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Diffstat (limited to 'auth-rsa.c')
-rw-r--r-- | auth-rsa.c | 349 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 349 deletions
diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c deleted file mode 100644 index cbd971be1..000000000 --- a/auth-rsa.c +++ /dev/null | |||
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1 | /* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.90 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */ | ||
2 | /* | ||
3 | * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> | ||
4 | * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland | ||
5 | * All rights reserved | ||
6 | * RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login | ||
7 | * based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check | ||
8 | * validity of the host key. | ||
9 | * | ||
10 | * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software | ||
11 | * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this | ||
12 | * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is | ||
13 | * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be | ||
14 | * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". | ||
15 | */ | ||
16 | |||
17 | #include "includes.h" | ||
18 | |||
19 | #ifdef WITH_SSH1 | ||
20 | |||
21 | #include <sys/types.h> | ||
22 | #include <sys/stat.h> | ||
23 | |||
24 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> | ||
25 | |||
26 | #include <pwd.h> | ||
27 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
28 | #include <stdarg.h> | ||
29 | #include <string.h> | ||
30 | |||
31 | #include "xmalloc.h" | ||
32 | #include "rsa.h" | ||
33 | #include "packet.h" | ||
34 | #include "ssh1.h" | ||
35 | #include "uidswap.h" | ||
36 | #include "match.h" | ||
37 | #include "buffer.h" | ||
38 | #include "pathnames.h" | ||
39 | #include "log.h" | ||
40 | #include "misc.h" | ||
41 | #include "servconf.h" | ||
42 | #include "key.h" | ||
43 | #include "auth-options.h" | ||
44 | #include "hostfile.h" | ||
45 | #include "auth.h" | ||
46 | #ifdef GSSAPI | ||
47 | #include "ssh-gss.h" | ||
48 | #endif | ||
49 | #include "monitor_wrap.h" | ||
50 | #include "ssh.h" | ||
51 | |||
52 | #include "digest.h" | ||
53 | |||
54 | /* import */ | ||
55 | extern ServerOptions options; | ||
56 | |||
57 | /* | ||
58 | * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication | ||
59 | * responses to a particular session. | ||
60 | */ | ||
61 | extern u_char session_id[16]; | ||
62 | |||
63 | /* | ||
64 | * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the | ||
65 | * following format: | ||
66 | * options bits e n comment | ||
67 | * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers, | ||
68 | * and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum | ||
69 | * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters. See sshd(8) for a | ||
70 | * description of the options. | ||
71 | */ | ||
72 | |||
73 | BIGNUM * | ||
74 | auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key) | ||
75 | { | ||
76 | BIGNUM *challenge; | ||
77 | BN_CTX *ctx; | ||
78 | |||
79 | if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) | ||
80 | fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed"); | ||
81 | /* Generate a random challenge. */ | ||
82 | if (BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0) == 0) | ||
83 | fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed"); | ||
84 | if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
85 | fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed"); | ||
86 | if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0) | ||
87 | fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed"); | ||
88 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
89 | |||
90 | return challenge; | ||
91 | } | ||
92 | |||
93 | int | ||
94 | auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) | ||
95 | { | ||
96 | u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16]; | ||
97 | struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; | ||
98 | int len; | ||
99 | |||
100 | /* don't allow short keys */ | ||
101 | if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { | ||
102 | error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits", | ||
103 | __func__, | ||
104 | BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); | ||
105 | return (0); | ||
106 | } | ||
107 | |||
108 | /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ | ||
109 | len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); | ||
110 | if (len <= 0 || len > 32) | ||
111 | fatal("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len); | ||
112 | memset(buf, 0, 32); | ||
113 | BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); | ||
114 | if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || | ||
115 | ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 || | ||
116 | ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 || | ||
117 | ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0) | ||
118 | fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); | ||
119 | ssh_digest_free(md); | ||
120 | |||
121 | /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ | ||
122 | if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { | ||
123 | /* Wrong answer. */ | ||
124 | return (0); | ||
125 | } | ||
126 | /* Correct answer. */ | ||
127 | return (1); | ||
128 | } | ||
129 | |||
130 | /* | ||
131 | * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client, | ||
132 | * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to | ||
133 | * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer. | ||
134 | */ | ||
135 | |||
136 | int | ||
137 | auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key) | ||
138 | { | ||
139 | BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge; | ||
140 | u_char response[16]; | ||
141 | int i, success; | ||
142 | |||
143 | if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) | ||
144 | fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed"); | ||
145 | |||
146 | challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key)); | ||
147 | |||
148 | /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */ | ||
149 | if (rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa) != 0) | ||
150 | fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__); | ||
151 | |||
152 | /* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */ | ||
153 | packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE); | ||
154 | packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge); | ||
155 | packet_send(); | ||
156 | BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge); | ||
157 | packet_write_wait(); | ||
158 | |||
159 | /* Wait for a response. */ | ||
160 | packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); | ||
161 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) | ||
