes: #93793, #75228)
+  * Removing add-log entry (Closes: #79266)
+  * This was a pam bug from a while back (Closes: #86908, #88457, #86843)
+  * pam build-dep already exists (Closes: #93683)
+  * libgnome-dev build-dep already exists (Closes: #93694)
+  * No longer in non-free (Closes: #85401)
+  * Adding in fr debconf translations (Closes: #83783)
+  * Already suggests xbase-clients (Closes: #79741)
+  * No need to suggest libpam-pwdb anymore (Closes: #81658)
+  * Providing rsh-client (Closes: #79437)
+  * hurd patch was already applied (Closes: #76033)
+  * default set to no (Closes: #73682)
+  * Adding in a suggests for dnsutils (Closes: #93265)
+  * postinst bugs fixed (Closes: #88057, #88066, #88196, #88405, #88612)
+    (Closes: #88774, #88196, #89556, #90123, #90228, #90833, #87814, #85465)
+  * Adding in debconf dependency
+ -- Ivan E. Moore II <rkrusty@debian.org>  Mon, 16 Apr 2001 14:11:04 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.2p2-2) unstable; urgency=high
+  * disable the OpenSSL version check in entropy.c
+    (closes: #93581, #93588, #93590, #93614, #93619, #93635, #93648)
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@uk.alcove.com>  Wed, 11 Apr 2001 20:30:04 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.2p2-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release
+  * removed make-ssh-known-hosts, since ssh-keyscan does that job (closes: #86069, #87748)
+  * fix double space indent in german templates (closes: #89493)
+  * make postinst check for ssh_host_rsa_key
+  * get rid of the last of the misguided debian/rules NMU debris  :-/
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Sat, 24 Mar 2001 20:59:33 +0000
+openssh (1:2.5.1p2-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * rebuild with new debhelper (closes: #89558, #89536, #90225)
+  * fix broken dpkg-statoverride test in postinst
+    (closes: #89612, #90474, #90460, #89605)
+  * NMU bug fixed but not closed in last upload  (closes: #88206)
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Fri, 23 Mar 2001 16:11:33 +0000
+openssh (1:2.5.1p2-1) unstable; urgency=high
+  * New upstream release
+  * fix typo in postinst (closes: #88110)
+  * revert to setting PAM service name in debian/rules, backing out last
+    NMU, which also (closes: #88101)
+  * restore the pam lastlog/motd lines, lost during the NMUs, and sshd_config
+  * restore printlastlog option patch
+  * revert to using debhelper, which had been partially disabled in NMUs
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Tue, 13 Mar 2001 01:41:34 +0000
+openssh (1:2.5.1p1-1.8) unstable; urgency=high
+  * And now the old pam-bug s/sshd/ssh in ssh.c is also fixed
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Thu,  1 Mar 2001 19:48:01 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.1p1-1.7) unstable; urgency=high
+  * And now we mark the correct binary as setuid, when a user requested
+    to install it setuid.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Thu,  1 Mar 2001 07:19:56 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.1p1-1.6) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Fixes postinst to handle overrides that are already there. Damn, I
+    should have noticed the bug earlier.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Wed, 28 Feb 2001 22:35:00 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.1p1-1.5) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Rebuild ssh with pam-support.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Mon, 26 Feb 2001 21:55:51 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.1p1-1.4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Added Build-Depends on libssl096-dev.
+  * Fixed sshd_config file to disallow root logins again.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Sun, 25 Feb 2001 20:03:55 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.1p1-1.3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Fixed missing manpages for sftp.1 and ssh-keyscan.1
+  * Made package policy 3.5.2 compliant.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Sun, 25 Feb 2001 15:46:26 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.1p1-1.2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Added Conflict with sftp, since we now provide our own sftp-client.
+  * Added a fix for our broken dpkg-statoverride call in the
+    2.3.0p1-13.
+  * Fixed some config pathes in the comments of sshd_config.
+  * Removed ssh-key-exchange-vulnerability-patch since it's not needed
+    anymore because upstream included the fix.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Sun, 25 Feb 2001 13:46:58 +0100
+openssh (1:2.5.1p1-1.1) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Another NMU to get the new upstream version 2.5.1p1 into
+    unstable. (Closes: #87123)
+  * Corrected postinst to mark ssh as setuid. (Closes: #86391, #85766)
+  * Key Exchange patch is already included by upstream. (Closes: #86015)
+  * Upgrading should be possible now. (Closes: #85525, #85523)
+  * Added --disable-suid-ssh as compile option, so ssh won't get installed
+    suid per default.
+  * Fixed postinst to run dpkg-statoverride only, when dpkg-statoverride
+    is available and the mode of the binary should be 4755. And also added
+    suggestion for a newer dpkg.
+    (Closes: #85734, #85741, #86876)
+  * sftp and ssh-keyscan will also be included from now on. (Closes: #79994)
+  * scp now understands spaces in filenames (Closes: #53783, #58958,
+    #66723)
+  * ssh-keygen now supports showing DSA fingerprints. (Closes: #68623)
+  * ssh doesn' t show motd anymore when switch -t is used. (Closes #69035)
+  * ssh supports the usage of other dsa keys via the ssh command line
+    options. (Closes: #81250)
+  * Documentation in sshd_config fixed. (Closes: #81088)
+  * primes file included by upstream and included now. (Closes: #82101)
+  * scp now allows dots in the username. (Closes: #82477)
+  * Spelling error in ssh-copy-id.1 corrected by upstream. (Closes: #78124)
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Sun, 25 Feb 2001 10:06:08 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.13) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Config should now also be fixed with this hopefully last NMU.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Sat, 10 Feb 2001 22:56:36 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.12) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Added suggest for xbase-clients to control-file. (Closes #85227)
+  * Applied patch from Markus Friedl to fix a vulnerability in
+    the rsa keyexchange.
+  * Fixed position of horizontal line. (Closes: #83613)
+  * Fixed hopefully the grep problem in the config-file. (Closes: #78802)
+  * Converted package from suidregister to dpkg-statoverride.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Fri,  9 Feb 2001 19:43:55 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.11) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Fixed some typos in the german translation of the debconf
+    template.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Wed, 24 Jan 2001 18:22:38 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.10) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Fixed double printing of motd. (Closes: #82618)
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Tue, 23 Jan 2001 21:03:43 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.9) unstable; urgency=high
+  * And the next NMU which includes the patch from Andrew Bartlett
+    and Markus Friedl to fix the root privileges handling of openssh.
+    (Closes: #82657)
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Wed, 17 Jan 2001 22:20:54 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.8) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Applied fix from Ryan Murray to allow building on other architectures
+    since the hurd patch was wrong. (Closes: #82471)
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Tue, 16 Jan 2001 22:45:51 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.7) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Fixed another typo on sshd_config
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Sun, 14 Jan 2001 19:01:31 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.6) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Added Build-Dependency on groff (Closes: #81886)
+  * Added Build-Depencency on debhelper (Closes: #82072)
+  * Fixed entry for known_hosts in sshd_config (Closes: #82096)
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Thu, 11 Jan 2001 23:08:16 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.5) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Fixed now also the problem with sshd used as default ipv4 and
+    didn't use IPv6. This should be now fixed.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Thu, 11 Jan 2001 21:25:55 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.4) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Fixed buggy entry in postinst.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Wed, 10 Jan 2001 23:12:16 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.3) unstable; urgency=high
+  * After finishing the rewrite of the rules-file I had to notice that
+    the manpage installation was broken. This should now work again.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Wed, 10 Jan 2001 22:11:59 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.2) unstable; urgency=high
+  * Fixed the screwed up build-dependency.
+  * Removed --with-ipv4-default to support ipv6.
+  * Changed makefile to use /etc/pam.d/ssh instead of /etc/pam.d/sshd.
+  * Fixed location to sftp-server in config.
+  * Since debian still relies on /etc/pam.d/ssh instead of moving to
+    /etc/pam.d/sshd, I had to hack ssh.h to get ssh to use this name.
+  * Fixed path to host key in sshd_config.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Wed, 10 Jan 2001 08:23:47 +0100
+openssh (1:2.3.0p1-1.1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * NMU with permission of Phil Hands.
+  * New upstream release
+  * Update Build-Depends to point to new libssl096.
+  * This upstream release doesn't leak any information depending
+    on the setting of PermitRootLogin (Closes: #59933)
+  * New upstream release contains fix against forcing a client to
+    do X/agent forwarding (Closes: #76788)
+  * Changed template to contain correct path to the documentation
+    (Closes: #67245)
+  * Added --with-4in6 switch as compile option into debian/rules.
+  * Added --with-ipv4-default as compile option into debian/rules.
+    (Closes: #75037)
+  * Changed default path to also contain /usr/local/bin and
+    /usr/X11R6/bin (Closes: #62472,#54567,#62810)
+  * Changed path to sftp-server in sshd_config to match the
+    our package (Closes: #68347)
+  * Replaced OpenBSDh with OpenBSD in the init-script.
+  * Changed location to original source in copyright.head
+  * Changed behaviour of init-script when invoked with the option
+    restart (Closes: #68706,#72560)
+  * Added a note about -L option of scp to README.Debian
+  * ssh won't print now the motd if invoked with -t option
+    (Closes: #59933)
+  * RFC.nroff.gz get's now converted into RFC.gz. (Closes: #63867)
+  * Added a note about tcp-wrapper support to README.Debian
+    (Closes: #72807,#22190)
+  * Removed two unneeded options from building process.
+  * Added sshd.pam into debian dir and install it.
+  * Commented out unnecessary call to dh_installinfo.
+  * Added a line to sshd.pam so that limits will be paid attention
+    to (Closes: #66904)
+  * Restart Option has a Timeout of 10 seconds (Closes: 51264)
+  * scp won't override files anymore (Closes: 51955)
+  * Removed pam_lastlog module, so that the lastlog is now printed
+    only once (Closes: #71742, #68335, #69592, #71495, #77781)
+  * If password is expired, openssh now forces the user to change it.
+    (Closes: #51747)
+  * scp should now have no more problems with shell-init-files that
+    produces ouput (Closes: #56280,#59873)
+  * ssh now prints the motd correctly (Closes: #66926)
+  * ssh upgrade should disable ssh daemon only if users has choosen
+    to do so (Closes: #67478)
+  * ssh can now be installed suid (Closes: #70879)
+  * Modified debian/rules to support hurd.
+ -- Christian Kurz <shorty@debian.org>  Wed, 27 Dec 2000 20:06:57 +0100
+openssh (1:2.2.0p1-1.1) unstable; urgency=medium
+  * Non-Maintainer Upload
+  * Check for new returns in the new libc
+    (closes: #72803, #74393, #72797, #71307, #71702)
+  * Link against libssl095a (closes: #66304)
+  * Correct check for PermitRootLogin (closes: #69448)
+ -- Ryan Murray <rmurray@debian.org>  Wed, 18 Oct 2000 00:48:18 -0700
+openssh (1:2.2.0p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Mon, 11 Sep 2000 14:49:43 +0100
+openssh (1:2.1.1p4-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * add rsh alternatives
+  * add -S option to scp (using Tommi Virtanen's patch) (closes: #63097)
+  * do the IPV4_DEFAULT thing properly this time
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Fri, 11 Aug 2000 18:14:37 +0100
+openssh (1:2.1.1p4-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * reinstate manpage .out patch from 1:1.2.3
+  * fix typo in postinst
+  * only compile ssh with IPV4_DEFAULT
+  * apply James Troup's patch to add a -o option to scp and updated manpage
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Sun, 30 Jul 2000 00:12:49 +0100
+openssh (1:2.1.1p4-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Sat, 29 Jul 2000 14:46:16 +0100
+openssh (1:1.2.3-10) unstable; urgency=low
+  * add version to libpam-modules dependency, because old versions of
+    pam_motd make it impossible to log in.
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Sat, 29 Jul 2000 13:28:22 +0100
+openssh (1:1.2.3-9) frozen unstable; urgency=low
+  * force location of /usr/bin/X11/xauth
+    (closes: #64424, #66437, #66859)  *RC*
+  * typos in config (closes: #66779, #66780)
+  * sshd_not_to_be_run could be assumed to be true, in error, if the config
+    script died in an unusual way --- I've reversed this (closes: #66335)
+  * Apply Zack Weinberg <zack@wolery.cumb.org>'s patch to ssh-askpass-ptk
+    (closes: #65981)
+  * change default for PermitRootLogin to "no" (closes: #66406)
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Tue, 11 Jul 2000 20:51:18 +0100
+openssh (1:1.2.3-8) frozen unstable; urgency=low
+  * get rid of Provides: rsh-server (this will mean that rstartd
+    will need to change it's depends to deal with #63948, which I'm
+    reopening)  (closes: #66257)
+    Given that this is also a trivial change, and is a reversal of a
+    change that was mistakenly made after the freeze, I think this should
+    also go into frozen.
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Wed, 28 Jun 2000 03:26:30 +0100
+openssh (1:1.2.3-7) frozen unstable; urgency=low
+  * check if debconf is installed before calling db_stop in postinst.
+    This is required to allow ssh to be installed when debconf is not
+    wanted, which probably makes it an RC upload (hopefully the last of
+    too many).
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Wed, 28 Jun 2000 03:19:47 +0100
+openssh (1:1.2.3-6) frozen unstable; urgency=low
+  * fixed depressing little bug involving a line wrap looking like
+    a blank line in the templates file   *RC*
+    (closes: #66090, #66078, #66083, #66182)
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Mon, 26 Jun 2000 00:45:05 +0100
+openssh (1:1.2.3-5) frozen unstable; urgency=low
+  * add code to prevent UseLogin exploit, although I think our PAM
+    conditional code breaks UseLogin in a way that protects us from this
+    exploit anyway. ;-)  (closes: #65495)  *RC*
+  * Apply Zack Weinberg <zack@wolery.cumb.org>'s patch to fix keyboard
+    grab vulnerability in ssh-askpass-gnome (closes: #64795) *RC*
+  * stop redirection of sshd's file descriptors (introduced in 1:1.2.3-3)
+    and use db_stop in the postinst to solve that problem instead
+    (closes: #65104)
+  * add Provides: rsh-server to ssh (closes: #63948)
+  * provide config option not to run sshd
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Mon, 12 Jun 2000 23:05:11 +0100
+openssh (1:1.2.3-4) frozen unstable; urgency=low
+  * fixes #63436 which is *RC*
+  * add 10 second pause in init.d restart (closes: #63844)
+  * get rid of noenv in PAM mail line (closes: #63856)
+  * fix host key path in make-ssh-known-hosts (closes: #63713)
+  * change wording of SUID template (closes: #62788, #63436)
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Sat, 27 May 2000 11:18:06 +0100
+openssh (1:1.2.3-3) frozen unstable; urgency=low
+  * redirect sshd's file descriptors to /dev/null in init to
+    prevent debconf from locking up during installation
+    ** grave bug just submited by me **
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Thu, 20 Apr 2000 17:10:59 +0100
+openssh (1:1.2.3-2) frozen  unstable; urgency=low
+  * allow user to select SUID status of /usr/bin/ssh (closes: 62462) ** RC **
+  * suggest debconf
+  * conflict with debconf{,-tiny} (<<0.2.17) so I can clean up the preinst
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Wed, 19 Apr 2000 17:49:15 +0100
+openssh (1:1.2.3-1) frozen unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release
+  * patch sshd to create extra xauth key required for localhost
+    (closes: #49944)  *** RC ***
+  * FallbacktoRsh now defaults to ``no'' to match impression
+    given in sshd_config
+  * stop setting suid bit on ssh (closes: #58711, #58558)
+    This breaks Rhosts authentication (which nobody uses) and allows
+    the LD_PRELOAD trick to get socks working, so seems like a net benefit.
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Thu, 13 Apr 2000 20:01:54 +0100
+openssh (1:1.2.2-1.4) frozen unstable; urgency=low
+  * Recompile for frozen, contains fix for RC bug.
+ -- Tommi Virtanen <tv@debian.org>  Tue, 29 Feb 2000 22:14:58 +0200
+openssh (1:1.2.2-1.3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Integrated man page addition for PrintLastLog.
+    This bug was filed on "openssh", and I ended up
+    creating my own patch for this (closes: #59054)
+  * Improved error message when ssh_exchange_identification
+    gets EOF (closes: #58904)
+  * Fixed typo (your -> you're) in debian/preinst.
+  * Added else-clauses to config to make this upgradepath possible:
+    oldssh -> openssh preinst fails due to upgrade_to_openssh=false
+    -> ssh-nonfree -> openssh. Without these, debconf remembered
+    the old answer, config didn't force asking it, and preinst always
+    aborted (closes: #56596, #57782)
+  * Moved setting upgrade_to_openssh isdefault flag to the place
+    where preinst would abort. This means no double question to most
+    users, people who currently suffer from "can't upgrade" may need
+    to run apt-get install ssh twice. Did not do the same for
+    use_old_init_script, as the situation is a bit different, and
+    less common (closes: #54010, #56224)
+  * Check for existance of ssh-keygen before attempting to use it in
+    preinst, added warning for non-existant ssh-keygen in config. This
+    happens when the old ssh is removed (say, due to ssh-nonfree getting
+    installed).
+ -- Tommi Virtanen <tv@debian.org>  Sun, 27 Feb 2000 21:36:43 +0200
+openssh (1:1.2.2-1.2) frozen unstable; urgency=low
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Added configuration option PrintLastLog, default off due to PAM
+    (closes: #54007, #55042)
+  * ssh-askpass-{gnome,ptk} now provide ssh-askpass, making ssh's
+    Suggests: line more accurate. Also closing related bugs fixed
+    earlier, when default ssh-askpass moved to /usr/bin.
+    (closes: #52403, #54741, #50607, #52298, #50967, #51661)
+  * Patched to call vhangup, with autoconf detection and all
+    (closes: #55379)
+  * Added --with-ipv4-default workaround to a glibc bug causing
+    slow DNS lookups, as per UPGRADING. Use -6 to really use
+    IPv6 addresses. (closes: #57891, #58744, #58713, #57970)
+  * Added noenv to PAM pam_mail line. Thanks to Ben Collins.
+    (closes: #58429)
+  * Added the UPGRADING file to the package.
+  * Added frozen to the changelog line and recompiled before
+    package was installed into the archive.
+ -- Tommi Virtanen <tv@debian.org>  Fri, 25 Feb 2000 22:08:57 +0200
+openssh (1:1.2.2-1.1) frozen unstable; urgency=low
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Integrated scp pipe buffer patch from Ben Collins
+    <benc@debian.org>, should now work even if reading
+    a pipe gives less than fstat st_blksize bytes.
+    Should now work on Alpha and Sparc Linux (closes: #53697, #52071)
+  * Made ssh depend on libssl09 (>= 0.9.4-3) (closes: #51393)
+  * Integrated patch from Ben Collins <benc@debian.org>
+    to do full shadow account locking and expiration
+    checking (closes: #58165, #51747)
+ -- Tommi Virtanen <tv@debian.org>  Tue, 22 Feb 2000 20:46:12 +0200
+openssh (1:1.2.2-1) frozen unstable; urgency=medium
+  * New upstream release (closes: #56870, #56346)
+  * built against new libesd (closes: #56805)
+  * add  Colin Watson <cjw44@cam.ac.uk> =NULL patch
+    (closes: #49902, #54894)
+  * use socketpairs as suggested by Andrew Tridgell to eliminate rsync
+    (and other) lockups
+  * patch SSHD_PAM_SERVICE back into auth-pam.c, again :-/
+    (closes: #49902, #55872, #56959)
+  * uncoment the * line in ssh_config (closes: #56444)
+  * #54894 & #49902 are release critical, so this should go in frozen
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Wed,  9 Feb 2000 04:52:04 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2.1pre24-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Fri, 31 Dec 1999 02:47:24 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2.1pre23-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release
+  * excape ? in /etc/init.d/ssh (closes: #53269)
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Wed, 29 Dec 1999 16:50:46 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2pre17-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Thu,  9 Dec 1999 16:50:40 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2pre16-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release
+  * upstream release (1.2pre14) (closes: #50299)
+  * make ssh depend on libwrap0 (>= 7.6-1.1) (closes: #50973, #50776)
+  * dispose of grep -q broken pipe message in config script (closes: #50855)
+  * add make-ssh-known-hosts (closes: #50660)
+  * add -i option to ssh-copy-id (closes: #50657)
+  * add check for *LK* in password, indicating a locked account
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Wed,  8 Dec 1999 22:59:38 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2pre13-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release
+  * make sshd.c use SSHD_PAM_SERVICE and define it as "ssh" in debian/rules
+  * remove duplicate line in /etc/pam.d/ssh (closes: #50310)
+  * mention ssh -A option in ssh.1 & ssh_config
+  * enable forwarding to localhost in default ssh_config (closes: #50373)
+  * tweak preinst to deal with debconf being `unpacked'
+  * use --with-tcp-wrappers (closes: #49545)
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Sat, 20 Nov 1999 14:20:04 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2pre11-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * oops, just realised that I forgot to strip out the unpleasant
+    fiddling mentioned below (which turned not to be a fix anyway)
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Mon, 15 Nov 1999 01:35:23 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2pre11-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release (closes: #49722)
+  * add 2>/dev/null to dispose of spurious message casused by grep -q
+    (closes: #49876, #49604)
+  * fix typo in debian/control (closes: #49841)
+  * Do some unpleasant fiddling with upgraded keys in the preinst, which
+    should make the keylength problem go away.   (closes: #49676)
+  * make pam_start in sshd use ``ssh'' as the service name (closes: #49956)
+  * If /etc/ssh/NOSERVER exist, stop sshd from starting (closes: #47107)
+  * apply Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>'s shadow patch
+  * disable lastlogin and motd printing if using pam (closes: #49957)
+  * add ssh-copy-id script and manpage
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Fri, 12 Nov 1999 01:03:38 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2pre9-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release
+  * apply Chip Salzenberg <chip@valinux.com>'s SO_REUSEADDR patch
+    to channels.c, to make forwarded ports instantly reusable
+  * replace Pre-Depend: debconf with some check code in preinst
+  * make the ssh-add ssh-askpass failure message more helpful
+  * fix the ssh-agent getopts bug (closes: #49426)
+  * fixed typo on Suggests: line (closes: #49704, #49571)
+  * tidy up ssh package description (closes: #49642)
+  * make ssh suid (closes: #49635)
+  * in preinst upgrade code, ensure ssh_host_keys is mode 600 (closes: #49606)
+  * disable agent forwarding by default, for the similar reasons as
+    X forwarding (closes: #49586)
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Tue,  9 Nov 1999 09:57:47 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2pre7-4) unstable; urgency=low
+  * predepend on debconf (>= 0.2.17) should now allow preinst questions
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Sat,  6 Nov 1999 10:31:06 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2pre7-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * add ssh-askpass package using Tommi Virtanen's perl-tk script
+  * add ssh-preconfig package cludge
+  * add usage hints to ssh-agent.1
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Fri,  5 Nov 1999 00:38:33 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2pre7-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * use pam patch from Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>
+  * add slogin symlink to Makefile.in
+  * change /usr/bin/login to LOGIN_PROGRAM define of /bin/login
+  * sort out debconf usage
+  * patch from Tommi Virtanen <tv@debian.org>'s makes ssh-add use ssh-askpass
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Thu,  4 Nov 1999 11:08:54 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2pre7-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream release
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Tue,  2 Nov 1999 21:02:37 +0000
+openssh (1:1.2.0.pre6db1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+  * change the binary package name to ssh (the non-free branch of ssh has
+    been renamed to ssh-nonfree)
+  * make pam file comply with Debian standards
+  * use an epoch to make sure openssh supercedes ssh-nonfree
+ -- Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>  Sat, 30 Oct 1999 16:26:05 +0100
+openssh (1.2pre6db1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream source
+  * sshd accepts logins now!
+ -- Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com>  Fri, 29 Oct 1999 11:13:38 -0500
+openssh (1.2.0.19991028-1) unstable; urgency=low
+  * New upstream source
+  * Added test for -lnsl to configure script
+ -- Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com>  Thu, 28 Oct 1999 18:52:09 -0500
+openssh (1.2.0.19991027-3) unstable; urgency=low
+  * Initial release
+ -- Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com>  Wed, 27 Oct 1999 19:39:46 -0500
diff --git a/debian/clean b/debian/clean
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fcd68b77e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/clean
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+config.log
+debian/openssh-server.sshd.pam
diff --git a/debian/compat b/debian/compat
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ec635144f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/compat
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+9
diff --git a/debian/control b/debian/control
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..33f2a3837
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/control
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+Source: openssh
+Section: net
+Priority: standard
+Maintainer: Debian OpenSSH Maintainers <debian-ssh@lists.debian.org>
+Build-Depends: autotools-dev,
+               debhelper (>= 9.20160709~),
+               dh-autoreconf,
+               dh-exec,
+               dpkg-dev (>= 1.16.1~),
+               libaudit-dev [linux-any],
+               libedit-dev,
+               libgtk-3-dev <!pkg.openssh.nognome>,
+               libkrb5-dev | heimdal-dev,
+               libpam0g-dev | libpam-dev,
+               libselinux1-dev [linux-any],
+               libssl-dev (>= 1.1.0g),
+               libsystemd-dev [linux-any],
+               libwrap0-dev | libwrap-dev,
+               pkg-config,
+               zlib1g-dev (>= 1:1.2.3),
+Standards-Version: 4.1.0
+Uploaders: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>,
+           Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>,
+Homepage: http://www.openssh.com/
+Vcs-Git: https://salsa.debian.org/ssh-team/openssh.git
+Vcs-Browser: https://salsa.debian.org/ssh-team/openssh
+Package: openssh-client
+Architecture: any
+Depends: adduser (>= 3.10),
+         dpkg (>= 1.7.0),
+         passwd,
+         ${misc:Depends},
+         ${shlibs:Depends},
+Recommends: xauth,
+Conflicts: sftp,
+Replaces: ssh,
+          ssh-krb5,
+Suggests: keychain,
+          libpam-ssh,
+          monkeysphere,
+          ssh-askpass,
+Provides: rsh-client,
+          ssh-client,
+Multi-Arch: foreign
+Description: secure shell (SSH) client, for secure access to remote machines
+ This is the portable version of OpenSSH, a free implementation of
+ the Secure Shell protocol as specified by the IETF secsh working
+ group.
+ .
+ Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine
+ and for executing commands on a remote machine.
+ It provides secure encrypted communications between two untrusted
+ hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP
+ ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+ It can be used to provide applications with a secure communication
+ channel.
+ .
+ This package provides the ssh, scp and sftp clients, the ssh-agent
+ and ssh-add programs to make public key authentication more convenient,
+ and the ssh-keygen, ssh-keyscan, ssh-copy-id and ssh-argv0 utilities.
+ .
+ In some countries it may be illegal to use any encryption at all
+ without a special permit.
+ .
+ ssh replaces the insecure rsh, rcp and rlogin programs, which are
+ obsolete for most purposes.
+Package: openssh-server
+Priority: optional
+Architecture: any
+Pre-Depends: ${misc:Pre-Depends},
+Depends: adduser (>= 3.9),
+         dpkg (>= 1.9.0),
+         libpam-modules (>= 0.72-9),
+         libpam-runtime (>= 0.76-14),
+         lsb-base (>= 4.1+Debian3),
+         openssh-client (= ${binary:Version}),
+         openssh-sftp-server,
+         procps,
+         ucf (>= 0.28),
+         ${misc:Depends},
+         ${shlibs:Depends},
+Recommends: libpam-systemd,
+            ncurses-term,
+            xauth,
+            ${openssh-server:Recommends},
+Conflicts: sftp,
+           ssh-socks,
+           ssh2,
+Replaces: openssh-client (<< 1:7.9p1-5),
+          ssh,
+          ssh-krb5,
+Suggests: molly-guard,
+          monkeysphere,
+          rssh,
+          ssh-askpass,
+          ufw,
+Provides: ssh-server,
+Multi-Arch: foreign
+Description: secure shell (SSH) server, for secure access from remote machines
+ This is the portable version of OpenSSH, a free implementation of
+ the Secure Shell protocol as specified by the IETF secsh working
+ group.
+ .
+ Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine
+ and for executing commands on a remote machine.
+ It provides secure encrypted communications between two untrusted
+ hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP
+ ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+ It can be used to provide applications with a secure communication
+ channel.
+ .
+ This package provides the sshd server.
+ .
+ In some countries it may be illegal to use any encryption at all
+ without a special permit.
+ .
+ sshd replaces the insecure rshd program, which is obsolete for most
+ purposes.
+Package: openssh-sftp-server
+Priority: optional
+Architecture: any
+Depends: ${misc:Depends},
+         ${shlibs:Depends},
+Recommends: openssh-server | ssh-server,
+Breaks: openssh-server (<< 1:6.5p1-5),
+Replaces: openssh-server (<< 1:6.5p1-5),
+Enhances: openssh-server,
+          ssh-server,
+Description: secure shell (SSH) sftp server module, for SFTP access from remote machines
+ This is the portable version of OpenSSH, a free implementation of
+ the Secure Shell protocol as specified by the IETF secsh working
+ group.
+ .
+ Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine
+ and for executing commands on a remote machine.
+ It provides secure encrypted communications between two untrusted
+ hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP
+ ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+ It can be used to provide applications with a secure communication
+ channel.
+ .
+ This package provides the SFTP server module for the SSH server. It
+ is needed if you want to access your SSH server with SFTP. The SFTP
+ server module also works with other SSH daemons like dropbear.
+ .
+ OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH filexfer
+ protocol described in:
+ .
+  http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
+ .
+ Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features
+ are individually implemented as extensions.
+Package: openssh-tests
+Priority: optional
+Architecture: any
+Depends: openssh-client (= ${binary:Version}),
+         openssh-server (= ${binary:Version}),
+         openssh-sftp-server (= ${binary:Version}),
+         openssl,
+         putty-tools (>= 0.67-2),
+         python-twisted-conch (>= 1:15.5.0-1),
+         ${misc:Depends},
+         ${shlibs:Depends},
+Description: OpenSSH regression tests
+ This package provides OpenSSH's regression test suite.  It is mainly
+ intended for use with the autopkgtest system, though can also be run
+ directly using /usr/lib/openssh/regress/run-tests.
+Package: ssh
+Priority: optional
+Architecture: all
+Pre-Depends: dpkg (>= 1.17.5),
+Depends: openssh-client (>= ${binary:Version}),
+         openssh-server (>= ${binary:Version}),
+         ${misc:Depends},
+Description: secure shell client and server (metapackage)
+ This metapackage is a convenient way to install both the OpenSSH client
+ and the OpenSSH server. It provides nothing in and of itself, so you
+ may remove it if nothing depends on it.
+Package: ssh-askpass-gnome
+Build-Profiles: <!pkg.openssh.nognome>
+Section: gnome
+Priority: optional
+Architecture: any
+Depends: openssh-client | ssh (>= 1:1.2pre7-4),
+         ${misc:Depends},
+         ${shlibs:Depends},
+Replaces: ssh (<< 1:3.5p1-3),
+Provides: ssh-askpass,
+Description: interactive X program to prompt users for a passphrase for ssh-add
+ This has been split out of the main openssh-client package so that
+ openssh-client does not need to depend on GTK+.
+ .
+ You probably want the ssh-askpass package instead, but this is
+ provided to add to your choice and/or confusion.
+Package: openssh-client-udeb
+Build-Profiles: <!noudeb>
+Package-Type: udeb
+Section: debian-installer
+Priority: optional
+Architecture: any
+Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
+XB-Installer-Menu-Item: 99999
+Description: secure shell client for the Debian installer
+ This is the portable version of OpenSSH, a free implementation of
+ the Secure Shell protocol as specified by the IETF secsh working
+ group.
+ .
+ This package provides the ssh client for use in debian-installer.
+Package: openssh-server-udeb
+Build-Profiles: <!noudeb>
+Package-Type: udeb
+Section: debian-installer
+Priority: optional
+Architecture: any
+Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
+Description: secure shell server for the Debian installer
+ This is the portable version of OpenSSH, a free implementation of
+ the Secure Shell protocol as specified by the IETF secsh working
+ group.
+ .
+ This package provides the sshd server for use in debian-installer.
+ Since it is expected to be used in specialized situations (e.g. S/390
+ installs with no console), it does not provide any configuration.
diff --git a/debian/copyright b/debian/copyright
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ef1bc8e69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/copyright
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+Format: https://www.debian.org/doc/packaging-manuals/copyright-format/1.0/
+Upstream-Name: OpenSSH
+Upstream-Contact: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
+Source: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
+Comment:
+ The overall licence of the OpenSSH upstream code amounts to BSD-3-clause or
+ various less restrictive licences, with the additional restrictions that
+ derived versions must be clearly marked as such and that if derived works
+ are incompatible with the RFC-specified protocol then they must be called
+ by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+Files: *
+Copyright:
+ 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ Markus Friedl
+ Theo de Raadt
+ Niels Provos
+ Dug Song
+ Aaron Campbell
+ Damien Miller
+ Kevin Steves
+ Daniel Kouril
+ Wesley Griffin
+ Per Allansson
+ Nils Nordman
+ Simon Wilkinson
+ Ben Lindstrom
+ Tim Rice
+ Andre Lucas
+ Chris Adams
+ Corinna Vinschen
+ Cray Inc.
+ Denis Parker
+ Gert Doering
+ Jakob Schlyter
+ Jason Downs
+ Juha Yrjölä
+ Michael Stone
+ Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ Solar Designer
+ Todd C. Miller
+ Wayne Schroeder
+ William Jones
+ Darren Tucker
+ Sun Microsystems
+ The SCO Group
+ Daniel Walsh
+ Red Hat, Inc
+ Simon Vallet / Genoscope
+ Internet Software Consortium
+ Reyk Floeter
+ Chad Mynhier
+License: OpenSSH
+ Tatu Ylonen's original licence is as follows (excluding some terms about
+ third-party code which are no longer relevant; see the LICENCE file for
+ details):
+ .
+   As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+   can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+   software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+   incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+   called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ .
+   Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this
+   software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major
+   bookstore, scientific library, and patent office worldwide.  More
+   information can be found e.g. at "http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto".
+ .
+   The legal status of this program is some combination of all these
+   permissions and restrictions.  Use only at your own responsibility.
+   You will be responsible for any legal consequences yourself; I am not
+   making any claims whether possessing or using this is legal or not in
+   your country, and I am not taking any responsibility on your behalf.
+ .
+ Most remaining components of the software are provided under a standard
+ 2-term BSD licence:
+ .
+   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+   are met:
+   1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+   2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+      documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ .
+   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+   IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+   OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+   IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+   INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+   NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+   THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ .
+ Some code is licensed under an ISC-style license, to the following
+ copyright holders:
+ .
+  Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+  purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+  copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+  .
+  THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND TODD C. MILLER DISCLAIMS ALL
+  WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+  OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL TODD C. MILLER BE LIABLE
+  FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+  WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+  OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+  CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+Files: ssh-keyscan.*
+Copyright: 1995, 1996 David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>
+License: Mazieres-BSD-style
+ Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+ permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+ OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+Files: rijndael.*
+License: public-domain
+ This code is from a reference implementation of the Rijndael cipher which
+ has been dedicated to the public domain.
+ .
+ @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ .
+ Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ .
+ @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+ .
+ This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ .
+ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+Files: loginrec.c openbsd-compat/* scp.c
+Copyright:
+ 1983, 1995-1997 Eric P. Allman
+ 1999 Aaron Campbell
+ 1993 by Digital Equipment Corporation
+ 2000 Andre Lucas
+ 1999-2010 Damien Miller
+ 1997-2010 Todd C. Miller
+ 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2008 Theo de Raadt
+ 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik@iclub.nsu.ru>
+ 1980, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 The Regents of the University of California
+License: BSD-3-clause
+ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ are met:
+ 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+    without specific prior written permission.
+ .
+ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ SUCH DAMAGE.
+Files: md5crypt.*
+Copyright: Poul-Henning Kamp
+License: Beer-ware
+ "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
+ <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file.  As long as you retain this
+ notice you can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet
+ some day, and you think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a
+ beer in return.   Poul-Henning Kamp
+Files: openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
+Copyright: 1995 Patrick Powell
+License: Powell-BSD-style
+ This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell
+ (papowell@astart.com) It may be used for any purpose as long as this
+ notice remains intact on all source code distributions
+Files: openbsd-compat/sigact.*
+Copyright: 1998, 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+License: Expat-with-advertising-restriction
+ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a
+ copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell
+ copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+ furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+ .
+ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included
+ in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ .
+ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+ OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
+ IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,
+ DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR
+ OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR
+ THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+ .
+ Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright
+ holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the
+ sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written
+ authorization.
+Files: debian/*
+Copyright: Matthew Vernon, Colin Watson
+License: BSD-2-clause
+ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ are met:
+ 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ .
+ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
diff --git a/debian/faq.html b/debian/faq.html
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7f0252891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/faq.html
@@ -0,0 +1,1187 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>OpenSSH FAQ</title>
+<link rev= "made" href= "mailto:www@openbsd.org">
+<meta name= "resource-type" content= "document">
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
+<meta name= "description"   content= "the OpenSSH FAQ page">
+<meta name= "keywords"      content= "OpenSSH,SSH,Secure Shell,faq">
+<meta name= "distribution"  content= "global">
+<meta name= "copyright"     content= "This document copyright 1999-2010 OpenBSD.">
+</head>
+<body bgcolor= "#ffffff" text= "#000000" link= "#23238E">
+<a href="http://www.openssh.com/index.html"><img alt="[OpenSSH]" height="30" width="141" src="images/smalltitle.gif" border="0"></a>
+<p>
+<h1>OpenSSH FAQ (Frequently asked questions)</h1>
+<hr>
+<blockquote>
+<h3><a href= "#1.0">1.0 - What Is OpenSSH and Where Can I Get It?</a></h3>
+<ul>
+<li><a href= "#1.1">1.1 - What is OpenSSH and where can I download it?</a>
+<li><a href= "#1.2">1.2 - Why should it be used?</a>
+<li><a href= "#1.3">1.3 - What Operating Systems are supported?</a>
+<li><a href= "#1.4">1.4 - What about copyright, usage and patents?</a>
+<li><a href= "#1.5">1.5 - Where should I ask for help?</a>
+<li><a href= "#1.6">1.6 - I have found a bug. Where do I report it?</a>
+</ul>
+<h3><a href= "#2.0">2.0 - General Questions</a></h3>
+<ul>
+<li><a href= "#2.1">2.1 - Why does ssh/scp make connections from low-numbered ports. My firewall blocks these.</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.2">2.2 - Why is the ssh client setuid root?</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.3">2.3 - Why does SSH 2.3 have problems interoperating with OpenSSH 2.1.1?</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.4">2.4 - Why does OpenSSH print: Dispatch protocol error: type 20</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.5">2.5 - Old versions of commercial SSH encrypt host keys with IDEA.</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.6">2.6 - What are these warning messages about key lengths?</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.7">2.7 - X11 and/or agent forwarding does not work.</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.8">2.8 - After upgrading OpenSSH I lost SSH2 support.</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.9">2.9 - sftp/scp fails at connection, but ssh is OK.</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.10">2.10 - Will you add [foo] to scp?</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.11">2.11 - How do I use port forwarding?</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.12">2.12 - My ssh connection freezes or drops out after N minutes of inactivity.</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.13">2.13 - How do I use scp to copy a file with a colon in it?</a>
+<li><a href= "#2.14">2.14 - Why does OpenSSH report its version to clients?</a>
+</ul>
+<h3><a href= "#3.0">3.0 - Portable OpenSSH Questions</a></h3>
+<ul>
+<li><a href= "#3.1">3.1 - Spurious PAM authentication messages in logfiles.</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.2">3.2 - Empty passwords not allowed with PAM authentication.</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.3">3.3 - ssh(1) takes a long time to connect or log in</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.4">3.4 - "Can't locate module net-pf-10" messages in log under Linux.</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.5">3.5 - Password authentication doesn't work (eg on Slackware 7.0 or Red Hat Linux 6.x)</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.6">3.6 - Configure or sshd(8) complain about lack of RSA support</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.7">3.7 - "scp: command not found" errors</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.8">3.8 - Unable to read passphrase</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.9">3.9 - 'configure' missing or make fails</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.10">3.10 - Hangs when exiting ssh</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.11">3.11 - Why does ssh hang on exit?</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.12">3.12 - I upgraded to OpenSSH 3.1 and X11 forwarding stopped working.</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.13">3.13 - I upgraded to OpenSSH 3.8 and some X11 programs stopped working.</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.14">3.14 - I copied my public key to authorized_keys but public-key authentication still doesn't work.</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.15">3.15 - OpenSSH versions and PAM behaviour.</a>
+<li><a href= "#3.16">3.16 - Why doesn't "w" or "who" on AIX 5.x show users logged in via ssh?</a>
+</ul>
+</blockquote>
+<hr>
+<h2><u><a name= "1.0">1.0 - What Is OpenSSH and Where Can I Get It?</a></u></h2>
+<h2><a name= "1.1">1.1 - What is OpenSSH and where can I download it?</a></h2>
+OpenSSH provides end-to-end encrypted replacement of applications such as
+telnet, rlogin, and ftp.
+Unlike these legacy applications, OpenSSH never passes anything
+(including username and password) over the wire in unencrypted form, and
+provides host authentication, to verify that you really are talking to
+the system that you think you are and that no one else can take over
+that session.
+<p>
+The OpenSSH suite includes the 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh&amp;sektion=1">ssh(1)</a> 
+program which replaces rlogin and telnet, and 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=scp&amp;sektion=1">scp(1)</a> 
+which replaces 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=rcp&amp;sektion=1">rcp(1)</a> and 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ftp&amp;sektion=1">ftp(1)</a>. 
+OpenSSH has also added 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sftp&amp;sektion=1">sftp(1)</a> and 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sftp-server&amp;sektion=8">sftp-server(8)</a> 
+which implement an easier solution for file-transfer. This is based upon the 
+<a href="http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt">secsh-filexfer</a> IETF draft.
+<p><strong>OpenSSH consists of a number of programs.</strong>
+<ul>
+<li><a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sshd&amp;sektion=8">sshd(8)</a> - Server program run on the server machine. This listens for connections from client machines, and whenever it receives a connection, it performs authentication and starts serving the client.
+Its behaviour is controlled by the config file <i><a
+href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sshd_config&amp;sektion=5">
+sshd_config(5)</a></i>.
+<li><a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh&amp;sektion=1">ssh(1)</a> - This is the client program used to log into another machine or to execute commands on the other machine. <i>slogin</i> is another name for this program.
+Its behaviour is controlled by the global config file <i><a
+href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh_config&amp;sektion=5">
+ssh_config(5)</a></i> and individual users' <i>$HOME/.ssh/config</i> files.
+<li><a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=scp&amp;sektion=1">scp(1)</a> - Securely copies files from one machine to another.
+<li><a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh-keygen&amp;sektion=1">ssh-keygen(1)</a> - Used to create Pubkey Authentication (RSA or DSA) keys (host keys and user authentication keys).
+<li><a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh-agent&amp;sektion=1">ssh-agent(1)</a> - Authentication agent.  This can be used to hold RSA keys for authentication.
+<li><a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh-add&amp;sektion=1">ssh-add(1)</a> - Used to register new keys with the agent.
+<li><a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sftp-server&amp;sektion=8">sftp-server(8)</a> - SFTP server subsystem.
+<li><a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sftp&amp;sektion=1">sftp(1)</a> - Secure file transfer program.
+<li><a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh-keyscan&amp;sektion=1">ssh-keyscan(1)</a> - gather ssh public keys.
+<li><a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh-keysign&amp;sektion=8">ssh-keysign(8)</a> - ssh helper program for hostbased authentication.
+</ul>
+<h3>Downloading</h3>
+<p>
+The most recent version of OpenSSH is included with the current
+distribution of <a href="http://www.openbsd.org/">OpenBSD</a>, and
+installed as part of a basic install.
+<p>
+Today, most other operating systems include some version of OpenSSH
+(often re-badged or privately labeled), so most users can immediately
+use it.
+However, sometimes the included versions are quite old, and missing
+features of the current release of OpenSSH, and you may wish to install
+the current version, or install it on one of the few OSs that lacked it,
+and where the OS publisher does not make a modern version available.
+You may also wish to use OpenSSH on your embedded application.
+<p>
+Non-OpenBSD users will want to download, compile and install the
+multi-platform <a href="http://www.openssh.com/portable.html">Portable</a> distribution from a
+<a href="http://www.openssh.com/portable.html#mirrors">mirror</a> near you.
+<h2><a name= "1.2">1.2 - Why should it be used?</a></h2>
+<p>
+OpenSSH is a suite of tools to help secure your network 
+connections. Here is a list of features:
+<ul>
+        <li>Strong authentication.  Closes several security holes (e.g., IP, routing, and DNS spoofing).
+        <li>Improved privacy.  All communications are automatically and transparently encrypted.
+        <li>Secure X11 sessions.  The program automatically sets DISPLAY on the server machine, and forwards any X11 connections over the secure channel.
+        <li>Arbitrary TCP/IP ports can be redirected through the encrypted channel in both directions (e.g., for e-cash transactions).
+        <li>No retraining needed for normal users.
+        <li>Never trusts the network. Minimal trust on the remote side of the connection. Minimal trust on domain name servers. Pure RSA authentication never trusts anything but the private key.
+        <li>Client RSA-authenticates the server machine in the beginning of every connection to prevent trojan horses (by routing or DNS spoofing) and man-in-the-middle attacks, and the server RSA-authenticates the client machine before accepting <i>.rhosts</i> or <i>/etc/hosts.equiv</i> authentication (to prevent DNS, routing, or IP-spoofing).
+        <li>Host authentication key distribution can be centrally by the administration, automatically when the first connection is made to a machine.
+        <li>Any user can create any number of user authentication RSA keys for his/her own use.
+        <li>The server program has its own server RSA key which is automatically regenerated every hour.
+        <li>An authentication agent, running in the user's laptop or local workstation, can be used to hold the user's RSA authentication keys.
+        <li>The software can be installed and used (with restricted functionality) even without root privileges.
+        <li>The client is customizable in system-wide and per-user configuration files.
+        <li>Optional compression of all data with gzip (including forwarded X11 and TCP/IP port data), which may result in significant speedups on slow connections.
+        <li>Complete replacement for rlogin, rsh, and rcp.
+</ul>
+<p>
+Currently, almost all communications in computer networks are done
+without encryption.  As a consequence, anyone who has access to any
+machine connected to the network can listen in on any communication.
+This is being done by hackers, curious administrators, employers,
+criminals, industrial spies, and governments.  Some networks leak off
+enough electromagnetic radiation that data may be captured even from a
+distance.
+<p>
+When you log in, your password goes in the network in plain
+text.  Thus, any listener can then use your account to do any evil he
+likes.  Many incidents have been encountered worldwide where crackers
+have started programs on workstations without the owner's knowledge
+just to listen to the network and collect passwords.  Programs for
+doing this are available on the Internet, or can be built by a
+competent programmer in a few hours.
+<p>
+Businesses have trade secrets, patent applications in preparation,
+pricing information, subcontractor information, client data, personnel
+data, financial information, etc.  Currently, anyone with access to
+the network (any machine on the network) can listen to anything that
+goes in the network, without any regard to normal access restrictions.
+<p>
+Many companies are not aware that information can so easily be
+recovered from the network.  They trust that their data is safe
+since nobody is supposed to know that there is sensitive information
+in the network, or because so much other data is transferred in the
+network.  This is not a safe policy.
+<h2><a name= "1.3">1.3 - What operating systems are supported?</a></h2>
+<p>
+Even though OpenSSH is developed on 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/">OpenBSD</a> a wide variety of 
+ports to other operating systems exist. The portable version of OpenSSH 
+is headed by <a href="mailto:djm@openbsd.org">Damien Miller</a>. 
+For a quick overview of the portable version of OpenSSH see 
+<a href="http://www.openssh.com/portable.html">OpenSSH Portable Release</a>.
+Currently, the supported operating systems are:
+<ul>
+        <li>OpenBSD
+        <li>NetBSD
+        <li>FreeBSD
+        <li>AIX 
+        <li>HP-UX 
+        <li>IRIX 
+        <li>Linux 
+        <li>NeXT 
+        <li>SCO 
+        <li>SNI/Reliant Unix 
+        <li>Solaris 
+        <li>Digital Unix/Tru64/OSF 
+        <li>Mac OS X 
+        <li>Cygwin
+</ul>
+<p>
+A list of vendors that include OpenSSH in their distributions 
+is located in the <a href="http://www.openssh.com/users.html">OpenSSH Users page</a>.
+<h2><a name= "1.4">1.4 - What about copyrights, usage and patents?</a></h2>
+<p>
+The OpenSSH developers have tried very hard to keep OpenSSH free of any 
+patent or copyright problems. To do this, some options had to be 
+stripped from OpenSSH. Namely support for patented algorithms.
+<p>
+OpenSSH does not support any patented transport algorithms. In SSH1 mode, 
+only 3DES and Blowfish are available options. In SSH2 mode, only 3DES, 
+Blowfish, CAST128, Arcfour and AES can be selected. 
+The patented IDEA algorithm is not supported.
+<p>
+OpenSSH provides support for both SSH1 and SSH2 protocols. 
+<p>
+Since the RSA patent has expired, there are no restrictions on the use 
+of RSA algorithm using software, including OpenBSD.
+<h2><a name= "1.5">1.5 - Where should I ask for help?</a></h2>
+<p>
+There are many places to turn to for help. In addition to the main
+<a href="http://www.openssh.com/index.html">OpenSSH website</a>, 
+there are many mailing lists to try. Before trying any mailing lists, 
+please search through all mailing list archives to see if your question 
+has already been answered. The OpenSSH Mailing List has been archived and 
+put in searchable form and can be found at 
+<a href="http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&amp;r=1&amp;w=2">marc.info</a>.
+<p>
+For more information on subscribing to OpenSSH related mailing lists, 
+please see <a href="http://www.openssh.com/list.html">OpenSSH Mailing lists</a>.
+<h2><a name= "1.6">1.6 - I have found a bug. Where do I report it?</a></h2>
+<p>
+Information about submitting bug reports can be found at the OpenSSH
+<a href="http://www.openssh.com/report.html">Reporting bugs</a> page.
+<p>
+If you wish to report a security bug, please contact the private developers
+list &lt;<a href="mailto:openssh@openssh.com">openssh@openssh.com</a>&gt;.
+<h2><u><a name= "2.0">2.0 - General Questions</a></u></h2>
+<h2><a name= "2.1">2.1 - Why does ssh/scp make connections from low-numbered ports.</a></h2>
+<p>
+The OpenSSH client uses low numbered ports for rhosts and rhosts-rsa 
+authentication because the server needs to trust the username provided by 
+the client. To get around this, you can add the below example to your 
+<i>ssh_config</i> or <i>~/.ssh/config</i> file.
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+<b>UsePrivilegedPort no</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+Or you can specify this option on the command line, using the <b>-o</b> 
+option to 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh&amp;sektion=1">ssh(1)</a> command.
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+$ <b>ssh -o "UsePrivilegedPort no" host.com</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<h2><a name= "2.2">2.2 - Why is the ssh client setuid root?</a></h2>
+<p>
+In conjunction with the previous question, (<a href="#2.1">2.1</a>)
+OpenSSH needs root authority to be able to bind to low-numbered ports to 
+facilitate <i>rhosts authentication</i>.
+A privileged port is also required for rhosts-rsa authentication to older
+SSH releases.
+<p>
+Additionally, for both <i>rhosts-rsa authentication</i> (in protocol 
+version 1) and <i>hostbased authentication</i> (in protocol version 2) 
+the ssh client needs to access the <i>private host key</i> in order to 
+authenticate the client machine to the server.
+OpenSSH versions prior to 3.3 required the <code>ssh</code> binary to be
+setuid root to enable this, and you may safely remove it if you don't
+want to use these authentication methods.
+<p>
+Starting in OpenSSH 3.3, <code>ssh</code> is not setuid by default.  <a
+href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh-keysign">ssh-keysign</a>,
+is used for access to the private hosts keys, and ssh does not use privileged
+source ports by default.  If you wish to use a privileged source port, you must
+manually set the setuid bit on <code>ssh</code>.
+<h2><a name= "2.3">2.3 - Why does SSH 2.3 have problems interoperating with OpenSSH 2.1.1?</a></h2>
+<p>
+SSH 2.3 and earlier versions contain a flaw in their HMAC implementation. 
+Their code was not supplying the full data block output from the digest, 
+and instead always provided 128 bits. For longer digests, this caused 
+SSH 2.3 to not interoperate with OpenSSH.
+<p>
+OpenSSH 2.2.0 detects that SSH 2.3 has this flaw. Recent versions of SSH 
+will have this bug fixed. Or you can add the following to 
+SSH 2.3 <i>sshd2_config</i>.
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+<b>Mac hmac-md5</b>
+               </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<h2><a name= "2.4">2.4 - Why does OpenSSH print: Dispatch protocol error: type 20</a></h2>
+<p>
+Problems in interoperation have been seen because older versions of 
+OpenSSH did not support session rekeying. However the commercial SSH 2.3 
+tries to negotiate this feature, and you might experience connection 
+freezes or see the error message &quot;<b>Dispatch protocol error: 
+type 20 </b>&quot;. 
+To solve this problem, either upgrade to a recent OpenSSH release or 
+disable rekeying by adding the following to your commercial SSH 2.3's
+<i>ssh2_config</i> or <i>sshd2_config</i>.
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+<b>RekeyIntervalSeconds 0</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<h2><a name= "2.5">2.5 - Old versions of commercial SSH encrypt host keys with IDEA.</a></h2>
+<p>
+The old versions of SSH used a patented algorithm to encrypt their 
+<i>/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key</i>. This problem will manifest as 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sshd&amp;sektion=8">sshd(8)</a> 
+not being able to read its host key. To solve this, use the command below 
+to convert your ssh_host_key to use 3DES. 
+<b>NOTE:</b> Use the 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh-keygen&amp;sektion=1">ssh-keygen(1)</a> 
+program from the Commercial SSH product, *NOT* OpenSSH for the example 
+below.
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+# <b>ssh-keygen -u -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<h2><a name= "2.6">2.6 - What are these warning messages about key lengths</a></h2>
+<p>
+Commercial SSH's 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh-keygen&amp;sektion=1">ssh-keygen(1)</a> 
+program contained a bug which caused it to occasionally generate Pubkey 
+Authentication (RSA or DSA) keys which had their Most Significant Bit 
+(MSB) unset. Such keys were advertised as being full-length, but are 
+actually, half the time, smaller than advertised.
+<p>
+OpenSSH will print warning messages when it encounters such keys. To rid 
+yourself of these message, edit your <i>known_hosts</i> files and replace the 
+incorrect key length (usually "1024") with the correct key length 
+(usually "1023").
+<h2><a name= "2.7">2.7 - X11 and/or agent forwarding does not work.</a></h2>
+<p>
+Check your <i>ssh_config</i> and <i>sshd_config</i>. The default 
+configuration files disable authentication agent and X11 forwarding. To 
+enable it, put the line below in <i>sshd_config</i>:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+<b>X11Forwarding yes</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+and put the following lines in <i>ssh_config</i>:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+<b>ForwardAgent yes</b><br>
+<b>ForwardX11 yes</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+X11 forwarding requires a working <a
+href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=xauth&amp;sektion=1"
+>xauth(1)</a> binary.  On OpenBSD this is in the <i>xbase</i> file
+set but will probably be different on other platforms.  For OpenSSH
+Portable, xauth must be either found at configure time or specified
+via <b>XAuthLocation</b> in sshd_config(5) and ssh_config(5).
+<p>
+Note on agent interoperability: There are two different and
+incompatible agent forwarding mechanisms within the SSH2 protocol.
+OpenSSH has always used an extension of the original SSH1 agent
+requests, however some commercial products use a different, non-free
+agent forwarding protocol.  This means that agent forwarding cannot
+be used between OpenSSH and those products.
+<p>
+<b>NOTE:</b> For users of Linux Mandrake 7.2, Mandrake modifies the 
+<i>XAUTHORITY</i> environment variable in <i>/etc/skel/.bashrc</i>, 
+and thus any bash user's home directory. This variable is set by OpenSSH 
+and for either of the above options to work, you need to comment out 
+the line:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+<b># export XAUTHORITY=$HOME/.Xauthority</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<h2><a name= "2.8">2.8 - After upgrading OpenSSH I lost SSH2 support.</a></h2>
+<p>
+Between versions changes can be made to <i>sshd_config</i> or 
+<i>ssh_config</i>. You should always check on these changes when upgrading 
+versions of OpenSSH. After OpenSSH Version 2.3.0 you need to add the 
+following to your <i>sshd_config</i>:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+<b>HostKey /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key</b><br>
+<b>HostKey /etc/ssh_host_rsa_key</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<h2><a name= "2.9">2.9 - sftp/scp fails at connection, but ssh is OK.</a></h2>
+<p>
+sftp and/or scp may fail at connection time if you have shell 
+initialization (.profile, .bashrc, .cshrc, etc) which produces output 
+for non-interactive sessions. This output confuses the sftp/scp client.  
+You can verify if your shell is doing this by executing:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+<b>ssh yourhost /usr/bin/true</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+If the above command produces any output, then you need to modify your 
+shell initialization.
+<h2><a name= "2.10">2.10 - Will you add [foo] to scp?</a></h2>
+<p>
+Short Answer: no.
+<p>
+Long Answer: scp is not standardized. The closest thing it has to a
+specification is "what rcp does".  Since the same command is used on both ends
+of the connection, adding features or options risks breaking interoperability with other
+implementations.
+<p>
+New features are more likely in sftp, since the protocol is standardized
+(well, a <a href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/OLD/secsh-charter.html">
+draft standard</a>), extensible, and the client and server are decoupled.
+<h2><a name= "2.11">2.11 - How do I use port forwarding?</a></h2>
+<p>
+If the remote server is running sshd(8), it may be possible to
+``tunnel'' certain services via ssh.  This may be desirable, for
+example, to encrypt POP or SMTP connections, even though the software
+does not directly support encrypted communications.  Tunnelling uses
+port forwarding to create a connection between the client and server.
+The client software must be able to specify a non-standard port to
+connect to for this to work.
+<p>
+The idea is that the user connects to the remote host using ssh,
+and specifies which port on the client's machine should be used to
+forward connections to the remote server.  After that it is possible
+to start the service which is to be encrypted (e.g. fetchmail, irc)
+on the client machine, specifying the same local port passed to
+ssh, and the connection will be tunnelled through ssh.  By default,
+the system running the forward will only accept connections from
+itself.
+<p>
+The options most relevant to tunnelling are the -L and -R options,
+which allow the user to forward connections, the -D option, which
+permits dynamic port forwarding, the -g option, which permits other
+hosts to use port forwards, and the -f option, which instructs ssh
+to put itself in the background after authentication.  See the <a
+href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh&amp;sektion=1"
+>ssh(1)</a> man page for further details.
+<p>
+This is an example of tunnelling an IRC session from client machine
+``127.0.0.1'' (localhost) to remote server ``server.example.com'':
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+<b>ssh -f -L 1234:server.example.com:6667 server.example.com sleep 10<br>
+irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1</b>
+        </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+This tunnels a connection to IRC server server.example.com, joining
+channel ``#users'', using the nickname ``pinky''.  The local port used
+in this example is 1234.  It does not matter which port is used, as
+long as it's greater than 1023 (remember, only root can open sockets on
+privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use.
+The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server, since
+that's the standard port for IRC services.
+<p>
+The remote command ``sleep 10'' was specified to allow an amount
+of time (10 seconds, in the example) to start the service which is to
+be tunnelled.  If no connections are made within the time specified,
+ssh will exit.  If more time is required, the sleep(1) value can be
+increased appropriately or, alternatively, the example above could
+be added as a function to the user's shell.  See ksh(1) and csh(1)
+for more details about user-defined functions.
+<p>
+ssh also has an -N option, convenient for use with port forwarding:
+if -N is specified, it is not necessary to specify a remote command
+(``sleep 10'' in the example above).  However, use of this option
+causes ssh to wait around for ever (as opposed to exiting after a
+remote command has completed), and the user must take care to manually
+kill(1) the process afterwards.
+<h2><a name= "2.12">2.12 - My ssh connection freezes or drops out after N minutes of inactivity.</a></h2>
+<p>
+This is usually the result of a packet filter or NAT device
+timing out your TCP connection due to inactivity.  You can enable
+<b>ClientAliveInterval</b> in the server's <i><a
+href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sshd_config&amp;sektion=5">
+sshd_config</a></i>, or enable <b>ServerAliveInterval</b> in the
+client's <i><a
+href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh_config&amp;sektion=5">
+ssh_config</a></i> (the latter is available in OpenSSH 3.8 and newer).
+<p>
+Enabling either option and setting the interval for less than the time
+it takes to time out your session will ensure that the connection is
+kept "fresh" in the device's connection table.
+<h2><a name= "2.13">2.13 - How do I use scp to copy a file with a colon in it?</a></h2>
+<b><a
+href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=scp&amp;sektion=1">
+scp</a></b> will interpret the component before the colon to be a remote
+server name and attempt to connect to it.  To prevent this, refer to
+the file by a relative or absolute path, eg:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+$ scp ./source:file sshserver:
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<h2><a name= "2.14">2.14 - Why does OpenSSH report its version to clients?</a></h2>
+<p>
+OpenSSH, like most SSH implementations, reports its name and version to clients
+when they connect, e.g.
+</p>
+<blockquote>
+SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_3.9
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+This information is used by clients and servers to enable protocol 
+compatibility tweaks to work around changed, buggy or missing features in 
+the implementation they are talking to. This protocol feature checking is 
+still required at present because versions with incompatibilities are still
+in wide use.
+</p>
+<h2><u><a name= "3.0">3.0 - Portable OpenSSH Questions</a></u></h2>
+<h2><a name= "3.1">3.1 - Spurious PAM authentication messages in logfiles.</a></h2>
+<p>
+The portable version of OpenSSH will generate spurious authentication 
+failures at every login, similar to:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+&quot;<b>authentication failure; (uid=0) -&gt; root for sshd service</b>&quot;
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+These are generated because OpenSSH first tries to determine whether a 
+user needs authentication to login (e.g. empty password). Unfortunately 
+PAM likes to log all authentication events, this one included.
+<p>
+If it annoys you too much, set &quot;<b>PermitEmptyPasswords no</b>&quot; 
+in <i>sshd_config</i>. This will quiet the error message at the expense 
+of disabling logins to accounts with no password set. 
+This is the default if you use the supplied <i>sshd_config</i> file.
+<h2><a name= "3.2">3.2 - Empty passwords not allowed with PAM authentication.</a></h2>
+<p>
+To enable empty passwords with a version of OpenSSH built with PAM you 
+must add the flag nullok to the end of the password checking module 
+in the <i>/etc/pam.d/sshd</i> file. For example:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+auth required/lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nodelay nullok
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+This must be done in addition to setting &quot;<b>PermitEmptyPasswords 
+yes</b>&quot; in the <i>sshd_config</i> file. 
+<p>
+There is one caveat when using empty passwords with PAM authentication: 
+PAM will allow any password when authenticating an account with an empty 
+password. This breaks the check that 
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sshd&amp;sektion=8">sshd(8)</a> 
+uses to determine whether an account has no password set and grant 
+users access to the account regardless of the policy specified by 
+<b>PermitEmptyPasswords</b>. For this reason, it is recommended that you 
+do not add the <b>nullok</b> directive to your PAM configuration file 
+unless you specifically wish to allow empty passwords.
+<h2><a name= "3.3">3.3 - ssh(1) takes a long time to connect or log
+in</a></h2>
+<p>
+Large delays (more than 10 seconds) are typically caused by a problem with
+name resolution:
+<ul>
+<li>Some versions of glibc (notably glibc 2.1 shipped with Red Hat 6.1)
+can take a long time to resolve "IPv6 or IPv4" addresses from domain
+names. This can be worked around with by specifying <b>AddressFamily
+inet</b> option in <i>ssh_config</i>.</li>
+<li>There may be a DNS lookup problem, either at the client or server.
+You can use the <code>nslookup</code> command to check this on both client
+and server by looking up the other end's name and IP address.  In
+addition, on the server look up the name returned by the client's
+IP-name lookup.  You can disable most of the server-side lookups by
+setting <b>UseDNS no</b> in <i>sshd_config</i>.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>
+Delays less than 10 seconds can have other causes.
+<ul>
+<li>OpenSSH releases prior to 3.8 had an <i>moduli</i> file with
+moduli that were just smaller than what sshd would look for, and
+as a result, sshd would end up using moduli significantly larger
+than requested, which resulted in a speed penalty.  Replacing the
+<i>moduli</i> file will resolve this (note that in most cases this
+file will not be replaced during an upgrade and must be replaced
+manually).</li>
+<li>OpenSSH releases prior to 3.8 had a flaw in <code>ssh</code> that
+would cause it to request moduli larger than intended (which when
+combined with the above resulted in significant slowdowns).
+Upgrading the client to 3.8 or higher will resolve this issue.</li>
+<li>If either the client or server lack a kernel-based random number
+device (eg Solaris &lt; 9, AIX &lt; 5.2, HP-UX &lt; 11.11) and no
+substitute is available (eg <a href=
+"ftp://ftp.ayamura.org/pub/prngd/">prngd</a>) it's possible that
+one of the programs called by <code>ssh-rand-helper</code> to
+generate entropy is hanging.  This can be investigated by running
+it in debug mode:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+/usr/local/libexec/ssh-rand-helper -vvv
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+Any significant delays should be investigated and rectified, or the
+corresponding commands should be removed from <i>ssh_prng_cmds</i>.
+</li>
+</ul>
+<h3>How slow is "slow"?</h3>
+Under normal conditions, the speed of SSH logins is dependant on
+CPU speed of client and server.  For comparison the following are
+typical connect times for <code>time ssh localhost true</code>
+with a 1024-bit RSA key on otherwise unloaded hosts.  OpenSSH and
+OpenSSL were compiled with gcc 3.3.x.
+<p>
+<table>
+<tr><th>CPU</th><th>Time (SSHv1)<a href="#3.3fn1">[1]</a></th>
+        <th>Time (SSHv2)</th></tr>
+<tr><td>170MHz SPARC/sun4m</td><td>0.74 sec</td><td>1.25 sec</td></tr>
+<tr><td>236MHz HPPA/8200<a href="#3.3fn2">[2]</a></td><td>0.44 sec</td>
+        <td>0.79 sec</td></tr>
+<tr><td>375MHz PowerPC/604e</td><td>0.38 sec</td><td>0.51 sec</td></tr>
+<tr><td>933MHz VIA Ezra</td><td>0.34 sec</td><td>0.44 sec</td></tr>
+<tr><td>2.1GHz Athlon XP 2600+</td><td>0.14 sec</td><td>0.22 sec</td></tr>
+</table>
+<br>
+<a name="3.3fn1">[1]</a> The SSHv1 protocol is faster but is
+cryptographically weaker than SSHv2.<br>
+<a name="3.3fn2">[2]</a> At the time of writing, gcc generates
+relatively slow code on HPPA for RSA and Diffie-Hellman operations
+(see <a href= "http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=7625">gcc
+bug #7625</a> and <a
+href="http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&amp;m=102646106016694">
+discussion on openssh-unix-dev</a>).
+<h2><a name= "3.4">3.4 - "Can't locate module net-pf-10" messages in log under Linux.</a></h2>
+<p>
+The Linux kernel is looking (via modprobe) for protocol family 10 (IPv6). 
+Either load the appropriate kernel module, enter the correct alias in 
+<i>/etc/modules.conf</i> or disable IPv6 in <i>/etc/modules.conf</i>.
+<p>
+For some silly reason <i>/etc/modules.conf</i> may also be named 
+<i>/etc/conf.modules</i>.
+<h2><a name= "3.5">3.5 - Password authentication doesn't work (eg on Slackware 7.0 or Red Hat 6.x)</a></h2>
+<p>
+If the password is correct password the login is still denied, the
+usual cause is that the system is configured to use MD5-type passwords
+but the
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=crypt&amp;sektion=3"
+>crypt(3)</a> function used by sshd doesn't understand them.
+<p>
+Affected accounts will have password strings in <i>/etc/passwd</i>
+or <i>/etc/shadow</i> that start with <b>$1$</b>.
+If password authentication fails for new accounts or accounts with
+recently changed passwords, but works for old accounts, this is the
+likely culprit.
+<p>
+The underlying cause is that some versions of OpenSSL have a crypt(3)
+function that does not understand MD5 passwords, and the link order of
+sshd means that OpenSSL's crypt(3) is used instead of the system's.
+OpensSSH's configure attempts to correct for this but is not always
+successful.
+<p>
+There are several possible solutions:
+<ul>
+<li>
+<p>
+Enable sshd's built-in support for MD5 passwords at build time.
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+./configure --with-md5-passwords [options]
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+This is safe even if you have both types of encryption as sshd will
+select the correct algorithm for each account automatically.
+<li>
+<p>
+If your system has a separate libcrypt library (eg Slackware 7) then you
+can manually add -lcrypt to the LIBS list so it's used instead of
+OpenSSL's:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+LIBS=-lcrypt ./configure [options]
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<li>
+<p>
+If your platforms supports PAM, you may configure sshd to use it
+(see <a href= "#3.15" >section 3.15</a>).  This will mean that sshd will
+not verify passwords itself but will defer to the configured PAM modules.
+</ul>
+<h2><a name= "3.6">3.6 - Configure or sshd(8) complain about lack of RSA or DSA support</a></h2>
+<p>
+Ensure that your OpenSSL libraries have been built to include RSA or DSA 
+support either internally or through RSAref.
+<h2><a name= "3.7">3.7 - "scp: command not found" errors</a></h2>
+<p>
+<a href="http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=scp&amp;sektion=1">scp(1)</a> 
+must be in the default PATH on both the client and the server. You may 
+need to use the <b>--with-default-path</b> option to specify a custom 
+path to search on the server. This option replaces the default path, 
+so you need to specify all the current directories on your path as well 
+as where you have installed scp. For example:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+$ <b>./configure --with-default-path=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/path/to/scp</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+Note that configuration by the server's admin will take precedence over the
+setting of <b>--with-default-path</b>.  This includes resetting PATH in
+<i>/etc/profile</i>, PATH in <i>/etc/environment</i> on AIX, or (for 3.7p1 and
+above) setting PATH or SUPATH in <i>/etc/default/login</i> on Solaris or
+Reliant Unix.
+<h2><a name= "3.8">3.8 - Unable to read passphrase</a></h2>
+<p>
+Some operating systems set <i>/dev/tty</i> with incorrect modes, causing 
+the reading of passwords to fail with the following error:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+You have no controlling tty.  Cannot read passphrase.
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+The solution to this is to reset the permissions on <i>/dev/tty</i> 
+to mode 0666 and report the error as a bug to your OS vendor. 
+<h2><a name= "3.9">3.9 - 'configure' missing or make fails</a></h2>
+<p>
+If there is no 'configure' file in the tar.gz file that you downloaded 
+or make fails with "missing separator" errors, you have probably 
+downloaded the OpenBSD distribution of OpenSSH and are attempting to 
+compile it on another platform. Please refer to the information on the 
+<a href="http://www.openssh.com/portable.html">portable version</a>.
+<h2><a name= "3.10">3.10 - Hangs when exiting ssh</a></h2>
+<p>
+OpenSSH may hang when exiting.  This can occur when there is an active 
+background process.  This is known to occur on Linux and HP-UX.  
+The problem can be verified by doing the following:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+$ <b>sleep 20 &amp; exit</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+Try to use this instead:
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+$ <b>sleep 20 &lt; /dev/null &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp;</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+A work around for bash users is to place <b>"shopt -s huponexit"</b> 
+in either /etc/bashrc  or ~/.bashrc.  Otherwise, consult your shell's 
+man page for an option to enable it to send a HUP signal to active 
+jobs when exiting.  See <a
+href="http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=52">bug #52</a>
+for other workarounds.
+<h2><a name= "3.11">3.11 - Why does ssh hang on exit?</a></h2>
+<p>
+When executing
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+$ <b>ssh host command</b>
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+ssh <b>needs</b> to hang, because it needs to wait:
+<ul>
+<li>
+until it can be sure that <code>command</code> does not need
+more input.
+<li>
+until it can be sure that <code>command</code> does not produce
+more output. 
+<li>
+until <code>command</code> exits because sshd needs to tell
+the exit status from <code>command</code> to ssh.
+</ul>
+<p>
+<h2><a name= "3.12">3.12 - I upgraded to OpenSSH 3.1 and X11
+forwarding stopped working.</a></h2>
+Starting with OpenSSH 3.1, the sshd x11 forwarding server listens on
+localhost by default; see the sshd <b>X11UseLocalhost</b> option to
+revert to prior behaviour if your older X11 clients do not function
+with this configuration.<p>
+In general, X11 clients using X11 R6 should work with the default
+setting.  Some vendors, including HP, ship X11 clients with R6
+and R5 libs, so some clients will work, and others will not work.
+This is true for HP-UX 11.X.<p>
+<h2><a name= "3.13">3.13 - I upgraded to OpenSSH 3.8 and some
+X11 programs stopped working.</a></h2>
+<p>
+As documented in the <a href="http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-3.8">3.8 release notes</a>,
+<code>ssh</code> will now use untrusted X11 cookies by 
+default.  The previous behaviour can be restored by setting
+<b>ForwardX11Trusted yes</b> in <i>ssh_config</i>.
+<p>
+Possible symptoms include:<br>
+<code>BadWindow (invalid Window parameter)<br>
+BadAccess (attempt to access private resource denied)<br>
+X Error of failed request:  BadAtom (invalid Atom parameter)<br>
+Major opcode of failed request:  20 (X_GetProperty)<br></code>
+<h2><a name= "3.14">3.14 - I copied my public key to authorized_keys
+but public-key authentication still doesn't work.</a></h2>
+<p>
+Typically this is caused by the file permissions on $HOME, $HOME/.ssh or
+$HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys being more permissive than sshd allows by default.
+<p>
+In this case, it can be solved by executing the following on the server.
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+<tr>
+  <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+$ <b>chmod go-w $HOME $HOME/.ssh</b><br>
+$ <b>chmod 600 $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys</b><br>
+$ <b>chown `whoami` $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys</b><br>
+  </td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+<p>
+If this is not possible for some reason, an alternative is to set
+<b>StrictModes no</b> in <i>sshd_config</i>, however this is not
+recommended.
+<h2><a name= "3.15">3.15 - OpenSSH versions and PAM behaviour.</a></h2>
+Portable OpenSSH has a configure-time option to enable sshd's use of the
+<a href="http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/008329799/">PAM</a>
+(Pluggable Authentication Modules) interface.
+<blockquote>
+<table border=0 width="800">
+        <tr>
+                <td nowrap bgcolor="#EEEEEE">
+./configure --with-pam [options]
+                </td>
+        </tr>
+</table>
+</blockquote>
+To use PAM at all, this option must be provided at build time.
+The run-time behaviour when PAM is built in varies with the version of
+Portable OpenSSH, and on later versions it must also be enabled by setting
+<b>UsePAM</b> to <b>yes</b> in <i>sshd_config</i>.
+<p>
+The behaviour of the relevant authentications options when PAM support is built
+in is summarised by the following table.
+<p>
+<table border="1">
+  <tr> <th>Version</th> <th>UsePAM</th> <th>PasswordAuthentication</th> <th>ChallengeResponseAuthentication</th> </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>&lt;=3.6.1p2</td>
+    <td>Not applicable</td>
+    <td>Uses PAM</td>
+    <td>Uses PAM if <b>PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt</b> is enabled</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>3.7p1 - 3.7.1p1</td>
+    <td>Defaults to <b>yes</b></td>
+    <td>Does not use PAM</td>
+    <td>Uses PAM if <b>UsePAM</b> is enabled</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>3.7.1p2 - 3.8.1p1</td>
+    <td>Defaults to <b>no</b></td>
+    <td>Does not use PAM <a href="#3.15fn1">[1]</a></td>
+    <td>Uses PAM if <b>UsePAM</b> is enabled</td>
+  </tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td>3.9p1</td>
+    <td>Defaults to <b>no</b></td>
+    <td>Uses PAM if <b>UsePAM</b> is enabled</td>
+    <td>Uses PAM if <b>UsePAM</b> is enabled</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+<p>
+<a name= "3.15fn1">[1]</a> Some vendors, notably Redhat/Fedora, have
+backported the PasswordAuthentication from 3.9p1 to their 3.8x based
+packages.  If you're using a vendor-supplied package then consult their
+documentation.
+<p>
+OpenSSH Portable's PAM interface still has problems with a few modules,
+however we hope that this number will reduce in the future.  As at the
+3.9p1 release, the known problems are:
+<ul>
+  <li>Modules relying on module-private data (eg pam_dhkeys, pam_krb5, AFS)
+  may fail to correctly establish credentials (bug <a
+  href="http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=688">#688</a>) when
+  authenticating via <b>ChallengeResponseAuthentication</b>.
+  <b>PasswordAuthentication</b> with 3.9p1 and above should work.
+</ul>
+You can also check <a
+href="http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/buglist.cgi?product=Portable+OpenSSH&amp;bug_status=RESOLVED&amp;bug_status=NEW&amp;bug_status=ACCEPTED&amp;component=PAM+support"
+>bugzilla for current PAM issues</a>.
+<h2><a name= "3.16">3.16 - Why doesn't "w" or "who" on AIX 5.x show users
+logged in via ssh?</a></h2>
+Between AIX 4.3.3 and AIX 5.x, the format of the wtmp struct changed.  This
+means that sshd binaries built on AIX 4.x will not correctly write wtmp
+entries when run on AIX 5.x.  This can be fixed by simply recompiling 
+sshd on an AIX 5.x system and using that.
+<hr>
+<a href="http://www.openssh.com/index.html"><img height=24 width=24 src="back.gif" border=0 alt=OpenSSH></a>
+<a href="mailto:www@openbsd.org">www@openbsd.org</a>
+<br>
+<small>$OpenBSD: faq.html,v 1.113 2012/04/21 12:12:22 dtucker Exp $</small>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/debian/gnome-ssh-askpass.1 b/debian/gnome-ssh-askpass.1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b74c410a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/gnome-ssh-askpass.1
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+.TH GNOME-SSH-ASKPASS 1
+.SH NAME
+gnome\-ssh\-askpass \- prompts a user for a passphrase using GNOME
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B gnome\-ssh\-askpass
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.B gnome\-ssh\-askpass
+is a GNOME-based passphrase dialog for use with OpenSSH.
+It is intended to be called by the
+.BR ssh\-add (1)
+program and not invoked directly.
+It allows
+.BR ssh\-add (1)
+to obtain a passphrase from a user, even if not connected to a terminal
+(assuming that an X display is available).
+This happens automatically in the case where
+.B ssh\-add
+is invoked from one's
+.B ~/.xsession
+or as one of the GNOME startup programs, for example.
+.PP
+In order to be called automatically by
+.BR ssh\-add ,
+.B gnome\-ssh\-askpass
+should be installed as
+.IR /usr/bin/ssh\-askpass .
+.SH "ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES"
+The following environment variables are recognized:
+.TP
+.I GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER
+Causes
+.B gnome\-ssh\-askpass
+to grab the X server before asking for a passphrase.
+.TP
+.I GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER
+Causes
+.B gnome\-ssh\-askpass
+to grab the mouse pointer using
+.IR gdk_pointer_grab ()
+before asking for a passphrase.
+.PP
+Regardless of whether either of these environment variables is set,
+.B gnome\-ssh\-askpass
+will grab the keyboard using
+.IR gdk_keyboard_grab ().
+.SH AUTHOR
+This manual page was written by Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+for the Debian system (but may be used by others).
+It was based on that for
+.B x11\-ssh\-askpass
+by Philip Hands.
diff --git a/debian/keygen-test/Makefile b/debian/keygen-test/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..666ed8227
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/keygen-test/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+test: getpid.so
+        chmod +x keygen-test
+        ./keygen-test
+getpid.o: getpid.c
+        gcc -fPIC -c $< -o $@
+getpid.so: getpid.o
+        gcc -shared -o $@ $<
+clean:
+        rm -f getpid.o getpid.so key1 key1.pub key2 key2.pub
diff --git a/debian/keygen-test/getpid.c b/debian/keygen-test/getpid.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c9e35b87e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/keygen-test/getpid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Compile:
+gcc -fPIC -c getpid.c -o getpid.o
+gcc -shared -o getpid.so getpid.o
+ * Use:
+ 
+FORCE_PID=1234 LD_PRELOAD=./getpid.so bash
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2001-2008 Kees Cook
+# kees@outflux.net, http://outflux.net/
+# 
+# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+# as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+# of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+# 
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+# GNU General Public License for more details.
+# 
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307, USA.
+# http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html
+*/
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+pid_t getpid(void)
+{
+    return atoi(getenv("FORCE_PID"));
+}
diff --git a/debian/keygen-test/keygen-test b/debian/keygen-test/keygen-test
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..2abe815ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/keygen-test/keygen-test
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+rm -f key1 key1.pub key2 key2.pub
+LD_PRELOAD="$(pwd)/getpid.so" FORCE_PID=1234 \
+        ../build-deb/ssh-keygen -N '' -f key1 >/dev/null
+LD_PRELOAD="$(pwd)/getpid.so" FORCE_PID=1234 \
+        ../build-deb/ssh-keygen -N '' -f key2 >/dev/null
+if cmp -s key1 key2; then
+        echo "Generated two identical keys!" >&2
+        exit 1
+fi
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/openssh-client-udeb.install b/debian/openssh-client-udeb.install
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b3891f02d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-client-udeb.install
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+scp usr/bin
+sftp usr/bin
+ssh usr/bin
diff --git a/debian/openssh-client.apport b/debian/openssh-client.apport
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3dbc8e5e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-client.apport
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python
+'''apport hook for openssh-client
+(c) 2010 Canonical Ltd.
+Author: Chuck Short <chuck.short@canonical.com>
+This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+option) any later version.  See http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html for
+the full text of the license.
+'''
+from apport.hookutils import *
+def add_info(report, ui):
+    response = ui.yesno("The contents of your /etc/ssh/ssh_config file "
+                        "may help developers diagnose your bug more "
+                        "quickly.  However, it may contain sensitive "
+                        "information.  Do you want to include it in your "
+                        "bug report?")
+    if response == None: # user cancelled
+        raise StopIteration
+    elif response == True:
+        attach_conffiles(report, 'openssh-client')
+    attach_related_packages(report,
+        ['ssh-askpass', 'libpam-ssh', 'keychain', 'ssh-askpass-gnome'])
+    report['SSHClientVersion'] = command_output(['/usr/bin/ssh', '-V'])
diff --git a/debian/openssh-client.docs b/debian/openssh-client.docs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d80ec1262
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-client.docs
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+ChangeLog.gssapi
+OVERVIEW
+README
+README.dns
+README.tun
+debian/faq.html
diff --git a/debian/openssh-client.install b/debian/openssh-client.install
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..310907648
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-client.install
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+#! /usr/bin/dh-exec
+etc/ssh/ssh_config
+usr/bin/scp
+usr/bin/sftp
+usr/bin/ssh
+usr/bin/ssh-add
+usr/bin/ssh-agent
+usr/bin/ssh-keygen
+usr/bin/ssh-keyscan
+usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
+usr/lib/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+usr/share/man/man1/scp.1
+usr/share/man/man1/sftp.1
+usr/share/man/man1/ssh-add.1
+usr/share/man/man1/ssh-agent.1
+usr/share/man/man1/ssh-keygen.1
+usr/share/man/man1/ssh-keyscan.1
+usr/share/man/man1/ssh.1
+usr/share/man/man5/moduli.5
+usr/share/man/man5/ssh_config.5
+usr/share/man/man8/ssh-keysign.8
+usr/share/man/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+contrib/ssh-copy-id usr/bin
+debian/ssh-argv0 usr/bin
+debian/agent-launch usr/lib/openssh
+# dh_apport would be neater, but at the time of writing it isn't in unstable
+# yet.
+debian/openssh-client.apport => usr/share/apport/package-hooks/openssh-client.py
+# systemd user unit (only used under sessions)
+debian/systemd/ssh-agent.service usr/lib/systemd/user
diff --git a/debian/openssh-client.links b/debian/openssh-client.links
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1d94c74e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-client.links
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+usr/bin/ssh usr/bin/slogin
+usr/share/man/man1/ssh.1 usr/share/man/man1/slogin.1
+# enable systemd user unit for graphical sessions that use systemd
+usr/lib/systemd/user/ssh-agent.service usr/lib/systemd/user/graphical-session-pre.target.wants/ssh-agent.service
diff --git a/debian/openssh-client.lintian-overrides b/debian/openssh-client.lintian-overrides
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..486567744
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-client.lintian-overrides
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+openssh-client: setuid-binary usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign 4755 root/root
diff --git a/debian/openssh-client.manpages b/debian/openssh-client.manpages
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..690bd8a22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-client.manpages
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
+debian/ssh-argv0.1
diff --git a/debian/openssh-client.postinst b/debian/openssh-client.postinst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ec0ad2b2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-client.postinst
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -e
+action="$1"
+oldversion="$2"
+umask 022
+create_alternatives() {
+# Create alternatives for the various r* tools.
+# Make sure we don't change existing alternatives that a user might have
+# changed, but clean up after some old alternatives that mistakenly pointed
+# rlogin and rcp to ssh.
+        update-alternatives --quiet --remove rlogin /usr/bin/ssh
+        update-alternatives --quiet --remove rcp /usr/bin/ssh
+        for cmd in rsh rlogin rcp; do
+                scmd="s${cmd#r}"
+                if ! update-alternatives --display "$cmd" 2>/dev/null | \
+                                grep -q "$scmd"; then
+                        update-alternatives --quiet --install "/usr/bin/$cmd" "$cmd" "/usr/bin/$scmd" 20 \
+                                --slave "/usr/share/man/man1/$cmd.1.gz" "$cmd.1.gz" "/usr/share/man/man1/$scmd.1.gz"
+                fi
+        done
+}
+set_ssh_agent_permissions() {
+        if ! getent group ssh >/dev/null; then
+                addgroup --system --quiet ssh
+        fi
+        if ! dpkg-statoverride --list /usr/bin/ssh-agent >/dev/null; then
+                chgrp ssh /usr/bin/ssh-agent
+                chmod 2755 /usr/bin/ssh-agent
+        fi
+}
+if [ "$action" = configure ]; then
+        create_alternatives
+        set_ssh_agent_permissions
+fi
+#DEBHELPER#
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/openssh-client.postrm b/debian/openssh-client.postrm
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..12fb3671d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-client.postrm
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -e
+#DEBHELPER#
+case $1 in
+        purge)
+                # Remove all non-conffiles that ssh might create, so that we
+                # can smoothly remove /etc/ssh if and only if the user
+                # hasn't dropped some other files in there. Conffiles have
+                # already been removed at this point.
+                rm -f /etc/ssh/moduli /etc/ssh/primes
+                rm -f /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2
+                [ ! -d /etc/ssh ] || rmdir --ignore-fail-on-non-empty /etc/ssh
+                if which delgroup >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                        delgroup --quiet ssh > /dev/null || true
+                fi
+                ;;
+esac
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/openssh-client.prerm b/debian/openssh-client.prerm
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d631cb9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-client.prerm
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# prerm script for ssh
+#
+# see: dh_installdeb(1)
+set -e
+# summary of how this script can be called:
+#        * <prerm> `remove'
+#        * <old-prerm> `upgrade' <new-version>
+#        * <new-prerm> `failed-upgrade' <old-version>
+#        * <conflictor's-prerm> `remove' `in-favour' <package> <new-version>
+#        * <deconfigured's-prerm> `deconfigure' `in-favour'
+#          <package-being-installed> <version> `removing'
+#          <conflicting-package> <version>
+# for details, see /usr/share/doc/packaging-manual/
+case "$1" in
+    remove|deconfigure)
+        update-alternatives --quiet --remove rsh /usr/bin/ssh
+        update-alternatives --quiet --remove rlogin /usr/bin/slogin
+        update-alternatives --quiet --remove rcp /usr/bin/scp
+        ;;
+    upgrade)
+        ;;
+    failed-upgrade)
+        ;;
+    *)
+        echo "prerm called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
+        exit 0
+    ;;
+esac
+# dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
+# generated by other debhelper scripts.
+#DEBHELPER#
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server-udeb.dirs b/debian/openssh-server-udeb.dirs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e730fc43d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server-udeb.dirs
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+run/sshd
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server-udeb.install b/debian/openssh-server-udeb.install
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..05ccbf7af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server-udeb.install
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+sshd usr/sbin
+ssh-keygen usr/bin
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.apport b/debian/openssh-server.apport
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3644bd855
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.apport
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python
+'''apport hook for openssh-server
+(c) 2010 Canonical Ltd.
+Author: Chuck Short <chuck.short@canonical.com>
+This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+option) any later version.  See http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html for
+the full text of the license.
+'''
+from apport.hookutils import *
+def add_info(report, ui):
+    response = ui.yesno("The contents of your /etc/ssh/sshd_config file "
+                        "may help developers diagnose your bug more "
+                        "quickly.  However, it may contain sensitive "
+                        "information.  Do you want to include it in your "
+                        "bug report?")
+    if response == None: # user cancelled
+        raise StopIteration
+    elif response == True:
+        report['SSHDConfig'] = root_command_output(['/usr/sbin/sshd', '-T'])
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.config b/debian/openssh-server.config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4a66a35e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.config
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+set -e
+. /usr/share/debconf/confmodule
+db_version 2.0
+get_config_option() {
+        option="$1"
+        [ -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config ] || return
+        # TODO: actually only one '=' allowed after option
+        perl -lne '
+                s/[[:space:]]+/ /g; s/[[:space:]]+$//;
+                print if s/^[[:space:]]*'"$option"'[[:space:]=]+//i' \
+           /etc/ssh/sshd_config 2>/dev/null
+}
+permit_root_login="$(get_config_option PermitRootLogin)" || true
+password_authentication="$(get_config_option PasswordAuthentication)" || true
+if [ -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config ]; then
+        # Make sure the debconf database is in sync with the current state
+        # of the system.
+        if [ "$permit_root_login" = yes ]; then
+                db_set openssh-server/permit-root-login false
+        else
+                db_set openssh-server/permit-root-login true
+        fi
+        if [ "$password_authentication" = no ]; then
+                db_set openssh-server/password-authentication false
+        else
+                db_set openssh-server/password-authentication true
+        fi
+fi
+if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt-nl 1:6.6p1-1 && \
+   [ "$permit_root_login" = yes ]; then
+        if [ "$(getent shadow root | cut -d: -f2)" = "!" ]; then
+                db_set openssh-server/permit-root-login true
+        else
+                db_input high openssh-server/permit-root-login || true
+                db_go
+        fi
+fi
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.examples b/debian/openssh-server.examples
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9f15e1fa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.examples
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+debian/systemd/ssh-session-cleanup.service
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.install b/debian/openssh-server.install
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..5c166fc02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.install
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#! /usr/bin/dh-exec
+etc/ssh/moduli
+usr/sbin/sshd
+usr/share/man/man5/authorized_keys.5
+usr/share/man/man5/sshd_config.5
+usr/share/man/man8/sshd.8
+sshd_config => usr/share/openssh/sshd_config
+debian/openssh-server.ucf-md5sum => usr/share/openssh/sshd_config.md5sum
+debian/openssh-server.ufw.profile => etc/ufw/applications.d/openssh-server
+debian/systemd/ssh.socket lib/systemd/system
+debian/systemd/rescue-ssh.target lib/systemd/system
+debian/systemd/ssh@.service lib/systemd/system
+debian/systemd/ssh-session-cleanup usr/lib/openssh
+# dh_apport would be neater, but at the time of writing it isn't in unstable
+# yet.
+debian/openssh-server.apport => usr/share/apport/package-hooks/openssh-server.py
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.links b/debian/openssh-server.links
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e69de29bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.links
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.maintscript b/debian/openssh-server.maintscript
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c721fdb48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.maintscript
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+mv_conffile /etc/pam.d/ssh /etc/pam.d/sshd 1:4.7p1-4~
+rm_conffile /etc/init/ssh.conf 1:7.5p1-6~
+rm_conffile /etc/network/if-up.d/openssh-server 1:7.9p1-1~
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.postinst b/debian/openssh-server.postinst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ae273e9c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.postinst
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -e
+. /usr/share/debconf/confmodule
+db_version 2.0
+action="$1"
+oldversion="$2"
+umask 022
+get_config_option() {
+        option="$1"
+        [ -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config ] || return
+        # TODO: actually only one '=' allowed after option
+        perl -lne '
+                s/[[:space:]]+/ /g; s/[[:space:]]+$//;
+                print if s/^[[:space:]]*'"$option"'[[:space:]=]+//i' \
+           /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+}
+host_keys_required() {
+        hostkeys="$(get_config_option HostKey)"
+        if [ "$hostkeys" ]; then
+                echo "$hostkeys"
+        else
+                # No HostKey directives at all, so the server picks some
+                # defaults.
+                echo /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+                echo /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+                echo /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+        fi
+}
+create_key() {
+        msg="$1"
+        shift
+        hostkeys="$1"
+        shift
+        file="$1"
+        shift
+        if echo "$hostkeys" | grep -x "$file" >/dev/null && \
+           [ ! -f "$file" ] ; then
+                echo -n $msg
+                ssh-keygen -q -f "$file" -N '' "$@"
+                echo
+                if which restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                        restorecon "$file" "$file.pub"
+                fi
+                ssh-keygen -l -f "$file.pub"
+        fi
+}
+create_keys() {
+        hostkeys="$(host_keys_required)"
+        create_key "Creating SSH2 RSA key; this may take some time ..." \
+                "$hostkeys" /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -t rsa
+        create_key "Creating SSH2 DSA key; this may take some time ..." \
+                "$hostkeys" /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -t dsa
+        create_key "Creating SSH2 ECDSA key; this may take some time ..." \
+                "$hostkeys" /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -t ecdsa
+        create_key "Creating SSH2 ED25519 key; this may take some time ..." \
+                "$hostkeys" /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key -t ed25519
+}
+new_config=
+cleanup() {
+        if [ "$new_config" ]; then
+                rm -f "$new_config"
+        fi
+}
+create_sshdconfig() {
+        # XXX cjwatson 2016-12-24: This debconf template is very confusingly
+        # named; its description is "Disable SSH password authentication for
+        # root?", so true -> prohibit-password (the upstream default),
+        # false -> yes.
+        db_get openssh-server/permit-root-login
+        permit_root_login="$RET"
+        db_get openssh-server/password-authentication
+        password_authentication="$RET"
+        trap cleanup EXIT
+        new_config="$(tempfile)"
+        cp -a /usr/share/openssh/sshd_config "$new_config"
+        if [ "$permit_root_login" != true ]; then
+                sed -i 's/^#*PermitRootLogin .*/PermitRootLogin yes/' \
+                        "$new_config"
+        fi
+        if [ "$password_authentication" != true ]; then
+                sed -i 's/^#PasswordAuthentication .*/PasswordAuthentication no/' \
+                        "$new_config"
+        fi
+        mkdir -p /etc/ssh
+        ucf --three-way --debconf-ok \
+                --sum-file /usr/share/openssh/sshd_config.md5sum \
+                "$new_config" /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+        ucfr openssh-server /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+}
+fix_statoverride() {
+# Remove an erronous override for sshd (we should have overridden ssh)
+        if dpkg-statoverride --list /usr/sbin/sshd >/dev/null; then
+                dpkg-statoverride --remove /usr/sbin/sshd
+        fi
+}
+setup_sshd_user() {
+        if ! getent passwd sshd >/dev/null; then
+                adduser --quiet --system --no-create-home --home /run/sshd --shell /usr/sbin/nologin sshd
+        fi
+}
+if [ "$action" = configure ]; then
+        create_sshdconfig
+        create_keys
+        fix_statoverride
+        setup_sshd_user
+        # Renamed to /etc/ssh/moduli in 2.9.9 (!)
+        if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt-nl 1:4.7p1-1; then
+            rm -f /etc/ssh/primes
+        fi
+        if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt-nl 1:5.5p1-6; then
+            rm -f /run/sshd/.placeholder
+        fi
+        if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt-nl 1:6.5p1-2 && \
+           deb-systemd-helper debian-installed ssh.socket && \
+           deb-systemd-helper --quiet was-enabled ssh.service && \
+           deb-systemd-helper --quiet was-enabled ssh.socket; then
+            # 1:6.5p1-1 mistakenly left both ssh.service and ssh.socket
+            # enabled.
+            deb-systemd-helper disable ssh.socket >/dev/null || true
+        fi
+        if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt-nl 1:6.5p1-3 && \
+           [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
+            # We must stop the sysvinit-controlled sshd before we can
+            # restart it under systemd.
+            start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --oknodo --pidfile /run/sshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/sshd || true
+        fi
+fi
+#DEBHELPER#
+db_stop
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.postrm b/debian/openssh-server.postrm
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4a716f563
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.postrm
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -e
+#DEBHELPER#
+case $1 in
+        purge)
+                # Remove all non-conffiles that ssh might create, so that we
+                # can smoothly remove /etc/ssh if and only if the user
+                # hasn't dropped some other files in there. Conffiles have
+                # already been removed at this point.
+                rm -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+                rm -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+                rm -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
+                rm -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
+                rm -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
+                for ext in .ucf-new .ucf-old .ucf-dist ""; do
+                        rm -f "/etc/ssh/sshd_config$ext"
+                done
+                if which ucf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                        ucf --purge /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+                fi
+                if which ucfr >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                        ucfr --purge openssh-server /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+                fi
+                rm -f /etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run
+                [ ! -d /etc/ssh ] || rmdir --ignore-fail-on-non-empty /etc/ssh
+                if which deluser >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                        deluser --quiet sshd > /dev/null || true
+                fi
+                ;;
+esac
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.preinst b/debian/openssh-server.preinst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5b75124e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.preinst
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+set -e
+action=$1
+version=$2
+if [ "$action" = upgrade ] || [ "$action" = install ]
+then
+  if dpkg --compare-versions "$version" lt 1:5.5p1-6 && \
+     [ -d /run/sshd ]; then
+    # make sure /run/sshd is not removed on upgrades
+    touch /run/sshd/.placeholder
+  fi
+fi
+#DEBHELPER#
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.ssh.default b/debian/openssh-server.ssh.default
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..304042224
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.ssh.default
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Default settings for openssh-server. This file is sourced by /bin/sh from
+# /etc/init.d/ssh.
+# Options to pass to sshd
+SSHD_OPTS=
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.ssh.init b/debian/openssh-server.ssh.init
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f25000883
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.ssh.init
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+### BEGIN INIT INFO
+# Provides:             sshd
+# Required-Start:       $remote_fs $syslog
+# Required-Stop:        $remote_fs $syslog
+# Default-Start:        2 3 4 5
+# Default-Stop:         
+# Short-Description:    OpenBSD Secure Shell server
+### END INIT INFO
+set -e
+# /etc/init.d/ssh: start and stop the OpenBSD "secure shell(tm)" daemon
+test -x /usr/sbin/sshd || exit 0
+( /usr/sbin/sshd -\? 2>&1 | grep -q OpenSSH ) 2>/dev/null || exit 0
+umask 022
+if test -f /etc/default/ssh; then
+    . /etc/default/ssh
+fi
+. /lib/lsb/init-functions
+if [ -n "$2" ]; then
+    SSHD_OPTS="$SSHD_OPTS $2"
+fi
+# Are we running from init?
+run_by_init() {
+    ([ "$previous" ] && [ "$runlevel" ]) || [ "$runlevel" = S ]
+}
+check_for_no_start() {
+    # forget it if we're trying to start, and /etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run exists
+    if [ -e /etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run ]; then 
+        if [ "$1" = log_end_msg ]; then
+            log_end_msg 0 || true
+        fi
+        if ! run_by_init; then
+            log_action_msg "OpenBSD Secure Shell server not in use (/etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run)" || true
+        fi
+        exit 0
+    fi
+}
+check_dev_null() {
+    if [ ! -c /dev/null ]; then
+        if [ "$1" = log_end_msg ]; then
+            log_end_msg 1 || true
+        fi
+        if ! run_by_init; then
+            log_action_msg "/dev/null is not a character device!" || true
+        fi
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+check_privsep_dir() {
+    # Create the PrivSep empty dir if necessary
+    if [ ! -d /run/sshd ]; then
+        mkdir /run/sshd
+        chmod 0755 /run/sshd
+    fi
+}
+check_config() {
+    if [ ! -e /etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run ]; then
+        /usr/sbin/sshd $SSHD_OPTS -t || exit 1
+    fi
+}
+export PATH="${PATH:+$PATH:}/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+case "$1" in
+  start)
+        check_privsep_dir
+        check_for_no_start
+        check_dev_null
+        log_daemon_msg "Starting OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "sshd" || true
+        if start-stop-daemon --start --quiet --oknodo --pidfile /run/sshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/sshd -- $SSHD_OPTS; then
+            log_end_msg 0 || true
+        else
+            log_end_msg 1 || true
+        fi
+        ;;
+  stop)
+        log_daemon_msg "Stopping OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "sshd" || true
+        if start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --oknodo --pidfile /run/sshd.pid; then
+            log_end_msg 0 || true
+        else
+            log_end_msg 1 || true
+        fi
+        ;;
+  reload|force-reload)
+        check_for_no_start
+        check_config
+        log_daemon_msg "Reloading OpenBSD Secure Shell server's configuration" "sshd" || true
+        if start-stop-daemon --stop --signal 1 --quiet --oknodo --pidfile /run/sshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/sshd; then
+            log_end_msg 0 || true
+        else
+            log_end_msg 1 || true
+        fi
+        ;;
+  restart)
+        check_privsep_dir
+        check_config
+        log_daemon_msg "Restarting OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "sshd" || true
+        start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --oknodo --retry 30 --pidfile /run/sshd.pid
+        check_for_no_start log_end_msg
+        check_dev_null log_end_msg
+        if start-stop-daemon --start --quiet --oknodo --pidfile /run/sshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/sshd -- $SSHD_OPTS; then
+            log_end_msg 0 || true
+        else
+            log_end_msg 1 || true
+        fi
+        ;;
+  try-restart)
+        check_privsep_dir
+        check_config
+        log_daemon_msg "Restarting OpenBSD Secure Shell server" "sshd" || true
+        RET=0
+        start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet --retry 30 --pidfile /run/sshd.pid || RET="$?"
+        case $RET in
+            0)
+                # old daemon stopped
+                check_for_no_start log_end_msg
+                check_dev_null log_end_msg
+                if start-stop-daemon --start --quiet --oknodo --pidfile /run/sshd.pid --exec /usr/sbin/sshd -- $SSHD_OPTS; then
+                    log_end_msg 0 || true
+                else
+                    log_end_msg 1 || true
+                fi
+                ;;
+            1)
+                # daemon not running
+                log_progress_msg "(not running)" || true
+                log_end_msg 0 || true
+                ;;
+            *)
+                # failed to stop
+                log_progress_msg "(failed to stop)" || true
+                log_end_msg 1 || true
+                ;;
+        esac
+        ;;
+  status)
+        status_of_proc -p /run/sshd.pid /usr/sbin/sshd sshd && exit 0 || exit $?
+        ;;
+  *)
+        log_action_msg "Usage: /etc/init.d/ssh {start|stop|reload|force-reload|restart|try-restart|status}" || true
+        exit 1
+esac
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.ssh.service b/debian/openssh-server.ssh.service
new file mode 120000
index 000000000..609457230
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.ssh.service
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+systemd/ssh.service
+\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.sshd.pam.in b/debian/openssh-server.sshd.pam.in
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2cad67da6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.sshd.pam.in
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# PAM configuration for the Secure Shell service
+# Standard Un*x authentication.
+@include common-auth
+# Disallow non-root logins when /etc/nologin exists.
+account    required     pam_nologin.so
+# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/access.conf if you need to set complex
+# access limits that are hard to express in sshd_config.
+# account  required     pam_access.so
+# Standard Un*x authorization.
+@include common-account
+# SELinux needs to be the first session rule.  This ensures that any
+# lingering context has been cleared.  Without this it is possible that a
+# module could execute code in the wrong domain.
+session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad]        pam_selinux.so close
+# Set the loginuid process attribute.
+session    required     pam_loginuid.so
+@IF_KEYINIT@# Create a new session keyring.
+@IF_KEYINIT@session    optional     pam_keyinit.so force revoke
+# Standard Un*x session setup and teardown.
+@include common-session
+# Print the message of the day upon successful login.
+# This includes a dynamically generated part from /run/motd.dynamic
+# and a static (admin-editable) part from /etc/motd.
+session    optional     pam_motd.so  motd=/run/motd.dynamic
+session    optional     pam_motd.so noupdate
+# Print the status of the user's mailbox upon successful login.
+session    optional     pam_mail.so standard noenv # [1]
+# Set up user limits from /etc/security/limits.conf.
+session    required     pam_limits.so
+# Read environment variables from /etc/environment and
+# /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
+session    required     pam_env.so # [1]
+# In Debian 4.0 (etch), locale-related environment variables were moved to
+# /etc/default/locale, so read that as well.
+session    required     pam_env.so user_readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
+# SELinux needs to intervene at login time to ensure that the process starts
+# in the proper default security context.  Only sessions which are intended
+# to run in the user's context should be run after this.
+session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad]        pam_selinux.so open
+# Standard Un*x password updating.
+@include common-password
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.templates b/debian/openssh-server.templates
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e071fe3b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.templates
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+Template: openssh-server/permit-root-login
+Type: boolean
+Default: true
+_Description: Disable SSH password authentication for root?
+ Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH
+ using password authentication. The default for new installations is now
+ "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password", which disables password authentication
+ for root without breaking systems that have explicitly configured SSH
+ public key authentication for root.
+ .
+ This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password
+ dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such
+ attacks). However, it may break systems that are set up with the
+ expectation of being able to SSH as root using password authentication. You
+ should only make this change if you do not need to do that.
+Template: openssh-server/password-authentication
+Type: boolean
+Default: true
+Description: Allow password authentication?
+ By default, the SSH server will allow authenticating using a password.
+ You may want to change this if all users on this system authenticate using
+ a stronger authentication method, such as public keys.
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.ucf-md5sum b/debian/openssh-server.ucf-md5sum
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c9c89d429
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.ucf-md5sum
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Historical md5sums of the default /etc/ssh/sshd_config up to and including
+# 1:7.3p1-5.
+0d06fc337cee10609d4833dc88df740f
+10dc68360f6658910a98a051273de22c
+11f9e107b4d13bbcabe7f8e8da734371
+16c827adcff44efaca05ec5eea6383d7
+2eeff28468576c3f2e538314e177687b
+386c8b9079625b78f6d624ae506958ae
+38fc7b31b3e3078848f0eec457d3e050
+395c5e13801f9b4f17c2cb54aa634fbd
+423d5796cee663af2d0f24c4d520b578
+42be2cb5b64bc91443b2e46969d2d539
+42cd8b7c5ea9e440d3efa50b9a1bb444
+4f56ca8d0b5dfdaeb732becd3292ce5d
+54998a682a97af8449e9de0316eacf1d
+5c0bdc1735accbdc062381149937ec4a
+6357b54acf8e089c57544e06d1bbec53
+6a621d8bc448987e5a8a613c40307a4c
+702a79962e60aa17c6d3df742e8ec670
+7a69eff91ec92b4e065b8dd8846366b2
+7c60e22f183b6219c684f15ce24153fd
+8304e780c43d4a606f695c8965f48299
+8b9e70ee87f4b822714e2ed7af5b70dc
+8caefdd9e251b7cc1baa37874149a870
+90baeb1c778464d2da610f8268939719
+962a382e51f43f80109131838ca326ba
+96eaf22faba705a37905282f6ad69d64
+9cb6cd83be1c21f73476be629b163c01
+a07a9865cd33b85a1426cd67954c6fa0
+ae1e844b43986e2a964cf84f46b50c5b
+b516afa5a1e298f4cd00952b36dd623f
+b69fc974ee9b5a111bd473ef54cdd232
+ba9c3f808c811d6f944ad10a508c4767
+bccf9af9c7027afd0895d8ff8e02761a
+bd3a2b95f8b4b180eed707794ad81e4d
+c34586b56496f81a10615c002685fc74
+c47555a21189a6b703d2c5d37d2c50ed
+cac079e87c0ae0d77eafc9b285e36348
+d224f92823483333432974f63cb6dc66
+d50ef9ef2aa51cb9f808f6a776260c0a
+e0029e1e9871d4d2b673ee6d70a38614
+e086e7eb521ccc5776371b2e198f0702
+e101f74dc7381527e9aefa1f78b01a7f
+e24f749808133a27d94fda84a89bb27b
+ec16c3dd0203f13885d74ce529719fda
+efcff5380823d4e3f5039620c2e08459
+f58056370a64dbd2017d7486421c281d
+fe396d52df77f1fbf710591d4dbf3311
diff --git a/debian/openssh-server.ufw.profile b/debian/openssh-server.ufw.profile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9bbe906bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-server.ufw.profile
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+[OpenSSH]
+title=Secure shell server, an rshd replacement
+description=OpenSSH is a free implementation of the Secure Shell protocol.
+ports=22/tcp
diff --git a/debian/openssh-sftp-server.install b/debian/openssh-sftp-server.install
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..25b12dc09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-sftp-server.install
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
+usr/share/man/man8/sftp-server.8
diff --git a/debian/openssh-sftp-server.links b/debian/openssh-sftp-server.links
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d98b1dcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-sftp-server.links
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server usr/lib/sftp-server
diff --git a/debian/openssh-tests.install b/debian/openssh-tests.install
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..941704595
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/openssh-tests.install
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+regress /usr/lib/openssh
+debian/build-deb/regress/check-perm /usr/lib/openssh/regress
+debian/build-deb/regress/misc /usr/lib/openssh/regress
+debian/build-deb/regress/mkdtemp /usr/lib/openssh/regress
+debian/build-deb/regress/modpipe /usr/lib/openssh/regress
+debian/build-deb/regress/netcat /usr/lib/openssh/regress
+debian/build-deb/regress/setuid-allowed /usr/lib/openssh/regress
+debian/build-deb/regress/unittests /usr/lib/openssh/regress
+debian/build-deb/config.h /usr/lib/openssh/regress
+debian/run-tests /usr/lib/openssh/regress
diff --git a/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c895e63db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 67a6cbb29f77920718884e783238f4a00fe64001 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Pospisek <tpo_deb@sourcepole.ch>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:07 +0000
+Subject: Install authorized_keys(5) as a symlink to sshd(8)
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1720
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/441817
+Last-Update: 2013-09-14
+Patch-Name: authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
+---
+ Makefile.in | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 70050ffb6..ee166114d 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ install-files:
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+       ln -s ../$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/authorized_keys.5
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+        $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
diff --git a/debian/patches/check-filenames-in-scp-client.patch b/debian/patches/check-filenames-in-scp-client.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..519358ce6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/check-filenames-in-scp-client.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From 125924e47db3713a85a70e0f8d6c23818d2ea054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 22:41:28 +0000
+Subject: upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during
+remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user.
+This checking provides some protection against a malicious server
+sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted
+files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules.
+For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check.
+reported by Harry Sintonen
+fix approach suggested by markus@;
+has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f44b50d2be8e321973f3c6d014260f8f7a8eda
+CVE-2019-6111
+Origin: backport, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=391ffc4b9d31fa1f4ad566499fef9176ff8a07dc
+Last-Update: 2019-02-08
+Patch-Name: check-filenames-in-scp-client.patch
+---
+ scp.1 | 12 +++++++++++-
+ scp.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
+index 0e5cc1b2d..397e77091 100644
+--- a/scp.1
+++ b/scp.1
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
+ .Nd secure copy (remote file copy program)
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm scp
+-.Op Fl 346BCpqrv
+.Op Fl 346BCpqrTv
+ .Op Fl c Ar cipher
+ .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+ .Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+@@ -208,6 +208,16 @@ to use for the encrypted connection.
+ The program must understand
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ options.
+.It Fl T
+Disable strict filename checking.
+By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
+.Nm
+checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line
+to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files.
+Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret
+filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected.
+This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that
+the server will not send unexpected filenames.
+ .It Fl v
+ Verbose mode.
+ Causes
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 1971c80cd..035037bcc 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
+ #include <dirent.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+#include <fnmatch.h>
+ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <locale.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+@@ -383,14 +384,14 @@ void verifydir(char *);
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ uid_t userid;
+ int errs, remin, remout;
+-int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
+int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
+ 
+ #define        CMDNEEDS        64
+ char cmd[CMDNEEDS];            /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
+ 
+ int response(void);
+ void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
+-void sink(int, char *[]);
+void sink(int, char *[], const char *);
+ void source(int, char *[]);
+ void tolocal(int, char *[]);
+ void toremote(int, char *[]);
+@@ -429,8 +430,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+        addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none");
+        addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no");
+ 
+-       fflag = tflag = 0;
+-       while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1)
+       fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
+       while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+           "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) {
+                switch (ch) {
+                /* User-visible flags. */
+                case '1':
+@@ -509,9 +511,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+                        setmode(0, O_BINARY);
+ #endif
+                        break;
+               case 'T':
+                       Tflag = 1;
+                       break;
+                default:
+                        usage();
+                }
+       }
+        argc -= optind;
+        argv += optind;
+ 
+@@ -542,7 +548,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+        }
+        if (tflag) {
+                /* Receive data. */
+-               sink(argc, argv);
+               sink(argc, argv, NULL);
+                exit(errs != 0);
+        }
+        if (argc < 2)
+@@ -800,7 +806,7 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
+                        continue;
+                }
+                free(bp);
+-               sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
+               sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src);
+                (void) close(remin);
+                remin = remout = -1;
+        }
+@@ -976,7 +982,7 @@ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
+         (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8))
+ 
+ void
+-sink(int argc, char **argv)
+sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
+ {
+        static BUF buffer;
+        struct stat stb;
+@@ -992,6 +998,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+        unsigned long long ull;
+        int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
+        char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
+       char *src_copy = NULL, *restrict_pattern = NULL;
+        struct timeval tv[2];
+ 
+ #define        atime   tv[0]
+@@ -1016,6 +1023,17 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+        (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+        if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+                targisdir = 1;
+       if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
+               /*
+                * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
+                * the requested destination file glob.
+                */
+               if ((src_copy = strdup(src)) == NULL)
+                       fatal("strdup failed");
+               if ((restrict_pattern = strrchr(src_copy, '/')) != NULL) {
+                       *restrict_pattern++ = '\0';
+               }
+       }
+        for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
+                cp = buf;
+                if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
+@@ -1120,6 +1138,9 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+                        run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
+                        exit(1);
+                }
+               if (restrict_pattern != NULL &&
+                   fnmatch(restrict_pattern, cp, 0) != 0)
+                       SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
+                if (targisdir) {
+                        static char *namebuf;
+                        static size_t cursize;
+@@ -1157,7 +1178,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+                                        goto bad;
+                        }
+                        vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
+-                       sink(1, vect);
+                       sink(1, vect, src);
+                        if (setimes) {
+                                setimes = 0;
+                                if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
diff --git a/debian/patches/conch-old-privkey-format.patch b/debian/patches/conch-old-privkey-format.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..90bb3e995
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/conch-old-privkey-format.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From 1d2a55436d4b556269f42ad5f7e16608b5a8ed74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2018 00:58:56 +0100
+Subject: Work around conch interoperability failure
+Twisted Conch fails to read private keys in the new format
+(https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9515).  Work around this until it
+can be fixed in Twisted.
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2018-08-30
+Patch-Name: conch-old-privkey-format.patch
+---
+ regress/Makefile         |  5 +++--
+ regress/conch-ciphers.sh |  2 +-
+ regress/test-exec.sh     | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
+index 647b4a049..6e462a4f6 100644
+--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
+@@ -110,8 +110,9 @@ CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \
+                modpipe netcat no_identity_config \
+                pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log \
+                remote_pid revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub \
+-               rsa1 rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub rsa1.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \
+-               rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \
+               rsa1 rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub rsa1.pub \
+               rsa_oldfmt rsa_oldfmt.pub \
+               rsa_ssh2_cr.prv rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \
+                scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \
+                sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
+                ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \
+diff --git a/regress/conch-ciphers.sh b/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
+index 199d863a0..c7df19fd4 100644
+--- a/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
+++ b/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ for c in aes256-ctr aes256-cbc aes192-ctr aes192-cbc aes128-ctr aes128-cbc \
+        rm -f ${COPY}
+        # XXX the 2nd "cat" seems to be needed because of buggy FD handling
+        # in conch
+-       ${CONCH} --identity $OBJ/rsa --port $PORT --user $USER  -e none \
+       ${CONCH} --identity $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt --port $PORT --user $USER  -e none \
+            --known-hosts $OBJ/known_hosts --notty --noagent --nox11 -n \
+            127.0.0.1 "cat ${DATA}" 2>/dev/null | cat > ${COPY}
+        if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+diff --git a/regress/test-exec.sh b/regress/test-exec.sh
+index 40d46e3cd..1bbd47f25 100644
+--- a/regress/test-exec.sh
+++ b/regress/test-exec.sh
+@@ -504,6 +504,18 @@ REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no
+ if test -x "$CONCH" ; then
+        REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes
+ fi
+case "$SCRIPT" in
+*conch*)       ;;
+*)             REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no
+esac
+
+if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH" = "yes" ; then
+       # Convert rsa key to old format to work around
+       # https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9515
+       cp $OBJ/rsa $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt
+       cp $OBJ/rsa.pub $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt.pub
+       ${SSHKEYGEN} -p -N '' -m PEM -f $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt >/dev/null
+fi
+ 
+ # If PuTTY is present and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare keys and
+ # configuration
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7963b03ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-banner.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From a18385c6866da4d69f46b64626ae5d60b4cf4a66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kees Cook <kees@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:06 +0000
+Subject: Add DebianBanner server configuration option
+Setting this to "no" causes sshd to omit the Debian revision from its
+initial protocol handshake, for those scared by package-versioning.patch.
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/562048
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2018-10-19
+Patch-Name: debian-banner.patch
+---
+ servconf.c    | 9 +++++++++
+ servconf.h    | 2 ++
+ sshd.c        | 3 ++-
+ sshd_config.5 | 5 +++++
+ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 6caf1db38..c5dd617ef 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+        options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+        options->disable_forwarding = -1;
+        options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
+       options->debian_banner = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
+@@ -417,6 +418,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+                options->disable_forwarding = 0;
+        if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1)
+                options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
+       if (options->debian_banner == -1)
+               options->debian_banner = 1;
+ 
+        assemble_algorithms(options);
+ 
+@@ -504,6 +507,7 @@ typedef enum {
+        sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
+        sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
+        sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain,
+       sDebianBanner,
+        sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -661,6 +665,7 @@ static struct {
+        { "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+       { "debianbanner", sDebianBanner, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -2173,6 +2178,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+                        *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+                break;
+ 
+       case sDebianBanner:
+               intptr = &options->debian_banner;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case sDeprecated:
+        case sIgnore:
+        case sUnsupported:
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 3b76da816..4e3c54042 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ typedef struct {
+        int     fingerprint_hash;
+        int     expose_userauth_info;
+        u_int64_t timing_secret;
+
+       int     debian_banner;
+ }       ServerOptions;
+ 
+ /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 9481272fc..d7e77d343 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -384,7 +384,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
+        char remote_version[256];       /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+ 
+        xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+-           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
+           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
+           options.debian_banner ? SSH_RELEASE : SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM,
+            *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+            options.version_addendum);
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index e7e55dd71..37e6be38f 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -543,6 +543,11 @@ or
+ .Cm no .
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+.It Cm DebianBanner
+Specifies whether the distribution-specified extra version suffix is
+included during initial protocol handshake.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm DenyGroups
+ This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
+ by spaces.
diff --git a/debian/patches/debian-config.patch b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4866d52ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/debian-config.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+From a433d9baa031d7136a8cf3e3807ebff83a3a8634 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:18 +0000
+Subject: Various Debian-specific configuration changes
+ssh: Enable ForwardX11Trusted, returning to earlier semantics which cause
+fewer problems with existing setups (http://bugs.debian.org/237021).
+ssh: Set 'SendEnv LANG LC_*' by default (http://bugs.debian.org/264024).
+ssh: Enable HashKnownHosts by default to try to limit the spread of ssh
+worms.
+ssh: Enable GSSAPIAuthentication by default.
+sshd: Enable PAM, disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication, and disable
+PrintMotd.
+sshd: Enable X11Forwarding.
+sshd: Set 'AcceptEnv LANG LC_*' by default.
+sshd: Change sftp subsystem path to /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server.
+Document all of this.
+Author: Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org>
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: debian-config.patch
+---
+ readconf.c    |  2 +-
+ ssh.1         | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ ssh_config    |  6 +++++-
+ ssh_config.5  | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ sshd_config   | 16 ++++++++++------
+ sshd_config.5 | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 6 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 6b01f20d2..661b8bf40 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -2000,7 +2000,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+        if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
+                options->forward_x11 = 0;
+        if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
+-               options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
+               options->forward_x11_trusted = 1;
+        if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
+                options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
+        /*
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index ad1ed0f86..1bcc8edab 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -782,6 +782,16 @@ directive in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+ for more information.
+ .Pp
+(Debian-specific: X11 forwarding is not subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
+restrictions by default, because too many programs currently crash in this
+mode.
+Set the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+option to
+.Dq no
+to restore the upstream behaviour.
+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
+.Pp
+ .It Fl x
+ Disables X11 forwarding.
+ .Pp
+@@ -790,6 +800,17 @@ Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
+ Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
+ controls.
+ .Pp
+(Debian-specific: This option does nothing in the default configuration: it
+is equivalent to
+.Dq Cm ForwardX11Trusted No yes ,
+which is the default as described above.
+Set the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+option to
+.Dq no
+to restore the upstream behaviour.
+This may change in future depending on client-side improvements.)
+.Pp
+ .It Fl y
+ Send log information using the
+ .Xr syslog 3
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index bcb9f153d..1b676fb2c 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
+++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
+ # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
+ # ssh_config(5) man page.
+ 
+-# Host *
+Host *
+ #   ForwardAgent no
+ #   ForwardX11 no
+#   ForwardX11Trusted yes
+ #   PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+@@ -46,3 +47,6 @@
+ #   VisualHostKey no
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+    SendEnv LANG LC_*
+    HashKnownHosts yes
+    GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index a91355726..1a8e24bd1 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -71,6 +71,22 @@ Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
+ host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
+ file, and general defaults at the end.
+ .Pp
+Note that the Debian
+.Ic openssh-client
+package sets several options as standard in
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+which are not the default in
+.Xr ssh 1 :
+.Pp
+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm SendEnv No LANG LC_*
+.It
+.Cm HashKnownHosts No yes
+.It
+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication No yes
+.El
+.Pp
+ The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
+ Lines starting with
+ .Ql #
+@@ -699,11 +715,12 @@ elapsed.
+ .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+ If this option is set to
+ .Cm yes ,
+(the Debian-specific default),
+ remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
+ .Pp
+ If this option is set to
+ .Cm no
+-(the default),
+(the upstream default),
+ remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
+ from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
+ clients.
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 2c48105f8..ed8272f6d 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -57,8 +57,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile    .ssh/authorized_keys
+ #PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #PermitEmptyPasswords no
+ 
+-# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+-#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+# Change to yes to enable challenge-response passwords (beware issues with
+# some PAM modules and threads)
+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ 
+ # Kerberos options
+ #KerberosAuthentication no
+@@ -81,16 +82,16 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile  .ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+-#UsePAM no
+UsePAM yes
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
+-#X11Forwarding no
+X11Forwarding yes
+ #X11DisplayOffset 10
+ #X11UseLocalhost yes
+ #PermitTTY yes
+-#PrintMotd yes
+PrintMotd no
+ #PrintLastLog yes
+ #TCPKeepAlive yes
+ #PermitUserEnvironment no
+@@ -107,8 +108,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
+ # no default banner path
+ #Banner none
+ 
+# Allow client to pass locale environment variables
+AcceptEnv LANG LC_*
+
+ # override default of no subsystems
+-Subsystem      sftp    /usr/libexec/sftp-server
+Subsystem      sftp    /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
+ 
+ # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+ #Match User anoncvs
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 23f71fd1d..ba50a30f1 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -56,6 +56,28 @@ Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+ .Pq \&"
+ in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+ .Pp
+Note that the Debian
+.Ic openssh-server
+package sets several options as standard in
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+which are not the default in
+.Xr sshd 8 :
+.Pp
+.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication No no
+.It
+.Cm X11Forwarding No yes
+.It
+.Cm PrintMotd No no
+.It
+.Cm AcceptEnv No LANG LC_*
+.It
+.Cm Subsystem No sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server
+.It
+.Cm UsePAM No yes
+.El
+.Pp
+ The possible
+ keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+ keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
diff --git a/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e2acdf1a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/dnssec-sshfp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From 0ee33d93c5c7a5fbb8b027aa24e7c9668125fda9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:01 +0000
+Subject: Force use of DNSSEC even if "options edns0" isn't in resolv.conf
+This allows SSHFP DNS records to be verified if glibc 2.11 is installed.
+Origin: vendor, https://cvs.fedoraproject.org/viewvc/F-12/openssh/openssh-5.2p1-edns.patch?revision=1.1&view=markup
+Bug: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572049
+Last-Update: 2010-04-06
+Patch-Name: dnssec-sshfp.patch
+---
+ dns.c                           | 14 +++++++++++++-
+ openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c | 10 +++++-----
+ openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h |  3 +++
+ 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c
+index ff1a2c41c..82ec97199 100644
+--- a/dns.c
+++ b/dns.c
+@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
+ {
+        u_int counter;
+        int result;
+       unsigned int rrset_flags = 0;
+        struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
+ 
+        u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
+@@ -234,8 +235,19 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
+                return -1;
+        }
+ 
+       /*
+        * Original getrrsetbyname function, found on OpenBSD for example,
+        * doesn't accept any flag and prerequisite for obtaining AD bit in
+        * DNS response is set by "options edns0" in resolv.conf.
+        *
+        * Our version is more clever and use RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag.
+        */
+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
+       rrset_flags |= RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0;
+#endif
+        result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
+-           DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
+           DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, rrset_flags, &fingerprints);
+
+        if (result) {
+                verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
+                return -1;
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
+index dc6fe0533..e061a290a 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
+@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
+                goto fail;
+        }
+ 
+-       /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
+-       if (flags) {
+       /* Allow RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0 flag only. */
+       if ((flags & !RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0) != 0) {
+                result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+                goto fail;
+        }
+@@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
+ #endif /* DEBUG */
+ 
+ #ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
+-       /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
+-       if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
+-               _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
+       /* turn on DNSSEC if required  */
+       if (flags & RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0)
+               _resp->options |= (RES_USE_EDNS0|RES_USE_DNSSEC);
+ #endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
+ 
+        /* make query */
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
+index 1283f5506..dbbc85a2a 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
+@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+ #ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
+ # define RRSET_VALIDATED       1
+ #endif
+#ifndef RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0
+# define RRSET_FORCE_EDNS0     0x0001
+#endif
+ 
+ /*
+  * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
diff --git a/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c6bc43299
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 1d0c41a7e0b2426733ddb598248d0488c9c00a8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:11 +0000
+Subject: Document that HashKnownHosts may break tab-completion
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1727
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/430154
+Last-Update: 2013-09-14
+Patch-Name: doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
+---
+ ssh_config.5 | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 7d55fa820..a91355726 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -793,6 +793,9 @@ Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
+ will not be converted automatically,
+ but may be manually hashed using
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+Use of this option may break facilities such as tab-completion that rely
+on being able to read unhashed host names from
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
+ authentication.
diff --git a/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b6d4f1239
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From df56506f727e37c13346259bdcd5975e257a259d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Vincent Untz <vuntz@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:16 +0000
+Subject: Give the ssh-askpass-gnome window a default icon
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/27152
+Last-Update: 2010-02-28
+Patch-Name: gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
+---
+ contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+index 535a69274..e37a13382 100644
+--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+@@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+        gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
+ 
+       gtk_window_set_default_icon_from_file ("/usr/share/pixmaps/ssh-askpass-gnome.png", NULL);
+
+        if (argc > 1) {
+                message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
+        } else {
diff --git a/debian/patches/gssapi.patch b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f62bf6672
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/gssapi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3353 @@
+From 72b1d308e6400194ef6e4e7dd45bfa48fa39b5e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000
+Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support
+This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
+in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
+years.  This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
+just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
+like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface.  This one is
+particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
+system resources."
+However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
+have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
+-krb5 packages (as we used to have).  It seems to have a generally good
+security history.
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
+Last-Updated: 2018-10-20
+Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
+---
+ ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 ++++++++++++++++
+ Makefile.in      |   3 +-
+ auth-krb5.c      |  17 ++-
+ auth.c           |  96 +------------
+ auth2-gss.c      |  54 +++++++-
+ auth2.c          |   2 +
+ canohost.c       |  93 +++++++++++++
+ canohost.h       |   3 +
+ clientloop.c     |  15 ++-
+ config.h.in      |   6 +
+ configure.ac     |  24 ++++
+ gss-genr.c       | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c  |  85 +++++++++++-
+ gss-serv.c       | 184 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ kex.c            |  19 +++
+ kex.h            |  14 ++
+ kexgssc.c        | 341 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ kexgsss.c        | 300 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ monitor.c        | 122 +++++++++++++++--
+ monitor.h        |   3 +
+ monitor_wrap.c   |  53 +++++++-
+ monitor_wrap.h   |   4 +-
+ opacket.c        |   2 +-
+ opacket.h        |   2 +-
+ readconf.c       |  43 ++++++
+ readconf.h       |   5 +
+ servconf.c       |  26 ++++
+ servconf.h       |   2 +
+ ssh-gss.h        |  41 +++++-
+ ssh_config       |   2 +
+ ssh_config.5     |  32 +++++
+ sshconnect2.c    | 133 +++++++++++++++++-
+ sshd.c           | 110 +++++++++++++++
+ sshd_config      |   2 +
+ sshd_config.5    |  10 ++
+ sshkey.c         |   3 +-
+ sshkey.h         |   1 +
+ 37 files changed, 2099 insertions(+), 146 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ChangeLog.gssapi
+ create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
+ create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
+diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..f117a336a
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+20110101
+  - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
+  - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
+ 
+20100308
+  - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
+    Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
+  - [ servconf.c ]
+    Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
+    some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin 
+    Watson.
+  -
+
+20100124
+  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
+    Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
+    Colin Watson
+
+20090615
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
+      sshd.c ]
+    Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
+       Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
+       Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
+       Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
+       Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
+       Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
+       Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
+       Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
+       Cast data.length before printing
+       If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
+
+20090201
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
+      ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
+    Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
+    to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
+
+20080404
+  - [ gss-serv.c ]
+    Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
+    been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
+    Stoichkov
+
+20070317
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a 
+    function
+
+20061220
+  - [ servconf.c ]
+    Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and 
+    documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
+
+20060910
+  - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
+      ssh-gss.h ]
+    add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
+  - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
+    Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
+    acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
+    <Bugzilla #928>
+  - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
+    Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
+    configuration files
+  - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
+    Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
+    Limit length of error messages displayed by client
+
+20060909
+  - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
+    move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
+    only, where they belong 
+    <Bugzilla #1225>
+
+20060829
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment 
+    variable
+
+20060828
+  - [ gss-genr.c ]
+    Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
+    <Fixed upstream 20060829>
+
+20060818
+  - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
+    Make sure that SPENGO is disabled 
+    <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
+
+20060421
+  - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
+    a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
+    fix compiler errors/warnings 
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
+    fix uninitialized variable warnings
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ gssgenr.c ]
+    pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <Bugzilla #1220 >
+  - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
+    #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <Fixed upstream 20060304>
+  - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c 
+    add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+  - [ sshconnect2.c ]
+    add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
+    (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
+    <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 126b2c742..70050ffb6 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+        kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+        kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
+        kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
+       kexgssc.o \
+        platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o
+ 
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
+        auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+        auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+        monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+-       auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+       auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+        loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+        sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+        sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 3096f1c8e..204752e1b 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -182,8 +182,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+ 
+        len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+        authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+       snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
+           authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#else
+        snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+            authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+        if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -240,15 +245,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-       int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+       int ret, oerrno;
+        char ccname[40];
+        mode_t old_umask;
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+       char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
+#else
+       char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
+       int tmpfd;
+#endif
+ 
+        ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-           "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+           cctemplate, geteuid());
+        if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+                return ENOMEM;
+ 
+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+        old_umask = umask(0177);
+        tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+        oerrno = errno;
+@@ -265,6 +277,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+                return oerrno;
+        }
+        close(tmpfd);
+#endif
+ 
+        return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index 3ca3762cc..d8e6b4a3d 100644
+--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
+@@ -399,7 +399,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+        case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
+                if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
+                    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
+-                   strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
+                   strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 ||
+                   strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0)
+                        return 1;
+                break;
+        case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
+@@ -737,99 +738,6 @@ fakepw(void)
+        return (&fake);
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+- * called.
+- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+- */
+-
+-static char *
+-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-       struct sockaddr_storage from;
+-       socklen_t fromlen;
+-       struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+-       char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+-       const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-
+-       /* Get IP address of client. */
+-       fromlen = sizeof(from);
+-       memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+-       if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+-           (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+-               debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+-               return strdup(ntop);
+-       }
+-
+-       ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+-       if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+-               fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+-
+-       debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+-       /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+-       if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+-           NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+-               /* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+-               return strdup(ntop);
+-       }
+-
+-       /*
+-        * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+-        * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+-        *      1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.  IN PTR  2.3.4.5
+-        */
+-       memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-       hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
+-       hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+-       if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+-               logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+-                   name, ntop);
+-               freeaddrinfo(ai);
+-               return strdup(ntop);
+-       }
+-
+-       /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+-       lowercase(name);
+-
+-       /*
+-        * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+-        * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+-        * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+-        * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+-        * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+-        * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+-        * the domain).
+-        */
+-       memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-       hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+-       hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-       if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+-               logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+-                   "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+-               return strdup(ntop);
+-       }
+-       /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+-       for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+-               if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+-                   sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+-                   (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+-                               break;
+-       }
+-       freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+-       /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+-       if (ai == NULL) {
+-               /* Address not found for the host name. */
+-               logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+-                   "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+-               return strdup(ntop);
+-       }
+-       return strdup(name);
+-}
+-
+ /*
+  * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+  * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 9351e0428..1f12bb113 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
+++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.29 2018/07/31 03:10:27 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -54,6 +54,46 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+ static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+ static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ 
+/* 
+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
+ */
+static int
+userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+       Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+       int r, authenticated = 0;
+       struct sshbuf *b;
+       gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+       u_char *p;
+       size_t len;
+
+       if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+       if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+               fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+       mic.value = p;
+       mic.length = len;
+
+       ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+           "gssapi-keyex");
+
+       if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
+               fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
+       gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
+
+       /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
+       if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, 
+           &gssbuf, &mic))))
+               authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+                   authctxt->pw));
+       
+       sshbuf_free(b);
+       free(mic.value);
+
+       return (authenticated);
+}
+
+ /*
+  * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+  * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -260,7 +300,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+        if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-       authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+       authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+           authctxt->pw));
+ 
+        if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+            (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+@@ -306,7 +347,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+        gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
+ 
+        if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+-               authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+               authenticated = 
+                   PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+        else
+                logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+ 
+@@ -326,6 +368,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+        return 0;
+ }
+ 
+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
+       "gssapi-keyex",
+       userauth_gsskeyex,
+       &options.gss_authentication
+};
+
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+        "gssapi-with-mic",
+        userauth_gssapi,
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index 4d19957a6..a77742819 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+        &method_none,
+        &method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+       &method_gsskeyex,
+        &method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+        &method_passwd,
+diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
+index f71a08568..404731d24 100644
+--- a/canohost.c
+++ b/canohost.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
+ #include "canohost.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ 
+/*
+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+ * called.
+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+ */
+
+char *
+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+       struct sockaddr_storage from;
+       socklen_t fromlen;
+       struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+       char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+       const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+       /* Get IP address of client. */
+       fromlen = sizeof(from);
+       memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+       if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+           (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+               debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+               return strdup(ntop);
+       }
+
+       ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+       if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+               fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+       debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+       /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+       if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+           NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+               /* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+               return strdup(ntop);
+       }
+
+       /*
+        * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+        * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+        *      1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.  IN PTR  2.3.4.5
+        */
+       memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+       hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
+       hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+       if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+               logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+                   name, ntop);
+               freeaddrinfo(ai);
+               return strdup(ntop);
+       }
+
+       /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+       lowercase(name);
+
+       /*
+        * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+        * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+        * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+        * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+        * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+        * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+        * the domain).
+        */
+       memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+       hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+       hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+       if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+               logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+                   "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+               return strdup(ntop);
+       }
+       /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+       for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+               if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+                   sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+                   (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+                               break;
+       }
+       freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+       /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+       if (ai == NULL) {
+               /* Address not found for the host name. */
+               logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+                   "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+               return strdup(ntop);
+       }
+       return strdup(name);
+}
+
+ void
+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
+ {
+diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
+index 26d62855a..0cadc9f18 100644
+--- a/canohost.h
+++ b/canohost.h
+@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
+ #ifndef _CANOHOST_H
+ #define _CANOHOST_H
+ 
+struct ssh;
+
+char           *remote_hostname(struct ssh *);
+ char           *get_peer_ipaddr(int);
+ int             get_peer_port(int);
+ char           *get_local_ipaddr(int);
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index 8d312cdaa..1464634b0 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+ 
+@@ -1370,9 +1374,18 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
+                        break;
+ 
+                /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+-               if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
+               if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
+                        channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+                       if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
+                           ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
+                               debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
+                               need_rekeying = 1;
+                       }
+#endif
+               }
+
+                /* Buffer input from the connection.  */
+                client_process_net_input(readset);
+ 
+diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
+index 91b65db8f..209760c7c 100644
+--- a/config.h.in
+++ b/config.h.in
+@@ -1845,6 +1845,9 @@
+ /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
+ #undef USE_BTMP
+ 
+/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
+#undef USE_CCAPI
+
+ /* Use libedit for sftp */
+ #undef USE_LIBEDIT
+ 
+@@ -1860,6 +1863,9 @@
+ /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
+ #undef USE_PIPES
+ 
+/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
+#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+
+ /* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
+ #undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+ 
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 7379ab358..023e7cc55 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -664,6 +664,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+            [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+        AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+            [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+       AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
+       AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
+               [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
+               [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
+                AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1], 
+                       [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
+                LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+                AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+               [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
+                AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
+       AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
+       AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+               [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
+               [cc_context_t c;
+                (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
+               [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1], 
+                       [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
+                LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+                AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+                if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
+                       AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
+               fi],
+               [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
+       )
+        m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
+        AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
+            AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
+index d56257b4a..491e62cee 100644
+--- a/gss-genr.c
+++ b/gss-genr.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.26 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -39,14 +39,37 @@
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+ 
+typedef struct {
+       char *encoded;
+       gss_OID oid;
+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
+
+/*
+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
+ * XXX   passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
+ */
+
+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
+
+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
+
+int 
+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
+       return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
+}
+
+ /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
+@@ -62,6 +85,143 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
+        return 0;
+ }
+ 
+/*
+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
+ *
+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
+ */
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
+       gss_OID_set gss_supported;
+       OM_uint32 min_status;
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
+               return NULL;
+
+       return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
+           host, client));
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+    const char *host, const char *client) {
+       struct sshbuf *buf;
+       size_t i;
+       int r, oidpos, enclen;
+       char *mechs, *encoded;
+       u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+       char deroid[2];
+       struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
+
+       if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
+               for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
+                       free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
+               free(gss_enc2oid);
+       }
+
+       gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
+           (gss_supported->count + 1));
+
+       if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+               fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+       oidpos = 0;
+       for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
+               if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
+                   (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
+
+                       deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
+                       deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
+
+                       if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
+                           ssh_digest_update(md, deroid, 2) != 0 ||
+                           ssh_digest_update(md,
+                           gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
+                           gss_supported->elements[i].length) != 0 ||
+                           ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0)
+                               fatal("%s: digest failed", __func__);
+
+                       encoded = xmalloc(ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)
+                           * 2);
+                       enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+                           ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+                           ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+
+                       if (oidpos != 0) {
+                               if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0)
+                                       fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+                                           __func__, ssh_err(r));
+                       }
+
+                       if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+                           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1)) != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshbuf_put(buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
+                           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1)) != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ',')) != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshbuf_put(buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
+                           sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1)) != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshbuf_put(buf, encoded, enclen)) != 0)
+                               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+                                   __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+                       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
+                       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
+                       oidpos++;
+               }
+       }
+       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
+       gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
+
+       if ((mechs = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
+               fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+
+       if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
+               free(mechs);
+               mechs = NULL;
+       }
+       
+       return (mechs);
+}
+
+gss_OID
+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
+       int i = 0;
+       
+       switch (kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+               if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
+                       return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+               name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
+                       return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+               name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
+                       return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+               name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
+               break;
+       default:
+               return GSS_C_NO_OID;
+       }
+
+       while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
+           strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
+               i++;
+
+       if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
+               ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
+
+       return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
+}
+
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -218,7 +378,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+        }
+ 
+        ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+-           GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+           ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+            GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+            0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+ 
+@@ -247,9 +407,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
+        return (ctx->major);
+ }
+ 
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+       gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+       gss_name_t gssname;
+       OM_uint32 status;
+       gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+       gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
+       gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
+
+       gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+       gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+       ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
+           GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
+
+       if (!ctx->major)
+               ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, 
+                   gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, 
+                   &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
+
+       gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
+       gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+
+       if (ctx->major)
+               ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+       return(ctx->major);
+}
+
+ OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
+       if (ctx == NULL) 
+               return -1;
+
+        if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+            GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -257,6 +451,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+        return (ctx->major);
+ }
+ 
+/* Priviledged when used by server */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+       if (ctx == NULL)
+               return -1;
+
+       ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+           gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+
+       return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+     const char *context)
+@@ -273,11 +480,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, 
+    const char *client)
+ {
+        gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+        OM_uint32 major, minor;
+        gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
+       Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
+
+       if (ctx == NULL)
+               ctx = &intctx;
+ 
+        /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+        if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
+@@ -287,6 +499,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+        ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+        ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+        major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
+
+       if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
+               major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
+
+        if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+                major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+                    NULL);
+@@ -296,10 +512,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+                            GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+        }
+ 
+-       if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
+       if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) 
+                ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+ 
+        return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+ }
+ 
+int
+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
+       static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+       static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
+       static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+       static gss_name_t name;
+       static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
+       OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
+       int equal;
+       
+       now = time(NULL);
+
+       if (ctxt) {
+               debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
+
+               if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+                       gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
+
+               major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+                   &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+
+               if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+                       saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
+                       saved_lifetime+= now;
+               } else {
+                       /* Handle the error */
+               }
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       if (now - last_call < 10)
+               return 0;
+
+       last_call = now;
+
+       if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+               return 0;
+       
+       major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, 
+           &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
+       if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
+               return 0;
+       else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+               return 0;
+
+       major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
+       gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
+       if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+               return 0;
+
+       if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
+               return 1;
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index a151bc1e4..90f8692f5 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+        krb5_error_code problem;
+        krb5_principal princ;
+        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+-       int len;
+        const char *errmsg;
+       const char *new_ccname;
+ 
+        if (client->creds == NULL) {
+                debug("No credentials stored");
+@@ -180,11 +180,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+                return;
+        }
+ 
+-       client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
+       new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
+
+        client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+-       len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+-       client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+-       snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+       xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
+       client->store.filename = NULL;
+#else
+       xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
+       client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
+#endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+        if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -196,6 +201,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+        return;
+ }
+ 
+int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, 
+    ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+       krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+       krb5_principal principal = NULL;
+       char *name = NULL;
+       krb5_error_code problem;
+       OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+
+       if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
+                logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
+                    krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+                return 0;
+               }
+       
+       /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
+       if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, 
+           &principal))) {
+               logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
+                   krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
+               logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
+                   krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+               krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+
+       if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
+               debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
+               krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+               return 0;
+       }
+       krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
+
+       /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
+
+       if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
+               logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
+                   krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+               krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
+
+       if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
+           ccache))) {
+               logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
+               krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+               return 0;
+       }
+
+       return 1;
+}
+
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+        "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+        "Kerberos",
+@@ -203,7 +273,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+        NULL,
+        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+        NULL,
+-       &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
+       &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
+       &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+ 
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index ab3a15f0f..6c087a1b1 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
+++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.31 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -44,17 +44,22 @@
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+-    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
+    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME,  NULL,
+    {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+-    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+ 
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -140,6 +145,28 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
+        return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
+ }
+ 
+/* Unprivileged */
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
+       if (supported_oids == NULL)
+               ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+       return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
+           &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+/* Unprivileged */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
+    const char *dummy) {
+       Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
+       int res;
+ 
+       res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
+       ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
+
+       return (res);
+}
+
+ /* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+@@ -150,7 +177,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+        gss_OID_set supported;
+ 
+        gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+-       gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
+               return;
+ 
+        while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+                if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -276,8 +305,48 @@ OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+        int i = 0;
+       int equal = 0;
+       gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+       gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+       if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
+               if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
+                   (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
+                    ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
+                       debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
+                       return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+               }
+
+               if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, 
+                   ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, 
+                   NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+                       ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+                       return (ctx->major);
+               }
+
+               ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, 
+                   new_name, &equal);
+
+               if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
+                       ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+                       return (ctx->major);
+               }
+ 
+               if (!equal) {
+                       debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
+                       return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+               }
+ 
+-       gss_buffer_desc ename;
+               debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
+
+               gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
+               gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
+               client->name = new_name;
+               client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+               ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+               client->updated = 1;
+               return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+       }
+ 
+        client->mech = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -292,6 +361,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+        if (client->mech == NULL)
+                return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ 
+       if (ctx->client_creds &&
+           (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
+            ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
+               ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+               return (ctx->major);
+       }
+
+        if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+            &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -309,6 +385,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+                return (ctx->major);
+        }
+ 
+       gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
+
+        /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+        client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+        ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -356,7 +434,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+        OM_uint32 lmin;
+ 
+@@ -366,9 +444,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+-               if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+               if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
+                       gssapi_client.used = 1;
+                       gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+                        return 1;
+-               else {
+               } else {
+                        /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+                        gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+                        gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -382,14 +462,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+        return (0);
+ }
+ 
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running 
+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
+ *
+ * In the child, we want to :
+ *    *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
+ *    *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
+ */
+
+/* Stuff for PAM */
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, 
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+-       ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+-           gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+       return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+#endif
+ 
+-       return (ctx->major);
+void
+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
+       int ok;
+       int ret;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+       pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+       struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
+       char *envstr;
+#endif
+
+       if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && 
+           gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+           gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
+               return;
+ 
+       ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+
+       if (!ok)
+               return;
+
+       debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
+
+       /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
+        * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
+        * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
+        */
+#ifdef USE_PAM 
+       if (!use_privsep) {
+               debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
+               return;
+       }
+
+       ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
+           &pamconv, &pamh);
+       if (ret)
+               return;
+
+       xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, 
+           gssapi_client.store.envval);
+
+       ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
+       if (!ret)
+               pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+       pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+}
+
+int 
+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
+       int ok = 0;
+
+       /* Check we've got credentials to store */
+       if (!gssapi_client.updated)
+               return 0;
+
+       gssapi_client.updated = 0;
+
+       temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
+       if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
+               ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
+       else
+               debug("No update function for this mechanism");
+
+       restore_uid();
+
+       return ok;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index 25f9f66f6..fb5bfaea5 100644
+--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
+ /* prototype */
+ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
+ static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+@@ -105,6 +109,14 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
+        { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+ };
+static const struct kexalg kexalg_prefixes[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+       { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+       { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+#endif
+       { NULL, -1, -1, -1 },
+};
+ 
+ char *
+ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+@@ -137,6 +149,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+                if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+                        return k;
+        }
+       for (k = kexalg_prefixes; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+               if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
+                       return k;
+       }
+        return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -653,6 +669,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
+        sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
+        sshbuf_free(kex->my);
+        free(kex->session_id);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       free(kex->gss_host);
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+        free(kex->client_version_string);
+        free(kex->server_version_string);
+        free(kex->failed_choice);
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 593de1208..4e5ead839 100644
+--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
+@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
+        KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+        KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+        KEX_C25519_SHA256,
+       KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
+       KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
+       KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
+        KEX_MAX
+ };
+ 
+@@ -148,6 +151,12 @@ struct kex {
+        u_int   flags;
+        int     hash_alg;
+        int     ec_nid;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       int     gss_deleg_creds;
+       int     gss_trust_dns;
+       char    *gss_host;
+       char    *gss_client;
+#endif
+        char    *client_version_string;
+        char    *server_version_string;
+        char    *failed_choice;
+@@ -198,6 +207,11 @@ int         kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
+ int     kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
+ int     kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int     kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
+int     kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
+#endif
+
+ int     kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
+     const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+     const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
+diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..3c8ae08dd
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgssc.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+int
+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
+       gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
+       Gssctxt *ctxt;
+       OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
+       u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
+       DH *dh; 
+       BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+       const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
+       BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *g = NULL;       
+       u_char *kbuf;
+       u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
+       u_char *empty = "";
+       char *msg;
+       int type = 0;
+       int first = 1;
+       int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+       u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+       size_t hashlen;
+
+       /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */       
+       ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
+       if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type) 
+           == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+               fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
+
+       if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_host))
+               fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
+
+       if (ssh->kex->gss_client && 
+           ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_client))
+               fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
+
+       switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group1();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group14();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               debug("Doing group exchange\n");
+               nbits = dh_estimate(ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
+               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+               packet_put_int(min);
+               packet_put_int(nbits);
+               packet_put_int(max);
+
+               packet_send();
+
+               packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
+
+               if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                       fatal("BN_new() failed");
+               packet_get_bignum2(p);
+               if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                       fatal("BN_new() failed");
+               packet_get_bignum2(g);
+               packet_check_eom();
+
+               if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
+                       fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
+                           min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
+
+               dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+       }
+       
+       /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
+       dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
+       DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+       DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+
+       /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
+       dh_server_pub = BN_new();
+       if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
+               fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
+
+       token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+                        
+       do {
+               debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
+               
+               maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
+                   ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
+                   &ret_flags);
+
+               if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+                       if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+                               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                               packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                   send_tok.length);
+                       }
+                       fatal("gss_init_context failed");
+               }
+
+               /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
+               if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
+                       free(recv_tok.value);
+
+               if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+                       /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
+                       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+                               fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
+
+                       /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
+                       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+                               fatal("Integrity check failed");
+               }
+
+               /* 
+                * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
+                * received cannot have been a 'complete'. 
+                */
+               if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+                       if (first) {
+                               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
+                               packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                   send_tok.length);
+                               packet_put_bignum2(pub_key);
+                               first = 0;
+                       } else {
+                               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                               packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+                                   send_tok.length);
+                       }
+                       packet_send();
+                       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+
+                       /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
+                       do {    
+                               type = packet_read();
+                               if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
+                                       debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
+                                       if (serverhostkey)
+                                               fatal("Server host key received more than once");
+                                       serverhostkey = 
+                                           packet_get_string(&slen);
+                               }
+                       } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
+
+                       switch (type) {
+                       case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+                               debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+                               if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) 
+                                       fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
+                               recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                               recv_tok.length = strlen; 
+                               break;
+                       case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
+                               debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
+                               packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
+                               msg_tok.value =  packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                               msg_tok.length = strlen; 
+
+                               /* Is there a token included? */
+                               if (packet_get_char()) {
+                                       recv_tok.value=
+                                           packet_get_string(&strlen);
+                                       recv_tok.length = strlen;
+                                       /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
+                                       if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                                               packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
+                                       } else {
+                                               /* No token included */
+                                               if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                                                       packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
+                               }
+                               break;
+                       case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
+                               debug("Received Error");
+                               maj_status = packet_get_int();
+                               min_status = packet_get_int();
+                               msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+                               (void) packet_get_string_ptr(NULL);
+                               fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
+                       default:
+                               packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+                               type);
+                       }
+                       token_ptr = &recv_tok;
+               } else {
+                       /* No data, and not complete */
+                       if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+                               fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
+               }
+       } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+       /* 
+        * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the 
+        * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok 
+        */
+
+       if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
+               fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
+
+       /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
+       if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
+               packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
+
+       /* compute K=f^x mod p */
+       klen = DH_size(dh);
+       kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+       kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
+       if (kout < 0)
+               fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+
+       shared_secret = BN_new();
+       if (shared_secret == NULL)
+               fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
+
+       if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+               fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+       memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+       free(kbuf);
+
+       hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+       switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               kex_dh_hash(
+                   ssh->kex->hash_alg,
+                   ssh->kex->client_version_string,
+                   ssh->kex->server_version_string,
+                   sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my),
+                   sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer),
+                   (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
+                   pub_key,            /* e */
+                   dh_server_pub,      /* f */
+                   shared_secret,      /* K */
+                   hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               kexgex_hash(
+                   ssh->kex->hash_alg,
+                   ssh->kex->client_version_string,
+                   ssh->kex->server_version_string,
+                   sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my),
+                   sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer),
+                   (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
+                   min, nbits, max,
+                   dh_p, dh_g,
+                   pub_key,
+                   dh_server_pub,
+                   shared_secret,
+                   hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+       }
+
+       gssbuf.value = hash;
+       gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+       /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
+       if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
+               packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
+
+       free(msg_tok.value);
+
+       DH_free(dh);
+       free(serverhostkey);
+       BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+
+       /* save session id */
+       if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
+               ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+               ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
+               memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
+       }
+
+       if (ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds)
+               ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
+
+       if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+               gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+       else
+               ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+       kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+       BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+       return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+}
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000..18070f1d7
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgsss.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+int
+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+       OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+       
+       /* 
+        * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
+        * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific 
+        * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently 
+        * activating this non-standard behaviour.
+        */
+
+       OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
+       gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
+       gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+       u_int slen, klen, kout;
+       u_char *kbuf;
+       DH *dh;
+       int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
+       const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
+       BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+       BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+       int type = 0;
+       gss_OID oid;
+       char *mechs;
+       u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+       size_t hashlen;
+
+       /* Initialise GSSAPI */
+
+       /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
+        * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
+        * into life
+        */
+       if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
+               mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+               free(mechs);
+       }
+
+       debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, ssh->kex->name);
+       oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+       if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
+          fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
+
+       debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
+               fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
+
+       switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group1();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               dh = dh_new_group14();
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               debug("Doing group exchange");
+               packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+               min = packet_get_int();
+               nbits = packet_get_int();
+               max = packet_get_int();
+               packet_check_eom();
+               if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
+                       fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
+                           min, nbits, max);
+               dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min),
+                   nbits, MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max)));
+               if (dh == NULL)
+                       packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
+               DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+
+               packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
+               packet_put_bignum2(dh_p);
+               packet_put_bignum2(dh_g);
+               packet_send();
+
+               packet_write_wait();
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+       }
+
+       dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
+
+       do {
+               debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
+               type = packet_read();
+               switch(type) {
+               case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
+                       if (dh_client_pub != NULL) 
+                               fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
+                       recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+                       recv_tok.length = slen; 
+
+                       if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+                               fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
+
+                       packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
+
+                       /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
+                       break;
+               case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+                       recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+                       recv_tok.length = slen; 
+                       break;
+               default:
+                       packet_disconnect(
+                           "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+                           type);
+               }
+
+               maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, 
+                   &send_tok, &ret_flags));
+
+               free(recv_tok.value);
+
+               if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
+                       fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
+
+               if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
+                       fatal("No client public key");
+               
+               if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+                       debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+                       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                       packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+                       packet_send();
+                       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+               }
+       } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+               if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+                       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+                       packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+                       packet_send();
+               }
+               fatal("accept_ctx died");
+       }
+
+       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+               fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
+
+       if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+               fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
+       
+       if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
+               packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+
+       klen = DH_size(dh);
+       kbuf = xmalloc(klen); 
+       kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
+       if (kout < 0)
+               fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
+
+       shared_secret = BN_new();
+       if (shared_secret == NULL)
+               fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
+
+       if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
+               fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
+
+       memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+       free(kbuf);
+
+       DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+       DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+
+       hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+       switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
+       case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
+               kex_dh_hash(
+                   ssh->kex->hash_alg,
+                   ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
+                   sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer),
+                   sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my),
+                   NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
+                   dh_client_pub, pub_key, shared_secret,
+                   hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
+               kexgex_hash(
+                   ssh->kex->hash_alg,
+                   ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
+                   sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->peer),
+                   sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->my), sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->my),
+                   NULL, 0,
+                   min, nbits, max,
+                   dh_p, dh_g,
+                   dh_client_pub,
+                   pub_key,
+                   shared_secret,
+                   hash, &hashlen
+               );
+               break;
+       default:
+               fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
+       }
+
+       BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+
+       if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
+               ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+               ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
+               memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
+       }
+
+       gssbuf.value = hash;
+       gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
+               fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
+
+       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
+       packet_put_bignum2(pub_key);
+       packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
+
+       if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+               packet_put_char(1); /* true */
+               packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+       } else {
+               packet_put_char(0); /* false */
+       }
+       packet_send();
+
+       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+       gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
+
+       if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+               gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+       else 
+               ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+       DH_free(dh);
+
+       kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+       BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+       kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
+
+       /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
+        * just exchanged.  */
+       if (options.gss_store_rekey)
+               ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
+       return 0;
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index 531b2993a..eabc1e89b 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, struct sshbuf *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -215,11 +217,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+     {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+ 
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
+#endif
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+ #endif
+@@ -289,6 +298,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+        /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif
+ 
+        /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+        while (!authenticated) {
+@@ -401,6 +414,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif         
+ 
+        if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
+@@ -1666,6 +1683,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ # endif
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+                kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+               if (options.gss_keyex) {
+                       kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+                       kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+                       kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+               }
+#endif
+                kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+                kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+                kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+@@ -1756,8 +1780,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+        u_char *p;
+        int r;
+ 
+-       if (!options.gss_authentication)
+-               fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+ 
+        if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+@@ -1789,8 +1813,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+        OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+        int r;
+ 
+-       if (!options.gss_authentication)
+-               fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+ 
+        if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+@@ -1810,6 +1834,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
+               monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+        }
+        return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1821,8 +1846,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+        OM_uint32 ret;
+        int r;
+ 
+-       if (!options.gss_authentication)
+-               fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+ 
+        if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
+            (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
+@@ -1851,10 +1876,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+        int r, authenticated;
+        const char *displayname;
+ 
+-       if (!options.gss_authentication)
+-               fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+ 
+-       authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+       authenticated = authctxt->valid && 
+           ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+ 
+        sshbuf_reset(m);
+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
+@@ -1871,5 +1897,83 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+        /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+        return (authenticated);
+ }
+
+int 
+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+       gss_buffer_desc data;
+       gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       OM_uint32 major, minor;
+       size_t len;
+       u_char *p;
+       int r;
+
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+
+       if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+       data.value = p;
+       data.length = len;
+       if (data.length != 20) 
+               fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, 
+                   (int) data.length);
+
+       /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
+       if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+               session_id2_len = data.length;
+               session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+               memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
+       }
+       major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
+
+       free(data.value);
+
+       sshbuf_reset(m);
+       if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+       mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
+
+       gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
+
+       /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+       
+       /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
+
+       return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, struct sshbuf *m) {
+       ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+       int r, ok;
+
+       if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+               fatal("%s: GSSAPI not enabled", __func__);
+
+       if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &store.filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &store.envvar, NULL)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &store.envval, NULL)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+       ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
+
+       free(store.filename);
+       free(store.envvar);
+       free(store.envval);
+
+       sshbuf_reset(m);
+       if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+       mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+
+       return(0);
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index 16047299f..44fbed589 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+        MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+        MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+ 
+       MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
+       MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
+
+ };
+ 
+ struct monitor {
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 732fb3476..1865a122a 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+        struct sshbuf *m;
+        int r, authenticated = 0;
+@@ -1003,4 +1003,55 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+        debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+        return (authenticated);
+ }
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
+{
+       struct sshbuf *m;
+       OM_uint32 major;
+       int r;
+
+       if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+               fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+       if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data->value, data->length)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+       mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, m);
+       mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
+
+       if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
+           (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, hash)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+       sshbuf_free(m);
+
+       return(major);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
+{
+       struct sshbuf *m;
+       int r, ok;
+
+       if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+               fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+       if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+           store->filename ? store->filename : "")) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+           store->envvar ? store->envvar : "")) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+           store->envval ? store->envval : "")) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+       mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+       mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+
+       if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ok)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+       sshbuf_free(m);
+
+       return (ok);
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 644da081d..7f93144ff 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -60,8 +60,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+diff --git a/opacket.c b/opacket.c
+index e637d7a71..7672c0b59 100644
+--- a/opacket.c
+++ b/opacket.c
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ ssh_packet_put_raw(struct ssh *ssh, const void *buf, u_int len)
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ void
+-ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value)
+ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM * value)
+ {
+        int r;
+ 
+diff --git a/opacket.h b/opacket.h
+index f92fe586e..1cf66a2d3 100644
+--- a/opacket.h
+++ b/opacket.h
+@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ void     ssh_packet_start(struct ssh *, u_char);
+ void     ssh_packet_put_char(struct ssh *, int ch);
+ void     ssh_packet_put_int(struct ssh *, u_int value);
+ void     ssh_packet_put_int64(struct ssh *, u_int64_t value);
+-void     ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value);
+void     ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *, const BIGNUM * value);
+ void     ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(struct ssh *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+ void     ssh_packet_put_string(struct ssh *, const void *buf, u_int len);
+ void     ssh_packet_put_cstring(struct ssh *, const char *str);
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 433811521..36bc5e59a 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ typedef enum {
+        oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+        oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+        oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+       oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
+       oGssServerIdentity, 
+        oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+        oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+        oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -201,10 +203,20 @@ static struct {
+        /* Sometimes-unsupported options */
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+        { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+        { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+       { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+       { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
+       { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
+       { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ # else
+        { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+        { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapiserveridentity", oUnsupported },
+       { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+        { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
+@@ -974,10 +986,30 @@ parse_time:
+                intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case oGssKeyEx:
+               intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case oGssDelegateCreds:
+                intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case oGssTrustDns:
+               intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+       case oGssClientIdentity:
+               charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
+               goto parse_string;
+
+       case oGssServerIdentity:
+               charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
+               goto parse_string;
+
+       case oGssRenewalRekey:
+               intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case oBatchMode:
+                intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+                goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1842,7 +1874,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+        options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+        options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+        options->gss_authentication = -1;
+       options->gss_keyex = -1;
+        options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+       options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+       options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
+       options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
+       options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
+        options->password_authentication = -1;
+        options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+        options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1988,8 +2025,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+                options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+        if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+                options->gss_authentication = 0;
+       if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+               options->gss_keyex = 0;
+        if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+                options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+       if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
+               options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+       if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
+               options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+        if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+                options->password_authentication = 1;
+        if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index fc7e38251..8e4900d01 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -40,7 +40,12 @@ typedef struct {
+        int     challenge_response_authentication;
+                                        /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+        int     gss_authentication;     /* Try GSS authentication */
+       int     gss_keyex;              /* Try GSS key exchange */
+        int     gss_deleg_creds;        /* Delegate GSS credentials */
+       int     gss_trust_dns;          /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+       int     gss_renewal_rekey;      /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
+       char    *gss_client_identity;   /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
+       char    *gss_server_identity;   /* GSSAPI target principal */
+        int     password_authentication;        /* Try password
+                                                 * authentication. */
+        int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 932d363bb..4668b8a45 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -124,8 +124,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+        options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+        options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+        options->gss_authentication=-1;
+       options->gss_keyex = -1;
+        options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+        options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+       options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+        options->password_authentication = -1;
+        options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+        options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -337,10 +339,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+                options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+        if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+                options->gss_authentication = 0;
+       if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+               options->gss_keyex = 0;
+        if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+                options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+        if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+                options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+       if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+               options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+        if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+                options->password_authentication = 1;
+        if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -485,6 +491,7 @@ typedef enum {
+        sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+        sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+        sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+       sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
+        sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+        sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+        sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+@@ -559,12 +566,20 @@ static struct {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+        { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+        { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+       { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1468,6 +1483,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+                intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case sGssKeyEx:
+               intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case sGssCleanupCreds:
+                intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+                goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1476,6 +1495,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+                intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+       case sGssStoreRekey:
+               intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
+               goto parse_flag;
+
+        case sPasswordAuthentication:
+                intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+                goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2560,7 +2583,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+       dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
+       dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+       dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ #endif
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 0175e00e8..3b76da816 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -125,8 +125,10 @@ typedef struct {
+        int     kerberos_get_afs_token;         /* If true, try to get AFS token if
+                                                 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+        int     gss_authentication;     /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+       int     gss_keyex;              /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+        int     gss_cleanup_creds;      /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+        int     gss_strict_acceptor;    /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+       int     gss_store_rekey;
+        int     password_authentication;        /* If true, permit password
+                                                 * authentication. */
+        int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index 36180d07a..350ce7882 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.14 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
+ 
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+ 
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT                            30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE                        31
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE                        32
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY                         33
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR                           34
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ                       40
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP                          41
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID                           "gss-group1-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID                          "gss-group14-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID                            "gss-gex-sha1-"
+
+ typedef struct {
+        char *filename;
+        char *envvar;
+        char *envval;
+       struct passwd *owner;
+        void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+ 
+@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
+        gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+        gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+        gss_cred_id_t creds;
+       gss_name_t name;
+        struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+        ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+       int used;
+       int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+        int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+        int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+        void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+       int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
+        gss_OID         oid; /* client */
+        gss_cred_id_t   creds; /* server */
+        gss_name_t      client; /* server */
+-       gss_cred_id_t   client_creds; /* server */
+       gss_cred_id_t   client_creds; /* both */
+ } Gssctxt;
+ 
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+ 
+ int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -123,17 +140,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *,
+     const char *, const char *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+ 
+ /* In the server */
+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, 
+    const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
+    const char *);
+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, 
+    const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
+
+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index c12f5ef52..bcb9f153d 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
+++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
+ #   HostbasedAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+#   GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ #   BatchMode no
+ #   CheckHostIP yes
+ #   AddressFamily any
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 4d5b01d3e..16c79368a 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -736,10 +736,42 @@ The default is
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when 
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default 
+identity will be used.
+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when 
+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
+hostname.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+If set to 
+.Cm yes
+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed 
+credentials to a session on the server.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
+Set to 
+.Cm yes
+to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
+the name of the host being connected to. If 
+.Cm no ,
+the hostname entered on the
+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 1675f3935..8c872a4fb 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -162,6 +162,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+        struct kex *kex;
+        int r;
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
+       char *gss_host = NULL;
+#endif
+
+        xxx_host = host;
+        xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+ 
+@@ -194,6 +199,35 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+                    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
+        }
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+                * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+               orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+               if (options.gss_server_identity)
+                       gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+               else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+                       gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
+               else
+                       gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+
+               gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+                   options.gss_client_identity);
+               if (gss) {
+                       debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+                       xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+                           "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+
+                       /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also
+                        * support the 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+                       orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+                       xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+                           "%s,null", orig);
+               }
+       }
+#endif
+
+        if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+                packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
+                    options.rekey_interval);
+@@ -215,15 +249,41 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ # endif
+ #endif
+        kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+       }
+#endif
+        kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+        kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+        kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
+               kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
+               kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
+               kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+       }
+#endif
+
+        ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
+ 
+        /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
+        myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
+            compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       /* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
+       /* ext-info removal above */
+       if (gss) {
+               orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+               xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+                   "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+               free(gss);
+       }
+#endif
+        if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
+                fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ 
+@@ -314,6 +374,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ int    input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ int    input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ int    input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int    userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+ 
+ void   userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -330,6 +391,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+ 
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+       {"gssapi-keyex",
+               userauth_gsskeyex,
+               NULL,
+               &options.gss_authentication,
+               NULL},
+        {"gssapi-with-mic",
+                userauth_gssapi,
+                NULL,
+@@ -686,25 +752,40 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+        static u_int mech = 0;
+        OM_uint32 min;
+        int r, ok = 0;
+       char *gss_host;
+
+       if (options.gss_server_identity)
+               gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+       else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+               gss_host = remote_hostname(active_state);
+       else
+               gss_host = xstrdup(authctxt->host);
+ 
+        /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+         * once. */
+ 
+        if (gss_supported == NULL)
+-               gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
+               if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
+                       gss_supported = NULL;
+                       free(gss_host);
+                       return 0;
+               }
+ 
+        /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+        while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+                /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+                if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+                    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+-                   &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
+                   &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
+                    options.gss_client_identity)) {
+                        ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+                } else {
+                        mech++;
+                }
+        }
+ 
+       free(gss_host);
+
+        if (!ok)
+                return 0;
+ 
+@@ -935,6 +1016,54 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+        free(lang);
+        return r;
+ }
+
+int
+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+       struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+       struct sshbuf *b;
+       gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+       gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+       OM_uint32 ms;
+       int r;
+
+       static int attempt = 0;
+       if (attempt++ >= 1)
+               return (0);
+
+       if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
+               debug("No valid Key exchange context"); 
+               return (0);
+       }
+
+       if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+               fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+       ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
+           "gssapi-keyex");
+
+       if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
+               fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
+       gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
+
+       if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
+               sshbuf_free(b);
+               return (0);
+       }
+
+       if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, mic.length)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+       sshbuf_free(b);
+       gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+
+       return (1);
+}
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ int
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index ba26287ba..539a000fd 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -123,6 +123,10 @@
+ #include "version.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ 
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
+#endif
+
+ /* Re-exec fds */
+ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD   (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+ #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD         (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+@@ -1810,10 +1814,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+                free(fp);
+        }
+        accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
+#ifndef GSSAPI
+       /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+        if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+                logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+                exit(1);
+        }
+#endif
+ 
+        /*
+         * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
+@@ -2104,6 +2111,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+            rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
+        free(laddr);
+ 
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+       /*
+        * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
+        * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
+        * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode).  We do not
+        * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
+        * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
+        *
+        * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
+        * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
+        * new sessions for us.  Then all the users will end up in the
+        * same session (bad).
+        *
+        * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
+        * automatically.
+        *
+        * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
+        * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
+        */
+       {
+               OSStatus err = 0;
+               SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
+               SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
+
+               err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
+               if (err)
+                       error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+                           (unsigned) err);
+               else
+                       debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+                           (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+
+               if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
+                       debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
+                           "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
+               else {
+                       debug("Creating new security session...");
+                       err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
+                       if (err)
+                               error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
+                                   (unsigned) err);
+
+                       err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, 
+                           &sattrs);
+                       if (err)
+                               error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+                                   (unsigned) err);
+                       else
+                               debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+                                   (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+               }
+       }
+#endif
+
+        /*
+         * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+         * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2287,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+        myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
+            list_hostkey_types());
+ 
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       {
+       char *orig;
+       char *gss = NULL;
+       char *newstr = NULL;
+       orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+       /* 
+        * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
+        * the other key exchange algorithms
+        */
+
+       if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+               orig = NULL;
+
+       if (options.gss_keyex)
+               gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+       else
+               gss = NULL;
+
+       if (gss && orig)
+               xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+       else if (gss)
+               newstr = gss;
+       else if (orig)
+               newstr = orig;
+
+       /* 
+        * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
+        * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
+        * host key algorithm we support
+        */
+       if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
+               myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
+
+       if (newstr)
+               myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+       else
+               fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
+       }
+#endif
+
+        /* start key exchange */
+        if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
+                fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
+@@ -2304,6 +2407,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ # endif
+ #endif
+        kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+       if (options.gss_keyex) {
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+               kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+       }
+#endif
+        kex->server = 1;
+        kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+        kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index 19b7c91a1..2c48105f8 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile    .ssh/authorized_keys
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+ 
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index c6484370b..985eef5a2 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -648,6 +648,11 @@ The default is
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+@@ -667,6 +672,11 @@ machine's default store.
+ This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a 
+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed 
+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
+.Cm no .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+ as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 6555c5ef8..a85c185fc 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
+ #  endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+       { "null", "null", NULL, KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 },
+        { NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -223,7 +224,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+        const struct keytype *kt;
+ 
+        for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+-               if (kt->name == NULL)
+               if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
+                        continue;
+                if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
+                        continue;
+diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+index f6a007fdf..f54deb0c0 100644
+--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
+        KEY_ED25519_CERT,
+        KEY_XMSS,
+        KEY_XMSS_CERT,
+       KEY_NULL,
+        KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/have-progressmeter-force-update-at-beginning-and-end-transfer.patch b/debian/patches/have-progressmeter-force-update-at-beginning-and-end-transfer.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..767dbf2b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/have-progressmeter-force-update-at-beginning-and-end-transfer.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From 2a8f710447442e9a03e71c022859112ec2d77d17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 16:52:17 +0000
+Subject: upstream: Have progressmeter force an update at the beginning and
+end of each transfer.  Fixes the problem recently introduces where very quick
+transfers do not display the progressmeter at all.  Spotted by naddy@
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 68dc46c259e8fdd4f5db3ec2a130f8e4590a7a9a
+Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=bdc6c63c80b55bcbaa66b5fde31c1cb1d09a41eb
+Last-Update: 2019-02-08
+Patch-Name: have-progressmeter-force-update-at-beginning-and-end-transfer.patch
+---
+ progressmeter.c | 13 +++++--------
+ progressmeter.h |  4 ++--
+ scp.c           |  2 +-
+ sftp-client.c   |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c
+index add462dde..e385c1254 100644
+--- a/progressmeter.c
+++ b/progressmeter.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.46 2019/01/23 08:01:46 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.47 2019/01/24 16:52:17 dtucker Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman.  All rights reserved.
+  *
+@@ -59,9 +59,6 @@ static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t);
+ static void sig_winch(int);
+ static void setscreensize(void);
+ 
+-/* updates the progressmeter to reflect the current state of the transfer */
+-void refresh_progress_meter(void);
+-
+ /* signal handler for updating the progress meter */
+ static void sig_alarm(int);
+ 
+@@ -120,7 +117,7 @@ format_size(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-refresh_progress_meter(void)
+refresh_progress_meter(int force_update)
+ {
+        char buf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1];
+        off_t transferred;
+@@ -131,7 +128,7 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
+        int hours, minutes, seconds;
+        int file_len;
+ 
+-       if ((!alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
+       if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
+                return;
+        alarm_fired = 0;
+ 
+@@ -254,7 +251,7 @@ start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
+        bytes_per_second = 0;
+ 
+        setscreensize();
+-       refresh_progress_meter();
+       refresh_progress_meter(1);
+ 
+        signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm);
+        signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
+@@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ stop_progress_meter(void)
+ 
+        /* Ensure we complete the progress */
+        if (cur_pos != end_pos)
+-               refresh_progress_meter();
+               refresh_progress_meter(1);
+ 
+        atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
+ }
+diff --git a/progressmeter.h b/progressmeter.h
+index 8f6678060..1703ea75b 100644
+--- a/progressmeter.h
+++ b/progressmeter.h
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.4 2019/01/23 08:01:46 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.5 2019/01/24 16:52:17 dtucker Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2002 Nils Nordman.  All rights reserved.
+  *
+@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@
+  */
+ 
+ void   start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
+-void   refresh_progress_meter(void);
+void   refresh_progress_meter(int);
+ void   stop_progress_meter(void);
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 80308573c..1971c80cd 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s)
+        off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt;
+ 
+        *cnt += s;
+-       refresh_progress_meter();
+       refresh_progress_meter(0);
+        if (limit_kbps > 0)
+                bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s);
+        return 0;
+diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+index 2bc698f86..cf2887a40 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.c
+++ b/sftp-client.c
+@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount)
+ {
+        struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit;
+ 
+-       refresh_progress_meter();
+       refresh_progress_meter(0);
+        if (bwlimit != NULL)
+                bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
+        return 0;
diff --git a/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4207302c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/keepalive-extensions.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+From 7ba31c6ff505278fb9f33b695605ca3a093caba2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Kettlewell <rjk@greenend.org.uk>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:52 +0000
+Subject: Various keepalive extensions
+Add compatibility aliases for ProtocolKeepAlives and SetupTimeOut, supported
+in previous versions of Debian's OpenSSH package but since superseded by
+ServerAliveInterval.  (We're probably stuck with this bit for
+compatibility.)
+In batch mode, default ServerAliveInterval to five minutes.
+Adjust documentation to match and to give some more advice on use of
+keepalives.
+Author: Ian Jackson <ian@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
+Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
+Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2018-10-19
+Patch-Name: keepalive-extensions.patch
+---
+ readconf.c    | 14 ++++++++++++--
+ ssh_config.5  | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
+ sshd_config.5 |  3 +++
+ 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 5e655e924..052d4b1ac 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ typedef enum {
+        oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
+        oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
+        oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
+       oProtocolKeepAlives, oSetupTimeOut,
+        oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
+ } OpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -322,6 +323,8 @@ static struct {
+        { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
+        { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
+        { "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
+       { "protocolkeepalives", oProtocolKeepAlives },
+       { "setuptimeout", oSetupTimeOut },
+ 
+        { NULL, oBadOption }
+ };
+@@ -1415,6 +1418,8 @@ parse_keytypes:
+                goto parse_flag;
+ 
+        case oServerAliveInterval:
+       case oProtocolKeepAlives: /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
+       case oSetupTimeOut:       /* Debian-specific compatibility alias */
+                intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
+                goto parse_time;
+ 
+@@ -2101,8 +2106,13 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+                options->rekey_interval = 0;
+        if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
+                options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
+-       if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
+-               options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+       if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) {
+               /* in batch mode, default is 5mins */
+               if (options->batch_mode == 1)
+                       options->server_alive_interval = 300;
+               else
+                       options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+       }
+        if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
+                options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
+        if (options->control_master == -1)
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 16c79368a..54e143c93 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -247,8 +247,12 @@ Valid arguments are
+ If set to
+ .Cm yes ,
+ passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
+In addition, the
+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
+option will be set to 300 seconds by default (Debian-specific).
+ This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
+-is present to supply the password.
+is present to supply the password,
+and where it is desirable to detect a broken network swiftly.
+ The argument must be
+ .Cm yes
+ or
+@@ -1485,7 +1489,14 @@ from the server,
+ will send a message through the encrypted
+ channel to request a response from the server.
+ The default
+-is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server,
+or 300 if the
+.Cm BatchMode
+option is set (Debian-specific).
+.Cm ProtocolKeepAlives
+and
+.Cm SetupTimeOut
+are Debian-specific compatibility aliases for this option.
+ .It Cm SetEnv
+ Directly specify one or more environment variables and their contents to
+ be sent to the server.
+@@ -1565,6 +1576,12 @@ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
+ other side.
+ If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
+ of the machines will be properly noticed.
+This option only uses TCP keepalives (as opposed to using ssh level
+keepalives), so takes a long time to notice when the connection dies.
+As such, you probably want
+the
+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
+option as well.
+ However, this means that
+ connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
+ find it annoying.
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 985eef5a2..e7e55dd71 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1577,6 +1577,9 @@ This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
+ .Pp
+ To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+ .Cm no .
+.Pp
+This option was formerly called
+.Cm KeepAlive .
+ .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
+ Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
+ trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
diff --git a/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..75ed46db7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From bb8bb2621914ad600202e38d5b9b4f4544b191e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Scott Moser <smoser@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:03 +0000
+Subject: Mention ssh-keygen in ssh fingerprint changed warning
+Author: Chris Lamb <lamby@debian.org>
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1843
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/686607
+Last-Update: 2017-08-22
+Patch-Name: mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
+---
+ sshconnect.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 700ea6c3c..158e8146f 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -1121,9 +1121,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+                        error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
+                        error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
+                        error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
+-                       if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
+                       if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) {
+                                error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
+                                    ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
+                               error("  remove with:");
+                               error("  ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R \"%s\"",
+                                   ip_found->file, ip);
+                       }
+                }
+                /* The host key has changed. */
+                warn_changed_key(host_key);
+@@ -1132,6 +1136,9 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+                error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu",
+                    sshkey_type(host_found->key),
+                    host_found->file, host_found->line);
+               error("  remove with:");
+               error("  ssh-keygen -f \"%s\" -R \"%s\"",
+                   host_found->file, host);
+ 
+                /*
+                 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
diff --git a/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3b2e05e58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/no-openssl-version-status.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 690051b3aa4ff72af57e4a82d640858357eef820 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:14 +0000
+Subject: Don't check the status field of the OpenSSL version
+There is no reason to check the version of OpenSSL (in Debian).  If it's
+not compatible the soname will change.  OpenSSH seems to want to do a
+check for the soname based on the version number, but wants to keep the
+status of the release the same.  Remove that check on the status since
+it doesn't tell you anything about how compatible that version is.
+Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/93581
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/664383
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/732940
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2014-10-07
+Patch-Name: no-openssl-version-status.patch
+---
+ openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c         | 6 +++---
+ openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+index 8b4a36274..ea0b0c9fb 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
+@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
+ /*
+  * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+  * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
+- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
+ * After that, we accept compatible fix and status versions (so we
+  * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
+  * within a patch series.
+  */
+@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
+        }
+ 
+        /*
+-        * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+        * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor must match and library
+         * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+         */
+-       mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
+       mask = 0xfff00000L; /* major,minor */
+        hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+        lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+        if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
+index 5d019b598..58474873d 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct version_test {
+ 
+        /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
+        { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
+       { 0x1000101fL, 0x10001010L, 1}, /* different status: ok */
+        { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */
+        { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */
+        { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */
diff --git a/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cdb905b2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/openbsd-docs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+From 96c85e746d4f94c7d2748a200e5817ad8a987918 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:09 +0000
+Subject: Adjust various OpenBSD-specific references in manual pages
+No single bug reference for this patch, but history includes:
+ http://bugs.debian.org/154434 (login.conf(5))
+ http://bugs.debian.org/513417 (/etc/rc)
+ http://bugs.debian.org/530692 (ssl(8))
+ https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/456660 (ssl(8))
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: openbsd-docs.patch
+---
+ moduli.5      |  4 ++--
+ ssh-keygen.1  | 12 ++++--------
+ ssh.1         |  4 ++++
+ sshd.8        |  5 ++---
+ sshd_config.5 |  3 +--
+ 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
+index ef0de0850..149846c8c 100644
+--- a/moduli.5
+++ b/moduli.5
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
+ .Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli
+ .Sh DESCRIPTION
+ The
+-.Pa /etc/moduli
+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
+ file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
+@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough
+ Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
+ .Xr sshd 8
+ then randomly selects a modulus from
+-.Fa /etc/moduli
+.Fa /etc/ssh/moduli
+ that best meets the size requirement.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
+index bfa2eb5f3..da6b5ed76 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
+@@ -176,9 +176,7 @@ key in
+ .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+ or
+ .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
+-Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
+-as seen in
+-.Pa /etc/rc .
+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys.
+ .Pp
+ Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
+ to store the private key.
+@@ -229,9 +227,7 @@ If
+ .Fl f
+ has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the
+ default path for the resulting host key files.
+-This is used by
+-.Pa /etc/rc
+-to generate new host keys.
+This is used by system administration scripts to generate new host keys.
+ .It Fl a Ar rounds
+ When saving a private key this option specifies the number of KDF
+ (key derivation function) rounds used.
+@@ -677,7 +673,7 @@ option.
+ Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
+ .Pp
+ Screened DH groups may be installed in
+-.Pa /etc/moduli .
+.Pa /etc/ssh/moduli .
+ It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
+ that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
+ .Sh CERTIFICATES
+@@ -877,7 +873,7 @@ on all machines
+ where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
+ There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+ .Pp
+-.It Pa /etc/moduli
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
+ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
+ The file format is described in
+ .Xr moduli 5 .
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 81f29af43..5dfad6daa 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -860,6 +860,10 @@ implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
+ using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.
+ The HISTORY section of
+ .Xr ssl 8
+(on non-OpenBSD systems, see
+.nh
+http://www.openbsd.org/cgi\-bin/man.cgi?query=ssl&sektion=8#HISTORY)
+.hy
+ contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
+ .Pp
+ The file
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 57a7fd66b..4abc01d66 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ over an insecure network.
+ .Nm
+ listens for connections from clients.
+ It is normally started at boot from
+-.Pa /etc/rc .
+.Pa /etc/init.d/ssh .
+ It forks a new
+ daemon for each incoming connection.
+ The forked daemons handle
+@@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ This file is for host-based authentication (see
+ .Xr ssh 1 ) .
+ It should only be writable by root.
+ .Pp
+-.It Pa /etc/moduli
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/moduli
+ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
+ key exchange method.
+ The file format is described in
+@@ -982,7 +982,6 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
+ .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+ .Xr inetd 8 ,
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 37e6be38f..23f71fd1d 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -395,8 +395,7 @@ Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
+ public key or host-based authentication.
+ .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
+-PAM or through authentication styles supported in
+-.Xr login.conf 5 )
+PAM).
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm ChrootDirectory
diff --git a/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..809c78846
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/package-versioning.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From b258a00bedcf29200b394c671c6deb1e53157f32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:05 +0000
+Subject: Include the Debian version in our identification
+This makes it easier to audit networks for versions patched against security
+vulnerabilities.  It has little detrimental effect, as attackers will
+generally just try attacks rather than bothering to scan for
+vulnerable-looking version strings.  (However, see debian-banner.patch.)
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: package-versioning.patch
+---
+ sshconnect.c | 2 +-
+ sshd.c       | 2 +-
+ version.h    | 7 ++++++-
+ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 158e8146f..b9418e277 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
+ {
+        /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+        xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
+-           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
+           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE);
+        if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
+            strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
+                fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 2bc6679e5..9481272fc 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
+        char remote_version[256];       /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+ 
+        xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+-           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
+           PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_RELEASE,
+            *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+            options.version_addendum);
+ 
+diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
+index 422dfbc3a..5e1ce0426 100644
+--- a/version.h
+++ b/version.h
+@@ -3,4 +3,9 @@
+ #define SSH_VERSION    "OpenSSH_7.9"
+ 
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE   "p1"
+-#define SSH_RELEASE    SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+#define SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM    SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
+#ifdef SSH_EXTRAVERSION
+#define SSH_RELEASE    SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM " " SSH_EXTRAVERSION
+#else
+#define SSH_RELEASE    SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM
+#endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch b/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fcb1ac7e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-authorized_keys2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From cebe4b82b280810172877a7f3d489c506c9a0691 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2017 02:02:11 +0000
+Subject: Restore reading authorized_keys2 by default
+Upstream seems to intend to gradually phase this out, so don't assume
+that this will remain the default forever.  However, we were late in
+adopting the upstream sshd_config changes, so it makes sense to extend
+the grace period.
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/852320
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2017-03-05
+Patch-Name: restore-authorized_keys2.patch
+---
+ sshd_config | 5 ++---
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index ed8272f6d..ee9629102 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
+++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -36,9 +36,8 @@
+ 
+ #PubkeyAuthentication yes
+ 
+-# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
+-# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
+-AuthorizedKeysFile     .ssh/authorized_keys
+# Expect .ssh/authorized_keys2 to be disregarded by default in future.
+#AuthorizedKeysFile    .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2
+ 
+ #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fdc6cf18a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From 389e16d0109d8c49a761cd7c267438b05c9ab984 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 13:22:41 +0100
+Subject: Restore TCP wrappers support
+Support for TCP wrappers was dropped in OpenSSH 6.7.  See this message
+and thread:
+  https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-April/032497.html
+It is true that this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the
+other hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly
+dropping it (from the perspective of users who don't read
+openssh-unix-dev) could easily cause more serious problems in practice.
+It's not entirely clear what the right long-term answer for Debian is,
+but it at least probably doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly
+before a freeze.
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2018-08-24
+Patch-Name: restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
+---
+ configure.ac | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd.8       |  7 +++++++
+ sshd.c       | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 023e7cc55..917300b43 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -1517,6 +1517,62 @@ else
+        AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+ 
+# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
+TCPW_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
+       [  --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
+       [
+               if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+                       saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+                       saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+                       saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+                       if test -n "${withval}" && \
+                           test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+                               if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
+                                       if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+                                               LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+                                       else
+                                               LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+                                       fi
+                               else
+                                       if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
+                                               LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+                                       else
+                                               LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+                                       fi
+                               fi
+                               if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
+                                       CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+                               else
+                                       CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+                               fi
+                       fi
+                       LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
+                       AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
+                       AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <tcpd.h>
+int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
+                               ]], [[
+       hosts_access(0);
+                               ]])], [
+                                       AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+                                       AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
+                                               [Define if you want
+                                               TCP Wrappers support])
+                                       SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
+                                       TCPW_MSG="yes"
+                               ], [
+                                       AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
+                               
+                       ])
+                       LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+               fi
+       ]
+)
+
+ # Check whether user wants to use ldns
+ LDNS_MSG="no"
+ AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
+@@ -5329,6 +5385,7 @@ echo "                       PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
+ echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
+ echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+ echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
+ echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
+ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo "                   libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index fb133c14b..57a7fd66b 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -873,6 +873,12 @@ the user's home directory becomes accessible.
+ This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+ readable by anyone else.
+ .Pp
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
+Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
+Further details are described in
+.Xr hosts_access 5 .
+.Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+ This file is for host-based authentication (see
+ .Xr ssh 1 ) .
+@@ -975,6 +981,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
+.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+ .Xr login.conf 5 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 539a000fd..673db87f6 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -127,6 +127,13 @@
+ #include <Security/AuthSession.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+#include <tcpd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+int allow_severity;
+int deny_severity;
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+
+ /* Re-exec fds */
+ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD   (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+ #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD         (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+@@ -2099,6 +2106,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+        audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+ #endif
+#ifdef LIBWRAP
+       allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
+       deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
+       /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
+       if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+               struct request_info req;
+
+               request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
+               fromhost(&req);
+
+               if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
+                       debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
+                       refuse(&req);
+                       /* NOTREACHED */
+                       fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
+               }
+       }
+#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+ 
+        rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/sanitize-scp-filenames-via-snmprintf.patch b/debian/patches/sanitize-scp-filenames-via-snmprintf.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e58b8b1bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/sanitize-scp-filenames-via-snmprintf.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+From 11b88754cadcad0ba79b4ffcc127223248dccb54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 08:01:46 +0000
+Subject: upstream: Sanitize scp filenames via snmprintf. To do this we move
+the progressmeter formatting outside of signal handler context and have the
+atomicio callback called for EINTR too.  bz#2434 with contributions from djm
+and jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af61c1f70e4f3bd8ab140b9f1fa699481db57d8
+CVE-2019-6109
+Origin: backport, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=8976f1c4b2721c26e878151f52bdf346dfe2d54c
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/793412
+Last-Update: 2019-02-08
+Patch-Name: sanitize-scp-filenames-via-snmprintf.patch
+---
+ atomicio.c      | 20 ++++++++++++++-----
+ progressmeter.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
+ progressmeter.h |  3 ++-
+ scp.c           |  1 +
+ sftp-client.c   | 16 ++++++++-------
+ 5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/atomicio.c b/atomicio.c
+index f854a06f5..d91bd7621 100644
+--- a/atomicio.c
+++ b/atomicio.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.28 2016/07/27 23:18:12 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.29 2019/01/23 08:01:46 dtucker Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+  * Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
+@@ -65,9 +65,14 @@ atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
+                res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
+                switch (res) {
+                case -1:
+-                       if (errno == EINTR)
+                       if (errno == EINTR) {
+                               /* possible SIGALARM, update callback */
+                               if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, 0) == -1) {
+                                       errno = EINTR;
+                                       return pos;
+                               }
+                                continue;
+-                       if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
+                       } else if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
+ #ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
+                                (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+ #endif
+@@ -122,9 +127,14 @@ atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
+                res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt);
+                switch (res) {
+                case -1:
+-                       if (errno == EINTR)
+                       if (errno == EINTR) {
+                               /* possible SIGALARM, update callback */
+                               if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, 0) == -1) {
+                                       errno = EINTR;
+                                       return pos;
+                               }
+                                continue;
+-                       if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
+                       } else if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
+ #ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
+                                (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c
+index fe9bf52e4..add462dde 100644
+--- a/progressmeter.c
+++ b/progressmeter.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.45 2016/06/30 05:17:05 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.46 2019/01/23 08:01:46 dtucker Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman.  All rights reserved.
+  *
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <time.h>
+@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@
+ #include "progressmeter.h"
+ #include "atomicio.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_WINSIZE 80
+ #define MAX_WINSIZE 512
+@@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ static void setscreensize(void);
+ void refresh_progress_meter(void);
+ 
+ /* signal handler for updating the progress meter */
+-static void update_progress_meter(int);
+static void sig_alarm(int);
+ 
+ static double start;           /* start progress */
+ static double last_update;     /* last progress update */
+@@ -74,6 +76,7 @@ static long stalled;          /* how long we have been stalled */
+ static int bytes_per_second;   /* current speed in bytes per second */
+ static int win_size;           /* terminal window size */
+ static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t alarm_fired;
+ 
+ /* units for format_size */
+ static const char unit[] = " KMGT";
+@@ -126,9 +129,17 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
+        off_t bytes_left;
+        int cur_speed;
+        int hours, minutes, seconds;
+-       int i, len;
+        int file_len;
+ 
+       if ((!alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
+               return;
+       alarm_fired = 0;
+
+       if (win_resized) {
+               setscreensize();
+               win_resized = 0;
+       }
+
+        transferred = *counter - (cur_pos ? cur_pos : start_pos);
+        cur_pos = *counter;
+        now = monotime_double();
+@@ -158,16 +169,11 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
+ 
+        /* filename */
+        buf[0] = '\0';
+-       file_len = win_size - 35;
+       file_len = win_size - 36;
+        if (file_len > 0) {
+-               len = snprintf(buf, file_len + 1, "\r%s", file);
+-               if (len < 0)
+-                       len = 0;
+-               if (len >= file_len + 1)
+-                       len = file_len;
+-               for (i = len; i < file_len; i++)
+-                       buf[i] = ' ';
+-               buf[file_len] = '\0';
+               buf[0] = '\r';
+               snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1 , &file_len, "%*s",
+                   file_len * -1, file);
+        }
+ 
+        /* percent of transfer done */
+@@ -228,22 +234,11 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
+ 
+ /*ARGSUSED*/
+ static void
+-update_progress_meter(int ignore)
+sig_alarm(int ignore)
+ {
+-       int save_errno;
+-
+-       save_errno = errno;
+-
+-       if (win_resized) {
+-               setscreensize();
+-               win_resized = 0;
+-       }
+-       if (can_output())
+-               refresh_progress_meter();
+-
+-       signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
+       signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm);
+       alarm_fired = 1;
+        alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
+-       errno = save_errno;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -259,10 +254,9 @@ start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
+        bytes_per_second = 0;
+ 
+        setscreensize();
+-       if (can_output())
+-               refresh_progress_meter();
+       refresh_progress_meter();
+ 
+-       signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
+       signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm);
+        signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
+        alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
+ }
+@@ -286,6 +280,7 @@ stop_progress_meter(void)
+ static void
+ sig_winch(int sig)
+ {
+       signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
+        win_resized = 1;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/progressmeter.h b/progressmeter.h
+index bf179dca6..8f6678060 100644
+--- a/progressmeter.h
+++ b/progressmeter.h
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.3 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.4 2019/01/23 08:01:46 dtucker Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2002 Nils Nordman.  All rights reserved.
+  *
+@@ -24,4 +24,5 @@
+  */
+ 
+ void   start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
+void   refresh_progress_meter(void);
+ void   stop_progress_meter(void);
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 7163d33dc..80308573c 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s)
+        off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt;
+ 
+        *cnt += s;
+       refresh_progress_meter();
+        if (limit_kbps > 0)
+                bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s);
+        return 0;
+diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+index 4986d6d8d..2bc698f86 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.c
+++ b/sftp-client.c
+@@ -101,7 +101,9 @@ sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount)
+ {
+        struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit;
+ 
+-       bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
+       refresh_progress_meter();
+       if (bwlimit != NULL)
+               bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
+        return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -121,8 +123,8 @@ send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m)
+        iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m);
+        iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m);
+ 
+-       if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2,
+-           conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_out) !=
+       if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, sftpio,
+           conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_out : NULL) !=
+            sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen))
+                fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+ 
+@@ -138,8 +140,8 @@ get_msg_extended(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m, int initial)
+ 
+        if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+-       if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4,
+-           conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != 4) {
+       if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, sftpio,
+           conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL) != 4) {
+                if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET)
+                        fatal("Connection closed");
+                else
+@@ -157,8 +159,8 @@ get_msg_extended(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m, int initial)
+ 
+        if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+-       if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len,
+-           conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in)
+       if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len, sftpio,
+           conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL)
+            != msg_len) {
+                if (errno == EPIPE)
+                        fatal("Connection closed");
diff --git a/debian/patches/scp-disallow-dot-or-empty-filename.patch b/debian/patches/scp-disallow-dot-or-empty-filename.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..716f2ffa8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/scp-disallow-dot-or-empty-filename.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From dee21e97428e69d30e2d15c71f3e7cc08bf8e4f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 03:03:10 +0000
+Subject: upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer to the
+current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9
+Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=6010c0303a422a9c5fa8860c061bf7105eb7f8b2
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/919101
+Last-Update: 2019-01-12
+Patch-Name: scp-disallow-dot-or-empty-filename.patch
+---
+ scp.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index ed2864250..7163d33dc 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1114,7 +1114,8 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+                        SCREWUP("size out of range");
+                size = (off_t)ull;
+ 
+-               if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) {
+               if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL ||
+                   strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) {
+                        run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
+                        exit(1);
+                }
diff --git a/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d054b2a82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/scp-quoting.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From eefdc7046766b52e39f1b6eafcde22c1e013ce9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Nicolas=20Valc=C3=A1rcel?= <nvalcarcel@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:59 +0000
+Subject: Adjust scp quoting in verbose mode
+Tweak scp's reporting of filenames in verbose mode to be a bit less
+confusing with spaces.
+This should be revised to mimic real shell quoting.
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/89945
+Last-Update: 2010-02-27
+Patch-Name: scp-quoting.patch
+---
+ scp.c | 12 ++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index 60682c687..ed2864250 100644
+--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
+@@ -198,8 +198,16 @@ do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
+ 
+        if (verbose_mode) {
+                fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
+-               for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
+-                       fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
+               for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) {
+                       if (i == 0)
+                               fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
+                       else
+                               /*
+                                * TODO: misbehaves if a->list[i] contains a
+                                * single quote
+                                */
+                               fmprintf(stderr, " '%s'", a->list[i]);
+               }
+                fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+        }
+        if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
diff --git a/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e864427bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 690939ba320d93e6f3ab5266bea94d8fb06c8bae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 10:53:04 -0300
+Subject: Allow flock and ipc syscall for s390 architecture
+In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock
+and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11
+implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the
+crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now,
+this is only need on s390 architecture.
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Origin: other, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1686618
+Last-Update: 2018-10-19
+Patch-Name: seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 5edbc6946..d4bc20828 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_exit_group
+        SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+ #endif
+#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__)
+       SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_futex
+        SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
+ #endif
+@@ -193,6 +196,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getuid32
+        SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
+ #endif
+#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__)
+       SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc),
+#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_madvise
+        SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
+ #endif
diff --git a/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ecbe1d142
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 9ce189b9f22890421b7f8d3f49a39186d3ce3e14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 13:33:30 -0300
+Subject: Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390)
+The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
+specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Origin: other, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2752
+Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1686618
+Last-Update: 2017-08-28
+Patch-Name: seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index d4bc20828..ef4de8c65 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -256,6 +256,8 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+        SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
+        SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
+        SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+       /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
+       SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
+ #endif
+ #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
+        /*
diff --git a/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..269a87c76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/selinux-role.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+From cf3f6ac19812e4d32874304b3854b055831c2124 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Manoj Srivastava <srivasta@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:49 +0000
+Subject: Handle SELinux authorisation roles
+Rejected upstream due to discomfort with magic usernames; a better approach
+will need an SSH protocol change.  In the meantime, this came from Debian's
+SELinux maintainer, so we'll keep it until we have something better.
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/394795
+Last-Update: 2018-08-24
+Patch-Name: selinux-role.patch
+---
+ auth.h                      |  1 +
+ auth2.c                     | 10 ++++++++--
+ monitor.c                   | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ monitor.h                   |  2 ++
+ monitor_wrap.c              | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ monitor_wrap.h              |  3 ++-
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
+ openbsd-compat/port-linux.h |  4 ++--
+ platform.c                  |  4 ++--
+ platform.h                  |  2 +-
+ session.c                   | 10 +++++-----
+ session.h                   |  2 +-
+ sshd.c                      |  2 +-
+ sshpty.c                    |  4 ++--
+ sshpty.h                    |  2 +-
+ 15 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index 977562f0a..90802a5eb 100644
+--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+        char            *service;
+        struct passwd   *pw;            /* set if 'valid' */
+        char            *style;
+       char            *role;
+ 
+        /* Method lists for multiple authentication */
+        char            **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index a77742819..3035926ba 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+        Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+        Authmethod *m = NULL;
+-       char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
+       char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL, *role = NULL;
+        int authenticated = 0;
+        double tstart = monotime_double();
+ 
+@@ -270,8 +270,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+        debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+        debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+ 
+       if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
+               *role++ = 0;
+
+        if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+                *style++ = 0;
+       else if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
+               *style++ = '\0';
+ 
+        if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
+                /* setup auth context */
+@@ -298,8 +303,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+                    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+                authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+                authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+               authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
+                if (use_privsep)
+-                       mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+                       mm_inform_authserv(service, style, role);
+                userauth_banner();
+                if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+                        packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index eabc1e89b..08fddabd7 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_authrole(int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, struct sshbuf *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, struct sshbuf *);
+@@ -193,6 +194,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -817,6 +819,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 
+        /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+       monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -850,16 +853,42 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+        monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+ 
+        if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
+-           (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
+           (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+-       debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
+-           __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+       debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
+           __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
+ 
+        if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
+                free(authctxt->style);
+                authctxt->style = NULL;
+        }
+ 
+       if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+               free(authctxt->role);
+               authctxt->role = NULL;
+       }
+
+       return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+       int r;
+
+       monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+       if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+       debug3("%s: role=%s",
+           __func__, authctxt->role);
+
+       if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+               free(authctxt->role);
+               authctxt->role = NULL;
+       }
+
+        return (0);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1501,7 +1530,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+        res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
+        if (res == 0)
+                goto error;
+-       pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
+       pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty, authctxt->role);
+ 
+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index 44fbed589..8f65e684d 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
+++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+        MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
+        MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
+ 
+       MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 154,
+
+ };
+ 
+ struct monitor {
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 1865a122a..fd4d7eb3b 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -369,10 +369,10 @@ mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
+        return (banner);
+ }
+ 
+-/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
+/* Inform the privileged process about service, style, and role */
+ 
+ void
+-mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style, char *role)
+ {
+        struct sshbuf *m;
+        int r;
+@@ -382,7 +382,8 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+        if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+                fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, service)) != 0 ||
+-           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, style ? style : "")) != 0)
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, style ? style : "")) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
+                fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+        mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, m);
+@@ -390,6 +391,26 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+        sshbuf_free(m);
+ }
+ 
+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
+
+void
+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
+{
+       struct sshbuf *m;
+       int r;
+
+       debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+       if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+               fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+       if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+       mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
+
+       sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+
+ /* Do the password authentication */
+ int
+ mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 7f93144ff..79e78cc90 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
+ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+ int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t,
+     const char *, u_int compat);
+-void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *, char *);
+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+index 622988822..3e6e07670 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+ 
+ /* Return the default security context for the given username */
+ static security_context_t
+-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, const char *role)
+ {
+        security_context_t sc = NULL;
+        char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+@@ -71,9 +71,16 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ #endif
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+-       r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+       if (role != NULL && role[0])
+               r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL,
+                                                      &sc);
+       else
+               r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+ #else
+-       r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+       if (role != NULL && role[0])
+               r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
+       else
+               r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+ #endif
+ 
+        if (r != 0) {
+@@ -103,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ 
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+ void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname, const char *role)
+ {
+        security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -112,7 +119,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ 
+        debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 
+-       user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+       user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
+        if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+                switch (security_getenforce()) {
+                case -1:
+@@ -134,7 +141,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ 
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty, const char *role)
+ {
+        security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL;
+        security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+@@ -146,7 +153,7 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+ 
+        debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+ 
+-       user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+       user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, role);
+ 
+        /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+ 
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+index 3c22a854d..c88129428 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *, const char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *, const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
+index 41acc9370..35654ea51 100644
+--- a/platform.c
+++ b/platform.c
+@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+  * called if sshd is running as root.
+  */
+ void
+-platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
+ {
+ #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
+        /*
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+        }
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-       ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+       ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name, role);
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
+index ea4f9c584..60d72ffe7 100644
+--- a/platform.h
+++ b/platform.h
+@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
+ void platform_post_fork_child(void);
+ int  platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
+ void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+-void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *, const char *);
+ char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
+ char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
+ int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 2d0958d11..19f38637e 100644
+--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
+@@ -1380,7 +1380,7 @@ safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
+ 
+ /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
+ void
+-do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw, const char *role)
+ {
+        char uidstr[32], *chroot_path, *tmp;
+ 
+@@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+                endgrent();
+ #endif
+ 
+-               platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
+               platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw, role);
+ 
+                if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+                    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+ 
+        /* Force a password change */
+        if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+-               do_setusercontext(pw);
+               do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
+                child_close_fds(ssh);
+                do_pwchange(s);
+                exit(1);
+@@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+        /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
+        if (!options.use_pam)
+                do_nologin(pw);
+-       do_setusercontext(pw);
+       do_setusercontext(pw, s->authctxt->role);
+        /*
+         * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
+         * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
+@@ -1955,7 +1955,7 @@ session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+        ssh_tty_parse_modes(ssh, s->ttyfd);
+ 
+        if (!use_privsep)
+-               pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
+               pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty, s->authctxt->role);
+ 
+        /* Set window size from the packet. */
+        pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
+index ce59dabd9..675c91146 100644
+--- a/session.h
+++ b/session.h
+@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ void   session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
+ Session        *session_new(void);
+ Session        *session_by_tty(char *);
+ void    session_close(struct ssh *, Session *);
+-void    do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+void    do_setusercontext(struct passwd *, const char *);
+ 
+ const char     *session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *, u_int, int);
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 673db87f6..2bc6679e5 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+        reseed_prngs();
+ 
+        /* Drop privileges */
+-       do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+       do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw, authctxt->role);
+ 
+  skip:
+        /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
+index 4da84d05f..676ade50e 100644
+--- a/sshpty.c
+++ b/sshpty.c
+@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty, const char *role)
+ {
+        struct group *grp;
+        gid_t gid;
+@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
+                    strerror(errno));
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-       ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
+       ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty, role);
+ #endif
+ 
+        if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
+diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h
+index 9ec7e9a15..de7e000ae 100644
+--- a/sshpty.h
+++ b/sshpty.h
+@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ int    pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
+ void    pty_release(const char *);
+ void    pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
+ void    pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
+-void    pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
+void    pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *);
+ void    disconnect_controlling_tty(void);
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4403cba3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+gssapi.patch
+restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
+selinux-role.patch
+ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
+keepalive-extensions.patch
+syslog-level-silent.patch
+user-group-modes.patch
+scp-quoting.patch
+shell-path.patch
+dnssec-sshfp.patch
+mention-ssh-keygen-on-keychange.patch
+package-versioning.patch
+debian-banner.patch
+authorized-keys-man-symlink.patch
+openbsd-docs.patch
+ssh-argv0.patch
+doc-hash-tab-completion.patch
+ssh-agent-setgid.patch
+no-openssl-version-status.patch
+gnome-ssh-askpass2-icon.patch
+systemd-readiness.patch
+debian-config.patch
+restore-authorized_keys2.patch
+seccomp-s390-flock-ipc.patch
+seccomp-s390-ioctl-ep11-crypto.patch
+conch-old-privkey-format.patch
+scp-disallow-dot-or-empty-filename.patch
+sanitize-scp-filenames-via-snmprintf.patch
+have-progressmeter-force-update-at-beginning-and-end-transfer.patch
+check-filenames-in-scp-client.patch
diff --git a/debian/patches/shell-path.patch b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ad574e829
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/shell-path.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From cabad6b7182cd6eaa8b760718200a316e7f578ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:00 +0000
+Subject: Look for $SHELL on the path for ProxyCommand/LocalCommand
+There's some debate on the upstream bug about whether POSIX requires this.
+I (Colin Watson) agree with Vincent and think it does.
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1494
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/492728
+Last-Update: 2013-09-14
+Patch-Name: shell-path.patch
+---
+ sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 6d819279e..700ea6c3c 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port,
+                /* Execute the proxy command.  Note that we gave up any
+                   extra privileges above. */
+                signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+-               execv(argv[0], argv);
+               execvp(argv[0], argv);
+                perror(argv[0]);
+                exit(1);
+        }
+@@ -1534,7 +1534,7 @@ ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
+        if (pid == 0) {
+                signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+                debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
+-               execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+               execlp(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+                error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
+                    shell, args, strerror(errno));
+                _exit(1);
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ed6ef3d46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-agent-setgid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 6d4521d39a852dc5627187c045c933f4e1cb4601 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:13 +0000
+Subject: Document consequences of ssh-agent being setgid in ssh-agent(1)
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/711623
+Forwarded: no
+Last-Update: 2013-06-08
+Patch-Name: ssh-agent-setgid.patch
+---
+ ssh-agent.1 | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
+index 83b2b41c8..7230704a3 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/ssh-agent.1
+@@ -206,6 +206,21 @@ environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
+ .Pp
+ The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
+ line terminates.
+.Pp
+In Debian,
+.Nm
+is installed with the set-group-id bit set, to prevent
+.Xr ptrace 2
+attacks retrieving private key material.
+This has the side-effect of causing the run-time linker to remove certain
+environment variables which might have security implications for set-id
+programs, including
+.Ev LD_PRELOAD ,
+.Ev LD_LIBRARY_PATH ,
+and
+.Ev TMPDIR .
+If you need to set any of these environment variables, you will need to do
+so in the program executed by ssh-agent.
+ .Sh FILES
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+ .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bb1e10973
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-argv0.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From d1064c2689df8d0894a68ac9671d14ab125bc91b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:10:10 +0000
+Subject: ssh(1): Refer to ssh-argv0(1)
+Old versions of OpenSSH (up to 2.5 or thereabouts) allowed creating symlinks
+to ssh with the name of the host you want to connect to.  Debian ships an
+ssh-argv0 script restoring this feature; this patch refers to its manual
+page from ssh(1).
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/111341
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Last-Update: 2013-09-14
+Patch-Name: ssh-argv0.patch
+---
+ ssh.1 | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 5dfad6daa..ad1ed0f86 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1585,6 +1585,7 @@ if an error occurred.
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-argv0 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr tun 4 ,
diff --git a/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ca3e090bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From eccbd3637a2b8544fdcfdd5d1a00a9dfdac62aeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:50 +0000
+Subject: Accept obsolete ssh-vulnkey configuration options
+These options were used as part of Debian's response to CVE-2008-0166.
+Nearly six years later, we no longer need to continue carrying the bulk
+of that patch, but we do need to avoid failing when the associated
+configuration options are still present.
+Last-Update: 2014-02-09
+Patch-Name: ssh-vulnkey-compat.patch
+---
+ readconf.c | 1 +
+ servconf.c | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 36bc5e59a..5e655e924 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static struct {
+        { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+        { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+        { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
+       { "useblacklistedkeys", oDeprecated },
+        { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+        { "useroaming", oDeprecated },
+        { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 4668b8a45..6caf1db38 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -600,6 +600,7 @@ static struct {
+        { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+       { "permitblacklistedkeys", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
+        { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+        { "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
diff --git a/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3093a41fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/syslog-level-silent.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From e755ec70d62bfb9b02159123f4e870b00010be77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jonathan David Amery <jdamery@ysolde.ucam.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:54 +0000
+Subject: "LogLevel SILENT" compatibility
+"LogLevel SILENT" (-qq) was introduced in Debian openssh 1:3.0.1p1-1 to
+match the behaviour of non-free SSH, in which -q does not suppress fatal
+errors.  However, this was unintentionally broken in 1:4.6p1-2 and nobody
+complained, so we've dropped most of it.  The parts that remain are basic
+configuration file compatibility, and an adjustment to "Pseudo-terminal will
+not be allocated ..." which should be split out into a separate patch.
+Author: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>
+Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2013-09-14
+Patch-Name: syslog-level-silent.patch
+---
+ log.c | 1 +
+ ssh.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
+index d9c2d136c..1749af6d1 100644
+--- a/log.c
+++ b/log.c
+@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static struct {
+        LogLevel val;
+ } log_levels[] =
+ {
+       { "SILENT",     SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, /* compatibility */
+        { "QUIET",      SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
+        { "FATAL",      SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
+        { "ERROR",      SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 0777c31e4..3140fed4c 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+        /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
+        if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
+            options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
+-               if (tty_flag)
+               if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+                        logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
+                            "stdin is not a terminal.");
+                tty_flag = 0;
diff --git a/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c5dee41ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/systemd-readiness.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From da34947128351bee9d2530574432190548f5be58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 16:08:47 +0000
+Subject: Add systemd readiness notification support
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/778913
+Forwarded: no
+Last-Update: 2017-08-22
+Patch-Name: systemd-readiness.patch
+---
+ configure.ac | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd.c       |  9 +++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 917300b43..8a5db4cb5 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -4586,6 +4586,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ 
+# Check whether user wants systemd support
+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
+       [  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
+       [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+               AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
+               if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
+                       AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
+                       if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
+                               SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
+                               SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
+                               CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
+                               SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
+                               AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+                               AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
+                               SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
+                       else
+                               AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+                       fi
+               fi
+       fi ]
+)
+
+ # Looking for programs, paths and files
+ 
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+@@ -5392,6 +5415,7 @@ echo "                   libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+ echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
+ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+ echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index d7e77d343..a1c3970b3 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
+ #include <prot.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
+#endif
+
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -1990,6 +1994,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+                        }
+                }
+ 
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+               /* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
+               sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
+#endif
+
+                /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+                server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+                    &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bc2390e06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/user-group-modes.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+From 7b931d36ad36a93d2b1811858ca29408ec44ecae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:58 +0000
+Subject: Allow harmless group-writability
+Allow secure files (~/.ssh/config, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, etc.) to be
+group-writable, provided that the group in question contains only the file's
+owner.  Rejected upstream for IMO incorrect reasons (e.g. a misunderstanding
+about the contents of gr->gr_mem).  Given that per-user groups and umask 002
+are the default setup in Debian (for good reasons - this makes operating in
+setgid directories with other groups much easier), we need to permit this by
+default.
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1060
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=314347
+Last-Update: 2017-10-04
+Patch-Name: user-group-modes.patch
+---
+ auth-rhosts.c |  6 ++----
+ auth.c        |  3 +--
+ misc.c        | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ misc.h        |  2 ++
+ readconf.c    |  3 +--
+ ssh.1         |  2 ++
+ ssh_config.5  |  2 ++
+ 7 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
+index 57296e1f6..546aa0495 100644
+--- a/auth-rhosts.c
+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
+@@ -261,8 +261,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+                return 0;
+        }
+        if (options.strict_modes &&
+-           ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+-           (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+           !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
+                logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+                    "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
+                auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+@@ -288,8 +287,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+                 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
+                 */
+                if (options.strict_modes &&
+-                   ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+-                   (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+                   !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
+                        logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
+                            pw->pw_name, buf);
+                        auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index d8e6b4a3d..9d1d453f1 100644
+--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
+@@ -473,8 +473,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
+                user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
+                if (options.strict_modes &&
+                    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
+-                   ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+-                   (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+                   !secure_permissions(&st, pw->pw_uid)) {
+                        logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
+                            "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
+                            pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index bdc06fdb3..5159e6692 100644
+--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
+@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@
+ #include <netdb.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+ # include <paths.h>
+-#include <pwd.h>
+ #endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+ #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
+ #include <net/if.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -1028,6 +1029,55 @@ percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
+ #undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS
+ }
+ 
+int
+secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid)
+{
+       if (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st->st_uid) && st->st_uid != uid)
+               return 0;
+       if ((st->st_mode & 002) != 0)
+               return 0;
+       if ((st->st_mode & 020) != 0) {
+               /* If the file is group-writable, the group in question must
+                * have exactly one member, namely the file's owner.
+                * (Zero-member groups are typically used by setgid
+                * binaries, and are unlikely to be suitable.)
+                */
+               struct passwd *pw;
+               struct group *gr;
+               int members = 0;
+
+               gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid);
+               if (!gr)
+                       return 0;
+
+               /* Check primary group memberships. */
+               while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
+                       if (pw->pw_gid == gr->gr_gid) {
+                               ++members;
+                               if (pw->pw_uid != uid)
+                                       return 0;
+                       }
+               }
+               endpwent();
+
+               pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid);
+               if (!pw)
+                       return 0;
+
+               /* Check supplementary group memberships. */
+               if (gr->gr_mem[0]) {
+                       ++members;
+                       if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, gr->gr_mem[0]) ||
+                           gr->gr_mem[1])
+                               return 0;
+               }
+
+               if (!members)
+                       return 0;
+       }
+       return 1;
+}
+
+ int
+ tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
+ {
+@@ -1786,8 +1836,7 @@ safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
+                snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
+                return -1;
+        }
+-       if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
+-           (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+       if (!secure_permissions(stp, uid)) {
+                snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
+                    buf);
+                return -1;
+@@ -1802,8 +1851,7 @@ safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
+                strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+ 
+                if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+-                   (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+-                   (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+                   !secure_permissions(&st, uid)) {
+                        snprintf(err, errlen,
+                            "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
+                        return -1;
+diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
+index 31b207a8d..aaf966e65 100644
+--- a/misc.h
+++ b/misc.h
+@@ -168,6 +168,8 @@ int  safe_path_fd(int, const char *, struct passwd *,
+ char   *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
+ int     ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+ 
+int     secure_permissions(struct stat *st, uid_t uid);
+
+ #define MINIMUM(a, b)  (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+ #define MAXIMUM(a, b)  (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+ #define ROUNDUP(x, y)   ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 052d4b1ac..6b01f20d2 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1820,8 +1820,7 @@ read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
+ 
+                if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
+                        fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
+-               if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
+-                   (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
+               if (!secure_permissions(&sb, getuid()))
+                        fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
+        }
+ 
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index 7760c3075..81f29af43 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -1485,6 +1485,8 @@ The file format and configuration options are described in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5 .
+ Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+ read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
+the user.
+ .Pp
+ .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
+ Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 54e143c93..7d55fa820 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -1835,6 +1835,8 @@ The format of this file is described above.
+ This file is used by the SSH client.
+ Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+ read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+It may be group-writable provided that the group in question contains only
+the user.
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+ Systemwide configuration file.
+ This file provides defaults for those
diff --git a/debian/po/POTFILES.in b/debian/po/POTFILES.in
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c619f3451
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/POTFILES.in
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[type: gettext/rfc822deb] openssh-server.templates
diff --git a/debian/po/cs.po b/debian/po/cs.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d01e0ffdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/cs.po
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Czech PO debconf template translation of openssh.
+# Copyright (C) 2014 Michal Simunek <michal.simunek@gmail.com>
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+# Michal Simunek <michal.simunek@gmail.com>, 2014.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh 1:6.6p1-1\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-06-12 12:25+0200\n"
+"Last-Translator: Michal Simunek <michal.simunek@gmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Czech <debian-l10n-czech@lists.debian.org>\n"
+"Language: cs\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr "Zakázat ověřování heslem pro uživatele root?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"Předchozí verze openssh-server dovolovala přihlašovat se přes SSH jako root "
+"pomocí ověřování heslem. Výchozí volba pro nové instalace je nyní "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", která zakazuje ověřování heslem pro "
+"uživatele root, aniž by to omezilo systémy, které mají explicitně nastaveno "
+"ověřování veřejným SSH klíčem pro uživatele root."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Tato změna činí systémy zabezpečenějšími proti útokům hrubou silou na heslo  "
+"uživatele root pomocí slovníku (velmi častý cíl útoků). Nicméně, to může "
+"poškodit systémy, které jsou nastaveny s předpokladem, že bude možné se "
+"přihlašovat přes SSH jako root pomocí ověřování heslem. Změnu této volby "
+"byste měli provést pouze pokud ověřování heslem potřebujete."
diff --git a/debian/po/da.po b/debian/po/da.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..70d576d7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/da.po
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Danish translation openssh.
+# Copyright (C) 2014 openssh og nedenstående oversættere.
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+# Joe Hansen <joedalton2@yahoo.dk>, 2014.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-03-21 23:51+0200\n"
+"Last-Translator: Joe Hansen <joedalton2@yahoo.dk>\n"
+"Language-Team: Danish <debian-l10n-danish@lists.debian.org>\n"
+"Language: da\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr "Deaktiver SSH-adgangskodegodkendelse for root?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"Tidligere versioner af openssh-server tillod indlogning som root over SSH "
+"med brug af adgangskodegodkendelse. Standarden for nye installationer er nu "
+"»PermitRootLogin prohibit-password«, som deaktiverer adgangskodegodkendelse "
+"for root uden at ødelægge systemer, som eksplicit har konfigureret SSH-"
+"offentlig nøglegodkendelse for root."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Denne ændring gør systemer mere sikre mod brute-force angreb vis ordlister "
+"med adgangskoder på root-brugeren (et meget ofte mål for sådanne angreb). "
+"Det kan dog ødelægge systemer, som er opsat med forventning om at kunne SSH "
+"som root via brug af adgangskodegodkendelse. Du skal kun lave denne ændring, "
+"hvis du ikke har brug for dette."
diff --git a/debian/po/de.po b/debian/po/de.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ecba54b6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/de.po
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# openssh.
+# Copyright (C) 2014 Colin Watson
+# Copyright (C) 2014 Stephan Beck
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+# Stephan Beck <sbeck@mailbox.org>, 2014.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh_1:6.6p1-1\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-03-24 22:21+0100\n"
+"Last-Translator: Stephan Beck <sbeck@mailbox.org>\n"
+"Language-Team: Debian German translation team <debian-l10n-german@lists."
+"debian.org>\n"
+"Language: de\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr "SSH Passwort-Authentifizierung für »root« deaktivieren?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"Vorherige Versionen von openssh-server erlaubten das Anmelden als »root« "
+"über SSH unter Verwendung von Passwort-Authentifizierung. Die "
+"Standardeinstellung für Neuinstallationen lautet nun »PermitRootLogin "
+"prohibit-password«, wodurch die Passwort-Authentifizierung für »root« "
+"deaktiviert wird, und Systeme dennoch funktionsfähig bleiben, bei denen "
+"ausdrücklich die Authentifizierung als »root« mittels öffentlichem SSH-"
+"Schlüssel konfiguriert ist."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Diese Änderung sichert Systeme besser gegen jene Angriffe auf den Benutzer "
+"»root« (ein verbreitetes Ziel solcher Angriffe) ab, die das Passwort durch "
+"simples Ausprobieren aller Einträge von Wörterbüchern zu erraten versuchen. "
+"Sie kann allerdings dazu führen, dass Systeme nicht mehr funktionieren, die "
+"in der Absicht konfiguriert wurden, die Anmeldung als »root« über SSH unter "
+"Verwendung von Passwort-Authentifizierung zuzulassen. Sie sollten diese "
+"Änderung nur vornehmen, wenn Sie auf Letzteres verzichten können."
diff --git a/debian/po/es.po b/debian/po/es.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..de8a67ace
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/es.po
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# openssh po-debconf translation to Spanish
+# Copyright (C) 2014 Software in the Public Interest
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+#
+# Changes:
+#   - Initial translation
+#       Matías A. Bellone <matiasbellone+debian@gmail.com>, 2014
+#
+# Traductores, si no conocen el formato PO, merece la pena leer la
+# de gettext, especialmente las secciones dedicadas a este
+# formato, por ejemplo ejecutando:
+#       info -n '(gettext)PO Files'
+#       info -n '(gettext)Header Entry'
+#
+# Equipo de traducción al español, por favor, lean antes de traducir
+# los siguientes documentos:
+#
+#   - El proyecto de traducción de Debian al español
+#     http://www.debian.org/intl/spanish/
+#     especialmente las notas de traducción en
+#     http://www.debian.org/intl/spanish/notas
+#
+#   - La guía de traducción de po's de debconf:
+#     /usr/share/doc/po-debconf/README-trans
+#     o http://www.debian.org/intl/l10n/po-debconf/README-trans
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-03-23 20:43-0300\n"
+"Last-Translator: Matías Bellone <matiasbellone+debian@gmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Debian l10n Spanish <debian-l10n-spanish@lists.debian.org>\n"
+"Language: es\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr ""
+"¿Desea desactivar la autenticación SSH mediante contraseña para el usuario "
+"root?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"Las versiones anteriores de openssh-server permitían iniciar sesión como "
+"usuario root utilizando autenticación con contraseña. La configuración "
+"predeterminada para las nuevas instalaciones ahora incluye «PermitRootLogin "
+"prohibit-password», lo que desactiva la autenticación con contraseña para el "
+"usuario root sin romper los sistemas que tienen configurado explícitamente "
+"la autenticación SSH utilizando claves públicas para el usuario root."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Este cambio hace que los sistemas sean más resistentes contra ataques de "
+"fuerza bruta basados en diccionarios sobre el usuario root (un objetivo muy "
+"común para este tipo de ataques). Sin embargo, podría romper sistemas cuya "
+"configuración permite que el usuario root inicie sesión a través de SSH "
+"utilizando una contraseña. Sólo debería realizar este cambio si no necesita "
+"este comportamiento."
diff --git a/debian/po/fr.po b/debian/po/fr.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f7125e9a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/fr.po
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# Translation of openssh debconf template to French
+# Copyright (C) 2014
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+# Étienne Gilli <etienne.gilli@gmail.com>, 2014.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh_1:6.5p1-6\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-03-22 08:26+0100\n"
+"Last-Translator: Étienne Gilli <etienne.gilli@gmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: French <debian-l10n-french@lists.debian.org>\n"
+"Language: fr\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr ""
+"Désactiver l’authentification SSH par mot de passe pour le superutilisateur ?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"Les versions précédentes du paquet openssh-server autorisaient la connexion "
+"par SSH du superutilisateur (root) en utilisant l’authentification par mot "
+"de passe. Par défaut, les nouvelles installations ont maintenant l’option "
+"« PermitRootLogin prohibit-password », qui désactive l’authentification par "
+"mot de passe pour le compte « root », sans casser les systèmes qui ont "
+"configuré explicitement l’authentification SSH par clé publique pour ce "
+"compte."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Cette modification rend les systèmes plus robustes face aux attaques par "
+"force brute et par dictionnaire contre le superutilisateur (très souvent "
+"pris pour cible par ce type d’attaque). Cependant, cela peut rendre "
+"inutilisables les systèmes reposant sur la possibilité de se connecter au "
+"compte « root » par SSH avec authentification par mot de passe. Vous ne "
+"devriez appliquer cette modification que si ce n’est pas votre cas."
diff --git a/debian/po/it.po b/debian/po/it.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dd7106090
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/it.po
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# Italian translation of openssh debconf messages.
+# Copyright (C) 2014, openssh package copyright holder
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+# Beatrice Torracca <beatricet@libero.it>, 2014.
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-03-28 11:12+0200\n"
+"Last-Translator: Beatrice Torracca <beatricet@libero.it>\n"
+"Language-Team: Italian <debian-l10n-italian@lists.debian.org>\n"
+"Language: it\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n != 1);\n"
+"X-Generator: Virtaal 0.7.1\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr "Disabilitare l'autenticazione SSH con password per root?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"Le versioni precedenti di openssh-server permettevano il login come root via "
+"SSH, usando l'autenticazione con password. Il comportamento predefinito "
+"delle nuove installazioni è «PermitRootLogin prohibit-password» che "
+"disabilita l'autenticazione con password per root, senza rendere non "
+"funzionanti sistemi che hanno esplicitamente configurato l'autenticazione "
+"SSH con chiave pubblica per root."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Questo cambiamento rende i sistemi più al sicuro da attacchi di forza bruta "
+"a dizionario sulle password per l'utente root (un obiettivo molto comune per "
+"tali attacchi). Tuttavia, può rendere non funzionanti sistemi che sono "
+"impostati facendo affidamento sulla possibilità di autenticazione SSH come "
+"root usando la password. Si dovrebbe fare questo cambiamento solo se non si "
+"ha bisogno di tale comportamento."
diff --git a/debian/po/ja.po b/debian/po/ja.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..db382f19a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/ja.po
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE.
+# Copyright (C) YEAR THE PACKAGE'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+# victory <victory.deb@gmail.com>, 2014.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-03-20 11:06+0900\n"
+"Last-Translator: victory <victory.deb@gmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Japanese <debian-japanese@lists.debian.org>\n"
+"Language: ja\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr "root での SSH パスワード認証を無効にしますか?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"openssh-server の以前のバージョンではパスワード認証を利用した SSH 経由の "
+"root のログインを許可していました。新しくインストールした場合のデフォルト値が"
+"現在は「PermitRootLogin prohibit-password」になり、root のパスワード認証を無"
+"効化しますが SSH の公開鍵認証を root 用に明示的に設定しているシステムでは特に"
+"問題はありません。"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"この変更によりシステムは root ユーザ (こういった攻撃ではとても一般的な攻撃対"
+"象です) へのブルートフォースによるパスワード辞書攻撃に対してはより安全になり"
+"ます。しかしパスワード認証により root で SSH 接続できることを前提として構成し"
+"たシステムでは問題が発生する可能性があります。そういった必要のない場合にのみ"
+"この変更を行うようにしてください。"
diff --git a/debian/po/nl.po b/debian/po/nl.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3afd6171e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/nl.po
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# Dutch translation of openssh debconf templates.
+# Copyright (C) YEAR THE PACKAGE'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+# Frans Spiesschaert <Frans.Spiesschaert@yucom.be>, 2014.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-10-03 23:54+0200\n"
+"Last-Translator: Frans Spiesschaert <Frans.Spiesschaert@yucom.be>\n"
+"Language-Team: Debian Dutch l10n Team <debian-l10n-dutch@lists.debian.org>\n"
+"Language: nl\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n != 1);\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr ""
+"Wachtwoordauthenticatie over SSH voor de systeembeheerder uitschakelen?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"Eerdere versies van de openssh-server lieten de systeembeheerder toe om zich "
+"over SSH te authenticeren met een wachtwoord. Voor nieuwe installaties is de "
+"standaard nu \"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\". Deze standaardinstelling "
+"maakt het voor de systeembeheerder onmogelijk om zich via een wachtwoord te "
+"authenticeren. Deze instelling heeft geen impact op systemen waarbij de SSH-"
+"configuratie expliciet vereist dat de systeembeheerder zich authenticeert "
+"via een publieke sleutel."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Deze wijziging maakt systemen veiliger tegenover aanvallen met brute kracht "
+"(met een wachtwoordenwoordenboek) op de systeembeheerder, een zeer courant "
+"doelwit voor zulke aanvallen. Maar het kan systemen onbruikbaar maken die "
+"ingesteld werden vanuit de verwachting dat de systeembeheerder SSH kan "
+"gebruiken met authenticatie via wachtwoord. Enkel wanneer u dit laatste niet "
+"nodig heeft, zou u deze wijziging kunnen doorvoeren."
diff --git a/debian/po/pt.po b/debian/po/pt.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2dab84ccf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/pt.po
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# Translation of openssh's debconf messages to European Portuguese
+# Copyright (C) 2014 YEAR THE openssh'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+#
+# Américo Monteiro <a_monteiro@gmx.com>, 2014.
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh 1:6.6p1-1\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-03-21 21:13+0000\n"
+"Last-Translator: Américo Monteiro <a_monteiro@gmx.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Portuguese <traduz@debianpt.org>\n"
+"Language: pt\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n != 1);\n"
+"X-Generator: Lokalize 1.4\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr "Desactivar a autenticação SSH por palavra passe para o root?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"As versões anteriores do servidor openssh permitiam iniciar sessão como root "
+"sobre SSH usando autenticação por palavra-passe. A predefinição para novas "
+"instalações é agora \"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", a qual desactiva "
+"a autenticação por palavra-passe para o root sem danificar os sistemas que "
+"têm configurados explicitamente autenticação SSH por chave pública para o "
+"root."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Esta alteração torna os sistemas mais seguros contra ataques em que se "
+"forçam dicionários de palavras-passe no utilizador root (um alvo muito comum "
+"para tais ataques). No entanto, pode danificar sistemas que estão "
+"configurados com a expectativa de serem capazes de SSH como root usando "
+"autenticação por palavra-passe. Apenas deverá fazer esta alteração se não "
+"precisa de tal método de autenticação."
diff --git a/debian/po/pt_BR.po b/debian/po/pt_BR.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99b1182f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/pt_BR.po
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Debconf translations for openssh.
+# Copyright (C) 2014 THE openssh'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+# José de Figueiredo <deb.gnulinux@gmail.com>, 2014.
+#
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-11-23 23:49-0200\n"
+"Last-Translator: José de Figueiredo <deb.gnulinux@gmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Brazilian Portuguese <debian-l10n-portuguese@lists.debian."
+"org>\n"
+"Language: pt_BR\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr "Desabilitar autenticação por senha do SSH para root?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"Versões anteriores do openssh-server permitiam login como root sobre SSH "
+"usando autenticação por senha. O padrão para as novas instalações agora é "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", que desabilita a autenticação por "
+"senha para root sem quebrar sistemas que tenham configurado explicitamente o "
+"SSH para autenticação por chave pública para root."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Esta alteração torna sistemas mais seguros contra ataques de força bruta por "
+"dicionário de senhas no usuário root (um alvo muito comum destes ataques). "
+"Entretanto, ela pode quebrar sistemas que foram configurados com a "
+"expectativa de acesso SSH com root usando autenticação por senha. Você deve "
+"fazer esta mudança somente se você não precisa fazer isso."
diff --git a/debian/po/ru.po b/debian/po/ru.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f2e1dafc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/ru.po
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Copyright (C) YEAR THE PACKAGE'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+#
+# Yuri Kozlov <yuray@komyakino.ru>, 2014.
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh 1:6.6p1-1\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-03-22 10:04+0400\n"
+"Last-Translator: Yuri Kozlov <yuray@komyakino.ru>\n"
+"Language-Team: Russian <debian-l10n-russian@lists.debian.org>\n"
+"Language: ru\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=3; plural=(n%10==1 && n%100!=11 ? 0 : n%10>=2 && n"
+"%10<=4 && (n%100<10 || n%100>=20) ? 1 : 2);\n"
+"X-Generator: Lokalize 1.4\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr "Выключить в SSH аутентификацию по паролю для root?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"В предыдущих версиях openssh-server разрешён вход с правами пользователя "
+"root через SSH с помощью аутентификации по паролю. При новых установках по "
+"умолчанию теперь используется настройка «PermitRootLogin prohibit-password», "
+"которая отключает аутентификацию по паролю для root, что не вредит системам, "
+"у которых в SSH для root настроена аутентификация по открытому ключу."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Это изменение делает системы более стойкими к атакам методом перебора "
+"словарных паролей для пользователя root (самая распространённая цель таких "
+"атак). Однако, это вредит системам, в которых специально настроен вход для "
+"root по SSH с парольной аутентификацией. Если это не ваш случай, то ответьте "
+"утвердительно."
diff --git a/debian/po/sv.po b/debian/po/sv.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..278b0ccbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/sv.po
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# Swedish translations for openssh package
+# Svenska översättningar för paket openssh.
+# Copyright (C) 2014 THE openssh'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+# Andreas Rönnquist <gusnan@gusnan.se>, 2014.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-03-21 21:36+0100\n"
+"Last-Translator: Andreas Rönnquist <gusnan@gusnan.se>\n"
+"Language-Team: Swedish\n"
+"Language: sv\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n != 1);\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr "Inaktivera SSH-lösenordsautentisering för root?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"Tidigare versioner av openssh-server tillät inloggning som root över SSH med "
+"hjälp av lösenordsautentisering. Standardinställningen för nya "
+"installationer är nu \"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", vilket "
+"inaktiverar lösenordsautentisering för root utan att förstöra system som "
+"explicit har konfigurerat nyckelautentisering med hjälp av publika nycklar "
+"för root."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Denna förändring gör system säkrare mot brute-force-angrepp med hjälp av "
+"ordlistor med lösenord på root-användaren (ett väldigt vanligt mål för "
+"sådana angrepp). Dock så kan detta förstöra system som förväntas kunna "
+"använda SSH som root med hjälp av lösenordsautentisering. Du skall endast "
+"göra denna förändring om du inte har ett behov av att kunna göra detta."
diff --git a/debian/po/templates.pot b/debian/po/templates.pot
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..47c9e3686
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/templates.pot
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE.
+# Copyright (C) YEAR THE PACKAGE'S COPYRIGHT HOLDER
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package.
+# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, YEAR.
+#
+#, fuzzy
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
+"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
+"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"
+"Language: \n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=CHARSET\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr ""
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
diff --git a/debian/po/tr.po b/debian/po/tr.po
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1ada04101
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/po/tr.po
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# Turkish translation of openssh package
+# Copyright (C) 2014 Mert Dirik
+# This file is distributed under the same license as the openssh package.
+# Mert Dirik <mertdirik@gmail.com>, 2014.
+#
+msgid ""
+msgstr ""
+"Project-Id-Version: openssh-server\n"
+"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: openssh@packages.debian.org\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2014-03-20 02:06+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-08-01 14:44+0200\n"
+"Last-Translator: Mert Dirik <mertdirik@gmail.com>\n"
+"Language-Team: Debian L10n Turkish <debian-l10n-turkish@lists.debian.org>\n"
+"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
+"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
+"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
+"X-Generator: Poedit 1.5.4\n"
+"Language: tr\n"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid "Disable SSH password authentication for root?"
+msgstr "root kullanıcısının parola ile kimlik doğrulaması engellensin mi?"
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"Previous versions of openssh-server permitted logging in as root over SSH "
+"using password authentication. The default for new installations is now "
+"\"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\", which disables password "
+"authentication for root without breaking systems that have explicitly "
+"configured SSH public key authentication for root."
+msgstr ""
+"openssh-server'ın önceki sürümleri parola ile kimlik doğrulama kullanılarak "
+"root kullanıcısının SSH üzerinden oturum açmasına izin veriyordu. Artık yeni "
+"kurulumların öntanımlı ayarı \"PermitRootLogin prohibit-password\" "
+"şeklindedir. Bu ayar root kullanıcısının parola kullanarak oturum açmasını "
+"yasaklar. SSH genel anahtar doğrulama yöntemine ayrıca izin veren mevcut "
+"sistemler bu ayardan etkilenmez."
+#. Type: boolean
+#. Description
+#: ../openssh-server.templates:1001
+msgid ""
+"This change makes systems more secure against brute-force password "
+"dictionary attacks on the root user (a very common target for such attacks). "
+"However, it may break systems that are set up with the expectation of being "
+"able to SSH as root using password authentication. You should only make this "
+"change if you do not need to do that."
+msgstr ""
+"Bu ayar sistemleri kaba kuvvet sözlükten parola saldırılarına karşı güvenli "
+"hale getirir (root kullanıcısı bu tarz saldırıların en büyük "
+"hedeflerindendir). Fakat bu ayarın etkinleştirilmesi, root kullanıcısına "
+"parola doğrulama yöntemiyle oturum açılabileceği varsayımıyla hareket eden "
+"sistemlerde eskiden çalışan düzenin bozulmasına sebep olacaktır. Bu "
+"değişikliği yalnızca sorun çıkarmayacağından eminseniz yapın."
diff --git a/debian/rules b/debian/rules
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..550306d4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/rules
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+#!/usr/bin/make -f
+export DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS := hardening=+all
+include /usr/share/dpkg/default.mk
+# Uncomment this to turn on verbose mode.
+# export DH_VERBOSE=1
+# This has to be exported to make some magic below work.
+export DH_OPTIONS
+ifeq (,$(filter nocheck,$(DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS)))
+  RUN_TESTS := yes
+else
+  RUN_TESTS :=
+endif
+ifeq (,$(filter parallel=%,$(DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS)))
+  PARALLEL :=
+else
+  PARALLEL := \
+        -j$(patsubst parallel=%,%,$(filter parallel=%,$(DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS)))
+endif
+ifeq ($(DEB_BUILD_GNU_TYPE),$(DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE))
+  CC := gcc
+  PKG_CONFIG = pkg-config
+else
+  CC := $(DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE)-gcc
+  PKG_CONFIG = $(DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE)-pkg-config
+  RUN_TESTS :=
+endif
+# Change the version string to reflect distribution
+SSH_EXTRAVERSION := $(DEB_VENDOR)-$(shell echo '$(DEB_VERSION)' | sed -e 's/.*-//')
+UBUNTU := $(shell $(call dpkg_vendor_derives_from,Ubuntu))
+ifeq ($(UBUNTU),yes)
+DEFAULT_PATH := /usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games
+else
+DEFAULT_PATH := /usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/games
+endif
+SUPERUSER_PATH := /usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
+ifeq ($(UBUNTU),yes)
+server_recommends := ssh-import-id
+else
+server_recommends :=
+endif
+# Common path configuration.
+confflags += --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
+confflags += --libexecdir=\$${prefix}/lib/openssh
+# Common build options.
+confflags += --disable-strip
+confflags += --with-mantype=doc
+confflags += --with-4in6
+confflags += --with-privsep-path=/run/sshd
+confflags += --with-pid-dir=/run
+# The Hurd needs libcrypt for res_query et al.
+ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
+confflags += --with-libs=-lcrypt
+endif
+# http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=60155
+ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH),hppa)
+confflags += --without-hardening
+endif
+# Everything above here is common to the deb and udeb builds.
+confflags_udeb := $(confflags)
+# Options specific to the deb build.
+confflags += --with-tcp-wrappers
+confflags += --with-pam
+confflags += --with-libedit
+confflags += --with-kerberos5=/usr
+confflags += --with-ssl-engine
+ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),linux)
+confflags += --with-selinux
+confflags += --with-audit=linux
+confflags += --with-systemd
+endif
+# The deb build wants xauth; the udeb build doesn't.
+confflags += --with-xauth=/usr/bin/xauth
+confflags_udeb += --without-xauth
+# Default paths. The udeb build has /usr/games removed.
+confflags += --with-default-path=$(DEFAULT_PATH) --with-superuser-path=$(SUPERUSER_PATH)
+confflags_udeb += --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
+# Compiler flags.
+cflags := $(CPPFLAGS) $(CFLAGS)
+cflags += -DSSH_EXTRAVERSION=\"$(SSH_EXTRAVERSION)\"
+cflags_udeb := -Os
+cflags_udeb += -DSSH_EXTRAVERSION=\"$(SSH_EXTRAVERSION)\"
+confflags += --with-cflags='$(cflags)'
+confflags_udeb += --with-cflags='$(cflags_udeb)'
+# Linker flags.
+confflags += --with-ldflags='$(strip -Wl,--as-needed $(LDFLAGS))'
+confflags_udeb += --with-ldflags='-Wl,--as-needed'
+%:
+        dh $@ --with=autoreconf,systemd
+autoreconf:
+        autoreconf -f -i
+        cp -f /usr/share/misc/config.guess /usr/share/misc/config.sub ./
+override_dh_autoreconf-arch:
+        dh_autoreconf debian/rules -- autoreconf
+override_dh_autoreconf-indep:
+override_dh_auto_configure-arch:
+        dh_auto_configure -Bdebian/build-deb -- $(confflags)
+ifeq ($(filter noudeb,$(DEB_BUILD_PROFILES)),)
+        dh_auto_configure -Bdebian/build-udeb -- $(confflags_udeb)
+        # Avoid libnsl linkage. Ugh.
+        perl -pi -e 's/ +-lnsl//' debian/build-udeb/config.status
+        cd debian/build-udeb && ./config.status
+endif
+override_dh_auto_configure-indep:
+override_dh_auto_build-arch:
+        $(MAKE) -C debian/build-deb $(PARALLEL) ASKPASS_PROGRAM='/usr/bin/ssh-askpass'
+        $(MAKE) -C debian/build-deb regress-prep
+        $(MAKE) -C debian/build-deb $(PARALLEL) regress-binaries
+ifeq ($(filter noudeb,$(DEB_BUILD_PROFILES)),)
+        $(MAKE) -C debian/build-udeb $(PARALLEL) ASKPASS_PROGRAM='/usr/bin/ssh-askpass' ssh scp sftp sshd ssh-keygen
+endif
+ifeq ($(filter pkg.openssh.nognome,$(DEB_BUILD_PROFILES)),)
+        $(MAKE) -C contrib gnome-ssh-askpass3 CC='$(CC) $(CPPFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -Wall -Wl,--as-needed $(LDFLAGS)' PKG_CONFIG=$(PKG_CONFIG)
+endif
+override_dh_auto_build-indep:
+override_dh_auto_test-arch:
+ifeq ($(RUN_TESTS),yes)
+        $(MAKE) -C debian/build-deb/regress \
+                .OBJDIR="$(CURDIR)/debian/build-deb/regress" \
+                .CURDIR="$(CURDIR)/regress" \
+                unit
+        $(MAKE) -C debian/build-deb compat-tests
+        $(MAKE) -C debian/keygen-test
+endif
+override_dh_auto_test-indep:
+override_dh_auto_clean:
+        rm -rf debian/build-deb debian/build-udeb
+ifeq ($(RUN_TESTS),yes)
+        $(MAKE) -C debian/keygen-test clean
+endif
+        $(MAKE) -C contrib clean
+override_dh_auto_install-arch:
+        $(MAKE) -C debian/build-deb DESTDIR=`pwd`/debian/tmp install-nokeys
+override_dh_auto_install-indep:
+override_dh_install-arch:
+        rm -f debian/tmp/etc/ssh/sshd_config
+        dh_install -Nopenssh-client-udeb -Nopenssh-server-udeb --fail-missing
+ifeq ($(filter noudeb,$(DEB_BUILD_PROFILES)),)
+        dh_install -popenssh-client-udeb -popenssh-server-udeb \
+                --sourcedir=debian/build-udeb
+endif
+        # Remove version control tags to avoid unnecessary conffile
+        # resolution steps for administrators.
+        sed -i '/\$$OpenBSD:/d' \
+                debian/openssh-server/etc/ssh/moduli \
+                debian/openssh-client/etc/ssh/ssh_config
+# We'd like to use dh_install --fail-missing here, but that doesn't work
+# well in combination with dh-exec: it complains that files generated by
+# dh-exec for architecture-dependent packages aren't installed.
+override_dh_install-indep:
+        rm -f debian/tmp/etc/ssh/sshd_config
+        dh_install
+override_dh_installdocs:
+        dh_installdocs -Nopenssh-server -Nopenssh-sftp-server
+        dh_installdocs -popenssh-server -popenssh-sftp-server \
+                --link-doc=openssh-client
+        # Avoid breaking dh_installexamples later.
+        mkdir -p debian/openssh-server/usr/share/doc/openssh-client
+override_dh_systemd_enable:
+        dh_systemd_enable -popenssh-server --name ssh ssh.service
+        dh_systemd_enable -popenssh-server --name ssh --no-enable ssh.socket
+override_dh_installinit:
+        dh_installinit -R --name ssh
+debian/openssh-server.sshd.pam: debian/openssh-server.sshd.pam.in
+ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),linux)
+        sed 's/^@IF_KEYINIT@//' $< > $@
+else
+        sed '/^@IF_KEYINIT@/d' $< > $@
+endif
+override_dh_installpam: debian/openssh-server.sshd.pam
+        dh_installpam --name sshd
+override_dh_fixperms-arch:
+        dh_fixperms
+        chmod u+s debian/openssh-client/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
+# Tighten libssl dependencies to match the check in entropy.c.
+override_dh_shlibdeps:
+        dh_shlibdeps
+        debian/adjust-openssl-dependencies
+override_dh_gencontrol:
+        dh_gencontrol -- -V'openssh-server:Recommends=$(server_recommends)'
+debian/faq.html:
+        wget -O - http://www.openssh.com/faq.html | \
+                sed 's,\(href="\)\(txt/\|[^":]*\.html\),\1http://www.openssh.com/\2,g' \
+                > debian/faq.html
diff --git a/debian/run-tests b/debian/run-tests
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..7c7a8b2a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/run-tests
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# Run installed OpenSSH regression tests.
+tmp="$1"
+if [ -z "$tmp" ]; then
+        tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
+        cleanup () {
+                rm -rf "$tmp"
+        }
+        trap cleanup EXIT
+fi
+# Copy the regression tests to a fresh directory; this is easier than trying
+# to pick apart which ones need write access.
+cp -a /usr/lib/openssh/regress "$tmp/regress"
+ret=0
+make -C "$tmp/regress" \
+        .OBJDIR="$tmp/regress" \
+        .CURDIR="$tmp/regress" \
+        BUILDDIR="$tmp/regress" \
+        OBJ="$tmp/regress" \
+        SUDO=sudo \
+        TEST_SHELL=sh \
+        TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER=/usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server \
+        TEST_SSH_PLINK=plink \
+        TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN=puttygen \
+        TEST_SSH_CONCH=conch \
+        TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes \
+        TEST_SSH_ECC=yes \
+        tests interop-tests </dev/zero || ret="$?"
+if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then
+        for log in failed-regress.log failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log; do
+                if [ -e "$tmp/regress/$log" ]; then
+                        tail -v -n+0 "$tmp/regress/$log"
+                fi
+        done
+fi
+exit "$ret"
diff --git a/debian/source/format b/debian/source/format
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..163aaf8d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/source/format
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+3.0 (quilt)
diff --git a/debian/source/include-binaries b/debian/source/include-binaries
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..df5790e2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/source/include-binaries
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.png
diff --git a/debian/source/lintian-overrides b/debian/source/lintian-overrides
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1a0c77d41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/source/lintian-overrides
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# openssh-server/password-authentication is preseeding-only, at least for now.
+openssh source: untranslatable-debconf-templates openssh-server.templates: 20
diff --git a/debian/ssh-argv0 b/debian/ssh-argv0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..37506a4d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/ssh-argv0
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+set -e
+# Copyright (c) 2001 Jonathan Amery.
+#
+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+# are met:
+# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+#    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+#
+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+# OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+# DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+# THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+# (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+# THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+if [ "${0##*/}" = "ssh-argv0" ]
+then
+  echo 'ssh-argv0: This script should not be run like this, see ssh-argv0(1) for details' 1>&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+exec ssh "${0##*/}" "$@"
diff --git a/debian/ssh-argv0.1 b/debian/ssh-argv0.1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a36a63d40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/ssh-argv0.1
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+.Dd September 7, 2001 
+.Dt SSH-ARGV0 1
+.Os Debian Project
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-argv0
+.Nd replaces the old ssh command-name as hostname handling
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Ar hostname | user@hostname
+.Op Fl l Ar login_name
+.Op Ar command
+.Pp
+.Ar hostname | user@hostname
+.Op Fl afgknqstvxACNTX1246
+.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
+.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
+.Op Fl e Ar escape_char
+.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl l Ar login_name
+.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec
+.Op Fl o Ar option
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl F Ar configfile
+.Oo Fl L Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar port :
+.Ar host :
+.Ar hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.Oc
+.Oo Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar port :
+.Ar host :
+.Ar hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.Oc
+.Op Fl D Ar port
+.Op Ar command
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+replaces the old ssh command-name as hostname handling.
+If you link to this script with a hostname then executing the link is
+equivalent to having executed ssh with that hostname as an argument.
+All other arguments are passed to ssh and will be processed normally.
+.Sh OPTIONS
+See
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Sh FILES
+See
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+Jonathan Amery wrote this ssh-argv0 script and the associated documentation.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1
diff --git a/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.desktop b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.desktop
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eba7a67d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.desktop
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+[Desktop Entry]
+Version=1.0
+Encoding=UTF-8
+Name=SSH AskPass
+GenericName=ssh-add
+Comment=Enter passphrase to authenticate to the ssh agent
+Exec=/usr/bin/ssh-add
+TryExec=ssh-add
+Terminal=false
+Type=Application
+Icon=ssh-askpass-gnome
+Categories=Network;Security;
diff --git a/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.examples b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.examples
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..66fd8c0e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.examples
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.desktop
diff --git a/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.install b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.install
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..8715aafaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.install
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#! /usr/bin/dh-exec
+contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass3 => usr/lib/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.png usr/share/pixmaps
diff --git a/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.manpages b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.manpages
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7749f13bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.manpages
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+debian/gnome-ssh-askpass.1
diff --git a/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.png b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..06f75764e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.png
Binary files differ
diff --git a/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.postinst b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.postinst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8a454e520
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.postinst
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# postinst script for ssh-askpass-gnome
+#
+# see: dh_installdeb(1)
+set -e
+# summary of how this script can be called:
+#        * <postinst> `configure' <most-recently-configured-version>
+#        * <old-postinst> `abort-upgrade' <new version>
+#        * <conflictor's-postinst> `abort-remove' `in-favour' <package>
+#          <new-version>
+#        * <deconfigured's-postinst> `abort-deconfigure' `in-favour'
+#          <failed-install-package> <version> `removing'
+#          <conflicting-package> <version>
+# for details, see /usr/share/doc/packaging-manual/
+#
+# quoting from the policy:
+#     Any necessary prompting should almost always be confined to the
+#     post-installation script, and should be protected with a conditional
+#     so that unnecessary prompting doesn't happen if a package's
+#     installation fails and the `postinst' is called with `abort-upgrade',
+#     `abort-remove' or `abort-deconfigure'.
+case "$1" in
+    configure)
+        update-alternatives --quiet \
+            --install /usr/bin/ssh-askpass ssh-askpass \
+                      /usr/lib/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass 30 \
+            --slave /usr/share/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1.gz \
+                    ssh-askpass.1.gz /usr/share/man/man1/gnome-ssh-askpass.1.gz
+    ;;
+    abort-upgrade|abort-remove|abort-deconfigure)
+    ;;
+    *)
+        echo "postinst called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
+        exit 0
+    ;;
+esac
+# dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
+# generated by other debhelper scripts.
+#DEBHELPER#
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.prerm b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.prerm
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0adcfc76b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/ssh-askpass-gnome.prerm
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# prerm script for ssh-askpass-gnome
+#
+# see: dh_installdeb(1)
+set -e
+# summary of how this script can be called:
+#        * <prerm> `remove'
+#        * <old-prerm> `upgrade' <new-version>
+#        * <new-prerm> `failed-upgrade' <old-version>
+#        * <conflictor's-prerm> `remove' `in-favour' <package> <new-version>
+#        * <deconfigured's-prerm> `deconfigure' `in-favour'
+#          <package-being-installed> <version> `removing'
+#          <conflicting-package> <version>
+# for details, see /usr/share/doc/packaging-manual/
+case "$1" in
+    remove|deconfigure)
+        update-alternatives --quiet --remove ssh-askpass /usr/lib/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+        ;;
+    upgrade)
+        ;;
+    failed-upgrade)
+        ;;
+    *)
+        echo "prerm called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
+        exit 0
+    ;;
+esac
+# dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
+# generated by other debhelper scripts.
+#DEBHELPER#
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/ssh.maintscript b/debian/ssh.maintscript
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..efd370e25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/ssh.maintscript
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+symlink_to_dir /usr/share/doc/ssh /usr/share/doc/openssh-client 1:6.6p1-8~
diff --git a/debian/systemd/rescue-ssh.target b/debian/systemd/rescue-ssh.target
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9501b7fd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/systemd/rescue-ssh.target
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Rescue with network and ssh
+Documentation=man:systemd.special(7)
+Requires=network-online.target ssh.service
+After=network-online.target ssh.service
+AllowIsolate=yes
diff --git a/debian/systemd/ssh-agent.override b/debian/systemd/ssh-agent.override
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2905494b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/systemd/ssh-agent.override
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+manual
diff --git a/debian/systemd/ssh-agent.service b/debian/systemd/ssh-agent.service
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cdc10bb47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/systemd/ssh-agent.service
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH Agent
+Documentation=man:ssh-agent(1)
+Before=graphical-session-pre.target
+ConditionPathExists=/etc/X11/Xsession.options
+Wants=dbus.socket
+After=dbus.socket
+[Service]
+ExecStart=/usr/lib/openssh/agent-launch start
+ExecStopPost=/usr/lib/openssh/agent-launch stop
diff --git a/debian/systemd/ssh-session-cleanup b/debian/systemd/ssh-session-cleanup
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..f283cc967
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/systemd/ssh-session-cleanup
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+ssh_session_pattern='sshd: \S.*@pts/[0-9]+'
+IFS="$IFS@"
+pgrep -a -f "$ssh_session_pattern" | while read pid daemon user pty; do
+        echo "Found ${daemon%:} session $pid on $pty; sending SIGTERM"
+        kill "$pid" || true
+done
+exit 0
diff --git a/debian/systemd/ssh-session-cleanup.service b/debian/systemd/ssh-session-cleanup.service
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b86727227
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/systemd/ssh-session-cleanup.service
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenBSD Secure Shell session cleanup
+Wants=network.target
+After=network.target
+[Service]
+ExecStart=/bin/true
+ExecStop=/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-session-cleanup
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+Type=oneshot
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
diff --git a/debian/systemd/ssh.service b/debian/systemd/ssh.service
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7495d9a81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/systemd/ssh.service
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenBSD Secure Shell server
+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
+After=network.target auditd.service
+ConditionPathExists=!/etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run
+[Service]
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/default/ssh
+ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/sshd -t
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $SSHD_OPTS
+ExecReload=/usr/sbin/sshd -t
+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
+KillMode=process
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
+Type=notify
+RuntimeDirectory=sshd
+RuntimeDirectoryMode=0755
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+Alias=sshd.service
diff --git a/debian/systemd/ssh.socket b/debian/systemd/ssh.socket
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5a766dcab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/systemd/ssh.socket
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenBSD Secure Shell server socket
+Before=ssh.service
+Conflicts=ssh.service
+ConditionPathExists=!/etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run
+[Socket]
+ListenStream=22
+Accept=yes
+[Install]
+WantedBy=sockets.target
diff --git a/debian/systemd/ssh@.service b/debian/systemd/ssh@.service
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f7fec1f6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/systemd/ssh@.service
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenBSD Secure Shell server per-connection daemon
+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
+After=auditd.service
+[Service]
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/default/ssh
+ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $SSHD_OPTS
+StandardInput=socket
+RuntimeDirectory=sshd
+RuntimeDirectoryMode=0755
diff --git a/debian/tests/control b/debian/tests/control
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b010ac63c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/tests/control
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+Tests: regress
+Restrictions: needs-root allow-stderr
+Depends: devscripts,
+         haveged,
+         openssh-tests,
+         openssl,
+         putty-tools,
+         python-twisted-conch,
+         sudo,
+         sysvinit-utils,
diff --git a/debian/tests/regress b/debian/tests/regress
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..8bb73ee95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/tests/regress
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+set -e
+if [ "$(id -un)" != openssh-tests ]; then
+        TMP="$ADTTMP/user"
+        CREATED_RUN_SSHD=false
+        STARTED_HAVEGED=false
+        cleanup () {
+                if $STARTED_HAVEGED; then
+                        if [ -d /run/systemd/system ] && \
+                           which systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                                systemctl disable haveged || true
+                                systemctl stop haveged || true
+                        else
+                                start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet \
+                                        --retry=TERM/30/KILL/5 \
+                                        --pidfile "$ADTTMP/haveged.pid" \
+                                        --name haveged
+                        fi
+                fi
+                rm -f /etc/sudoers.d/openssh-tests
+                if id openssh-tests >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                        deluser --remove-home openssh-tests
+                fi
+                if $CREATED_RUN_SSHD; then
+                        rm -rf /run/sshd
+                fi
+        }
+        trap cleanup EXIT
+        adduser --disabled-password --gecos 'OpenSSH tests' openssh-tests
+        cat >/etc/sudoers.d/openssh-tests <<EOF
+openssh-tests ALL = (ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
+EOF
+        chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/openssh-tests
+        mkdir -p "$TMP"
+        chown -R openssh-tests:openssh-tests "$TMP"
+        # Depending on how the environment is configured, our test
+        # dependency on openssh-server may not actually started sshd and
+        # thus may not have caused /run/sshd to be created.
+        if [ ! -d /run/sshd ]; then
+                mkdir -m755 /run/sshd
+                CREATED_RUN_SSHD=:
+        fi
+        # If we're running in a container, haveged may not have started
+        # automatically.
+        if [ -d /run/systemd/system ] && which systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                systemctl enable haveged || true
+                systemctl start haveged || true
+                STARTED_HAVEGED=:
+        elif ! pidof haveged >/dev/null; then
+                start-stop-daemon --start --quiet \
+                        --pidfile "$ADTTMP/haveged.pid" \
+                        --exec /usr/sbin/haveged -- -p "$ADTTMP/haveged.pid"
+                STARTED_HAVEGED=:
+        fi
+        sudo -u openssh-tests env TMP="$TMP" "$0" "$@"
+        exit "$?"
+fi
+annotate-output +%H:%M:%S.%N /usr/lib/openssh/regress/run-tests "$TMP"
diff --git a/debian/upstream/signing-key.asc b/debian/upstream/signing-key.asc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..974ad55f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/upstream/signing-key.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+mQGdBFKmggUBDICUNqm4cNh7tdEbwaNhbnwqLiHpILeXT6sddGI0Stz5ofB1uvIH
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+FemzwFELIBIIHNY/n/wsmxQGkI3Oj86JpOVVgR5lXWR+BrGcBjkSEyg=
+=1M/J
+-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
diff --git a/debian/watch b/debian/watch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9e2a44eb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/watch
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version=3
+opts=pgpsigurlmangle=s/$/.asc/ \
+https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-(.*)\.tar\.gz