162 | response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char(); | ||
163 | packet_check_eom(); | ||
164 | |||
165 | success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response)); | ||
166 | BN_clear_free(challenge); | ||
167 | return (success); | ||
168 | } | ||
169 | |||
170 | static int | ||
171 | rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file, | ||
172 | const BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey) | ||
173 | { | ||
174 | char *fp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; | ||
175 | int allowed = 0, bits; | ||
176 | FILE *f; | ||
177 | u_long linenum = 0; | ||
178 | Key *key; | ||
179 | |||
180 | debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file); | ||
181 | if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) | ||
182 | return 0; | ||
183 | |||
184 | /* | ||
185 | * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If | ||
186 | * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the | ||
187 | * user really has the corresponding private key. | ||
188 | */ | ||
189 | key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); | ||
190 | while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { | ||
191 | char *cp; | ||
192 | char *key_options; | ||
193 | int keybits; | ||
194 | |||
195 | /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ | ||
196 | for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) | ||
197 | ; | ||
198 | if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') | ||
199 | continue; | ||
200 | |||
201 | /* | ||
202 | * Check if there are options for this key, and if so, | ||
203 | * save their starting address and skip the option part | ||
204 | * for now. If there are no options, set the starting | ||
205 | * address to NULL. | ||
206 | */ | ||
207 | if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') { | ||
208 | int quoted = 0; | ||
209 | key_options = cp; | ||
210 | for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { | ||
211 | if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') | ||
212 | cp++; /* Skip both */ | ||
213 | else if (*cp == '"') | ||
214 | quoted = !quoted; | ||
215 | } | ||
216 | } else | ||
217 | key_options = NULL; | ||
218 | |||
219 | /* Parse the key from the line. */ | ||
220 | if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) { | ||
221 | debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax", | ||
222 | file, linenum); | ||
223 | continue; | ||
224 | } | ||
225 | /* cp now points to the comment part. */ | ||
226 | |||
227 | /* | ||
228 | * Check if the we have found the desired key (identified | ||
229 | * by its modulus). | ||
230 | */ | ||
231 | if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0) | ||
232 | continue; | ||
233 | |||
234 | /* check the real bits */ | ||
235 | keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n); | ||
236 | if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits) | ||
237 | logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: " | ||
238 | "actual %d vs. announced %d.", | ||
239 | file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); | ||
240 | |||
241 | if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, | ||
242 | SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) | ||
243 | continue; | ||
244 | debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", | ||
245 | file, linenum, key_type(key), fp); | ||
246 | free(fp); | ||
247 | |||
248 | /* Never accept a revoked key */ | ||
249 | if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) | ||
250 | break; | ||
251 | |||
252 | /* We have found the desired key. */ | ||
253 | /* | ||
254 | * If our options do not allow this key to be used, | ||
255 | * do not send challenge. | ||
256 | */ | ||
257 | if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum)) | ||
258 | continue; | ||
259 | if (key_is_cert_authority) | ||
260 | continue; | ||
261 | /* break out, this key is allowed */ | ||
262 | allowed = 1; | ||
263 | break; | ||
264 | } | ||
265 | |||
266 | /* Close the file. */ | ||
267 | fclose(f); | ||
268 | |||
269 | /* return key if allowed */ | ||
270 | if (allowed && rkey != NULL) | ||
271 | *rkey = key; | ||
272 | else | ||
273 | key_free(key); | ||
274 | |||
275 | return allowed; | ||
276 | } | ||
277 | |||
278 | /* | ||
279 | * check if there's user key matching client_n, | ||
280 | * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise | ||
281 | */ | ||
282 | |||
283 | int | ||
284 | auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey) | ||
285 | { | ||
286 | char *file; | ||
287 | u_int i, allowed = 0; | ||
288 | |||
289 | temporarily_use_uid(pw); | ||
290 | |||
291 | for (i = 0; !allowed && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { | ||
292 | if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0) | ||
293 | continue; | ||
294 | file = expand_authorized_keys( | ||
295 | options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); | ||
296 | allowed = rsa_key_allowed_in_file(pw, file, client_n, rkey); | ||
297 | free(file); | ||
298 | } | ||
299 | |||
300 | restore_uid(); | ||
301 | |||
302 | return allowed; | ||
303 | } | ||
304 | |||
305 | /* | ||
306 | * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns | ||
307 | * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was | ||
308 | * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation. | ||
309 | */ | ||
310 | int | ||
311 | auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n) | ||
312 | { | ||
313 | Key *key; | ||
314 | struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; | ||
315 | |||
316 | /* no user given */ | ||
317 | if (!authctxt->valid) | ||
318 | return 0; | ||
319 | |||
320 | if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) { | ||
321 | auth_clear_options(); | ||
322 | return (0); | ||
323 | } | ||
324 | |||
325 | /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */ | ||
326 | if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) { | ||
327 | /* Wrong response. */ | ||
328 | verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge."); | ||
329 | packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge."); | ||
330 | /* | ||
331 | * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send | ||
332 | * another challenge and break the protocol. | ||
333 | */ | ||
334 | key_free(key); | ||
335 | return (0); | ||
336 | } | ||
337 | /* | ||
338 | * Correct response. The client has been successfully | ||
339 | * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the | ||
340 | * options; this will be reset if the options cause the | ||
341 | * authentication to be rejected. | ||
342 | */ | ||
343 | pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); | ||
344 | |||
345 | packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted."); | ||
346 | return (1); | ||
347 | } | ||
348 | |||
349 | #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ | ||